LHWCA § 20(a) “Harm” Includes Respiratory Symptoms Without a Definitive Diagnosis; Fee Challenges Are Waived Without Record Support

Case: Jeffboat, Incorporated v. Director, OWCP (7th Cir. June 23, 2026)  |  Statute: Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (33 U.S.C. §§ 902(2), 903(a), 904(a), 908(c)(23), 920(a))

1. Introduction

This petition for review arose from a Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (“LHWCA”) claim filed by Calvin F. Chaffers, a longtime shipyard painter at Jeffboat, Inc., alleging breathing difficulties after years of exposure to paint fumes, sandblasting materials, and other irritants. Jeffboat, Inc. and its insurer, American Longshore Mutual Association, Ltd. (collectively, “Jeffboat”), disputed compensability and the extent of disability.

After a formal hearing, a Department of Labor Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) awarded permanent partial disability and medical benefits. The Office of the District Director later awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to claimant’s counsel. The Benefits Review Board affirmed both.

The Seventh Circuit addressed two central issues:

• Whether Chaffers met the threshold to invoke the LHWCA’s causation presumption under § 20(a) (33 U.S.C. § 920(a)), and whether substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s ultimate causation and disability findings after rebuttal.
• Whether Jeffboat preserved and adequately supported its challenge to the District Director’s fee award on appeal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court denied Jeffboat’s petition and affirmed the Benefits Review Board. It held:

• § 20(a) presumption: Chaffers met the “light” prima facie showing to invoke the presumption by presenting “some evidence” of harm and workplace conditions that could have caused it. Respiratory symptoms (cough and shortness of breath) constitute “harm,” and a claimant need not prove a specific disease label at the prima facie stage.
• Merits after rebuttal: Even though Jeffboat rebutted the presumption with its expert’s contrary view, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding—on the record as a whole—that workplace exposures caused or contributed to Chaffers’ pulmonary impairment. The court emphasized it cannot reweigh medical evidence or second-guess credibility determinations.
• Disability classification: The ALJ permissibly found permanent partial disability and used the AMA Guides-based impairment rating under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(23).
• Fee challenge waived: Jeffboat waived its fee objections by failing to provide the record materials necessary for review and by failing to develop an argument supported by legal authority, as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A).

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. The § 20(a) presumption framework

The court grounded the decision in the Seventh Circuit’s established § 20(a) burden-shifting approach described in Am. Grain Trimmers, Inc. v. OWCP, 181 F.3d 810 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc), and reiterated in Marinette Marine Corp. v. OWCP, 431 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2005). These cases supply the operative structure:

• Prima facie: claimant shows (1) harm; (2) workplace conditions that could have caused the harm. (Am. Grain Trimmers, Inc. v. OWCP)
• Rebuttal: employer rebuts with “substantial evidence to the contrary.” (Marinette Marine Corp. v. OWCP quoting Am. Grain Trimmers, Inc. v. OWCP)
• Record as a whole: if rebutted, presumption drops out and claimant must prove causation by a preponderance. (Marinette Marine Corp. v. OWCP)

B. Appellate review: “substantial evidence” and deference to ALJs

The opinion’s deference theme rests on:

• Consolidation Coal Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 129 F.4th 409 (7th Cir. 2025) (standard of review; “threshold ... is not high”);
• Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019) (substantial evidence threshold);
• Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938) (classic definition of substantial evidence);
• Roberts & Schaefer Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 400 F.3d 992 (7th Cir. 2005) (no reweighing, no credibility do-overs);
• Summers v. Freeman United Coal Mining Co., 14 F.3d 1220 (7th Cir. 1994) (ALJ’s province to resolve conflicts; appellate court cannot substitute inferences);
• Bunge Corp. v. Carlisle, 227 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2000) (ensure ALJ considered relevant evidence and did not substitute judgment for experts; disability classification principles).

C. What counts as “harm” (injury) under the Act

A key move in the court’s reasoning is to treat “injury” broadly. It cited a Benefits Review Board decision and the line of authority it collects:

• Rose v. Vectrus Sys. Corp., BRB No. 20-0279, 2023 WL 111367 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 2023) (en banc) (“some evidence” is a light burden; credibility not weighed at prima facie stage);
• Brown v. I.T.T./Continental Baking Co., 921 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1990) and Albina Engine & Mach. v. Dir., OWCP, 627 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 2010) (supporting the low threshold concept);
• Psalidas v. Core Lab'ys, BRB No. 02-0687, 2003 WL 26100032 (Ben. Rev. Bd. June 30, 2003), citing Wheatley v. Adler, 407 F.2d 307 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Crawford v. Dir., OWCP, 932 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1991); and Romeike v. Kaiser Shipyards, 22 BRBS 57 (Ben. Rev. Bd. 1989), for the proposition that a claimant need not prove a specific illness—only that “something has gone wrong with the human frame.”

