FTCA Presentment Requires “Receipt” by the Agency, Not Suspicious Emails to Random Employees

I. Introduction

In Jessica Hernandez v. United States (11th Cir. June 8, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), plaintiffs Jessica Hernandez and Sheila C. Figueroa sought relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) for injuries allegedly caused when a United States Postal Service (“USPS”) truck ran a stop sign and collided with Hernandez’s vehicle in Boynton Beach, Florida (Nov. 16, 2020). The case turned not on negligence, but on whether the plaintiffs satisfied the FTCA’s administrative “presentment” prerequisite within the two-year limitations period.

The core issues were: (1) whether emails attaching Standard Form 95 (“SF-95”) sent to non-claims USPS employees could satisfy FTCA presentment; (2) whether a “constructive filing” doctrine could deem the claims timely; and (3) whether equitable tolling could excuse an untimely SF-95 mailing where counsel had been told exactly how to file.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. It held that, even assuming email can sometimes qualify as presentment, the plaintiffs’ June 24, 2022 emails did not “present” their claims because they were sent to geographically remote USPS employees unrelated to tort claims, looked suspicious, and were not reasonably processable as claims. The court also rejected constructive filing (even assuming its availability) because the USPS could not be said to have “receive[d]” a compliant claim, and because the governing transfer regulation addresses misdirected claims between agencies—not to the wrong employee within the right agency. Finally, it denied equitable tolling because no extraordinary circumstances prevented timely, proper filing; counsel had clear written instructions and simply failed to comply.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Dimanche v. Brown, 783 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2015) and Bryant v. Rich, 530 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2008): The panel described standards of review (clear error for factual findings; de novo for application of the limitations bar), and explained the district court’s procedural choice to resolve disputed facts using a “matter in abatement” approach borrowed from Bryant (developed in the PLRA exhaustion context).
  • United States v. Wong, 575 U.S. 402 (2015): Cited to note that 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)’s time bar is non-jurisdictional, which typically pushes timeliness disputes into Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56 frameworks. The panel ultimately avoided deciding whether the district court’s Bryant-style procedure was erroneous because the parties did not challenge it on appeal.
  • Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 2002), Marine Coatings of Alabama, Inc. v. United States, 792 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1986), and Galanti v. United States, 709 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1983): Used to support waiver/abandonment and harmless-error principles—reinforcing that procedural objections not raised are forfeited, and that lack of formal notice can be harmless where parties fully litigate the issue.
  • Burchfield v. United States, 168 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 1999): Provided the policy foundation for presentment: giving agencies a fair opportunity to investigate and settle before litigation, reducing congestion and unnecessary suits. The panel used Burchfield to explain why “random” suspicious emails do not serve the statutory objective.
  • Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United States, 717 F.3d 840 (11th Cir. 2013) and Greene v. United States, 872 F.2d 236 (8th Cir. 1989): Discussed the “constructive filing” doctrine derived from 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1). The panel noted that the Eleventh Circuit has “yet to adopt” constructive filing for FTCA claims (Motta), but assumed arguendo it could apply—then held it still would not save these plaintiffs.
  • Wright v. Waste Pro USA, Inc., 69 F.4th 1332 (11th Cir. 2023) and Dotson v. United States, 30 F.4th 1259 (11th Cir. 2022): Supplied the equitable-tolling standard: tolling is reserved for “extraordinary circumstances” beyond the plaintiff’s control and unavoidable even with diligence, with the burden on the plaintiff.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Presentment under the FTCA requires agency “receipt” in a meaningful sense

The FTCA bars a claim unless it is “presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years” after accrual. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (administrative presentment prerequisite to suit). Because the statutes do not define “present,” the court relied heavily on USPS regulations:

  • 39 C.F.R. § 912.5(a): a claim is “presented” when USPS “receives” an executed SF-95 from the claimant/agent.
  • 39 C.F.R. § 912.4: claims “should” be filed with the Tort Claims Coordinator for the district where the accident occurred, but “may be filed at any office of the Postal Service, or sent directly to the Chief Counsel, Torts, General Law Service Center.”

The plaintiffs conceded on appeal that their physical mailings did not constitute timely presentment; their case rose or fell on the June 24, 2022 emails. The panel did not definitively decide whether email can ever constitute presentment under §§ 2401(b) and 2675(a). Instead, it held that these emails failed because they were sent to employees outside the tort-claims channel, outside South Florida, and in roles unrelated to tort claims. Critically, the emails bore “hallmarks of a phishing scam” and were handled accordingly: one employee deleted the email; the other flagged it via “Cyber-Safe” with the comment “Does not look legit.” The court’s bottom line was functional: presentment must be effectuated in a way that can reasonably trigger agency processing and settlement evaluation; a suspicious email blast to random employees does not.

