1. Introduction
This mortgage-foreclosure appeal examines the relationship between relief from a procedural default and the finality of an earlier determination of liability. Helena Laurino sought to reopen an unopposed 2019 summary judgment order nearly five years after its entry, attributing her failure to oppose the motion to former counsel and others assisting her. She also challenged the lender’s statutory compliance, the referee’s report, the authority of a mortgage-servicing employee, and the substitution of the mortgage assignee as plaintiff.
The Third Department affirmed the order confirming the referee’s report and directing foreclosure and sale. Its central conclusion was that an unsupported account of law-office failure did not establish a reasonable excuse for the default, particularly given the lengthy delay and the litigation’s advanced stage. Without vacating that default, Laurino could not use the later confirmation proceedings to reopen issues already resolved against her.
The opinion principally reinforces established rules rather than announces a new statutory test. Its significance lies in applying those rules together: a borrower must first overcome the procedural default before reopening foreclosure liability, while challenges properly directed to the referee’s calculations and supporting evidence remain subject to independent judicial scrutiny.
4. Analysis
A. Legal Reasoning
1. Vacatur required both an adequate excuse and a meritorious defense
The governing framework required Laurino to demonstrate both a reasonable excuse for failing to oppose summary judgment and a meritorious defense. These are cumulative requirements: a potentially strong defense does not, by itself, cure an inadequately explained default.
The court acknowledged that Supreme Court retains inherent authority to vacate an order in the interest of justice even after the statutory one-year period under CPLR 5015(a)(1) has expired. Accordingly, the application was not rejected merely because the order was old. The decisive question was whether the circumstances justified discretionary relief.
Appellate review was correspondingly deferential. The Third Department reviewed Supreme Court’s exercise of discretion for clear abuse, rather than deciding the application afresh.
2. Law-office failure must be explained, not merely asserted
CPLR 2005 permits courts to accept law-office failure as an excuse in appropriate circumstances. The opinion nevertheless distinguishes an adequately documented, inadvertent mistake from vague allegations or repeated neglect.
Laurino supplied only her own affidavit asserting failures by former counsel and numerous other individuals involved in the foreclosure and a related bankruptcy matter. She provided no supporting explanation establishing why those individuals remained unaware of the 2019 order throughout the intervening years. Supreme Court considered that account implausible, and the appellate court found no abuse of discretion.
The decision should not be read as holding that a party’s affidavit can never establish law-office failure. The defect was the affidavit’s conclusory and uncorroborated account in the circumstances presented. Nor does the decision eliminate relief for isolated attorney mistakes; it expressly recognizes that adequately explained mistakes may be excused.
3. Delay and litigation progress reinforced the refusal to reopen the case
The nearly five-year interval mattered because of what had occurred during it. A referee had already calculated the debt, and the foreclosure was approaching completion. The court considered the prejudice to Wilmington from reopening liability at that stage particularly significant.
This is a contextual assessment, not a categorical rule that an order becomes immune from vacatur after five years. The court combined the inadequate explanation, the duration of the delay, and the advanced procedural posture.
4. Confirmation proceedings could not substitute for vacating the liability order
Once vacatur failed, the 2019 summary judgment order remained operative. Laurino’s arguments concerning RPAPL article 13 therefore could not proceed, and her attack on the evidence establishing repayment default attempted to reopen an issue already resolved.
This distinction separates two stages of foreclosure litigation: establishing the right to foreclose, and determining the amount due and the manner of sale. Opposition at the second stage does not automatically reopen matters resolved at the first.
The holding is tied to the challenges presented and the existing unvacated order. It should not be enlarged into a declaration that every conceivable statutory or jurisdictional objection is extinguished by any default.
5. The referee’s recommendations remained subject to judicial evaluation
A referee’s report is advisory, not binding. Under CPLR 4403, the court may reject the report, make its own findings, receive further testimony, or direct further proceedings. Nevertheless, confirmation is appropriate when the findings are supported by the record.
The court identified adequate support for the challenged aspects of this report:
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Authority of the servicing employee: The limited power of attorney broadly authorized Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC to execute documents reasonably necessary for its servicing duties. Its supervisor, Dennis Micek, expressly stated that he was authorized to provide the information in his affidavit and had personal knowledge of the relevant records. Laurino supplied nothing contradicting those representations.
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Sale as one parcel: The report’s documentary schedule identified the tax search as its basis. That search described a single-family dwelling under a single tax account number.
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Debt computations: After her legal objections were rejected, Laurino offered no admissible evidence showing an error in the referee’s calculations.
