1. Introduction
This decision clarifies how Minnesota courts must assess the admissibility of a breath-test result when a driver challenges the observation period preceding the test. It rejects two opposing shortcuts: an imperfect observation period does not automatically require exclusion, but a properly functioning instrument operated by a trained person does not automatically establish that the tested breath sample was uncontaminated.
Derek Alexander Knapp challenged the revocation of his driver’s license after a breath test reported an alcohol concentration of .08, the statutory threshold. His sole challenge concerned the arresting deputy’s pre-test observation. Knapp did not contest the general reliability of the DataMaster DMT-G instrument or the operator’s performance of the instrument-testing procedures.
The central question was therefore not whether the instrument accurately measured alcohol in the sample presented to it. It was whether that sample reliably represented Knapp’s deep lung breath, rather than breath contaminated by residual alcohol in his mouth.
The Supreme Court adopted a whole-record inquiry governed by the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. The Commissioner, as the party offering the result, must establish that the sample was not contaminated. Neither a procedural lapse nor the driver’s failure to prove actual contamination independently resolves admissibility.
2. Factual and Procedural Background
The test and its purpose
Minnesota Statutes § 169A.20, subdivision 1(5), prohibits driving, operating, or being in physical control of a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration of .08 or more at the relevant time. Approved breath-testing instruments measure alcohol in exhaled deep lung air. That measurement is useful because alcohol circulating in the bloodstream passes into the air in deep lung tissue.
Mouth alcohol creates a different problem. Residual alcohol from recent drinking, vomiting, belching, or regurgitation can enter a breath sample without representing alcohol absorbed into the bloodstream. Its presence can produce an inaccurately elevated measurement. The pre-test observation period is intended to prevent or detect that contamination.
Knapp’s observation period
Following Knapp’s arrest on February 10, 2023, the deputy transported him to the Washington County jail. The relevant sequence was:
- Midnight: The deputy and the handcuffed Knapp waited in a squad car. Knapp sat behind a plexiglass divider. The deputy checked his mouth and delivered the breath-test advisory.
- Approximately 12:02 a.m.: They entered the jail’s intake area. A corrections officer searched Knapp while the deputy spoke with the DMT operator and then began paperwork.
- Approximately 12:06 a.m.: Knapp sat beside the deputy. Body-camera footage showed intermittent conversation and proximity between them.
- 12:10 a.m.: The available body-camera recording ended for reasons unexplained in the record.
- 12:17 a.m.: Knapp provided his first breath sample, more than 15 minutes after entering the intake area.
The operator testified that the instrument successfully completed the required air-blank and control-sample tests, accepted both breath samples, and reported an alcohol concentration of .08. The deputy testified that he could see and hear Knapp and observed no burping, belching, or vomiting. The operator likewise observed none of those events during the test.
The lower courts’ competing approaches
The district court rescinded the revocation because the Commissioner had not demonstrated an adequate observation period. It emphasized the deputy’s position in the squad car, his reliance on a rearview mirror, the plexiglass divider, and uncertainty about his position inside the jail.
Although the district court initially received the test result into evidence, its later order treated the result as lacking the foundational reliability necessary for admission. The Supreme Court therefore reviewed the order as an admissibility ruling, not merely a determination that admitted evidence deserved insufficient weight.
The court of appeals reversed. Applying its established burden-shifting framework, it reasoned that an imperfect observation period did not justify exclusion without evidence that Knapp had ingested or regurgitated something, or experienced a bodily function, that affected the result. The Supreme Court concluded that neither court had used the correct standard.
3. Summary of the Opinion
The Supreme Court established the following governing principles:
- No automatic exclusion: An imperfect observation period does not, by itself, make a breath-test result inadmissible.
- No automatic admission: Instrument approval, operator training, and proper instrument operation do not conclusively establish that the sample was free from mouth alcohol.
- The proponent retains the burden: The party offering the result must establish its foundational reliability, including that contamination did not undermine the sample.
- Preponderance governs: The court must determine whether it is more likely than not that the sample provided a reliable measure of alcohol in the driver’s deep lung breath.