By using these authorities, the Seventh Circuit reinforced that symptoms such as cough and shortness of breath can themselves satisfy “harm,” even amidst diagnostic disagreement.

D. The aggravation principle

To address Jeffboat’s emphasis on smoking and comorbidities, the court invoked:

• Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Dir., OWCP, 949 F.3d 921 (5th Cir. 2020) (pre-existing condition compensable if work aggravates it);
• Marinette Marine Corp. v. OWCP, 431 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2005) (aggravation rule: enough that work produces or contributes to worsening symptoms).

E. Waiver of fee challenges on appeal

The court’s waiver holding relied on:

• Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A) (argument must include reasons and citations);
• Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667 (7th Cir. 2016) (perfunctory, undeveloped arguments or those lacking authority are waived);
• Plus the practical necessity of supplying the record, especially after the court ordered submission of cited or relied-upon items.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Invoking § 20(a): “some evidence” and “harm” can be symptom-based

The court endorsed the ALJ’s threshold application of § 20(a): Chaffers provided evidence of breathing problems and medical opinions diagnosing pulmonary impairment; he also described extensive exposure to known respiratory irritants. That combination satisfied the low production burden for the presumption. Importantly, the opinion emphasizes two doctrinal points:

• Minimal prima facie burden: At this stage, the claimant need only produce “some evidence,” not persuade the factfinder or defeat contrary evidence.
• Broad “harm” concept: Even if diagnostic labels are contested, physical symptoms (coughing, shortness of breath) can constitute “harm” for § 20(a) purposes.

B. Rebuttal accepted, but claimant prevailed on the record as a whole

The ALJ found rebuttal based on Jeffboat’s expert suggesting the symptoms were unrelated to work and perhaps attributable to an undiagnosed cardiac condition. With the presumption removed, the ALJ returned to a preponderance assessment and credited Dr. Gupta. The Seventh Circuit’s role was limited: it asked whether the ALJ’s choice was rational and supported by substantial evidence.

The court highlighted why the ALJ could rationally credit Dr. Gupta over Dr. Frazier:

• Dr. Gupta offered a fuller explanation and cited literature; Dr. Frazier selectively engaged the pulmonary function test results.
• Dr. Frazier conceded that certain exposures can cause lung disease but did not explain why they could not have contributed here—leaving a reasoning gap the ALJ could weigh against him.
• Even without a definitive diagnosis, the ALJ could treat persistent respiratory symptoms as compensable harm if work contributed.

C. Disability and permanency: partial disability may be measured by impairment rating

Jeffboat argued disability was unsupported because no doctor said Chaffers could not work due to lung issues. The court rejected the premise: the LHWCA covers permanent partial disability, and where total inability to work is not established, partial disability can still be compensated. The ALJ used 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(23) and Dr. Gupta’s 14% AMA Guides impairment rating as the best-supported measure in the record, and deemed the condition “permanent” because symptoms persisted for years.

D. Attorneys’ fees: preservation and record discipline are determinative

On fees, the court did not reach the merits. It treated Jeffboat’s challenge as waived because:

• The necessary fee-petition materials (including the disputed entries) were not provided, making appellate review impossible.
• The brief lacked supporting case law as required by Rule 28(a)(8)(A).

The court’s final observation—that the District Director had already reduced the request by over one-third—underscored the discretionary and record-intensive nature of fee litigation.

3.3 Impact

• Lower barrier to invoking § 20(a) in exposure/symptom cases: The opinion reinforces that respiratory symptoms can qualify as “harm” even when experts dispute specific diagnoses. This matters in occupational exposure claims where causation is multi-factorial and medical labeling may be contested.
• Expert-opinion accountability: The court signaled that an expert’s concession that exposures can cause disease, coupled with a failure to explain why they did not do so here, may legitimately reduce the opinion’s persuasive force before an ALJ.
• Strengthening ALJ factfinding discretion: By reiterating the no-reweighing rule, the decision discourages appeals that merely seek a different medical “winner.”
• Appellate waiver as a practical gatekeeper in fee disputes: Parties challenging fee awards must build a record and brief the issue with authority; otherwise, the challenge ends at waiver, not substance.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Jeffboat, Incorporated v. Director, OWCP reinforces two practical rules in LHWCA litigation. First, the § 20(a) presumption is triggered by a light showing: respiratory symptoms can be “harm,” and a claimant need not carry a definitive diagnostic label to get the presumption in play. Second, once the case is tried to an ALJ, appellate review is tightly constrained by substantial-evidence deference—especially where competing experts were weighed and explained.

Separately, the decision serves as a cautionary precedent on appellate practice: fee-award challenges require a complete record and developed, authority-supported argumentation, or they will be waived.