The absence of contrary evidence was important, but it did not replace the need for affirmative record support. The court first examined the support for the report and then emphasized the absence of an admissible factual rebuttal.
6. Documentary proof supported substitution following the transfer
In a footnote, the court rejected Laurino’s challenge to substitution under CPLR 1018. The motion included the note endorsed in blank and the mortgage assignment executed after commencement. These documents supported substituting Wilmington as the party in interest and defeated the related claim that Micek’s affidavit lacked probative value.
This ruling concerns continuation of an existing action following a transfer. It should not be confused with a blanket holding that a mortgage assignment alone necessarily establishes every element of entitlement to enforce the note.
B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
The opinion draws heavily on established Third and Second Department authority, together with First Department and Court of Appeals decisions on particular evidentiary and enforcement issues. The roles described below follow the propositions for which the supplied opinion cites the cases; where it uses a contrasting citation, it does not provide a detailed account of that precedent’s facts.
1. The requirements for vacating a default and the standard of review
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Deutsche Bank Natl. Trust Co. v Tardi-Osterhoudt, 237 AD3d 1439, 1440 (3d Dept 2025), supplies the foundational requirement of both a reasonable excuse and a meritorious claim. That conjunctive test made Laurino’s inadequate excuse dispositive.
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Zeledon v Zeledon, 250 AD3d 1520, 1523 (3d Dept 2026), establishes that inherent judicial authority to vacate an order in the interest of justice survives expiration of CPLR 5015(a)(1)’s one-year period. It preserved the possibility of relief without requiring that relief be granted.
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Reverse Mtge. Solutions, Inc. v Lawrence, 200 AD3d 1146, 1148 (3d Dept 2021), supplies the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Its importance is procedural: the appellate court needed a clear abuse to disturb Supreme Court’s rejection of the excuse.
2. When law-office failure qualifies as a reasonable excuse
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Nationstar Mtge. LLC v Sheeley, 226 AD3d 1185, 1186 (3d Dept 2024), recognizes that a detailed, credible explanation of law-office failure may be accepted in the absence of willfulness, deliberate default, or prejudice. It supplies the potentially favorable rule that Laurino’s proof failed to satisfy.
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Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v Talukder, 176 AD3d 772, 774 (2d Dept 2019), and Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Rodriguez, 197 AD3d 784, 786 (2d Dept 2021), supply the complementary limitation: conclusory, undetailed, and uncorroborated allegations do not establish a reasonable excuse. The court used both decisions directly against Laurino’s affidavit.
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Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v Banks, 198 AD3d 1222, 1224 (3d Dept 2021), distinguishes an isolated inadvertent mistake from repeated neglect. It explains why attributing years of inaction to professional assistance does not itself establish excusable law-office failure.
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CitiMortgage, Inc. v Ramlal, 238 AD3d 976, 978 (2d Dept 2025), provides the formulation that conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations are insufficient. Selene Fin., L.P. v Ng, 218 AD3d 619, 620 (2d Dept 2023), White v Daimler Chrysler Corp., 44 AD3d 651, 651–652 (2d Dept 2007), and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Cervini, 84 AD3d 789, 790 (2d Dept 2011), reinforce that evidentiary requirement.
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Bank of N.Y. Mellon v Colucci, 138 AD3d 1047, 1048 (2d Dept 2016), is cited with Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., N.A. v Talukder to support treating the explanation as insufficient neglect rather than an adequately demonstrated basis for relief.
3. Prejudice, delay, and the consequences of failing to establish an excuse
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Gootnick v Gootnick, 241 AD3d 1292, 1293 (2d Dept 2025), supports considering the prejudice associated with reopening an old order at an advanced stage of litigation.
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Ditech Fin., LLC v Connolly, 230 AD3d 647, 649 (2d Dept 2024), Zoom Tan, Inc. v Monforte, 227 AD3d 1237, 1238 (3d Dept 2024), and Luderowski v Sexton, 152 AD3d 918, 920 (3d Dept 2017), appear as contrasting authorities. Their placement underscores that prejudice and delay require contextual evaluation; the present court found the circumstances unfavorable to Laurino.
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U.S. Bank N.A. v Thibault, 248 AD3d 1350, 1352 (3d Dept 2026), supplies the decisive sequencing principle: once the reasonable-excuse showing fails, the court need not decide whether the proposed defense is meritorious.
