Joinder (Not Substitution) of an Adult SSI Claimant When a Childhood Application Reaches the Court of Appeals

1. Introduction

Jamie Cosenza applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in 2011 on behalf of her son, James Freid, alleging disability since birth based primarily on a learning disorder and behavioral/interpersonal difficulties. After multiple denials, remands, and hearings spanning roughly seven years, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a 2018 decision concluding Freid was not disabled both as a child (pre-18) and as an adult (post-18) under the Social Security Act.

On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, two sets of issues dominated:

• Jurisdiction/party status: Because Freid was now an adult, was Cosenza still able to maintain the appeal, or must Freid be substituted or joined as the real party in interest?
• Merits (substantial evidence): Did the ALJ (a) mishandle vocational expert testimony and (b) inadequately evaluate whether Freid’s impairments met/medically equaled/functionally equaled the Listings, particularly in light of special education accommodations and behavioral evidence?

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit resolved the procedural dispute by holding that both Cosenza and Freid qualify as real parties in interest and that joinder of Freid as a second appellant was “permitted” and “appropriate” under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 17 and 21. The court granted the motion to join Freid and found subject-matter jurisdiction secure.

On the merits, applying highly deferential substantial-evidence review, the court affirmed. It rejected claims that the ALJ ignored vocational expert testimony, reasoning that the disputed vocational limitations came from hypotheticals describing a person more limited than the record supported for Freid. It also distinguished Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v. Astrue, finding that the ALJ here thoroughly addressed the individualized education program (IEP) evidence and permissibly relied on record evidence supporting a conclusion that some of Freid’s behavioral/school difficulties were volitional.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The order relies on a blend of (i) Article III standing/party-case principles, (ii) procedural rules about real parties in interest and joinder, and (iii) Social Security substantial-evidence doctrine.

• Rabdeau v. Bisignano, 155 F.4th 908 (7th Cir. 2025)
  Cited for the court’s practice of summarizing only necessary facts when the record is voluminous and the merits turn on substantial-evidence review.
• Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
  Used for the proposition that when at least one party has standing, a court may proceed without resolving the standing of all parties (the opinion references the standing/party discussion at 429 U.S. 264 n.9). This supported the court’s decision to avoid deciding whether Cosenza independently had standing once Freid was joined.
• LJM Partners, Ltd. v. Barclays Cap., Inc., 165 F.4th 552 (7th Cir. 2026)
  Cited twice: first as an example of standing (injury plus redressability), and second for Rule 17(a)(3) treatment (allowing time for the real party in interest to join). It reinforced that Freid—whose benefits were denied—plainly satisfied standing and could be added without jurisdictional defect.
• RK Co. v. See, 622 F.3d 846 (7th Cir. 2010)
  Central to the “real party in interest” analysis: it supplies the definition (the party who possesses the interest to be enforced and is entitled to recover) and, importantly, the waiver principle: the Commissioner’s failure to raise whether Cosenza was a proper party in the district court waived that argument on appeal.
• Bavido v. Apfel, 215 F.3d 743 (7th Cir. 2000)
  Cited for Rule 21 authority to add parties “at any time,” supporting joinder of Freid even at the appellate stage of this long-running SSI dispute.
• Town of Chester v. Laroe Est., Inc., 581 U.S. 433 (2017) and Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009)
  Both cited alongside Arlington Heights to justify the court’s decision not to decide Cosenza’s standing once Freid’s standing was secure and he was joined.
• Jarnutowski v. Kijakazi, 48 F.4th 769 (7th Cir. 2022); Butler v. Kijakazi, 4 F.4th 498 (7th Cir. 2021); Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408 (7th Cir. 2008)
  These cases anchor the court’s standard of review: de novo review of the district court’s affirmance but direct, very deferential substantial-evidence review of the ALJ.
• Burmester v. Berryhill, 920 F.3d 507 (7th Cir. 2019)
  Reinforces the boundary of review: the court will not reweigh evidence, resolve conflicts, or substitute its judgment for the ALJ’s.
• Deborah M. v. Saul, 994 F.3d 785 (7th Cir. 2021) and Moy v. Bisignano, 142 F.4th 546 (7th Cir. 2025)
  These frame the vocational-hypothetical issue. Deborah M. supports the proposition that an ALJ need only include limitations supported by the record. Moy is cited as the contrast case—error occurs if the ALJ omits limitations that the record does support.
• Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v. Astrue, 578 F.3d 696 (7th Cir. 2009)
  The principal merits comparator. The court distinguished it: unlike the conclusory ALJ analysis in Hopgood, the ALJ here discussed IEP accommodations and conflicting evidence in detail, and—unlike in Hopgood—there was record support for viewing certain behavioral problems as volitional.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Jurisdiction, standing, and the “real party in interest” problem when the child becomes an adult

The Commissioner’s jurisdictional attack was straightforward: if Cosenza could no longer sue “on his behalf” now that Freid was an adult, the appeal should be dismissed. The court responded by separating distinct concepts that are often conflated in Social Security litigation:

• Standing (Article III): Freid suffered the denial of benefits; reversal would redress the injury. That is enough for standing.
• Real party in interest (Rule 17): Freid “possesses the interest to be enforced” and is “entitled to recover,” making him a proper plaintiff-appellant.
• Remedy for misalignment: Even if the case was not originally prosecuted in the correct name, Rule 17(a)(3) disfavors dismissal and instead allows time for the real party to join.