The panel also rejected an expansive reading of “any office of the Postal Service” to include any employee inbox, warning that such a reading would be unworkable (given USPS’s workforce scale) and would render the regulation effectively meaningless.

2. The USPS Administrative Support Manual did not salvage the emails

Plaintiffs relied on the USPS Administrative Support Manual (“ASM”), which states that written tort claims “must be accepted at any Post Office or other postal facility,” and directs any employee who “receives a completed tort claim form or other writing indicating that it is a claim” to date-stamp it and forward it to the district tort claims coordinator.

Even assuming the ASM’s provisions could bind employees, the panel treated them as operational instructions about handling recognizable claims—not as redefining statutory/regulatory “presentment.” And, factually, the court agreed with the district court’s assessment that the email was so suspicious it did not even clearly indicate it was a claim in a manner that would trigger the ASM’s handling steps.

3. Constructive filing: not intra-agency, and not without compliant “receipt”

The “constructive filing” doctrine flows from 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1), which requires a federal agency that receives a misdirected claim to transfer it “forthwith” to the appropriate agency (or return it). Under Motta ex rel. A.M. v. United States, some courts treat a claim as timely when (i) the wrong agency receives a claim that otherwise complies with § 14.2(a) in time, and (ii) that wrong agency fails to transfer/return it.

The Eleventh Circuit assumed arguendo that constructive filing could exist, but held it could not apply here for two independent reasons:

  • Textual fit: § 14.2(b)(1) addresses misdirection to the wrong agency, not the wrong employee within the same agency.
  • Threshold failure under § 14.2(a): constructive filing requires the “recei[pt]” of an executed SF-95 or equivalent written notice “accompanied by a claim for money damages in a sum certain.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). Given the suspicious nature of the emails and their treatment by the recipients, the court found USPS could not be said to have “receive[d]” a compliant presentment.

4. Equitable tolling: attorney missteps with clear instructions are not “extraordinary circumstances”

Applying Dotson v. United States and Wright v. Waste Pro USA, Inc., the panel held equitable tolling requires extraordinary circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s control and unavoidable with diligence. The record cut strongly against tolling:

  • USPS sent counsel letters in December 2020 and January 2021 explaining FTCA (not Florida sovereign immunity), specifying SF-95, and identifying where/who to send it to.
  • Counsel had roughly twenty-two months to comply, yet did not successfully mail the SF-95 to the correct recipient until 12 days after the deadline.
  • The asserted “extraordinary” circumstance—that USPS did not accept the emails—was rejected because the emails were not a reliable or reasonable submission method in context (and were treated as a phishing risk).

The panel also underscored that “notice” is not enough. Presentment requires, at minimum, a “sum certain” demand (28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a)), and equitable tolling does not turn on whether the agency had generalized awareness of an incident.

C. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is a clear warning about the practical meaning of FTCA “presentment” in the digital era:

  • Functional receipt matters: a claimant cannot satisfy presentment by sending an attachment to random agency employees in a way that reasonably appears unsafe or unprocessable.
  • Follow agency instructions: where an agency provides explicit directions and warns against electronic submission (as USPS did here), failure to comply will be difficult to excuse.
  • Constructive filing remains constrained: even assuming the doctrine exists in the Eleventh Circuit, this opinion signals it is unlikely to be expanded to intra-agency routing mistakes, and it still requires actual “receipt” of a compliant claim.
  • Equitable tolling remains exceptional: routine law-office error, delegation issues, and last-minute mishandling—especially after clear written guidance—will not qualify as “extraordinary.”

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • FTCA “presentment”: Before suing the United States, you must first submit a written administrative claim to the correct federal agency within two years. It is not enough to intend to sue or to notify the government of an accident; the submission must be in a form and manner the agency can actually process.
  • SF-95: A standard federal form used to present FTCA claims. It typically includes facts of the incident and a specific dollar amount demanded.
  • “Sum certain”: The claim must demand a definite amount of money. Without it, the agency cannot evaluate settlement and the claim is defective.
  • Constructive filing: A limited doctrine (derived from regulation) that can treat a claim as timely when it is sent to the wrong federal agency in time and that agency fails to transfer/return it as required.
  • Equitable tolling: A narrow safety valve that pauses a deadline only when truly extraordinary events beyond the plaintiff’s control made timely filing impossible despite diligence.

V. Conclusion

Hernandez v. United States reinforces a practical rule: FTCA presentment is not satisfied by emailing a claim form to arbitrary agency employees—especially where the message looks like a phishing attempt and never reaches personnel responsible for tort claims. The court’s reasoning ties presentment to its settlement-centric purpose: enabling an agency to identify, evaluate, and resolve claims before litigation. The opinion also narrows the usefulness of constructive filing (at least on these facts) and reaffirms that equitable tolling is reserved for truly extraordinary impediments, not correctable law-office failures in the face of clear agency instructions.