OSHA Lacks § 8(c)(2) Authority to Require Employer Recording of Work-Related Mental Illnesses (Vacatur of 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix))

Case: Exxon Mobil Corp v. OSHCC
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Date: July 21, 2026

I. Introduction

This petition for review arose after a catastrophic December 2021 explosion and fire at ExxonMobil’s Baytown, Texas refinery and a subsequent OSHA recordkeeping enforcement action. A process technician (“Employee 2”) who assisted in emergency response was later diagnosed with PTSD by multiple providers. Exxon declined to record the PTSD on OSHA Forms 300 and 301, disputing provider qualifications and work-relatedness, and ultimately relied on a reviewing physician’s opinion that the PTSD was not work-related.

OSHA cited Exxon for failing to record a work-related “mental illness” under 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix). After an ALJ affirmed the citation (and a modest penalty), the case reached the Fifth Circuit. The court framed the dispositive issue as one of statutory authorization: whether OSHA may, under 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) (OSH Act § 8(c)(2)), require employers to record employees’ work-related mental illnesses.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit granted Exxon’s petition for review and held that OSHA lacked statutory authority under 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) to mandate recording of work-related mental illnesses. The court concluded that, in this provision, “illnesses” is best read as limited to physical ailments, not mental conditions.

As a remedy, the court (1) vacated OSHA’s mental-illness recordkeeping rule, 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix), and (2) set aside Exxon’s citation and penalty.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.(NFIB) v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109 (2022)
    The court used NFIB for the foundational principle that agencies are “creatures of statute” and therefore must act within delegated authority—setting the tone for a delegation-and-limits analysis rather than a policy-balancing inquiry.
  • Inhance Techs., L.L.C. v. EPA, 96 F.4th 888 (5th Cir. 2024)
    Cited for the Fifth Circuit’s insistence that an agency “must point to explicit Congressional authority.” This case supplied the burden/stance of skepticism applied to OSHA’s claimed power where the statute is silent or unclear.
  • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)
    The court treated Loper Bright as controlling the interpretive method: courts must exercise “independent judgment” on whether an agency acted within statutory authority and must arrive at the “best” reading of the statute—rejecting the idea that a merely “permissible” agency reading suffices.
  • Mayfield v. Dep't of Lab., 117 F.4th 611 (5th Cir. 2024)
    Used to operationalize Loper Bright in the Fifth Circuit: apply “all relevant interpretive tools,” identify delegations, and police their “outer boundaries.” The opinion repeatedly returns to “best reading” and “outer boundaries” as the decision rule.
  • United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762 (2023) and Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024)
    These cases supplied general textualist canons: context resolves multiple plausible meanings (Hansen), and associated-words reasoning informs meaning (Fischer). They supported the court’s move from “illness” in the abstract to “illnesses” as situated next to “injuries” and “first aid” exclusions.
  • United States v. Koutsostamatis, 956 F.3d 301 (5th Cir. 2020)
    Cited for noscitur a sociis (a word is known by its neighbors), supporting the inference that “injuries and illnesses” in § 657(c)(2) travel together in meaning and are best read in the same physical-harm register.
  • Restaurant Law Ctr. v. Dep't of Lab., 120 F.4th 163 (5th Cir. 2024)
    Used for reliance on contemporaneous dictionary definitions as evidence of ordinary meaning at enactment. This bolstered the court’s argument that circa-1970 “illness” definitions skew physical and do not clearly include mental conditions.
  • Int'l MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994)
    Used to discount OSHA’s reliance on a lone Webster’s Third definition (“condition of body or mind”). The Fifth Circuit analogized to Int’l MCI, where the Supreme Court resisted treating Webster’s Third as sufficient to establish ambiguity justifying agency latitude.
  • Matter of DeBerry, 945 F.3d 943 (5th Cir. 2019)
    Cited for the proposition that legislative history is “not law.” This supported the court’s refusal to let snippets of history expand the statutory text of § 657(c)(2).
  • RadLAX Gateway Hotel, L.L.C. v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639 (2012) (quoting Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992))
    Provided the “specific governs the general” canon. The court used it to reject OSHA’s reliance on the OSH Act’s broad purpose clause to enlarge OSHA’s narrower recordkeeping delegation in § 657(c)(2).

