A User-Specific Arbitration Agreement Does Not Delegate or Require Arbitration of Wrongful-Death Claims Arising from Another Person’s Use

Introduction

Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc. addresses whether a person’s individual agreement to arbitrate disputes connected with her own use of Uber’s services can control wrongful-death claims arising exclusively from another person’s use of those services. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that it cannot.

Mark Geller was fatally injured after an Uber driver, Ejaz Rathore, lost control of the vehicle in which Mark was riding. Mark’s wife, Gloria Sheridan Geller, acting as independent administrator of his estate, sued Uber Technologies, Inc., Rasier, LLC, and Rathore. The complaint asserted survival, wrongful-death, negligence, and res ipsa loquitur theories.

Both Mark and Sheridan had separately accepted Uber terms containing arbitration provisions and clauses assigning threshold questions of arbitrability to an arbitrator. The central issue was whether Sheridan’s personal agreement—limited to claims connected with her own access to or use of Uber’s services—required arbitration of either the arbitrability or the merits of wrongful-death claims arising from Mark’s separate use of Uber.

Procedural Background

1. The circuit court compelled arbitration of the estate’s survival claims under Mark’s agreement but refused to compel arbitration of the wrongful-death claims under Sheridan’s agreement.
2. The estate voluntarily dismissed the survival claims.
3. The appellate court reversed, reasoning that Sheridan’s agreement contained a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator to determine whether the wrongful-death claims were arbitrable.
4. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the appellate court, affirmed the circuit court, and remanded for litigation of the wrongful-death claims.

Summary of the Opinion

The court resolved two distinct questions:

1. Who decides arbitrability? The court held that Sheridan did not clearly and unmistakably agree to delegate the arbitrability of these wrongful-death claims to an arbitrator.
2. Are the wrongful-death claims themselves subject to arbitration? The court held that they are not because Sheridan’s agreement governed disputes arising from her own use of Uber, while the claims arose exclusively from Mark’s use and death.

The court emphasized that a delegation clause is itself a specialized arbitration agreement. Before enforcing it, a court must determine whether the parties agreed to delegate arbitrability for the particular category of dispute at issue. Sheridan’s agreement repeatedly tied arbitration to “your” access to, use of, or relationship with Uber. In context, “your” referred to Sheridan as the individual account holder—not to Mark or to Sheridan acting in a legally distinct representative capacity.

Because no agreement covered arbitrability or the merits of the wrongful-death dispute, the court did not decide whether Uber’s terms were procedurally or substantively unconscionable.

Analysis

1. Wrongful-Death and Survival Claims Are Legally Distinct

The court began with the nature of an Illinois wrongful-death action. The Wrongful Death Act creates a cause of action for losses suffered by the surviving spouse and next of kin because of the decedent’s death. Although the personal representative must bring the action, that representative acts as a nominal party or statutory trustee for the beneficiaries, who are the true parties in interest.

A survival action is different. It preserves claims that accrued to the injured person before death and permits the decedent’s representative to pursue them. Survival damages concern injuries suffered by the decedent before death; wrongful-death damages compensate the next of kin for losses resulting from the death.

This distinction explains why Mark’s arbitration agreement could control claims that had belonged to him, such as survival claims, but could not by itself limit the statutory beneficiaries’ separate wrongful-death rights.

Sheridan also occupied three distinct legal capacities:

• an individual Uber account holder;
• a statutory wrongful-death beneficiary; and
• the estate’s independent administrator and personal representative.

Consent given in the first capacity did not automatically constitute consent in the other capacities, particularly where the contract was expressly tied to Sheridan’s personal use of Uber.

2. Delegation Is a Matter of Contractual Consent

Arbitration is based on consent. The same is true of a delegation clause assigning threshold questions—such as scope, applicability, formation, or enforceability—to an arbitrator. Courts may enforce such a clause only when there is clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to delegate the relevant arbitrability dispute.

Sheridan’s agreement contained broad delegation language and incorporated American Arbitration Association rules. Those features may establish delegation in an otherwise covered dispute. They did not, however, eliminate the agreement’s user-specific limits.

The arbitration section covered disputes arising from:

• “your” access to or use of Uber’s services;
• personal injuries connected with “your” use;
• “your” relationship with Uber; and
• third-party claims whose underlying claims related to “your” use.

The fatal accident resulted from Mark’s use of Uber, not Sheridan’s. Reading the delegation clause within the agreement as a whole, the court found no clear and unmistakable assent to delegate arbitrability of claims arising solely from a different person’s account, contract, and transportation activity.

3. The Court Distinguished Formation of Delegation from Scope

Uber characterized the dispute as an ordinary question about the scope of an arbitration agreement—a question that the delegation clause assigned to an arbitrator. The court rejected that characterization.

Before asking whether a claim falls within the scope of a delegated issue, a court must determine whether the parties formed an agreement to delegate arbitrability for that kind of dispute. The appellate court had effectively merged those inquiries. It identified the delegation clause and proceeded as though its existence alone required arbitration of every scope dispute between Sheridan and Uber.

