Nevada Recognizes Enforceable Contractual Waiver of the Statute-of-Limitations Defense

1. Introduction

In MMV INVS. LLC v. DRIBBLE DUNK, LLC, 141 Nev., Advance Opinion 13 (Mar. 13, 2025), the Supreme Court of Nevada addressed whether a guarantor can be held liable on a guaranty even when the lender’s direct contract claims against the principal borrowers are time-barred—where the guaranty expressly states that the guarantor remains liable “regardless of whether recovery… may be or hereafter become barred or otherwise unenforceable.”

The parties were appellant MMV Investments LLC (lender) and respondents Dribble Dunk LLC and All Net, LLC (borrowers), plus Jackie L. Robinson (owner and personal guarantor). After respondents defaulted on loans made between 2010 and 2012, MMV sued in 2021. Respondents moved to dismiss on limitations grounds, and the district court dismissed, including the guaranty claim on the theory that the guaranty was “void” because the underlying obligations were time-barred.

The appeal presented two core issues: (1) whether Nevada law permits a party to contractually waive a statute-of-limitations defense (particularly in a guaranty), and (2) whether Robinson’s June 2021 email revived or tolled the limitations period under NRS 11.390.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

  • Reversed: Dismissal of MMV’s breach-of-guaranty claim against Robinson. The court held that a party may contractually waive a statute-of-limitations defense, and Robinson’s guaranty language did so.
  • Affirmed: Dismissal of MMV’s breach-of-contract claims against Dribble Dunk and All Net as time-barred under NRS 11.190(1)(b), rejecting MMV’s argument that the June 2021 email revived the claims under NRS 11.390.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Procedural and review standards

  • Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of North Las Vegas, 124 Nev. 224, 228, 181 P.3d 670, 672 (2008): Provided the de novo standard of review for dismissal and the rule that factual allegations are accepted as true. This framed the court’s posture: the question was legal viability, not factfinding.
  • Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Stewart Venture, LLC, 129 Nev. 181, 186, 300 P.3d 124, 128 (2013) (quoting Bemis v. Estate of Bemis, 114 Nev. 1021, 1024, 967 P.2d 437, 439 (1999)): Reinforced that dismissal is proper when a claim is barred by the statute of limitations—supporting affirmance of the time-bar ruling against the borrower entities.
  • State v. Stu's Bail Bonds, 115 Nev. 436, 436 n.1, 991 P.2d 469, 470 n.1 (1999): Not substantive to limitations doctrine, but important to the appellate context. It explained why the corporate entities’ failure to appear through counsel left the court to decide based on MMV’s submissions and Robinson’s pro se posture.

2) Statute-of-limitations waiver and contract enforcement

  • NRCP 8(c)(1)(R) and Williams v. Cottonwood Cove Dev. Co., 96 Nev. 857, 860, 619 P.2d 1219, 1221 (1980): These authorities were the linchpin for the court’s new rule. Because the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that can be waived by failure to timely assert it in litigation, the court reasoned that waiver is not inherently against Nevada public policy—and thus can also be waived by contract.
  • Kaldi v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 117 Nev. 273, 278, 21 P.3d 16, 20 (2001) (quoting Ellison v. C.S.A.A., 106 Nev. 601, 603, 797 P.2d 975, 977 (1990)): Supplied Nevada’s general contract principle: absent a countervailing reason, contracts are enforced as written. The court used this as a normative foundation to reject a judicially created public-policy bar to limitations waivers.

3) Majority rule elsewhere (and minority alignment)

  • 31 Williston on Contracts § 79:113 (4th ed. 2024) and Umpqua Bank v. Gunzel, 483 P.3d 796 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021): The court acknowledged that “the substantial majority of jurisdictions” treat contractual statute-of-limitations waivers as unenforceable on public-policy grounds (comfort to defendants; avoidance of stale-claim adjudication), but it declined to adopt that approach for Nevada.
  • Salmon Prot. & Watershed Network v. County of Marin, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 290, 296 (Ct. App. 2012), quoting Brownrigg v. deFrees, 196 Cal. 534, 541 (1925): Provided persuasive authority for the minority view that limitations protection is a personal privilege that may be waived. Nevada aligned itself with this conception.

