Heck Bars § 1983/Bivens Damages Claims That Would Undermine an Uninvalidated Federal Conviction, and Frivolous Prisoner Appeals Deny IFP and Add a PLRA Strike

1. Introduction

In Hamett v. City of Broken Arrow, the Tenth Circuit reviewed a pro se prisoner’s civil action seeking damages for alleged Fourth Amendment “malicious prosecution,” framed under both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Randy Alan Hamett sued the City of Broken Arrow, alleging (among other theories) that a protective order was issued “without jurisdiction on tribal land” and that officers spoliated exculpatory evidence that would have shown his innocence, thereby tainting later federal convictions.

Because Hamett sought to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), the district court screened the amended complaint and dismissed it without prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), concluding the action was barred by Heck v. Humphrey. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, denied IFP, dismissed the appeal as frivolous, and assessed a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The key legal issue was whether Hamett could pursue civil damages when his allegations—if accepted—would necessarily imply the invalidity of an existing federal conviction and sentence that have not been invalidated.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit held that Hamett’s claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey because success on his theory (void protective order; spoliation proving innocence; “taint” of all charges) would necessarily imply the invalidity of his federal convictions and sentence, which have not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called into question by habeas relief.

The court also denied Hamett’s motion to proceed IFP on appeal under McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, reasoning that although he showed financial inability to pay, he did not present a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument—particularly because his appellate filings did not confront the Heck bar. The court dismissed the appeal, assessed a second strike under § 1915(g), and warned him about the “three strikes” consequence.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
  The controlling doctrine: a damages claim that would “necessarily imply the invalidity” of a conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless the conviction or sentence has been invalidated. The court emphasized the “favorable termination” requirement (no “termination of the prior criminal proceeding in favor of the accused”) and applied Heck directly to Hamett’s allegations.
• Parris v. United States, 45 F.3d 383 (10th Cir. 1995).
  The panel treated Parris as the Tenth Circuit’s adoption and operationalization of Heck: a plaintiff must show invalidation of the conviction/sentence before recovering damages for harm caused by unlawful actions that would render the conviction/sentence invalid. The court quoted Parris and used it to frame Hamett’s suit as “actually seeking further review of the basis for his conviction.”
• Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086 (10th Cir. 1996).
  The opinion relied on Crow to underscore that the Heck bar applies to federal prisoners, and that it is not limited to § 1983 suits challenging state convictions. The court expressly stated that the bar can apply whether the cause of action arises under Bivens, § 1983, or “some other statute.”
• Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
  While Hamett pleaded a Bivens theory, the court’s point was that the vehicle (Bivens vs. § 1983) does not avoid the Heck precondition when the claim would undermine an existing conviction.
• Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2018) and Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012).
  These cases provided the standard of review (de novo) and the pleading sufficiency threshold (“conceivable to plausible”) for affirming a dismissal for failure to state a claim.
• Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 63 F.4th 1264 (10th Cir. 2023).
  Cited for the principle that courts may consider matters subject to judicial notice when evaluating dismissal—an important step here because the panel supplemented the civil pleadings by noticing Hamett’s criminal case history.
• Childs v. Miller, 713 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2013) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
  These cases supplied the rule of liberal construction for pro se pleadings, which the panel applied but found insufficient to overcome Heck.
• Lamb v. Norwood, 899 F.3d 1159 (10th Cir. 2018).
  Cited as an example of screening authority in IFP/prisoner cases, supporting the district court’s threshold review for “frivolousness, failure to state a valid claim, and immunity.”
• United States v. Hamett, 961 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2020) and McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. 894 (2020).
  The panel used judicial notice of Hamett’s criminal proceedings for background. The discussion of McGirt explained how federal jurisdiction expanded for conduct on reservation land, but the civil case turned not on that merits question; it turned on whether Hamett’s convictions were invalidated (they were not).
• United States v. Hamett, No. 21-5063, 2022 WL 1789162 (10th Cir. June 2, 2022) (unpublished) and United States v. Hamett, No. 24-5017, 2024 WL 3084971 (10th Cir. June 21, 2024) (unpublished).
  Cited solely for procedural background, including that his later § 2255 effort was dismissed as untimely and a certificate of appealability was denied—reinforcing that his convictions remained intact.
• McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, 115 F.3d 809 (10th Cir. 1997) and Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
  These cases defined the IFP-on-appeal standard: financial inability plus a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument; and “frivolous” meaning lacking an arguable basis in law or fact. The panel applied them to deny IFP.
• Coleman v. Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015) and Payton v. Ballinger, 831 F. App'x 898 (10th Cir. 2020).
  These authorities framed the “three strikes” rule under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) and supported the court’s caution that Hamett was nearing the third strike threshold.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeded in a structured sequence:

