Hague Service Convention Exclusivity: Email Service on China-Based Defendants Is Prohibited Where the Convention Applies

1. Introduction

Kangol LLC v. Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd. is a Seventh Circuit decision arising from a “Schedule A” Lanham Act enforcement action in the Northern District of Illinois—litigation commonly used by brand owners to target multiple e-commerce storefronts alleged to be selling counterfeit or infringing goods.

Kangol LLC (a hat and apparel company) sued numerous online vendors, including Hangzhou Chuanyue Silk Import & Export Co., Ltd. (“Hangzhou”), alleging trademark infringement and counterfeiting under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1), false designation and unfair competition under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and dilution under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). As is typical in Schedule A cases, Kangol sought expedited relief (a TRO) and requested permission to serve Hangzhou by email under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3).

After email service, Hangzhou engaged in settlement communications but did not appear; the district court entered default judgment, and Kangol later enforced the judgment by collecting funds from Hangzhou’s Amazon account. Hangzhou then appeared and moved to vacate the default judgment under Rule 60(b)(4), arguing the judgment was void because service by email in China violated the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (the “Hague Service Convention”), to which both the United States and China are parties.

The Seventh Circuit confronted a recurring Schedule A issue: whether the Hague Service Convention permits email service on defendants in China—and, as a predicate, whether the Convention applies at all when a defendant’s address is allegedly “not known.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of Hangzhou’s motion to vacate and remanded. The court held:

  • No waiver by Hangzhou: settlement negotiations alone did not waive a service objection, and Kangol’s waiver argument was itself waived because it was raised for the first time on appeal.
  • Timeliness under Rule 60(c)(1): applying Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, Hangzhou’s motion was filed within a reasonable time because it followed shortly after Kangol’s enforcement efforts.
  • Rule 69(a)(1) challenge rejected: Hangzhou’s Illinois post-judgment collection argument was forfeited below and, in any event, unsupported by the cited Illinois provisions.
  • Key holding on service: where the Hague Service Convention applies, it is exclusive and therefore prohibits email service in China because China has objected to Article 10(a) methods (and no other Convention provision authorizes email service).
  • But the court did not decide applicability: because the district court had not determined whether Hangzhou’s address was “not known” within the meaning of Article 1, the Seventh Circuit remanded for that threshold determination.

The court also declined to reach Hangzhou’s Article 15 default-judgment argument and restitution issues because those depend on whether service was “under the provisions” of the Convention.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and Their Role)

1) Schedule A context and service mechanics

  • Eicher Motors Ltd. v. P'ships and Unincorporated Assn's Identified on Schedule "A": cited to explain what “Schedule A cases” are and why service questions arise repeatedly in that posture.
  • Peanuts Worldwide LLC v. P'ships and Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule "A": cited to illustrate that email service under Rule 4(f)(3) is common in Schedule A litigation.

2) Waiver and preservation doctrine

  • Pable v. Chi. Transit Auth. and United States v. Hassebrock: used to dispose of Kangol’s newly-raised waiver theory and to emphasize the appellate court’s discretion to enforce waiver doctrines.
  • Hedeen Int'l, LLC v. Zing Toys, Inc.: supplied the Seventh Circuit’s waiver standard for objections to service/personal jurisdiction—waiver requires conduct that reasonably signals merits litigation or wastes judicial effort if jurisdiction is later denied.
  • Am. Patriot Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Mut. Risk Mgmt., Ltd.: crucially applied to hold that settlement discussions and delay (even nine months there) do not, without more, waive service objections.

3) Rule 60 timeliness and void-judgment review

  • Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC: the Supreme Court clarified that Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement applies even to Rule 60(b)(4) voidness motions, but without a fixed deadline. The Seventh Circuit relied on Coney Island’s recognition that, for default judgments, it may be reasonable to wait until enforcement efforts begin.
  • Philos Techs., Inc. v. Philos & D, Inc. (both 2011 and 2015 decisions): used to set the standards of review—abuse of discretion generally, but “less deferential” review when voidness for lack of jurisdiction is asserted; de novo review of legal jurisdiction questions and clear-error review of related facts.

