2. Factual and Procedural Background
The search and resulting charges
On September 9, 2021, a Walmart asset-protection employee in White Hall, West Virginia, suspected Crawford and a female companion of shoplifting. The employee confronted them and contacted law enforcement, providing a description of their vehicle. Surveillance footage showed Crawford wearing a fanny pack over his shoulder.
Officers stopped the vehicle in the Walmart parking lot. Crawford occupied the passenger seat, and his companion was driving. After an officer smelled marijuana, Sergeant Charles Funk searched the vehicle and discovered a black fanny pack tucked beneath the front passenger seat. It contained a loaded firearm, baggies holding suspected cocaine, and pills initially believed to be oxycontin.
Sergeant Funk acknowledged that nobody had seen the firearm before he discovered it. Crawford had not displayed, presented, or deployed it. The prosecution nevertheless elicited general testimony that drug traffickers possess firearms to protect themselves and their merchandise, then sought to characterize that protective possession as firearm “use.”
The substitute forensic witness
Tiffany A. Neu, a forensic scientist at the West Virginia State Police Forensic Laboratory, tested the seized substances and prepared the laboratory report. At trial, however, the State called Blake Kinder instead. Neu had relocated and no longer worked at the laboratory.
Kinder was the laboratory section’s technical leader, not Neu’s supervisor. His responsibilities included instrument validation and calibration. He had reviewed the data generated by Neu and initialed the report as a reviewer, but he had neither performed nor observed her testing. He also acknowledged that the report’s findings belonged to the scientist who performed the tests.
Crawford objected when the State sought to introduce Neu’s report through Kinder. The circuit court admitted the report and permitted Kinder to testify about its conclusions identifying cocaine and fentanyl. His testimony revealed limitations in his knowledge, including an inability to confirm whether photographed pills were the pills actually tested.
Trial, post-trial motion, and appeal
Following a one-day trial on July 19, 2023, the jury convicted Crawford of five offenses and acquitted him of conspiracy to commit felony controlled-substance offenses. He moved for a judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, a new trial.
The circuit court denied that motion on November 17, 2023. It treated firearm “use” as a factual question sufficiently supported by the evidence and concluded that Kinder’s review of the laboratory report satisfied confrontation requirements. In doing so, it incorrectly described Kinder as Neu’s supervisor. Crawford was sentenced on January 10, 2024, and appealed.
4. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited: Standards of Review and Appellate Scope
The opinion carefully separated challenges to evidentiary sufficiency from challenges to the legality of the trial process. That distinction determined both the standard of review and the permissible remedy.
| Precedent |
Principle and significance |
| State v. Phillips, 205 W. Va. 673, 520 S.E.2d 670 (1999) |
Identifies a motion for judgment of acquittal as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. It supported treating Crawford’s first assignment as an acquittal issue rather than merely a request for another trial. |
| State v. Thompson, 253 W. Va. 23, 927 S.E.2d 885 (2026) |
Requires de novo review of the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. The appellate court therefore independently assessed whether the evidence legally supported the firearm-use conviction. |
| State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 (1995) |
Requires examination of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, asking whether any rational factfinder could find every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. This prosecution-favorable standard still could not supply the missing element of active firearm use. |
| Crystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 194 W. Va. 138, 459 S.E.2d 415 (1995) |
Provides de novo review for questions of law and statutory interpretation. Before evaluating the evidence, the court independently determined what “uses” means under § 61-7-15a. |
| State v. Vance, 207 W. Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000) |
Distinguishes review of new-trial rulings for abuse of discretion, underlying factual findings for clear error, and legal questions de novo. This framework governed the confrontation-related request for a new trial. |
| Sanders v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 159 W.Va. 621, 225 S.E.2d 218 (1976); Andrews v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital, Inc., 201 W.Va. 624, 499 S.E.2d 846 (1997); and Lively v. Rufus, 207 W. Va. 436, 533 S.E.2d 662 (2000) |
Through a chain of quoted syllabus principles, these decisions establish that respect for a trial court’s new-trial ruling does not prevent reversal when the court misunderstands the law or evidence. The circuit court’s misunderstanding of confrontation principles warranted reversal under this rule. |
| State v. Louk, 171 W.Va. 639, 301 S.E.2d 596 (1983), and State v. Peyatt, 173 W. Va. 317, 315 S.E.2d 574 (1983) |
Recognize the general discretion afforded trial courts over evidentiary admissibility. That discretion did not resolve the constitutional question presented here. |
| May v. May, 214 W. Va. 394, 589 S.E.2d 536 (2003), and State v. Waldron, 228 W. Va. 577, 723 S.E.2d 402 (2012) |
Support independent review of legal questions, including alleged Confrontation Clause violations. A constitutional admissibility issue is not insulated by ordinary evidentiary deference. |
| State v. Sites, 241 W. Va. 430, 825 S.E.2d 758 (2019) |
Supports declining to decide inadequately briefed issues. Although a heading in Crawford’s brief referenced sufficiency challenges to the drug charges, his developed argument addressed only firearm use. The court therefore did not decide drug-charge sufficiency. |
The court also declined to reach the separate objection that Kinder had not appeared on the State’s proposed witness list, because the confrontation issue was dispositive. The opinion therefore establishes no independent rule concerning late substitution of an undisclosed witness.