4) Revival/tolling by acknowledgment under NRS 11.390

  • Wilcox v. Williams, 5 Nev. 206, 209 (1869): Controlled the NRS 11.390 analysis by articulating the stringent standard—an acknowledgment must be “clear, explicit, or direct” to restart or revive the limitations period. The court applied this to conclude Robinson’s email was too conditional and forward-looking to qualify.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The new Nevada rule: contractual waiver of limitations defenses is enforceable

The district court treated the guaranty as “void” because the underlying claims were time-barred. The Supreme Court rejected that premise because the guaranty expressly contemplated exactly that risk: Robinson guaranteed payment even if recovery on the obligations became “barred or otherwise unenforceable.”

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  1. The statute of limitations is a waivable affirmative defense in Nevada litigation. (NRCP 8(c)(1)(R); Williams v. Cottonwood Cove Dev. Co.)
  2. If waiver by litigation conduct is not against public policy, waiver by contract should not be treated differently absent a legislative prohibition or a strong public-policy justification.
  3. Nevada’s contract-enforcement policy favors honoring clear written terms. (Kaldi/Ellison) With no identified Nevada authority barring these clauses, the guaranty’s waiver term was enforced.

Importantly, the court did not cabin the holding to guaranties; it stated broadly that “a party may contractually waive a statute-of-limitations defense,” positioning the decision as a general Nevada contract principle.

2) Limits on debt “revival”: the email did not restart time

MMV argued that Robinson’s June 2021 email—expressing a “plan” and “anticipat[ion]” to pay investors upon receiving future loan proceeds—revived the debt under NRS 11.390. Applying Wilcox v. Williams, the court held the email lacked the required “clear, explicit, or direct” promise or acknowledgment. As a result, MMV’s direct contract claims against Dribble Dunk and All Net remained barred by NRS 11.190(1)(b)’s six-year period.

C. Impact

  • Contract drafting in Nevada will change immediately: lenders, landlords, and other creditors are likely to add explicit limitations waivers in guaranties and other payment undertakings, attempting to preserve enforcement even after the primary claim is time-barred.
  • Guaranty litigation may decouple from borrower limitations defenses: even when the borrower can successfully assert limitations, a guarantor may remain exposed if the guaranty includes the kind of “barred or otherwise unenforceable” language upheld here.
  • Public-policy and legislative response risk: because the court acknowledged Nevada is adopting a minority approach, the Legislature could respond by restricting or regulating contractual waivers (e.g., consumer contexts, employment, or caps on waiver duration).
  • Future doctrinal questions: the opinion leaves room for later disputes about unconscionability, adhesion contracts, scope/clarity requirements for waiver language, and whether certain statutory limitation schemes are nonwaivable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Statute of limitations: a deadline for filing a lawsuit. After the deadline passes, the claim is not automatically erased—but the defendant can defeat it by raising the defense.
  • Affirmative defense: a defense the defendant must assert (plead) to benefit from it. If not asserted, it is typically waived—meaning the defendant loses the protection.
  • Contractual waiver of limitations: a pre-lawsuit agreement where a party promises not to rely on the limitations defense. This opinion holds such a promise is enforceable in Nevada, absent some other legal problem with the contract.
  • Guaranty: a separate promise by a guarantor to pay if the borrower does not. A guaranty can include terms expanding the guarantor’s exposure beyond what the borrower owes or can be sued for—if enforceable under contract law.
  • Revival/tolling by acknowledgment (NRS 11.390): in some situations, a debtor’s clear, direct acknowledgment or promise can restart the limitations clock. Vague assurances or conditional plans generally do not qualify.

5. Conclusion

MMV INVS. LLC v. DRIBBLE DUNK, LLC establishes a significant Nevada precedent: statute-of-limitations defenses may be waived by contract, and courts will enforce clear written waiver language absent a legislative prohibition or compelling public-policy bar. At the same time, the court reaffirmed that reviving a time-barred debt under NRS 11.390 requires a “clear, explicit, or direct” acknowledgment, and optimistic or conditional payment statements will not suffice. The combined effect is to strengthen carefully drafted guaranties while keeping strict limits on informal “revival” arguments.