- The entire record matters: Observation deficiencies must be considered together with all other evidence bearing on contamination.
- The prior burden-shifting framework is rejected: Inconsistent court of appeals decisions are overruled to the extent of the inconsistency.
The Court did not decide whether Knapp’s result ultimately satisfied this standard. It vacated the court of appeals’ decision and the district court’s ruling and remanded for a new admissibility determination. The district court may reopen the evidentiary record in its discretion.
4. Analysis: The Governing Evidentiary Framework
Two distinct questions of foundational reliability
The opinion rests on a distinction between instrument reliability and reliability in the particular administration:
| Question |
What must be established? |
| Is the testing method or instrument reliable? |
When properly operated, the instrument accurately analyzes a breath sample and reports its alcohol concentration. |
| Was this particular test reliably administered? |
The sample and procedures produced a reliable measure of alcohol in the driver’s deep lung breath. |
A machine may answer the first question satisfactorily while the sample fails the second. An accurate measurement of a contaminated sample can still be an unreliable measurement of the driver’s legally relevant alcohol concentration.
Ordinary evidentiary rules also continue to apply. Rules 401 and 402 require relevance, while Rule 403 permits exclusion when specified dangers or costs substantially outweigh probative value. Establishing that a sample was uncontaminated resolves the particular foundational objection addressed here; it does not eliminate every other possible evidentiary objection.
The burden remains with the party offering the result
The Court rejected a framework under which the Commissioner first establishes a prima facie case and the driver must then prove a contamination event that actually affected the result. That approach risks converting the driver’s failure to prove unreliability into affirmative proof of reliability.
Instead, the court must evaluate all pertinent evidence under one governing inquiry. In an implied-consent proceeding such as this one, the Commissioner must persuade the court that the sample was more likely than not uncontaminated. Direct evidence of every procedural step is unnecessary, but sufficient affirmative indications of reliability must exist in the record.
This does not make the absence of defense evidence irrelevant. Uncontradicted testimony may be persuasive. It means only that the absence of a defense showing cannot replace the Commissioner’s ultimate burden.
5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. The principal foundational-reliability decisions
State, City of St. Louis Park v. Quinn, 182 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 1971)
State, City of St. Louis Park v. Quinn addressed whether the prosecution needed expert testimony in every case explaining the scientific theory and mathematical conversion underlying breath testing. The Court held that such testimony was unnecessary where the accepted technology was used by a properly certified operator with a properly functioning instrument and proper chemicals.
The Commissioner read that decision as making certification and instrument functionality sufficient for admission regardless of defects elsewhere in the testing process. The Court rejected that reading. The earlier decision concerned the reliability of the technology, not whether a particular sample was contaminated.
The opinion also identifies State v. Miller, 165 A.2d 829 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1960), and State v. Johnson, 199 A.2d 809 (N.J. 1964), as authorities cited in that earlier decision for admitting readings from properly conducted breath tests without preliminary expert proof of the accepted scientific relationship. Their role is historical and supportive; neither supplies a rule dispensing with sample integrity.
State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 1977)
State v. Dille supplies the controlling two-part foundation: the proponent must establish both the reliability of the test itself and reliable administration in the particular instance. There, the defendant challenged a blood sample because the prosecution had not directly established sterilization of the needle and collection bottle and had not directly identified a white substance in the bottle.
The Court nevertheless found adequate evidence of reliability. A medical technologist collected the sample in a hospital, the needle had not previously been used, and the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension supplied the collection bottle as part of its testing kit. These circumstances supported the conclusion that the sample was uncontaminated despite gaps in direct proof.
The present opinion draws two complementary lessons. First, the proponent bears the burden of showing that contamination did not adversely affect reliability. Second, that burden does not require direct proof that every protocol was perfectly followed. Circumstantial evidence can establish that the protective purpose of a procedure was achieved.
The Court also clarifies that the earlier decision’s references to “prima facie proof” and the defendant coming forward with contrary indications did not establish the court of appeals’ three-stage burden-shifting system. Those passages instead reflected consideration of the whole evidentiary record.