B. Firearm “Use”: Active Employment, Not Protective Possession
1. The statutory text controls
West Virginia Code § 61-7-15a creates a separate felony when a person, while committing a felony, “uses or presents a firearm.” It does not say “possesses.” The State nevertheless argued that Crawford used the gun because it protected him and his drug inventory.
The court rejected that expansion. Its reasoning rested on a textual distinction: possessing an object for possible future protection is not necessarily employing that object during the offense. The Legislature’s use of “possess” in other firearm statutes reinforced the significance of its omission here.
Several precedents supplied the interpretive framework:
- State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, Veterans of Foreign Wars, 144 W. Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959): Clear statutory language must be applied rather than judicially rewritten. The opinion invoked this principle through State v. Jones.
- State v. Jones, 251 W. Va. 611, 915 S.E.2d 389 (2025): Had already held § 61-7-15a clear and unambiguous and applicable to all felonies, rather than only specified classes. Here, the court applied the same resistance to adding language, but addressed a different question: the conduct required by “uses.”
- State v. Epperly, 135 W. Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951): Supports giving statutory words their ordinary meaning. The court accordingly treated “use” as a term ordinarily denoting employment for a purpose.
- State v. McMutary, 250 W. Va. 78, 902 S.E.2d 410 (2024): Acknowledges that assigning ordinary meaning involves some interpretation, while warning against imposing a different meaning on an unambiguous statute under that label.
These authorities explain why the court could define “uses” without treating the statute as ambiguous: it understood itself to be identifying and applying the word’s ordinary, contextual meaning, not adding a new category of prohibited conduct.
2. The central persuasive precedent: Bailey v. United States
The court adopted the active-employment analysis of Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). There, officers found drugs in a vehicle’s passenger compartment and a loaded pistol, cash, and a bag in the trunk. The lower appellate court treated accessibility and proximity to drugs or proceeds as sufficient evidence of firearm use.
The United States Supreme Court rejected that approach because it would make almost every firearm possession associated with drug trafficking qualify as “use.” Instead, the federal statute’s use prong required active employment. If Congress had intended possession alone to suffice, it could have used that word.
That reasoning directly answered the State’s protective-possession theory in Crawford’s case. Moving the gun from a trunk to a fanny pack beneath the passenger seat might affect accessibility, but it did not demonstrate active employment. Accessibility was not the statutory element.
The opinion also noted an important historical qualification: Congress amended the federal statute in 1998 to reach possession “in furtherance of” specified crimes. Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007), was cited in part to document that amendment. West Virginia’s statute contained no comparable possession language. Consequently, the court borrowed Bailey v. United States’s interpretation of “use,” not the broader coverage of the subsequently amended federal statute.
3. Active use need not mean firing the weapon
The active-employment standard is narrower than possession but broader than discharge. Drawing from Bailey v. United States, the court identified conduct such as:
- Brandishing or displaying a firearm;
- Striking someone with it;
- Firing or attempting to fire it;
- Bartering it; and
- Referring to it, or displaying its forceful presence, to alter the circumstances of the underlying offense.
A visible gun placed on a table to intimidate someone may therefore constitute active use even without movement or discharge. By contrast, a hidden gun that merely gives its owner a sense of security does not become actively employed simply because it could later be used.
Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993), illustrated this distinction. Trading a firearm for narcotics was “use” because the defendant actively employed the gun as an item of barter. The decision did not require use as a weapon, but it did require active employment. It therefore supported, rather than displaced, the later analysis in Bailey v. United States.
Watson v. United States, 552 U.S. 74 (2007), addressed the converse exchange: receiving a gun for drugs. The Supreme Court held that receiving the firearm was not “using” it under the federal provision. The comparison underscores that statutory liability turns on the defendant’s particular conduct, not merely a connection between firearms and drugs.