4) Rule 69(a)(1) forfeiture principles

  • Hall v. Berryhill and Darif v. Holder: supported the district court’s ability to treat perfunctory arguments as waived and to disregard arguments raised for the first time in reply.

5) Hague Service Convention: exclusivity and interpretation

  • Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk: foundational authority defining service of process as “formal delivery of documents,” and holding that Hague compliance is mandatory where the Convention applies; also invoked for treaty-interpretation methodology (start with text and context).
  • Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. D. Ct. for the S.D. of Iowa: provided the “model exclusivity provision” framing: the Convention’s mandatory language excludes alternative practices where it applies.
  • Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon: reaffirmed that the Convention “specifies certain approved methods” and “pre-empts inconsistent methods of service” wherever it applies, and discussed Articles 11 and 19.
  • TRW Inc. v. Andrews: a general interpretive canon used by analogy—avoid constructions that render treaty clauses superfluous (supporting exclusivity via Articles 11 and 19).
  • Smart Study Co. v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi and SEC v. Lahr: persuasive circuit authority aligning with the “closed universe” view—Convention silence is not implicit permission for novel methods.
  • Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social v. Zimmer Biomet Holdings, Inc.: supplied the Seventh Circuit’s standard for de novo review of Hague Convention interpretation.

6) Address “not known” standard in Schedule A practice

  • NBA Props., Inc. v. P'ships and Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified in Schedule "A": cited for the district-court approach requiring “reasonably diligent efforts to ascertain and verify” a foreign defendant’s address before treating it as “not known” under Article 1.

7) Article 10(a) and the email-as-postal-channels split

  • Luxottica Grp. S.p.A. v. P'ships and Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified on Schedule "A" vs. NBA Props., Inc. v. P'ships and Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified in Schedule "A": the opinion noted conflicting district-court views on whether email could fit within Article 10(a)’s “postal channels.” The Seventh Circuit declined to resolve that interpretive dispute because China has objected to Article 10 methods, making 10(a) unavailable regardless.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Convention’s applicability is a threshold question (Article 1)

The opinion separates two inquiries that are often conflated in Schedule A practice: (i) whether the Hague Service Convention applies at all; and (ii) if it applies, whether the attempted service method is permitted.

Under Article 1, the Convention applies “where there is occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad,” but “shall not apply where the address of the person to be served with the document is not known.” The Seventh Circuit rejected as “hardly credible” Kangol’s suggestion that emailing a link to litigation papers is not transmission of a “document,” relying on Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk’s understanding of service as formal delivery of legally operative documents.

However, the court found the “address not known” issue fact-dependent and unresolved: Kangol asserted it found conflicting addresses (described as “stalls at an open-air market”), while Hangzhou claimed its address was readily discoverable. Because the district court did not decide whether Kangol’s efforts were “reasonably diligent” (as reflected in decisions like NBA Props., Inc. v. P'ships and Unincorporated Ass'ns Identified in Schedule "A"), the Seventh Circuit remanded for that determination.

2) If the Convention applies, it is exclusive—silence is not permission

The core doctrinal holding is the Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the district court’s premise that the Hague Service Convention allows any service method it does not expressly forbid. The Seventh Circuit concluded the opposite: the Convention’s text and structure show that, where it applies, it enumerates permissible methods and excludes others.

The opinion grounds exclusivity in:

  • Text: Article 1’s “shall apply” mandatory language, read in light of Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. D. Ct. for the S.D. of Iowa, Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, and Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon.
  • Structure: Articles 2–10 specify methods; Articles 11 and 19 would be unnecessary if parties could freely use any unlisted method. The opinion uses TRW Inc. v. Andrews’s anti-surplusage principle to reinforce this point.
  • Persuasive authority: alignment with Smart Study Co. v. Shenzhenshixindajixieyouxiangongsi and SEC v. Lahr that the Convention creates a “closed universe.”

3) Why email service fails in China under the Convention

Having concluded unenumerated service is barred, the court asked whether any Convention provision authorizes email service in China. It observed that no provision expressly authorizes email.