State v. Erdman, 391 P.2d 518 (Wash. 1964)
State v. Erdman supported the reasoning in State v. Dille. Although the prosecution had not directly identified white material in a blood-sample bottle, testimony established that sodium fluoride was ordinarily placed in such bottles and that testing revealed no inaccuracies. The Washington court accepted that evidence as sufficient proof of the substance’s identity and the test’s accuracy.
Its importance here is evidentiary: reliable inference can fill a gap in direct proof. The present opinion does not treat its “prima facie” terminology as transferring the ultimate burden of persuasion to the driver.
State, Department of Public Safety v. Habisch, 313 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1981)
In State, Department of Public Safety v. Habisch, a simulator solution used to validate a breath-testing instrument had not been replaced within the prescribed 30 days; it was 62 days old. The Court nevertheless upheld the test’s foundation because the solution consistently produced its expected reading and the room-air validation test also performed correctly.
This precedent demonstrates why noncompliance with a procedural schedule is not necessarily dispositive. The relevant inquiry is whether other evidence establishes that the procedure’s reliability function remained satisfied.
Applied here, the analogy permits evidence beyond perfect observation to establish sample integrity. It does not establish that successful instrument checks necessarily rule out mouth alcohol: the evidence must address the particular reliability concern raised.
In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters, 816 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. 2012)
In re Source Code Evidentiary Hearings in Implied Consent Matters concerned alleged defects in the software controlling Intoxilyzer instruments. It established that preliminary conditions of admissibility under Minnesota Rule of Evidence 104(a) must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
The present opinion joins that standard to the sample-integrity principles of State v. Dille. A judge must decide whether reliable measurement of deep lung alcohol is more likely than not, rather than demanding certainty or treating a speculative possibility of contamination as automatically decisive.
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987), supplied the federal reasoning adopted in the source-code decision. Its interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) supports using the preponderance standard to resolve preliminary admissibility facts. That threshold concerns admission of evidence, not the ultimate burden of proving a criminal offense.
State v. Loving, 775 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. 2009)
The Commissioner relied on State v. Loving to argue that contamination concerns affect evidentiary weight rather than admissibility. That case involved reliable identification of gunshot residue on a coat. Questions about when or how the residue reached the coat concerned what the finding meant, not whether the testing accurately identified residue.
The Court distinguished that situation from a breath sample contaminated with mouth alcohol. The breath result is offered to establish the driver’s relevant alcohol concentration, not merely to show that some alcohol existed somewhere in the submitted sample. Mouth alcohol can undermine that foundational connection itself.
The distinction turns on the proposition the evidence is offered to prove. A limitation on the inference drawn from an accurate finding may concern weight; a defect that makes the sample an unreliable measure of the legally relevant condition can concern admissibility.
B. The court of appeals’ burden-shifting line
The opinion examines several intermediate appellate decisions that developed or applied the framework it rejects:
| Precedent |
Role in the opinion |
| Noren v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 363 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. App. 1985) |
Helped develop the staged framework, including a return of the burden to the Commissioner after a sufficient defense challenge. |
| Melin v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 384 N.W.2d 474 (Minn. App. 1986) |
Explained that deficient observation does not itself invalidate a test. That proposition survives, but cannot justify requiring the driver to prove contamination. |
| Falaas v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 388 N.W.2d 40 (Minn. App. 1986) |
Required the driver to produce evidence of untrustworthiness and rejected unsupported speculation. The present opinion replaces the staged inquiry with a whole-record determination under the proponent’s burden. |
| Hounsell v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 401 N.W.2d 94 (Minn. App. 1987) |
Required a driver who established a substance in the mouth also to demonstrate an actual effect on the result. That allocation conflicts with the new clarification. |
| Kramer v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 706 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. App. 2005) |
Illustrated the burden-shifting framework derived from the earlier “prima facie” language. |
| Vondrachek v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 906 N.W.2d 262 (Minn. App. 2017) |
Required a petitioner to present evidence of ingestion or regurgitation affecting the result. The Supreme Court identified this as an improper burden allocation. |
| Junker v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 925 N.W.2d 661 (Minn. App. 2019) |
Required proof both of burping and of its actual effect. The opinion expressly criticizes that requirement. |
| Knapp v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 23 N.W.3d 847 (Minn. App. 2025) |
The decision under review correctly rejected automatic exclusion but incorrectly relied on Knapp’s failure to produce affirmative evidence of contamination. |
The Supreme Court overrules these decisions only to the extent they are inconsistent with its holding. It does not reject every proposition they contain, particularly the principle that imperfect observation is not automatically fatal.
