Minor IDRS Transcript Errors Do Not Defeat Admissibility or Create a Genuine Dispute Over Installment-Agreement Termination

Introduction

In United States v. Albert Boufarah (3d Cir. Mar. 2, 2026) (not precedential), the Government sued to reduce to judgment Boufarah’s unpaid federal income-tax liabilities for tax years 2009 through 2013. The key dispute was procedural rather than computational: whether the suit was filed prematurely because an IRS installment agreement allegedly remained “in effect,” and whether the Government’s proof of assessments—IRS account transcripts, TXMODA transcripts, and Forms 4340—was admissible despite acknowledged erroneous entries in the IRS’s Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS) records.

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the Government, holding (1) no reasonable jury could find an installment agreement remained in effect when the complaint was filed, and (2) the transcripts were admissible under Federal Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 803(8) because the identified errors were too few and unrelated to the assessment calculations to establish “lack of trustworthiness.”

Summary of the Opinion

  • Installment agreement termination / prematurity: Although Boufarah pointed to a July 18, 2022 “installment agreement terminated” notation on 2009 transcripts, the record showed the agreement had effectively terminated months earlier after a June 2021 CP523 default notice went unanswered, and subsequent communications in October 2021 sought a “new” agreement.
  • Admissibility of transcripts: The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting IRS transcripts under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) and 803(8) notwithstanding several erroneous notations, because those errors did not impugn the transcripts’ reliability for the purpose offered—proving assessments.
  • Disposition: Summary judgment for the Government was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Summary judgment standards and evidentiary review

  • Jean-Paul Weg LLC v. Dir. of New Jersey Div. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 133 F.4th 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2025): Cited for the de novo review standard for summary judgment and the requirement that courts view facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. The Boufarah panel used this framework but emphasized that, even under that favorable view, the evidentiary record could not support Boufarah’s theory.
  • Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014): Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for evidentiary rulings underlying summary judgment—disturbing them only if “no reasonable person” would adopt the district court’s view. This deferential lens mattered for Boufarah’s hearsay/trustworthiness attack on IRS transcripts.
  • SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183, 204 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)): The “mere scintilla of evidence” formulation was central to rejecting Boufarah’s reliance on a single inconsistent notation. The panel treated the July 18 entry as exactly the kind of thin, isolated datum that cannot create a triable dispute in the face of a contrary record.

2) Tax assessment proof and burden shifting

  • Psaty v. United States, 442 F.2d 1154, 1160 (3d Cir. 1971): The court invoked Psaty’s burden-shifting rule: once the Government offers proof of assessments, the taxpayer must show by a preponderance that the assessments are erroneous. Boufarah attempted to short-circuit that shift by arguing the Government’s assessment proof was inadmissible.

3) Admissibility of IRS transcripts and reliability

  • Perez v. United States, 312 F.3d 191, 195 & nn. 14, 15 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), and United States v. Meyer, 914 F.3d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 2019): Cited for the widespread acceptance of Forms 4340 as admissible proof of assessments in tax-collection litigation. The Third Circuit used these authorities to situate the district court’s ruling within the mainstream approach.
  • United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 909-10 (3d Cir. 1991): Used by analogy to reinforce that a record’s trustworthiness must be evaluated in light of the purpose for which it is offered. Here, the erroneous notations concerned installment-agreement status/date entries rather than the calculation of assessments, which was the evidentiary point in dispute.

Legal Reasoning

A) Installment agreements bar collection suits only while “in effect”

The court began from the statutory premise that the Government may not sue to collect unpaid assessments while an installment agreement is in effect. It cited 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(k)(2)(C), (3)(A) for that prohibition. Boufarah’s factual theory was narrow: the July 18, 2022 notation on the 2009 transcript could allow a jury to infer the agreement remained active on July 8, 2022 (the complaint date).