The only plausible textual hook is Article 10(a)’s reference to “postal channels,” but the Seventh Circuit found it unnecessary to decide whether email could ever qualify as a “postal channel,” because “it’s undisputed that China has objected to service under Article 10(a).” That objection forecloses reliance on Article 10(a) in China even under the most expansive “postal channels” reading.

Accordingly, if the Convention applies, service by email in China is “prohibit[ed]” and therefore cannot be authorized under Rule 4(f)(3), which allows alternative means only if “not prohibited by international agreement.”

C. Impact

1) Immediate procedural impact on Schedule A litigation in the Seventh Circuit

This opinion sharply limits a commonly used shortcut in Northern District of Illinois Schedule A cases: email service on China-based defendants is not available under Rule 4(f)(3) where the Hague Service Convention applies. Plaintiffs who previously relied on district-level decisions permitting email service must now either:

  • establish that the defendant’s address is “not known” after reasonably diligent efforts (thus taking the case outside the Convention), or
  • serve through Convention-compliant routes (typically via the destination state’s Central Authority), or
  • identify some other Convention-permitted mechanism (or an Article 11/19-authorized alternative) actually available in the destination state.

2) Increased focus on “address not known” fact development

Because the Seventh Circuit remanded on Article 1’s “address … not known” condition, future cases will likely see more robust evidentiary records on investigative steps taken to identify and verify foreign defendant addresses (platform records, payment processor data, shipment/return addresses, corporate registry searches, counsel-to-platform correspondence, etc.).

3) Greater vulnerability of defaults based on email service in China

Defendants who were defaulted after email service in China may cite this decision in Rule 60(b)(4) motions, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction if the Convention applied. The opinion also signals that enforcement activity may affect timeliness analysis under Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC, potentially encouraging defendants to move promptly after learning of collection actions.

4) Substantive treaty-interpretation significance

Beyond trademark cases, the opinion reinforces an exclusivity framework for Hague Service Convention analysis: treaty silence is not a safe harbor. Courts and litigants should treat the Convention as preempting non-enumerated service methods when applicable, unless a specific treaty article (or a valid declaration/authorization under Articles 11 or 19) supports the method.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Schedule A” case
A case (common in IP enforcement) suing many online sellers at once, with defendants listed in a sealed or filed schedule. Plaintiffs often seek rapid TROs, asset restraints, and expedited service.
Rule 4(f)(3) service
A federal rule allowing a court to authorize alternative service on foreign defendants (including email) so long as the method is “not prohibited by international agreement” and satisfies due process.
Hague Service Convention “exclusive”
If the Convention applies, it sets the permitted menu of service methods; methods outside that menu are not allowed merely because the treaty does not mention them.
Article 1: “address … not known”
The Convention does not apply if the defendant’s address is not known. Courts often require “reasonably diligent” efforts to find a usable address before allowing plaintiffs to proceed outside the Convention.
Article 10(a) and China’s objection
Article 10(a) allows service through “postal channels” only if the destination country does not object. China has objected, so plaintiffs cannot rely on Article 10(a) to justify service there.
Rule 60(b)(4) void judgment
A judgment is “void” if the court lacked jurisdiction (often because service was defective). If void, courts generally must vacate it. Rule 60(c)(1) still requires the motion be filed within a “reasonable time,” as clarified by Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton Trustee for Vista-Pro Automotive, LLC.
Article 15
A Hague Convention provision limiting when default judgment may be entered if service was made under the Convention. The Seventh Circuit declined to address it until the district court decides whether the Convention applies in the first place.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s principal contribution is a clear rule for Hague Service Convention cases in its jurisdiction: where the Convention applies, it is exclusive and therefore forbids email service on defendants in China (given China’s objection to Article 10(a) and the absence of any other authorizing provision). The decision simultaneously underscores that applicability matters: if the defendant’s address is truly “not known” after reasonably diligent efforts, Article 1 may place the case outside the Convention.

For litigants and courts—especially in Schedule A trademark and counterfeiting suits—the opinion shifts the center of gravity from broad Rule 4(f)(3) email-service orders toward (i) a more exacting factual inquiry into address discoverability and (ii) Convention-compliant service pathways where an address is knowable.