4. RPAPL arguments after an unsuccessful attempt to vacate default
The court cites HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Coxall, 239 AD3d 714, 716–717 (2d Dept 2025); U.S. Bank N.A. v Goldberger, 211 AD3d 1077, 1078 (2d Dept 2022); US Bank N.A. v Oliver, 180 AD3d 843, 844 (2d Dept 2020); Bank of Am., N.A. v Agarwal, 150 AD3d 651, 652 (2d Dept 2017); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Clayton, 146 AD3d 942, 944 (2d Dept 2017), leave denied 29 NY3d 1073 (2017); and PHH Mtge. Corp. v Celestin, 130 AD3d 703, 704 (2d Dept 2015).
These decisions collectively support the procedural barrier to Laurino’s RPAPL article 13 contentions while her default remains unvacated. The additional citation to U.S. Bank N.A. v Thibault, 248 AD3d at 1351–1352, links that Second Department line of authority to the Third Department’s own recent jurisprudence. Their function is not to decide whether Wilmington actually violated a particular notice requirement, but to explain why Laurino could not obtain review of those contentions in this posture.
5. Confirmation of a referee’s report and the court’s continuing authority
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Nationstar Mtge. LLC v O'Brien, 231 AD3d 1392, 1393 (3d Dept 2024), and Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy., FSB v Helal, 211 AD3d 991, 993 (2d Dept 2022), establish that a referee’s report should be confirmed when supported by the record.
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Carrington Mtge. Servs., LLC v Fiore, 206 AD3d 1306, 1308–1309 (3d Dept 2022), performs two functions. First, it explains that the referee’s findings are advisory and that CPLR 4403 preserves the court’s authority to reject or supplement them. Second, it supports confirmation when the borrower presents no admissible evidence contesting supported computations.
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Wilmington Sav. Fund Socy. FSB v Oppitz, 198 AD3d 1198, 1200 (3d Dept 2021), reinforces the latter conclusion: Laurino’s unsuccessful legal objections, without admissible evidence exposing computational error, did not warrant denying confirmation.
6. Previously resolved liability issues could not be reopened through the reference
Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co. v Loodus, 160 AD3d 797, 798 (2d Dept 2018), and HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v Simmons, 125 AD3d 930, 932 (2d Dept 2015), support rejecting Laurino’s renewed attack on the evidence establishing her repayment default. Schantz v O'Sullivan, 302 AD2d 793, 795 (3d Dept 2003), supplies general support for respecting issues already determined. These authorities preserve the distinction between adjudicating liability and calculating the ensuing relief.
7. Servicer authority and evidence supporting a single-parcel sale
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Nationstar Mtge. LLC v Vassi, 258 NYS3d 28, 35–36 (1st Dept 2026), supports the conclusion that the power of attorney and Micek’s express representations adequately established authority. U.S. Bank N.A. v Tesoriero, 204 AD3d 1066, 1068 (2d Dept 2022), is cited by comparison, emphasizing that authority must be demonstrated through the particular record rather than assumed from employment alone.
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Laronga, 219 AD3d 1559, 1561 (2d Dept 2023), appears as a comparison concerning evidentiary support for selling property in one parcel. Here, the report identified a specific documentary basis—the tax search—so the claimed failure to identify supporting evidence was unfounded.
8. Substitution after a postcommencement transfer
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v Caliguri, 36 NY3d 953, 954 (2020), supports the relevance of the note endorsed in blank. Aurora Loans Servs., LLC v Mandel, 148 AD3d 965, 967 (2d Dept 2017), and Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v Lopa, 130 AD3d 952, 952–953 (2d Dept 2015), support substitution following the mortgage assignment after commencement. Together, they explain why the documentary submission was sufficient under CPLR 1018.
C. Potential Impact
For borrowers seeking relief from default
The decision emphasizes the need for a specific, credible account of what went wrong and why the resulting delay persisted. Where available, communications, office records, or explanations from former counsel may materially strengthen such an application. Simply changing counsel and attributing earlier inaction to predecessors will not necessarily suffice.
For foreclosure plaintiffs and servicers
The opinion supports procedural finality once liability has been established, but it also illustrates the documentation needed at the confirmation stage: evidence supporting the calculations, proof of the affiant’s authority, identified support for the proposed manner of sale, and transfer documents where substitution is sought.
For courts assessing delayed applications
The opinion supplies a structured sequence: evaluate the excuse, consider the defense only if necessary, identify which issues are already resolved, and independently review the matters properly presented by the referee’s report. The age of the order and the litigation’s progress remain relevant without becoming automatic barriers.
Limits of the precedent
The decision does not eliminate inherent vacatur authority, make every attorney error inexcusable, validate every servicer affidavit, or require confirmation whenever a borrower lacks contrary evidence. Its conclusions depend on the inadequate excuse and affirmative documentary support in this record.