1. Introduction
The First Step Act encourages rehabilitation by allowing eligible federal prisoners to earn time credits through successful participation in designated programs and productive activities. Congress nevertheless excluded prisoners convicted of specified offenses. This case addresses whether the exclusion of a prisoner convicted of attempted child sex trafficking violates procedural due process or equal-protection principles.
Carlos Figueroa-Gibson pleaded guilty in 2019 to attempted child sex trafficking under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and 1594(a). He received a 120-month prison sentence and was scheduled for release in January 2030. His conviction rendered him ineligible to earn First Step Act time credits under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D)(xxvii).
Figueroa sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 against his warden. He alleged that he had completed qualifying programming and work that, absent the exclusion, would have generated more than six months of credits. He argued that denying credits without an individualized assessment of his rehabilitation or recidivism risk violated procedural due process. He also maintained that distinguishing prisoners by their offenses of conviction produced an irrational classification.
The government disputed standing, asserted failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and defended the statute’s constitutionality. The district court dismissed the petition. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, although it concluded that Figueroa had sufficiently alleged Article III standing.
The decision’s central distinction is between participating in rehabilitative programming and possessing a statutory entitlement to earn credits for that participation. The former does not necessarily establish the latter.
3. Analysis: Statutory Framework, Legal Reasoning, and Precedents Cited
A. The Statutory Distinction Between Participation, Earning Credits, and Applying Credits
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A), eligible prisoners can earn credits through successful participation in recidivism-reduction programs and productive activities. The implementing regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 523.41, connects qualifying participation to the Bureau of Prisons’ individualized recommendations and the requirements of the particular program or activity.
Credits are applied toward prerelease custody or supervised release under § 3632(d)(4)(C) and § 3624(g). Thus, “early-release credits” is convenient shorthand, but credits do not automatically erase part of the judicially imposed sentence or guarantee immediate release from federal supervision.
Section 3632(d)(4)(D) expressly removes specified prisoners from the credit-earning framework. Figueroa fell within that exclusion because of his attempted child sex trafficking conviction. The mandatory phrase “shall earn” therefore could not be read independently of the statutory exception.
The court also distinguished the risk-assessment provisions from the credit provisions. Section 3632(a)(5)(C) requires a system enabling all prisoners to participate successfully in appropriate programming. Figueroa had received an assessment and had participated. That statutory opportunity did not override the separate prohibition on earning credits.
This reading gives effect to both parts of the Act: rehabilitation remains available to excluded prisoners, while Congress’s offense-based restrictions continue to govern credit eligibility.
B. Appellate Review and the Decision to Bypass Exhaustion
The court reviewed standing and the dismissal of the habeas petition de novo, meaning that it independently assessed the legal questions rather than deferring to the district court.
- CAMP Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 451 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2006): Supplied the standard of independent review for standing.
- Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2006): Established the corresponding standard for reviewing dismissal of a habeas petition.
- Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2017): Permitted affirmance on any ground supported by the record, even if the district court did not rely on that ground. This allowed the panel to affirm without adopting every possible basis for dismissal.
Figueroa conceded that he had not exhausted administrative remedies. He argued that exhaustion should be excused because the Bureau could not invalidate its governing statute. The court did not resolve that contention.
Santiago-Lugo v. Warden, 785 F.3d 467 (11th Cir. 2015), and White v. Lemma, 947 F.3d 1373 (11th Cir. 2020), supported treating exhaustion as nonjurisdictional and proceeding to the merits. Importantly, bypassing exhaustion here did not establish a futility exception or hold that constitutional challenges to Bureau-administered statutes never require exhaustion.
C. Standing: A Plausible Route to Relief Is Enough
Standing was the threshold constitutional issue. The government argued that Figueroa had not adequately shown qualifying participation and that other contingencies could prevent credits from producing earlier release. The panel rejected both arguments at the pleading stage.
The governing authorities
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016): Connected standing to Article III’s limitation of federal judicial power to cases and controversies.
- Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992): Supplied the three essential requirements: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability.
- Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 2020): Placed the burden of alleging those requirements on the party invoking federal jurisdiction.
Figueroa identified a concrete disadvantage: he allegedly could not obtain more than half a year’s worth of credits despite performing qualifying activities. He connected that disadvantage to the Bureau’s enforcement of the exclusion. His allegations included recommended classes, educational work, and more than a year of qualified programming.