The Supreme Court instead asked the antecedent question: Did Sheridan clearly and unmistakably agree to let an arbitrator decide arbitrability of a wrongful-death claim arising from Mark’s independent use? The contract’s language supplied no such agreement.

4. The Federal Arbitration Act Did Not Expand the Agreement

The agreement expressly adopted the Federal Arbitration Act. Section 2 of the FAA concerns written provisions requiring arbitration of controversies arising out of the contract or transaction. The court treated this language as reinforcing the contractual limitation: Sheridan’s agreement contemplated disputes tied to her own transaction and relationship with Uber.

The FAA requires arbitration agreements to be enforced according to their terms, but it does not enlarge those terms or create consent where none exists. It therefore did not authorize arbitration of a dispute arising exclusively from Mark’s separate use of Uber.

5. No Revival of the “Wholly Groundless” Exception

Uber argued that judicially examining whether the wrongful-death claims were sufficiently related to Sheridan’s agreement improperly revived the “wholly groundless” exception rejected by the United States Supreme Court.

The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. Under the rejected exception, a court could disregard an otherwise valid delegation clause because it considered the argument for arbitration frivolous or wholly groundless. Here, the court was not evaluating the strength of an arbitrability argument after finding a valid delegation. It was deciding whether the parties had agreed to delegate this dispute at all.

Thus, the decision preserves the distinction between:

• Formation and existence of delegation: initially for the court; and
• Merits of arbitrability under a valid delegation: for the arbitrator, even if the arbitration argument appears weak.

6. The Underlying Claims Were Not Arbitrable

After concluding that no valid delegation covered the dispute, the court itself decided arbitrability. It held that the wrongful-death claims were outside Sheridan’s agreement for essentially the same textual reason: the agreement covered disputes related to her own use, while the complaint arose from Mark’s use and death.

Sheridan was also a nonsignatory to Mark’s agreement for purposes of her independent wrongful-death rights. Her role as estate administrator did not transform those statutory claims into assets that had belonged to Mark or make her personally bound by his arbitration agreement.

Precedents Cited

Wrongful Death, Survival, and Representative Capacity

• Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Co.—identified in the opinion as both Carter I and Carter II—was the principal Illinois precedent. Carter II established that a decedent’s arbitration agreement may bind the estate on survival claims but does not bind statutory beneficiaries on wrongful-death claims. The decision supplied the foundation for treating Mark’s and Sheridan’s legal rights separately.
• Glenn v. Johnson explained that the personal representative is a nominal party acting for the spouse and next of kin, who are the true beneficial plaintiffs.
• Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering explained that requiring one action through the personal representative avoids multiple suits and protects all beneficiaries.
• Wyness v. Armstrong World Industry, Inc. distinguished survival damages suffered by the decedent before death from losses suffered by next of kin after death.
• National Bank of Bloomington v. Podgorski supported the conclusion that wrongful-death proceeds belong to the next of kin rather than to the decedent’s estate.
• Williams v. Manchester supplied historical context for the enactment of wrongful-death legislation.
• Johnson v. Armstrong was cited for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, one of the complaint’s negligence theories, but it did not materially determine the arbitration issue.

Consent, Delegation, and Judicial Gatekeeping

• First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan supplied the central “clear and unmistakable evidence” standard. It also recognizes a presumption that courts, rather than arbitrators, decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.
• AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America established that arbitrators derive authority solely from the parties’ agreement.
• Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson described a delegation clause as an antecedent agreement to arbitrate threshold issues. It supported treating delegation as a separate contractual commitment that must itself be valid.
• Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters and Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. supported judicial resolution of disputes concerning whether an arbitration agreement was formed.
• Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. rejected the “wholly groundless” exception. The Illinois Supreme Court treated it as controlling only after a valid delegation covering the dispute has been established.
• New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira confirmed that a court must determine whether the FAA authorizes enforcement before sending arbitrability to an arbitrator, even when a delegation clause exists.
• Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski emphasized that the first question is what the parties actually agreed to and that courts must identify the governing agreement before enforcing a delegation clause.
• Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University reinforced that arbitration is a matter of consent and that the FAA enforces agreements according to—not beyond—their terms.

Arbitrability Compared with Procedural Questions

• Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. distinguished gateway questions of arbitrability, generally for courts, from procedural questions presumptively for arbitrators.
• John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston treated compliance with preliminary grievance procedures as an issue for the arbitrator.
• Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. treated waiver, delay, and similar procedural defenses as matters generally for arbitrators.

Contract Formation and Interpretation

• Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. and Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever supplied Illinois contract principles requiring offer, acceptance, consideration, definite terms, and mutual assent.
• Buenz v. Frontline Transportation Co. supported reading contractual language in context rather than isolating the delegation clause from the user-specific arbitration terms surrounding it.
• Allscripts Healthcare, LLC v. Etransmedia Technology, Inc. recognized that incorporating AAA rules may support delegation. The court distinguished that principle because incorporation could not overcome the agreement’s substantive limitation to Sheridan’s own use.