4. Authorities rejected or distinguished
The court examined the State’s additional authorities rather than assuming that all firearm-related cases supported an expansive meaning of “use.”
| Authority |
Treatment in the opinion |
| United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1084 (10th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Hager, 969 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1992) |
Their broader “ready access” approach predated and did not survive Bailey v. United States. They could not justify treating accessibility as active use. |
| Smith v. United States, 516 U.S. 1105 (1996) |
This separate decision bearing the same case title remanded a judgment based on United States v. Hall for reconsideration in light of Bailey v. United States, confirming the weakness of the State’s pre-Bailey authorities. |
| United States v. Lara-Ruiz, 781 F.3d 919 (8th Cir. 2015) |
Involved displaying guns, striking a customer with a handgun, and shooting her unoccupied car. Those facts involved active conduct unlike Crawford’s concealed possession. The decision did not resolve the definitional issue presented here. |
| Garrett v. State, 998 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. App. 1999) |
A firearm held during a sexual assault induced the victim’s submission. That threatening employment fits the active-use standard rather than supporting liability for mere possession. |
| Fowler v. State, 375 So.2d 879 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) |
Concerned sentence enhancement for burglary while armed, not the meaning of “use.” It therefore offered no persuasive answer to Crawford’s statutory argument. |
5. Consistency with West Virginia decisions
In State v. Cain, 253 W. Va. 435, 931 S.E.2d 835 (2026), the court had upheld a firearm-use conviction where the defendant struck the victim’s head with a pistol. That is straightforward active employment.
Acord v. Hedrick, 176 W. Va. 154, 342 S.E.2d 120 (1986), concerned probation eligibility under a different statute addressing firearm use, presentation, or brandishment. A firearm was held to the victim’s head during sexual assaults by multiple assailants. The court treated that threatening deployment as consistent with active employment, while recognizing that the earlier decision did not require proof that every principal physically held the gun throughout the offense.
6. Application to Crawford
The decisive deficiency was not a credibility dispute. Even accepting the prosecution’s evidence, the firearm remained hidden inside a fanny pack beneath a seat until police found it. There was no evidence of display, threat, barter, striking, firing, or even a reference to the weapon.
General testimony that drug dealers keep guns for protection could explain possession, but it could not establish the missing conduct required by the statute. The circuit court therefore erred in treating submission to the jury as sufficient: the jury determines disputed facts, but it cannot enlarge the legal elements of an offense.
The express new rule concerns the statute’s “use” prong. Because the State effectively conceded that Crawford had not presented the gun, the court did not comprehensively define the separate “presents” alternative.
C. Confrontation: The Witness Must Answer for the Relevant Forensic Work
1. The constitutional foundation
The Sixth Amendment and Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution protect an accused’s right to confront witnesses against him. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), supplied the background principle that the federal confrontation right applies to state criminal proceedings through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), established the controlling approach to testimonial statements: when the witness does not appear, the prosecution generally must show unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. A court’s confidence in the statement’s reliability is not a substitute for that procedure.
West Virginia adopted this framework in State v. Mechling, 219 W. Va. 366, 633 S.E.2d 311 (2006). That decision also defined testimonial statements generally as those made in circumstances that would lead an objective witness reasonably to expect their use at a later trial. The opinion noted that State v. Jako, 245 W. Va. 625, 862 S.E.2d 474 (2021), modified State v. Mechling on other grounds; it continued to apply the confrontation principles quoted here.
2. Why the laboratory report was testimonial
Neu’s report was not an ordinary record created independently of a prosecution. It identified Crawford as a suspect, specified alleged offenses and the incident date, and supplied the chemical identifications needed to prove the drug charges. The State did not dispute its testimonial character.
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), directly supported that conclusion. Certificates reporting forensic identification of seized substances were testimonial because they were prepared in circumstances anticipating use at trial. Scientific form does not place prosecution evidence outside the Confrontation Clause.
The same decision rejected administrative convenience as a reason to relax the constitutional requirement. Although producing analysts may burden prosecutions, constitutional trial protections remain binding despite their practical costs.
3. Why a substitute expert was insufficient
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), was the central authority against surrogate testimony. The prosecution introduced a blood-alcohol report through an analyst who had neither participated in nor observed the test. The Supreme Court held that this arrangement did not satisfy confrontation.
The problem was specific, not merely formal. A substitute could not explain what the original analyst actually observed or expose that analyst’s possible mistakes, omissions, or dishonesty. Questioning a generally knowledgeable scientist was therefore not equivalent to questioning the person responsible for the testimonial assertions.
Kinder’s testimony presented precisely that problem. His expertise and review responsibilities did not give him firsthand knowledge of Neu’s handling and testing of the substances. His signature as reviewer did not transform her observations into his own.
