No Additional Improvement Period Absent Substantial Change; New Domestic-Violence Conviction and Out-of-State Home Incarceration Support Termination (In re R.L.)

Introduction

Case: In re R.L., No. 25-38 (W. Va. Mar. 3, 2026) (memorandum decision).
Parties: Petitioner Father (T.L.) appealed the Wayne County Circuit Court’s order terminating his parental rights to R.L. The West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) and the child’s Guardian ad Litem supported affirmance.
Core issues: (1) Whether the circuit court erred in denying Father a further improvement period after he had already received (and failed) one; and (2) whether termination was proper where Father had a prior involuntary termination, new domestic-violence felony conduct, inability to return to West Virginia due to Indiana home incarceration, and ongoing non-support and lack of bonding.

The opinion follows an earlier appeal in the same matter, in which the Supreme Court of Appeals vacated prior adjudicatory and dispositional orders because the circuit court did not make sufficient adjudicatory findings, and remanded for a new adjudication. After remand, DHS filed an amended petition detailing the grounds for Father’s prior termination and alleging additional, intervening criminal conduct.

Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the December 17, 2024, termination order. It held that Father was not entitled to an additional improvement period because he failed to show the statutorily required substantial change in circumstances and failed to establish he was likely to fully participate. The record instead showed deterioration: Father pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence against the child’s mother while the prior appeal was pending and was sentenced to three years of home incarceration in Indiana, making him unable to leave the state to engage meaningfully in services or establish a relationship with the child.

The Court also rejected Father’s challenge to termination premised on the denied improvement period. The circuit court’s unchallenged findings—no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect could be corrected in the near future and termination was necessary for the child’s welfare—authorized termination under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • In re R.L., No. 23-223, 2024 WL 2946237 (W. Va. June 10, 2024) (memorandum decision)
    Role in this decision: The earlier In re R.L. appeal provides the procedural posture and underscores the Court’s insistence on adequate adjudicatory findings. The 2026 decision implicitly contrasts the earlier deficiency with the post-remand record: DHS pleaded and developed the basis for the prior termination, and Father stipulated to aggravated circumstances and other neglect-related grounds, enabling the circuit court to make findings sufficient to withstand appellate review.
  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
    Rule supplied: Appellate standard of review in abuse and neglect cases—factual findings reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions reviewed de novo.
    Role in this decision: The Court’s affirmance is anchored in deference to the circuit court’s factfinding about Father’s inability to participate (home incarceration), ongoing non-support, lack of cooperation, and the weight of new domestic-violence conduct—none of which the Court found clearly erroneous.
  • In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)
    Rule supplied: Circuit courts have discretion to deny an improvement period when no improvement is likely.
    Role in this decision: The Court used Tonjia M. to validate the circuit court’s predictive judgment: Father’s history of noncompliance, together with new felony domestic violence and interstate confinement restrictions, supported the conclusion that an additional improvement period would not likely yield improvement.

Legal Reasoning

The decision’s central legal move is the Court’s application of West Virginia’s statutory gatekeeping for additional improvement periods. Because Father previously received a post-adjudicatory improvement period earlier in the case, his later request—styled as “post-adjudicatory”—was treated as a request for an additional period governed by W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(3)(D).

Under that statute, an additional improvement period requires proof of two linked propositions:

  1. A substantial change in circumstances since the initial improvement period; and
  2. Because of that change, the parent is likely to fully participate in the improvement period.

The Court emphasized what Father did not do: he did not meaningfully argue substantial change; he primarily relied on his own assertion that he would comply. The Court treated that as inadequate in light of the record and the statute’s structure, which contemplates an objective showing (and not mere assurances) that circumstances have materially improved such that participation and remediation are realistically probable.

The Court then highlighted affirmative evidence cutting against Father:

  • Intervening felony domestic violence against the child’s mother during the pendency of the prior appeal;
  • Indiana home incarceration for three years, barring him from leaving Indiana—an operational barrier to in-person services, visitation, and bonding;
  • Continuation of prior-proceeding behaviors (non-support, lack of effort, dishonesty about the relationship with the mother as referenced in the amended petition and testimony);
  • Failure to financially support the child despite employment.

This set of facts allowed the circuit court to conclude not merely that Father failed to show “substantial change,” but that his circumstances deteriorated. That reasoning matters: it shows the Court views § 49-4-610(3)(D) as a comparative inquiry (then versus now), and deterioration is the opposite of what the statute requires.

On termination, the Court’s reasoning is deliberately straightforward. It notes Father did not challenge the dispositive statutory findings: (1) no reasonable likelihood the conditions of neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future, and (2) termination is necessary for the child’s welfare. Those findings authorize termination under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), and the Court refused to repackage the termination issue as merely a dispute over an improvement period.

Impact

Although a memorandum decision, In re R.L. provides practical guidance to litigants and circuit courts in abuse-and-neglect cases:

  • “Substantial change” is a real evidentiary burden. A parent seeking an additional improvement period must articulate and prove concrete, favorable changes since the last period; conclusory testimony is unlikely to suffice.
  • New criminal conduct—especially domestic violence—can be dispositive against improvement. The Court treated Father’s recent felony domestic violence as powerful evidence that circumstances worsened and that a child’s safety and welfare concerns intensified.
  • Practical ability to participate matters. The opinion underscores that legal or logistical restraints (here, out-of-state home incarceration) can justify denial where they prevent meaningful engagement in services and relationship-building.
  • Termination review will be narrow when key findings are unchallenged. By noting Father did not contest the “no reasonable likelihood” and “necessary for welfare” findings, the Court signals that appeals focusing only on improvement-period denial may fail if those statutory predicates stand.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication decides whether the parent committed abuse/neglect (or related statutory grounds). Disposition decides the remedy—services, placement, improvement periods, or termination.
  • Improvement period: A court-supervised window for a parent to complete services (e.g., parenting, counseling, visitation) to remedy conditions of abuse/neglect. A second (additional) improvement period requires heightened proof under § 49-4-610(3)(D).
  • Aggravated circumstances: Serious statutory factors (including a prior involuntary termination) that weigh against reunification efforts and can support more expedited permanency decisions.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” finding: A determination that the parent is unlikely to correct the problems in the near future—often based on patterns of behavior, failure to benefit from services, and ongoing instability or violence.
  • Standard of review (clear error / de novo): Appellate courts rarely disturb factual findings unless clearly wrong; legal questions are reviewed anew. This makes well-supported circuit court findings particularly resilient on appeal.

Conclusion

In re R.L. reinforces a stringent, evidence-based approach to requests for additional improvement periods: a parent must prove a substantial, positive change in circumstances and a realistic likelihood of full participation, not merely promise compliance. The Court also confirms that intervening felony domestic violence and constraints that prevent meaningful participation (such as out-of-state home incarceration) can support denial of further reunification opportunities and strengthen the case for termination—especially where statutory termination findings under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) are made and left unchallenged.