Knowing Inaction by a Potential Father After Notice of Pregnancy/Birth Constitutes “Abandonment,” Permitting Denial of an Improvement Period and Termination

Case: In re B.P., No. 25-348 (Wood County CC-54-2022-JA-190) (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2026) (memorandum decision)
Lower court order affirmed: May 1, 2025 (termination of petitioner father C.N.’s parental, custodial, and guardianship rights)

1. Introduction

In re B.P. addresses when a father’s failure to act—despite knowledge that he may have conceived a child—amounts to “abandonment” in West Virginia abuse and neglect proceedings. The petitioner father (C.N.) challenged (1) the circuit court’s adjudicatory finding that he abandoned B.P. and (2) the dispositional denial of a post-adjudicatory improvement period and termination of his parental rights. He also argued that delays and deficiencies in the Department of Human Services’ (“DHS”) efforts to identify and contact him improperly contributed to the outcome.

Key parties and posture

• Petitioner: Father C.N.
• Respondent: Department of Human Services (“DHS”)
• Child: B.P.
• Guardian ad litem: Michael D. Farnsworth Jr.

Condensed factual timeline (as relevant to the legal holdings)

• July 2022: Initial abuse/neglect petition filed shortly after B.P.’s birth; father listed as unknown; later amended to add abandonment allegations against unknown father and service by publication.
• Sept. 2022: Mother names several possible fathers (including petitioner) but lacks direct contact information.
• Apr.–July 2024: CPS attempts contact; eventual contact occurs; paternity testing ordered.
• Aug. 2024: DNA results confirm petitioner is the biological father; court enters paternity order.
• Nov. 2024: Second amended petition alleges petitioner’s abandonment.
• Dec. 2024–Jan. 2025: Adjudication: evidence petitioner knew of pregnancy and possible paternity, yet chose not to act; court finds abandonment.
• Mar. 2025: Disposition: improvement period denied; parental rights terminated.
• Mar. 3, 2026: Supreme Court of Appeals affirms.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the circuit court’s termination order. It held that the evidence supported the finding that the father abandoned B.P. by demonstrating a “settled purpose to forego” parental duties under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201—specifically, by doing nothing after learning the mother was pregnant and that he might be the father, despite awareness that he could pursue testing. The Court further held that, once abandonment was found, the circuit court acted within its discretion in denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period and properly terminated parental rights upon finding no reasonable likelihood the conditions could be corrected and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare. Finally, the Court rejected the argument that DHS delay caused the termination: the decisive cause was the father’s own knowing inaction.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Standard of appellate review

• Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
  The Court reiterated the established framework for reviewing abuse and neglect orders: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. This standard mattered because the father’s primary challenges were factual (credibility, inferences from inaction) framed as legal error. The Court’s deference to supported fact-finding (including credibility determinations) reinforced the circuit court’s abandonment finding.

Abandonment as “settled purpose” shown by failure to assert rights

• In re C.M.-1, 247 W. Va. 744, 749, 885 S.E.2d 875, 880 (2023)
  Cited for the proposition that a father’s failure to “assert[] his parental rights” can demonstrate a settled purpose to forgo responsibilities and duties. In re B.P. applies this reasoning to a father who, after receiving information suggesting possible paternity, chose not to pursue confirmation or engagement.
• In re A.B., No. 18-1147, 2019 WL 2452770, at *3 (W. Va. June 12, 2019) (memorandum decision)
  Quoted for the point that “total abdication of any responsibility” is definitive proof of a settled purpose to forego parental duties. The Court used this to underscore that the father’s extended noninvolvement—despite knowledge and opportunity—fit the statutory abandonment concept.

Improvement periods are discretionary; abandonment justifies denial

• In re Tonjia M., 212 W. Va. 443, 448, 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002)
  Used to reaffirm that granting an improvement period is within the circuit court’s discretion—even when a parent requests one and offers participation.
• Syl. Pt. 2, James M. v. Maynard, 185 W. Va. 648, 408 S.E.2d 400 (1991)
  Central to the outcome on the improvement-period issue: “Abandonment ... constitutes compelling circumstances sufficient to justify the denial of an improvement period.” The Court treated the abandonment finding as a powerful, often dispositive consideration against granting post-adjudicatory services designed to reunify.
• In re Emily, 208 W. Va. 325, 336, 540 S.E.2d 542, 553 (2000)
  Reinforced that when abandonment forms the basis for abuse/neglect allegations, the conduct is so egregious it warrants the “virtually automatic denial of an improvement period.” In re B.P. relies on this framing to justify denial even though the father requested an improvement period and claimed willingness to participate.

Termination without less restrictive alternatives when correction is unlikely

• Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011) (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980))
  Cited for the rule that termination may be used without less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood the conditions can be corrected. The Court integrated this rule with the statutory scheme that expressly treats abandonment as establishing “no reasonable likelihood” under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(4).

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Abandonment: “settled purpose” proven by knowing inaction

The Court anchored its analysis in the statutory definition of abandonment: W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 defines “abandonment” as conduct demonstrating “the settled purpose to forego the duties and parental responsibilities to the child.” The circuit court found (and the Supreme Court agreed) that the father: (1) knew the mother was pregnant and told him he was one of several possible fathers, (2) later realized he was not sterile and thus could be the father, (3) knew or learned the child was born and could be his, yet (4) chose not to investigate paternity or assume any parental role.

