In re M.M.: Uncontested Paternity Evidence and Unobjected Dispositional Reports Can Sustain Termination

1. Introduction

Case: In re M.M., No. 25-341 (Wood County CC-54-2024-JA-255)
Court: Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
Date Issued: June 1, 2026
Disposition Below: May 15, 2025 order terminating petitioner father D.M.’s parental rights

This memorandum decision arises from an abuse and neglect proceeding initiated by the West Virginia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) after allegations that the father engaged in domestic violence with the child’s mother in the child’s presence and, critically, left the child in the mother’s care despite the mother’s prior voluntary relinquishment of parental rights in an earlier proceeding. The father appealed the termination order on two principal grounds:

  • Paternity: DHS allegedly failed to establish he was the child’s parent.
  • Dispositional process/evidence: The evidence and hearing at disposition were allegedly insufficient (including an asserted inability to cross-examine report authors).

The Supreme Court affirmed, emphasizing the father’s nonappearance, failure to participate, failure to submit to court-ordered paternity testing, and failure to object to the evidentiary foundation at disposition.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed the termination of parental rights. It held that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding the father was the child’s parent because DHS presented uncontradicted testimony of parentage and the father—despite obtaining an order for paternity testing—never submitted to testing or offered contrary evidence.

The Court also rejected the claim that the circuit court failed to hold a sufficient dispositional hearing. It found the hearing adequate where DHS and CASA reports were admitted into evidence without objection, the court took notice of the case file, and the father had a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to call/cross-examine witnesses but did not exercise those rights. The circuit court’s unchallenged findings—no participation, no contact, repeated nonappearance—supported the statutory determination that there was no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and that termination was necessary for the child’s welfare.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)

The Court relied on In re Cecil T. for the standard of appellate review in abuse and neglect appeals: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The memorandum decision quotes Syl. Pt. 1 and applies its “shall not be set aside… unless clearly erroneous” directive to uphold the circuit court’s reliance on the only evidence presented on parentage—testimony that the father was the child’s parent.

Practically, In re Cecil T. functions here as a strong deference principle: when a parent does not appear, does not present evidence, and does not create a record contesting key facts, appellate review will rarely disturb the trial court’s factual findings.

In re C.E., 251 W. Va 342, 913 S.E.2d 366 (2025)

The Court invoked In re C.E. to address the father’s argument that the circuit court failed to hold a sufficient dispositional hearing under Rule 35 of the Rules of Procedure for Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings. In re C.E. is quoted for the “explicit direction” that a circuit court must conduct a dispositional hearing prior to entering a dispositional order.

Importantly, In re M.M. clarifies what can satisfy that requirement: a hearing at which the court admits DHS and CASA reports into evidence without objection and provides the parties an opportunity to present evidence and call witnesses can qualify as the required dispositional hearing even if no witness testimony is actually presented.

Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011)

The Court cited Syl. Pt. 5 of In re Kristin Y. for the familiar but decisive termination principle: termination of parental rights may be employed without less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that conditions of abuse/neglect can be substantially corrected.

In In re M.M., this precedent supports the dispositional endpoint: given the father’s lack of participation and demonstrated disinterest, the circuit court could conclude reunification-oriented alternatives were unwarranted and that termination was permissible and necessary.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Paternity/Parentage: Uncontradicted Evidence + Failure to Test

The father’s paternity argument failed for two independent, reinforcing reasons reflected in the Court’s reasoning:

  1. Affirmative evidence existed: A CPS worker testified the father was the child’s father, and DHS represented that the father was listed on the birth certificate. The Court tied this to the statutory definition of “parent” in W. Va. Code § 49-1-204.
  2. No rebuttal record was created: The father did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing to contest parentage, presented no contrary evidence, and—most significantly—after moving for and obtaining a paternity test, never submitted to testing. The Court characterized this as “squandering” an opportunity to obtain rebuttal evidence.

The opinion thus conveys a practical litigation rule: when a respondent parent raises paternity doubts, the issue must be developed in the record; a respondent cannot obtain an order for testing and then undermine the proceeding by noncompliance and absence, expecting the appellate court to reverse for lack of proof.