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is a layered “best reading” analysis constrained by delegation limits:

  1. Identify the claimed delegation: OSHA relied on § 657(c)(2), authorizing regulations requiring employers to keep records of “work-related deaths, injuries and illnesses” (excluding minor injuries requiring only first aid, etc.).
  2. Textual-context analysis: The court found that the statutory neighbors of “illnesses” push toward a physical reading:
    • “Injuries” and “illnesses” are conjoined, suggesting similar character; the carveout speaks in physical terms (first aid, loss of consciousness, restriction of work or motion, transfer).
    • The “minor injuries requiring only first aid” carveout does not naturally map onto mental health conditions, making OSHA’s “physical + mental” reading harder to reconcile with Congress’s chosen thresholds and examples.
  3. Structural reading of § 657(c)(1)–(3): The broader recordkeeping and exposure provisions focus on physical hazards (toxic materials, harmful physical agents). The inspection regime in § 657(a) enumerates workplace “conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and materials”—again pointing to physical dangers.
  4. Ordinary meaning at enactment: The court surveyed contemporaneous dictionaries and concluded they do not clearly include mental illness within “illness,” and that “mental illness” (where defined) tended to be treated separately (e.g., linked to “insanity”), undermining OSHA’s reading.
  5. Reject extratextual expansion:
    • Legislative history: not controlling and, in any event, not specific to the definitional question of “illnesses” in § 657(c)(2).
    • Purpose clause: the general goal of “safe and healthful working conditions” cannot override the specific limitations of a particular delegation.
  6. Conclusion on authority and remedy: Because OSHA’s mental-illness recordkeeping mandate fell outside § 657(c)(2)’s “outer boundaries,” the court vacated the regulation itself and set aside the citation and penalty.

C. Impact

  • Immediate regulatory consequence (within the Fifth Circuit and potentially beyond): The opinion’s vacatur of 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix) eliminates OSHA’s ability (under this rule) to require employers to record employee-reported work-related mental illnesses. The decision invites challenges to any OSHA enforcement that depends on that rule’s validity.
  • Delegation-limiting template post-Loper Bright: The court models a strict “best reading” approach: even if OSHA’s interpretation is “plausible,” it fails if not the best reading. This raises the bar for OSHA (and other agencies) to defend expansive readings of older statutory text.
  • Shift to Congress for mental-health recordkeeping: The opinion signals that workplace mental-health recordkeeping of the type at issue may require a clearer statutory amendment or a different statutory hook—rather than relying on § 8(c)(2)’s general recordkeeping language.
  • Practical employer effects: Employers may see reduced federal recordkeeping exposure for mental-health diagnoses tied to work events (at least under this particular OSHA authority), though other legal regimes (workers’ compensation, disability law, leave laws, confidentiality/privacy obligations, collective bargaining) can still drive documentation and reporting practices.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Independent judgment” review (post-Loper Bright): Courts do not accept an agency’s interpretation merely because it is reasonable; they decide what interpretation is best using standard tools of statutory interpretation.
  • Delegation and “outer boundaries”: Congress gives agencies power in defined zones. An agency rule is invalid if it crosses the boundary of what Congress actually authorized—even if the rule seems beneficial.
  • Noscitur a sociis: A word’s meaning is informed by nearby words. Here, “illnesses” is read in light of “injuries” and “first aid” concepts that are predominantly physical.
  • “Specific governs the general”: Broad statutory purposes (“safe and healthful working conditions”) cannot expand a narrower, specific grant of authority (the particular recordkeeping authorization in § 657(c)(2)).
  • Vacatur: Rather than merely stopping enforcement against a single party, the court nullified the regulation itself, removing it from the body of valid agency rules (as the court framed the remedy).

V. Conclusion

Exxon Mobil Corp v. OSHCC establishes a clear Fifth Circuit rule: OSHA’s § 8(c)(2) recordkeeping authority does not extend to requiring employers to record work-related mental illnesses, because the best reading of “illnesses” in 29 U.S.C. § 657(c)(2) is limited to physical ailments. Relying on textual context, statutory structure, contemporaneous ordinary meaning, and post-Loper Bright “best reading” review, the court held OSHA exceeded its delegated power—then responded with a sweeping remedy by vacating 29 C.F.R. § 1904.5(b)(2)(ix) and setting aside Exxon’s citation and penalty.