Importantly, the court chose joinder rather than substitution. It held joinder “permitted” and “appropriate” under: Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a)(3) (time to join the real party in interest) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (court may add a party “at any time”).

The court also declined to remove Cosenza. Two reasons carried the day:

• Waiver: Under RK Co. v. See, the Commissioner waived argument that Cosenza was not a proper party by not raising it in the district court.
• Standing avoidance: Under Arlington Heights, Town of Chester v. Laroe Est., Inc., and Horne v. Flores, once Freid was joined and had standing, the court did not need to decide Cosenza’s standing to proceed to the merits.

Finally, the court declined to appoint a guardian ad litem as unnecessary, given the joinder solution and the decision not to disturb Cosenza’s party status.

B. Vocational expert testimony: hypotheticals need not be adopted if the limitations are unsupported

The appellants highlighted vocational expert answers indicating unemployability if a worker (i) lost 15% productivity, (ii) missed two days a month, or (iii) acted inappropriately twice a month. The court treated these as hypotheticals describing additional restrictions that the ALJ ultimately did not find supported by the record.

The legal principle applied is practical: an ALJ is not required to incorporate into the residual functional capacity or job-availability analysis limitations that the claimant did not prove. The order aligns with Deborah M. v. Saul and distinguishes Moy v. Bisignano, where omission of supported limitations was reversible error.

C. Listings and functional equivalence: distinguishing Hopgood through record engagement

The appellants’ central merits move was to analogize to Hopgood ex rel. L.G. v. Astrue, where the Seventh Circuit faulted an ALJ for conclusory reasoning and for failing to grapple with IEP evidence and other favorable material. The court rejected the analogy by focusing on the depth of the ALJ’s discussion here:

• The ALJ catalogued Freid’s special education accommodations (extended time, calculators, small groups, oral/written directions, verbal testing, scribe).
• The ALJ connected accommodations and performance by referencing teacher-reported marks and Freid’s testimony about positive effects.
• The ALJ explained how that evidence supported a finding of moderate impairment in cognitive/communicative functioning rather than listing-level severity.

On the “volitional behavior” point, the court again distinguished Hopgood. In Hopgood, the ALJ attributed problems to choice without medical support and while ignoring diagnosed-condition evidence. Here, the court held there was adequate record support for the ALJ’s inference, citing:

• a 2012 IEP describing Freid as capable of focus but using excuses and overreacting “to waste time,”
• a 2018 consultative psychologist’s uncertainty whether issues were diagnosable or due to lack of effort, and
• Freid’s own testimony that he could do better if he tried harder.

Because substantial-evidence review tolerates competing interpretations so long as the ALJ’s is reasonable and grounded in the record, the court affirmed.

3.3. Impact

Although nonprecedential, the order has practical significance in two recurring contexts:

• Long-running childhood SSI claims reaching adulthood midstream: The decision models a clean procedural fix—join the now-adult claimant under Rules 17 and 21 rather than dismissing for a perceived defect in who filed the suit years earlier.
• Appellate handling of party-status disputes: The court’s approach encourages litigants and courts to treat real-party problems as curable (joinder) rather than jurisdiction-destroying, while also reminding appellees that objections not raised below may be deemed waived under RK Co. v. See.

On the merits, the order reinforces two stabilizing trends in Seventh Circuit Social Security review:

• Vocational hypotheticals: VE answers to more-restrictive hypotheticals do not bind the ALJ unless the ALJ finds those restrictions supported.
• IEP evidence: Hopgood remains a warning against conclusory treatment of special education records, but detailed engagement with accommodations and performance will generally satisfy substantial evidence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Standing: A party must show a concrete injury caused by the government and likely to be fixed by a court order. Here, Freid’s injury is denial of benefits; a remand/award could fix it.
• Real party in interest (Rule 17): The person who actually owns the claim and would receive the remedy. Even if a parent filed originally, the adult child may be the real party entitled to benefits.
• Joinder vs. substitution: Joinder adds a party; substitution replaces one party with another. The court chose joinder, allowing both Cosenza and Freid to remain appellants.
• Residual Functional Capacity (RFC): The ALJ’s assessment of what an applicant can still do in a work setting despite impairments (including nonphysical, “nonexertional” limits like stress tolerance or social interaction).
• Substantial evidence: Not “most evidence” or “clear and convincing.” It means enough relevant evidence that a reasonable person could agree with the ALJ’s conclusion, even if other evidence points the other way.
• Listings / medical equivalence / functional equivalence: The Listings are a regulatory shortcut: if an impairment meets or equals a listed set of criteria, disability is established. For children, “functional equivalence” asks whether limitations are as serious as a Listing across key domains of functioning.

5. Conclusion

Cosenza v. Bisignano delivers two principal takeaways. Procedurally, when a childhood SSI claimant becomes an adult during protracted litigation, the Seventh Circuit treats the resulting party-status problem as solvable through joinder under Rules 17 and 21, while avoiding unnecessary standing rulings once one appellant indisputably has standing. Substantively, the order exemplifies deferential substantial-evidence review: an ALJ need not adopt vocational limitations posed only in unsupported hypotheticals, and an ALJ who meaningfully engages IEP accommodations and record evidence can withstand a Hopgood-based challenge.