• Step 1: Confirm screening and dismissal posture.
  Because Hamett proceeded IFP, the district court had authority—indeed a duty—to screen and dismiss claims that fail to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
• Step 2: Apply standard dismissal review and permissible materials.
  The court applied de novo review under Requena v. Roberts, accepted well-pleaded facts as true, and construed pro se allegations liberally under Childs v. Miller/Haines v. Kerner. It also relied on Clinton v. Sec. Benefit Life Ins. Co. and Fed. R. Evid. 201 to take judicial notice of the criminal-case record.
• Step 3: Identify whether the civil theory would undermine a standing conviction.
  Hamett alleged that the protective order was “void” for lack of jurisdiction and that officers spoliated evidence showing his innocence; he further alleged the void order was a predicate to the federal gun conviction and “taints all the other charges.” The panel treated these allegations as an attempt to establish that his convictions are unlawful.
• Step 4: Apply Heck v. Humphrey to bar damages claims absent invalidation.
  Because a judgment for Hamett on those contentions would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” Heck required dismissal unless he could show prior invalidation. The opinion found the opposite: there was no favorable termination, and his convictions and sentence remained intact.
• Step 5: Reject attempted end-runs around Heck via pleading labels.
  The court emphasized (via Parris v. United States and Crow v. Penry) that the Heck bar is not confined to state prisoners or to § 1983 labels—it also applies to federal prisoners and to claims styled under Bivens (and even “some other statute”).
• Step 6: Deny IFP on appeal and impose PLRA consequences.
  Under McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, IFP requires a nonfrivolous argument. The panel deemed the appeal frivolous under Neitzke v. Williams because Hamett did not even address Heck, the dispositive barrier. It then assessed a strike under § 1915(g) and cautioned him about the third strike, citing Coleman v. Tollefson and Payton v. Ballinger.

3.3 Impact

Although designated as nonprecedential, the order has clear practical significance and persuasive weight in three recurrent litigation settings:

• Malicious-prosecution and “wrongful conviction” damages suits by prisoners.
  The decision reinforces that allegations framed as “malicious prosecution” (or as evidentiary spoliation or jurisdictional defects) are still barred when their success would undermine an outstanding conviction. Plaintiffs must first obtain invalidation through direct appeal, executive action, state tribunal invalidation, or habeas relief as described in Heck v. Humphrey.
• Federal defendants and mixed pleading theories.
  By reiterating that Heck applies to federal prisoners and to actions arising under Bivens and § 1983, the panel discourages strategic relabeling of claims to bypass the favorable-termination rule.
• PLRA enforcement—IFP screening, frivolous appeals, and “three strikes.”
  The opinion illustrates a consequential procedural pathway: failure to grapple with a dispositive doctrine (here, Heck) can not only defeat the appeal but also deny IFP, trigger immediate fee liability, and add a strike under § 1915(g), accelerating loss of IFP eligibility.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Heck v. Humphrey bar (the “favorable termination” rule).
  You generally cannot sue for money damages claiming your conviction was obtained unlawfully if winning that lawsuit would mean the conviction must be invalid. First, you must get the conviction set aside (reversed, expunged, invalidated, or undermined by habeas).
• “Necessarily imply the invalidity.”
  If the civil court would have to agree that key foundations of the conviction were unlawful—e.g., “the predicate protective order was void” or “evidence was destroyed that proves I’m innocent”—then success in the civil case would effectively declare the conviction defective. That triggers Heck.
• Judicial notice (Fed. R. Evid. 201).
  Courts may rely on certain indisputable public records (like prior court proceedings) without requiring the parties to attach them to the complaint. Here, that allowed the court to fill in the details of Hamett’s criminal proceedings.
• § 1983 vs. Bivens.
  § 1983 is typically used for constitutional claims against state and local actors; Bivens is the analogous (but limited) doctrine for certain federal-actor constitutional claims. This opinion’s point: whichever label is used, Heck can still block the case.
• IFP and “three strikes” (PLRA).
  IFP lets indigent prisoners file without prepaying fees, but repeated frivolous or meritless cases lead to “strikes.” After three strikes, a prisoner generally cannot proceed IFP unless in imminent danger of serious physical injury.
• Spoliation.
  “Spoliation” means destruction or loss of evidence. Alleging spoliation to prove innocence can collide with Heck if the claim’s success would undermine a still-valid conviction.

5. Conclusion

Hamett v. City of Broken Arrow applies a straightforward but powerful rule: a prisoner cannot use a civil damages action—whether styled under § 1983 or Bivens—to attack the legitimacy of an outstanding conviction or sentence unless and until that conviction or sentence has been invalidated under the pathways identified in Heck v. Humphrey.

Procedurally, the decision also demonstrates the high stakes of PLRA screening and appellate IFP review: failing to confront a dispositive doctrine can render an appeal frivolous under Neitzke v. Williams, defeat IFP under McIntosh v. U.S. Parole Comm'n, and generate a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), bringing the litigant closer to the “three strikes” bar described in Coleman v. Tollefson.