(B) Disposition: A Hearing Occurred; Objections and Witness Examination Were Waived/Not Pursued

The father framed disposition as procedurally inadequate because the court heard no live testimony and he could not cross-examine report authors. The Court rejected that characterization by focusing on what actually happened at the dispositional hearing:

  • DHS and CASA reports were admitted into evidence without objection.
  • The circuit court took notice of the case file, also without objection.
  • The father (through counsel) presented no evidence and did not call witnesses.

The Court further grounded procedural sufficiency in W. Va. Code § 49-4-601(h), emphasizing that the father was afforded a “meaningful opportunity to be heard, including the opportunity to testify and to present and cross-examine witnesses”—but “chose not to exercise those rights.” Critically, the Court noted he was not precluded from calling the authors of the reports; he simply did not do so and did not object to admission of the reports in the first place.

This is both an evidentiary and due process holding in application: the adequacy of a dispositional hearing is assessed not by whether witnesses were actually called, but by whether the court convened a hearing, admitted evidence, and afforded the parties the opportunity to test and contest that evidence.

(C) Substantive Basis for Termination: Unchallenged “No Reasonable Likelihood” Findings

After disposition, the circuit court found the father had shown no interest, failed to participate in services, failed to contact DHS or inquire about the child, and failed to appear at multiple hearings. The Supreme Court pointedly observed that the father did not challenge these findings on appeal. Those findings supported termination under:

  • W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6) (termination upon a finding of no reasonable likelihood of correction in the near future and when necessary for the welfare of the child), and
  • Syl. Pt. 5, In re Kristin Y. (termination without less restrictive alternatives when the “no reasonable likelihood” finding is made).

In short, even apart from the contested arguments (paternity and the structure of disposition), the record described by the Court supports a classic “no reasonable likelihood” disposition where the parent is disengaged and nonparticipatory.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, In re M.M. reinforces several practical rules likely to shape future abuse and neglect litigation strategy and trial-court process:

  • Parentage challenges must be litigated, not merely asserted: When testimony identifies a respondent as the parent and the respondent offers no rebuttal, a circuit court may rely on that testimony—especially where the respondent fails to submit to an ordered paternity test.
  • Disposition can be evidence-based without live testimony if parties do not contest: A dispositional hearing can satisfy Rule 35 where reports are admitted into evidence and parties have the opportunity (even if not exercised) to call and cross-examine witnesses.
  • Objection practice matters: Failure to object to admission of DHS/CASA reports—and failure to subpoena or call their authors—undercuts later appellate complaints about inability to cross-examine.
  • Nonappearance and noncompliance carry compounding consequences: Repeated absence not only affects adjudication and visitation decisions but also builds a record supporting “no reasonable likelihood” at disposition.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudicatory hearing
The phase where the court determines whether the child was abused or neglected based on evidence. It is akin to deciding “did the alleged misconduct occur, and does it meet the legal definition of abuse/neglect?”
Dispositional hearing
The phase after adjudication where the court decides the remedy—services, improvement period, placement, or termination—based on the child’s welfare and the parent’s ability to correct conditions.
Clear error vs. de novo review
“Clear error” means the appellate court defers to the trial judge’s factual findings unless a serious mistake is evident. “De novo” means the appellate court reviews legal questions fresh, without deference.
“No reasonable likelihood” of correction
A statutory threshold (used in W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(c)(6)) allowing termination when the parent is not likely to fix the problems causing abuse/neglect soon enough to meet the child’s need for safety and stability.
Meaningful opportunity to be heard
Due process in this context: the parent must have the chance to attend, testify, present evidence, and cross-examine witnesses. If the chance exists but the parent does not use it (or does not object), later due-process arguments are weakened.

5. Conclusion

In re M.M. affirms termination of parental rights where the record showed domestic violence in the child’s presence, the father’s decision to leave the child with a mother who had already relinquished parental rights, and—most decisively—persistent nonparticipation and nonappearance. The Court held that uncontradicted testimony identifying the father as the child’s parent, coupled with the father’s failure to submit to court-ordered paternity testing, supported the circuit court’s parentage finding. The Court further held that a dispositional hearing is sufficient where DHS and CASA reports are admitted without objection and the parent has (but does not exercise) the opportunity to present and challenge evidence. The decision underscores that abuse and neglect proceedings turn not only on allegations, but on the parties’ creation of an evidentiary record—and that disengagement can itself become the evidentiary basis for a “no reasonable likelihood” termination.