The government’s contention that he had not satisfied his individualized plan did not defeat those allegations. Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197 (11th Cir. 1989), required acceptance of the relevant factual allegations as true at this stage. The court also observed that his individual needs plan supported his account.
Removing a legal barrier can redress an injury
Gutierrez v. Saenz, 606 U.S. 305 (2025), supported the proposition that a declaration removing an allegedly unconstitutional barrier can redress an injury. Figueroa did not need to establish that declaratory relief would itself calculate and award every credit; removing the exclusion would likely permit access to the benefit he sought.
Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v. Norton, 338 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2003), supplied the complementary rule that redressability requires likelihood, not certainty. Hypothetical hospital stays or transfers to non-Bureau facilities did not make relief too speculative.
The standing holding is therefore distinct from the merits. Figueroa had a sufficiently concrete dispute for judicial resolution, but that did not mean his constitutional interpretation was correct or that he had established an ultimate entitlement to credits.
D. Procedural Due Process: No Protected Interest in Credits the Statute Withholds
Procedural due process ordinarily asks whether the government deprived a person of a protected liberty or property interest and, if so, whether the procedures were constitutionally adequate. The panel stopped at the first question.
Cook v. Wiley, 208 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2000), established that a protected liberty or property interest is a prerequisite to a Fifth Amendment due-process claim. Grayden v. Rhodes, 345 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2003), supplied the broader framework requiring a protected deprivation, governmental action, and constitutionally inadequate process.
Because Figueroa’s conviction categorically disqualified him, he never acquired a statutory entitlement to earn the disputed credits. His participation could not create an entitlement contrary to the provision defining eligibility.
Initial ineligibility differs from taking away an existing benefit
Cruz v. Skelton, 543 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1976), quoting Brown v. Lundgren, 528 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1976), distinguished losing a statutory privilege already obtained from being denied a privilege never conferred. That distinction directly supported the panel’s reasoning: Figueroa was challenging initial exclusion, not the forfeiture of credits he had lawfully acquired.
The court also invoked two decisions addressing First Step Act credits:
- White v. Warden of Fed. Corr. Inst. - Cumberland, 164 F.4th 326 (4th Cir. 2026): Explained that mandatory credit language operates only when the prisoner satisfies the conditions determining the right to credits. The decision supported reading mandatory language together with eligibility restrictions, rather than treating participation alone as sufficient.
- Cheng v. United States, 132 F.4th 655 (2d Cir. 2025): Rejected a protected interest in earned-time credits for a noncitizen prisoner subject to a final removal order. Although involving a different statutory restriction, it reinforced the relevance of statutory conditions to the claimed liberty interest.
These authorities do not establish that First Step Act credits can never implicate due process. Their role here was narrower: a person cannot derive the asserted entitlement from provisions that expressly exclude him.
Mandatory language must be read with its exception
Figueroa relied on provisions stating that prisoners “shall earn” credits and that credits “shall” be applied. The panel answered that the earning provision expressly excepts prisoners ineligible under subparagraph (D). Statutory language cannot be made unconditional by omitting the qualification attached to it.
Nor did the universal availability of risk assessments establish a universal credit entitlement. Assessment and programming serve rehabilitative purposes independently of credit eligibility.
The “irrebuttable presumption” argument challenged substance, not procedure
Figueroa characterized the exclusion as an irrebuttable presumption that disqualified prisoners are “irredeemable.” He sought an opportunity to prove that this supposed presumption was false in his case.
Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003), explained why that formulation did not establish a procedural claim. When a law turns on the fact of conviction rather than current dangerousness, a hearing about current dangerousness does not resolve a fact material to the statutory rule.
Similarly, Figueroa’s rehabilitation could not change his offense of conviction. His argument questioned Congress’s substantive decision to make that conviction disqualifying. Because he expressly insisted that his due-process claim was procedural, the court did not decide a separate substantive-due-process challenge.
E. Equal Protection: The Classification Required Only a Rational Basis
Although the Fifth Amendment contains no express Equal Protection Clause, equal-protection principles constrain the federal government through its Due Process Clause. The panel applied those principles to Congress’s distinction between eligible and ineligible prisoners.
Similarly situated prisoners and the level of scrutiny
Morrissey v. United States, 871 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2017), quoting Strickland v. Alderman, 74 F.3d 260 (11th Cir. 1996), required differential treatment of similarly situated persons. The government disputed that prisoners convicted of different offenses were similarly situated. The panel assumed that requirement was satisfied and rejected the claim on rational-basis grounds instead.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), supplied the general framework distinguishing classifications warranting heightened scrutiny from ordinary legislative distinctions. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), supported the presumption of constitutionality and the requirement of a rational connection to a legitimate governmental interest when heightened scrutiny does not apply.
Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005), supported treating the offender classification as nonsuspect. Eknes-Tucker v. Governor of Ala., 80 F.4th 1205 (11th Cir. 2023), explained that classifications involving neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right receive rational-basis review. Drawing on Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), it also supported the permissibility of differential treatment when a legitimate interest rationally justifies the distinction.
No fundamental right to earn the disputed credits was identified. Consequently, Congress did not have to establish that its classification was narrowly tailored or that every excluded prisoner personally presented a heightened danger.
Conceivable justifications, not proof of Congress’s actual reasoning
The panel emphasized the demanding burden confronting a rational-basis challenger:
- United States v. Green, 152 F.4th 1239 (11th Cir. 2025): Required acceptance of a conceivable factual basis that could justify the legislation.
- Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876): Supplied the foundational formulation that courts presume the existence of circumstances capable of sustaining legislative action.
- Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955): Reinforced judicial tolerance of imperfect legislative classifications and the limited role of courts in reviewing ordinary policy judgments.
- FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993): Supported sustaining a classification on plausible grounds, regardless of whether those grounds actually motivated the legislature.
Panama City Med. Diagnostic Ltd. v. Williams, 13 F.3d 1541 (11th Cir. 1994), applied that distinction between a conceivable justification and actual legislative motivation. Its reliance on Cash Inn of Dade, Inc. v. Metro. Dade Cnty., 938 F.2d 1239 (11th Cir. 1991), further supported considering rationales not demonstrably contemplated when Congress enacted the law.
This framework meant that the government did not need individualized evidence showing that Figueroa would reoffend. The constitutional question concerned the rationality of the legislative category.
Protecting children and retaining serious offenders in prison
The most directly analogous justification came from Cook v. Wiley, quoting Conlogue v. Shinbaum, 949 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1991): denying credits based on criminal history can rationally serve the governmental interest in preventing early release of serious offenders.
The panel reinforced the legitimacy of child-protection objectives through Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which emphasized the seriousness of child sexual abuse, and New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), which recognized preventing children’s sexual exploitation and abuse as an objective of exceptional importance. Those decisions were not First Step Act cases; they supplied the constitutional context for the interests invoked here.
The court also relied on authorities discussing recidivism and dangerousness:
- United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Discussed continuing risks associated with offenders who sexually abuse children.
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003): Recognized legislative concerns about recidivism and dangerousness among convicted sex offenders.
- McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24 (2002): Provided a plurality discussion of sex-offender recidivism that the panel used to support the plausibility of public-safety concerns.
These citations supported a general legislative rationale, not a factual finding that Figueroa personally would commit another offense. Their use illustrates the difference between reviewing a category under rational-basis scrutiny and making an individualized prediction of dangerousness.
The panel concluded that retaining excluded offenders in prison and deterring similar conduct rationally advanced child protection. Once plausible reasons existed, further judicial evaluation of the policy’s wisdom was unnecessary.
Underinclusiveness did not invalidate the exclusion
Figueroa identified prisoners who, he asserted, had completed sentences for disqualifying offenses but later returned to prison for eligible offenses and could earn credits. He argued that this treatment undermined the public-safety rationale.
The court rejected the argument because rational-basis review does not require a perfectly comprehensive classification. Congress may address part of a problem without resolving every analogous situation. The reasoning drawn from Doe v. Moore and Cook v. Wiley supported sustaining a plausible distinction despite alleged gaps.
The panel did not separately determine whether every proposed comparator actually would receive credits. Its point was that the asserted underinclusiveness did not itself establish irrationality.
The legislative materials did not establish animus
Figueroa relied on an opinion article by Senator Tom Cotton and a Senate Judiciary Committee summary. The senator advocated restricting early release for specified serious offenders to protect public safety. The committee summary described the exclusion of violent and high-risk offenders, including those convicted of serious crimes against children.
The panel treated the first source as a public-safety argument and the second as a description of the Act, rather than expressions of unconstitutional hostility.
Shen v. Comm'r, Fla. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 158 F.4th 1227 (11th Cir. 2025), supplied an additional limitation: the statement of one senator did not establish discriminatory intent attributable to Congress as a whole. The court therefore found neither the content nor the attribution necessary to sustain Figueroa’s animus argument.