The panel rejected that inference as unreasonable when placed in the full evidentiary context:

  • Boufarah did not dispute receiving a CP523 default notice the week of June 14, 2021, nor that he failed to respond. Under 26 U.S.C. § 6159(b)(5)(A), the notice warned termination would occur after 30 days absent action.
  • TXMODA transcripts for 2009 and 2010 showed “balance due” entries dated September 13—about 90 days after the default notice—consistent with the IRS’s internal timing (30 days notice + mailing + appeal period under 26 C.F.R. § 301.6159-1(e)(5) plus mailing).
  • Boufarah’s own conduct undermined the “still active” claim: in October 2021 his attorney contacted the IRS to request a new installment plan, and the parties attempted to finalize one for months—behavior inconsistent with an existing effective agreement.
  • The court accepted the Government’s explanation (via Revenue Officer Troichuk) that IDRS sometimes fails to log the termination at the expected time, and that the July 18 “termination” entry appeared only because the system, on the limitations-date it had recorded for 2009, performed automated actions that led to a termination entry for that year alone. If termination had actually occurred on July 18, it would have appeared across transcripts for all covered years, not solely 2009.

Applying SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ. and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., the court treated the lone July 18 entry as a “mere scintilla” insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.

B) IRS transcripts were admissible despite some errors

Boufarah’s evidentiary argument acknowledged the transcripts were hearsay but contested admissibility on “trustworthiness” grounds. The district court admitted them under the business-records and public-records exceptions—Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) and 803(8)—each of which excludes records if the opponent shows circumstances indicating “lack of trustworthiness” (Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(E), (8)(B)).

The Third Circuit held it was not an abuse of discretion to find the records trustworthy even with several incorrect notations, for three reasons:

  1. Institutional acceptance: Courts routinely admit IDRS-derived records, especially Form 4340, in collection suits, supported by Perez v. United States and United States v. Meyer.
  2. Purpose-specific reliability: The errors concerned installment-agreement status and certain dated transactions, not the amount or computation of the assessments. Following the logic reflected in United States v. Casoni, the relevant trustworthiness inquiry was whether the transcripts reliably evidenced assessments.
  3. Expected noise in long-running accounts: The record showed IDRS logs both manual and automatic entries and may include erroneous entries that are subsequently reversed; a few errors in a decade-long collection history did not reasonably impeach the entire set of assessment records.

With admissible assessment proof in the record, the Psaty v. United States burden shift operated as normal; Boufarah’s attack did not raise a triable issue that the assessments themselves were erroneous.

Impact

Although designated “not precedential,” the decision is likely to be persuasive in routine federal tax-collection litigation within the Third Circuit in two recurring contexts:

  • Installment-agreement litigation defenses: Taxpayers may attempt to defeat collection suits by pointing to isolated transcript codes suggesting an agreement remained active. Boufarah signals that courts will look to the total record—default notices, the taxpayer’s responsive actions, and transcript patterns across years—rather than treating a single coding anomaly as creating a genuine dispute.
  • Transcript admissibility challenges: The opinion reinforces that “trustworthiness” objections under Rules 803(6) and 803(8) require more than demonstrating some clerical or system errors; the challenger must tie inaccuracies to the reliability of the records for the specific fact they are offered to prove (here, assessments).

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Installment agreement: A payment plan the IRS agrees to; while it is “in effect,” certain collection actions—including suing to collect— are restricted by statute.
  • CP523 notice of default: The IRS letter warning that a taxpayer has defaulted and that the installment agreement will be terminated if the taxpayer does not cure within the notice period.
  • IDRS / TXMODA / account transcript / Form 4340: IDRS is the IRS database; TXMODA is a detailed module transcript; “account transcripts” provide plain-language event summaries; Form 4340 is a certified “Certificate of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters.”
  • Summary judgment: A case-ending ruling when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; a “scintilla” of evidence is not enough to force a trial.
  • Hearsay exceptions (Rules 803(6) and 803(8)) and “trustworthiness”: Business and public records can be admissible despite being hearsay, unless circumstances show the records are unreliable. Minor errors do not automatically render the entire record untrustworthy.

Conclusion

United States v. Albert Boufarah affirms two practical rules in federal tax-collection practice: (1) a taxpayer cannot manufacture a trial issue about an installment agreement’s continued existence by isolating a single transcript notation when the surrounding record shows termination after a default notice and nonresponse; and (2) IRS transcripts—including account transcripts and Forms 4340—remain admissible under Rules 803(6) and 803(8) despite minor, explainable IDRS errors, particularly when those errors do not bear on the assessment amounts the Government must prove. The opinion thus strengthens the Government’s ability to obtain summary judgment in collection suits when taxpayers rely on transcript anomalies rather than substantive evidence that the assessments are wrong.