C. Supporting procedural, statutory, and historical authorities
- Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 2012), reinforces the two-part requirement of reliable testing and reliable administration.
- State v. Carbo, 6 N.W.3d 114 (Minn. 2024), establishes abuse-of-discretion review of evidentiary rulings.
- Riley v. State, 792 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 2011), explains that reliance on an erroneous legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. This principle supports remand despite deference to evidentiary decisions.
- State v. Carridine, 812 N.W.2d 130 (Minn. 2012), supplies clear-error review for factual findings.
- In re SIRS Appeal by Best Care, LLC, 26 N.W.3d 459 (Minn. 2025), supports beginning statutory interpretation with text and structure.
- In re Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 735 N.W.2d 706 (Minn. 2007), establishes that statutory relief from antecedent expert testimony does not eliminate challenges to individual test reliability.
- Jasper v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 642 N.W.2d 435 (Minn. 2002), provides historical context concerning Minnesota’s use of Intoxilyzer technology.
Finally, Puce v. City of Burnsville, 997 N.W.2d 49 (Minn. 2023), State v. Rewitzer, 617 N.W.2d 407 (Minn. 2000), and United Power Ass'n v. Comm'r of Revenue, 483 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1992), support judicial notice of publicly available documents. They explain the Court’s consideration of the BCA’s DMT Operator Training Manual despite its absence from the district-court record. The Court noted that the relevant material appeared in both the current manual and the earlier version.
6. Statutory Interpretation: What Instrument Approval Does—and Does Not—Establish
Minnesota Statutes § 634.16
Section 634.16 permits qualifying breath-test results to be admitted without antecedent expert testimony establishing that an approved instrument reliably measures alcohol in breath. The Court reads that provision narrowly: it removes a recurring need to prove the scientific reliability of approved technology when a properly trained operator uses it.
The statutory conditions are that:
- The Commissioner has approved the instrument; and
- The operator has been fully trained through Commissioner-approved training.
The statute does not resolve whether a particular sample was contaminated. Nor does it transform every concern about test administration into a matter of weight alone.
The Court also rejects Knapp’s grammatical argument that “pursuant to training” requires proof of perfect compliance with training protocols before the statutory expert-testimony dispensation applies. Using the nearest-reasonable-referent principle, the Court reads that language as identifying the required training of the operator, rather than prescribing a comprehensive admissibility condition for every step of a particular test.
Conversely, the statute is not an absolute exclusion rule when its conditions are absent. The opinion explains that an appropriate foundation may still be established through expert testimony. Its central function is to excuse a category of preliminary scientific proof, not to exhaust the law of admissibility.
Minnesota Statutes § 169A.51, subdivision 5
The Court also rejects the Commissioner’s argument that two adequate samples within .02 alcohol concentration foreclose a mouth-alcohol challenge. Subdivision 5 addresses minimum testing requirements, sample sequence, and circumstances constituting test refusal.
An instrument’s acceptance of samples, or their agreement within the specified range, is not legislatively designated conclusive proof that mouth alcohol was absent. Statutory sample adequacy and evidentiary sample reliability remain distinct inquiries.
7. Applying the Standard to Knapp’s Record
The district court’s error was treating inadequate observation as independently dispositive. Its findings remained relevant, but they had to be assessed alongside the rest of the record.