The Court treated this as more than mere delay or uncertainty; it was a purposeful decision to do nothing. It also emphasized the circuit court’s credibility findings (the father was “not a credible witness”) and rejected explanations (illness, being busy with a child “born in wedlock”) as legally insufficient to negate abandonment once the factual finding of knowing, purposeful inaction was made.

(b) No requirement that men “stay in contact” after sexual relations; the duty arises upon notice of possible paternity

The father argued the abandonment finding improperly rested on a “non-existent legal obligation”—that a male must remain in contact with a woman after sexual relations to determine if she becomes pregnant. The Supreme Court rejected this characterization: the circuit court did not impose a generalized post-relationship surveillance duty. Instead, the abandonment determination turned on the father’s refusal to take action after learning of pregnancy and possible paternity. The Court framed the key fact as notice plus opportunity, followed by intentional nonaction.

(c) Improvement period denial: abandonment is “compelling” and participation evidence was insufficient

Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-610(2)(B), the parent must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he is likely to fully participate. Even assuming willingness to participate, the Court emphasized the line of cases—especially James M. v. Maynard and In re Emily—treating abandonment as a compelling circumstance supporting denial of an improvement period. The father’s lack of bond with the child and the child’s longstanding placement further supported the circuit court’s exercise of discretion.

(d) Termination: abandonment satisfies “no reasonable likelihood” under the statute

The Court connected the abandonment finding to the termination prerequisites in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604. W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(4) expressly recognizes abandonment as a circumstance demonstrating “no reasonable likelihood that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected.” Once the circuit court found abandonment and additionally found termination necessary for the child’s welfare, W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) authorized termination. The Court also invoked syllabus law allowing termination without less restrictive alternatives when correction is unlikely (as stated in In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.).

(e) DHS delay arguments: causation and prejudice ran from the father’s choices

The father contended that DHS’s delay in locating him deprived the child of a relationship and delayed permanency, conflicting with statutes/rules. The Court’s response was causation-focused: regardless of the paternity investigation timeline, the father independently knew of the pregnancy/birth and did nothing. The Court also noted practical obstacles: the mother initially could not identify the father, later expressed confidence another man was the father, and only after that man was ruled out did DHS investigate other named men. Additionally, DHS served unknown fathers by publication under W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(e)(4). On these facts, the Court held the termination was attributable to the father’s settled purpose to forego responsibilities, not DHS misconduct.

3.3. Impact

• Clarifies how “notice” triggers responsibility for potential fathers. The decision underscores that once a man has credible information that he may be a child’s father, purposeful inaction—failing to pursue paternity confirmation or any support—can constitute abandonment.
• Reinforces abandonment as a fast track to permanency. By relying on precedent describing near-automatic denial of improvement periods in abandonment cases, the decision strengthens the principle that abandonment can justify moving directly to termination when statutory criteria are met.
• Limits DHS-delay defenses where the parent had independent knowledge. The opinion signals that alleged agency shortcomings will not typically defeat termination if the parent’s own informed nonaction is the decisive cause of the child’s lack of parental relationship.
• Practical implication for litigation strategy. Respondent parents asserting late identification/contact will likely need to show not just agency delay, but lack of notice or inability to act, and a concrete causal link between the delay and the failure to form a relationship—facts not present here.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication is where the court decides whether abuse/neglect allegations are proven (here, abandonment). Disposition is where the court decides the remedy (improvement period, termination, placement).
• “Abandonment” (W. Va. Code § 49-1-201): Not merely physical absence; it is conduct showing a settled intent to give up parental duties—such as knowingly doing nothing to establish paternity or support the child.
• Improvement period (W. Va. Code § 49-4-610): A court-supervised chance to correct problems. It is discretionary, and abandonment can be a compelling reason to deny it.
• “No reasonable likelihood” (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604): A legal finding that the parent is not likely to fix the conditions soon enough. The statute expressly includes abandonment as a basis for this finding.
• “Reasonable efforts” to preserve the family: Generally, DHS must work toward reunification, but abandonment can remove or reduce that obligation; here the circuit court found DHS was under no obligation to make reasonable efforts “under the circumstances of abandonment.”
• Clear error review: On appeal, factual findings (like credibility and what inferences to draw from inaction) stand unless clearly wrong; this makes well-supported circuit court findings difficult to overturn.

5. Conclusion

In re B.P. affirms a stringent application of abandonment in West Virginia abuse and neglect law: when a potential father has notice that he may have conceived a child and chooses not to pursue paternity or parental responsibility, that knowing inaction can establish “abandonment” as a settled purpose to forego parental duties under W. Va. Code § 49-1-201. Once abandonment is found, precedent supports denying a post-adjudicatory improvement period (James M. v. Maynard; In re Emily), and the statutory framework treats abandonment as supporting “no reasonable likelihood” of correction (W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(4)), permitting termination when necessary for the child’s welfare. The decision also narrows the practical force of DHS-delay arguments where the parent’s independent knowledge and intentional nonaction are the true drivers of the child’s lack of relationship and the resulting permanency outcome.