Unrelated Transactions and Third-Party Use

• Peterson v. Devita was the closest Illinois appellate analogue. It held that an Airbnb user was not required to arbitrate claims arising from a property booking made by someone else because the injuries did not result from the plaintiff’s use of Airbnb.
• Moritz v. Universal City Studios LLC supported the proposition that agreeing to arbitrate one contractual relationship does not create a perpetual obligation to arbitrate unrelated disputes.
• Slaughter v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. similarly found that a delegation clause did not reach claims arising from a separate course of dealing.
• Perez v. Discover Bank rejected an interpretation that would use an earlier, unrelated contract to compel arbitration of later discrimination claims.
• Revitch v. DIRECTV, LLC rejected the theory that a consumer intended to arbitrate every future dispute with unknown affiliates regardless of its connection to the referenced service.
• Olson v. FCA US, LLC supported the absence of clear and unmistakable assent where a third party lacked a sufficient connection to the underlying arbitration agreement.
• Matthew-Ajayi v. Airbnb, Inc. was cited as additional authority against compelling arbitration of unrelated disputes.

Contrasting Authority

• Airbnb, Inc. v. Rice took a broader view, concluding that Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. foreclosed a “wholly unrelated” exception and required an arbitrator to decide arbitrability.
• Tao v. Murphy recognized tension between that approach and the FAA’s “arising out of” limitation, holding that a delegation agreement did not reach a wholly unrelated dispute arising from another person’s conduct.

Additional Authorities

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, Dimick v. Schiedt, and People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce underscored the importance of the civil jury-trial right. Salsitz v. Kreiss established that an order granting or denying arbitration is injunctive and immediately appealable. Clanton v. Oakbrook Healthcare Centre, Ltd. supplied de novo review. In re Donald A.G. supported avoiding absurd contractual results.

The court also discussed Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., Archer & White Sales, Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc., Simply Wireless, Inc. v. T-Mobile US, Inc., Douglas v. Regions Bank, Turi v. Main Street Adoption Servs., LLP, and Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp. when explaining the history and rejection of the “wholly groundless” doctrine.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Arbitrability

Whether a dispute must be decided in arbitration rather than in court.

Delegation clause

A contractual provision giving the arbitrator authority to decide whether a dispute is arbitrable.

Clear and unmistakable evidence

The heightened showing required before a court concludes that parties surrendered judicial determination of arbitrability.

Survival claim

A claim that belonged to the decedent before death and continues through the estate.

Wrongful-death claim

A statutory claim compensating the spouse and next of kin for losses caused by the death.

Personal representative as nominal party

The representative formally files the wrongful-death action but acts for the statutory beneficiaries, who hold the beneficial interest.

Nonsignatory

A person who did not agree to the relevant contract and ordinarily cannot be compelled to arbitrate under it.

Res ipsa loquitur

A doctrine allowing negligence to be inferred when an accident ordinarily would not occur without negligence and the relevant instrumentality was under the defendant’s control.

Unconscionability

A defense based on unfair contracting procedures, unfair terms, or both. The court did not decide it because no agreement covered this dispute.

“Wholly groundless” exception

A rejected doctrine under which a court could disregard a valid delegation clause if the argument for arbitration appeared frivolous. The court held that determining whether a delegation agreement exists is different from using this exception.

Impact of the Decision

• User-specific arbitration terms will be read literally. A clause covering claims related to “your use” ordinarily will not reach injuries arising solely from another person’s account or transaction.
• The existence of a delegation clause is not conclusive. Courts must first determine whether the parties agreed to delegate arbitrability of the particular dispute.
• Different legal capacities remain significant. Consent given as an individual consumer does not automatically bind the same person acting as estate representative or statutory beneficiary.
• Wrongful-death rights remain distinct from estate assets. A decedent’s arbitration agreement generally controls survival claims but does not automatically bind wrongful-death beneficiaries.
• The FAA does not create limitless arbitration duties. It enforces actual agreements but does not turn one consumer contract into an obligation to arbitrate every future controversy between the same parties.
• Future litigation may focus on the formation-scope boundary. Courts will need to distinguish a permissible inquiry into whether delegation was agreed upon from an impermissible judicial assessment of arbitrability after valid delegation.

The holding is limited. It does not invalidate Uber’s delegation clauses generally, revive the “wholly groundless” exception, or hold that wrongful-death claims can never be arbitrated. It holds that these particular terms did not demonstrate Sheridan’s consent to arbitrate claims arising solely from Mark’s separate use.

Conclusion

Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc. reinforces the contractual foundation of arbitration. A delegation clause cannot be detached from the agreement containing it and applied to an unrelated transaction merely because the parties have some other contractual relationship.

Sheridan agreed to arbitrate disputes arising from her own use of Uber. She did not clearly and unmistakably agree to delegate, or ultimately arbitrate, statutory wrongful-death claims arising from Mark’s independent use and death. The wrongful-death action may therefore proceed in the circuit court.