Potentially significant evidence included:
- The deputy’s testimony that he could see and hear Knapp and observed no burping, belching, or vomiting;
- The operator’s observations during testing;
- The body-camera evidence of conversation and proximity inside the jail;
- The fact that the first sample was not supplied until 12:17 a.m., more than 15 minutes after entry into the intake area; and
- The gaps and limitations in observation and recording.
The timing could reduce the significance of deficiencies in the earlier squad-car observation. Conversely, the incomplete recording and questions about the deputy’s attention could affect the strength of the Commissioner’s proof.
The Supreme Court also noted that the video appeared inconsistent with the district court’s broad finding that the deputy’s location remained unclear after he spoke to the operator. It did not finally resolve that factual matter. Instead, it left reassessment to the district court, with permission to reopen the record.
Importantly, the Court did not hold that successful diagnostic checks alone establish the absence of mouth alcohol. The governing question concerns sample integrity, and the probative force of particular evidence must be evaluated against that concern.
8. Potential Impact
A functional rather than mechanical approach
The decision directs courts to ask whether a safeguard’s protective purpose was achieved, rather than whether a checklist was followed without any departure. That approach prevents exclusion for inconsequential lapses while preserving scrutiny of defects that genuinely undermine reliability.
A clearer and more demanding allocation of proof
The Commissioner cannot prevail merely because a driver offers no testimony or cannot prove what happened during an observation gap. Evidence supporting an uncontaminated sample must persuade the court. At the same time, the Commissioner may rely on credible circumstantial evidence and need not eliminate every theoretical possibility of contamination.
More focused evidentiary hearings
Future hearings are likely to focus on what officers could actually perceive, the duration and significance of observation gaps, the timing of samples, and how particular evidence bears on mouth alcohol. Findings should explain why the entire record does or does not establish reliable deep lung measurement.
The opinion does not prescribe a mandatory body-camera record, an inflexible visual-observation method, or an exhaustive list of acceptable proof. It supplies an evidentiary standard rather than a new operational testing manual.
Relevance beyond this civil revocation proceeding
Although the case concerns license revocation, the Court’s reasoning discusses alcohol-concentration evidence and precedents arising in both civil and criminal proceedings. Its clarification of foundational reliability therefore has significance for criminal DWI litigation as well. The preponderance threshold for admitting evidence must remain separate from the prosecution’s ultimate burden of proving a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
The decision does not resolve constitutional search questions, establish a new scientific rule about detecting mouth alcohol, or determine the ultimate outcome of Knapp’s revocation challenge.
9. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Implied-consent hearing
- A proceeding in which a driver challenges a license revocation imposed under Minnesota’s impaired-driving testing laws.
- Foundational reliability
- The minimum showing that a testing method works and that its use in the particular case produced dependable evidence.
- Deep lung breath and mouth alcohol
- Deep lung breath reflects alcohol exchanged with the bloodstream. Mouth alcohol is residual alcohol that may artificially elevate the reading.
- Preponderance of the evidence
- Proof that a proposition is more likely true than not true. If the evidence is evenly balanced, the party bearing the burden has not satisfied it.
- Admissibility versus weight
- Admissibility asks whether evidence may be considered at all. Weight asks how persuasive it is after admission.
- Antecedent expert testimony
- Preliminary expert evidence establishing a scientific basis before a test result is admitted. Section 634.16 excuses specified testimony about approved instruments, not proof of every aspect of an individual result’s reliability.
- Per se exclusion
- Automatic exclusion because a particular defect occurred, without considering other evidence. The Court rejects that approach for imperfect observation periods.
10. Conclusion
The opinion replaces competing presumptive shortcuts with a single, evidence-centered inquiry. An imperfect observation period does not automatically defeat admissibility, and an approved instrument does not automatically establish an uncontaminated sample.
The proponent must show, from the entire relevant record and by a preponderance of the evidence, that the result reliably measures alcohol in the driver’s deep lung breath. By rejecting inconsistent burden-shifting precedent while permitting circumstantial proof, the Court preserves both practical testing procedures and meaningful judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence. Whether Knapp’s result meets that standard remains for the district court on remand.