4. Smith v. Arizona and the limits of “independent opinion”
Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), addressed an attempted alternative: presenting an absent analyst’s statements as the basis of a substitute expert’s supposedly independent opinion, rather than formally introducing the original report.
The Supreme Court explained that an expert’s reliance on another analyst’s statements does not prevent those statements from being offered for their truth. If the substitute’s opinion depends on accepting the original analyst’s account of the procedures and results, that account supplies substantive proof. If those statements are testimonial, confrontation requirements apply.
The distinction matters because Smith v. Arizona did not make every statement underlying expert testimony automatically testimonial. Its analysis requires attention both to whether statements are offered for their truth and to whether they are testimonial. In Crawford’s case, however, the report’s testimonial character was clear, and the report itself was admitted.
West Virginia Rule of Evidence 703 did not change the result. Although experts may sometimes rely on otherwise inadmissible material, and may disclose it under specified conditions, an evidence rule cannot override the Constitution. Labeling testimonial assertions “background” or the “basis” of an opinion does not remove their substantive evidentiary function.
5. West Virginia’s surrogate-autopsy precedents
The opinion extended an established line of state decisions concerning testimonial autopsy reports to laboratory reports identifying controlled substances.
- State v. Kennedy, 229 W. Va. 756, 735 S.E.2d 905 (2012): A pathologist acted as a transmitter for an absent physician’s conclusions. Agreement with those conclusions did not make them the testifying witness’s independently developed opinion. This directly undermined the argument that Kinder’s concurrence cured the problem.
- State v. Frazier, 229 W.Va. 724, 735 S.E.2d 727 (2012): Admission of an autopsy report through the Chief Medical Examiner violated confrontation. The substitute had not observed the autopsy and could not explain discrepancies or answer questions about the absent pathologist’s work. The error was not harmless. Those practical limitations closely resembled Kinder’s inability to answer questions about Neu’s testing.
- State v. Blevins, 231 W.Va. 135, 744 S.E.2d 245 (2013): Found a confrontation violation in surrogate autopsy testimony but held it harmless because the testimony did not contribute to the conviction or punishment.
- State v. Flack, 232 W. Va. 708, 753 S.E.2d 761 (2013): Likewise recognized constitutional error when a supervising medical examiner testified about another pathologist’s report, but found no contribution to the verdict.
- State v. Dolen, 252 W. Va. 465, 923 S.E.2d 395 (2025): Synthesized the general requirement that the expert performing forensic testing testify and recognized the consistency between Smith v. Arizona and the reasoning of State v. Kennedy.
Together, these authorities showed that professional seniority, review authority, or approval of a report cannot substitute for personal involvement in the relevant forensic work. The circuit court’s mistaken description of Kinder as a supervisor was therefore both factually incorrect and legally insufficient: even actual supervisory status would not, by itself, answer the confrontation problem.
6. Genuine independent judgment versus transmission of another’s conclusions
The opinion acknowledged the principle, quoted in State v. Kennedy from United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2009), that an expert who applies training and experience to source material and reaches a genuinely independent judgment may ordinarily present an original opinion capable of meaningful cross-examination.
But that principle did not help the State. Kinder did not independently test the substances, and the court found that he did not independently determine their identity. He reviewed Neu’s generated data and agreed with her conclusions. More fundamentally, even a genuinely independent conclusion would not authorize him to relay Neu’s testimonial assertions for their truth in violation of Smith v. Arizona.
The distinction is therefore functional: the question is not whether the witness says “I agree,” but whether the prosecution is proving its case through testimonial assertions made by someone whom the defendant cannot cross-examine.
7. Application and limits of the holding
Kinder repeatedly attributed the testing and observations to Neu. He could not personally identify the tested pills from a photograph and could not resolve the discrepancy between descriptions of blue seized pills and green pills in the laboratory documentation. These exchanges demonstrated why cross-examination of the actual analyst mattered.
The State did not establish that Neu was constitutionally unavailable; it explained only that she had left the laboratory. Crawford also had no prior opportunity to cross-examine her. The established exception for an unavailable, previously cross-examined witness therefore did not apply.
The holding should not be overstated. The court did not decide that every laboratory employee must testify, that every item of machine-generated data is testimonial, or that all expert reliance on another person’s work is forbidden. It addressed a testimonial report introduced through a witness who neither performed nor observed the reported testing and who transmitted the absent analyst’s findings.
D. Remedy: Insufficient Evidence and Trial Error Have Different Consequences
The remedial distinction is central to the opinion’s significance.
The firearm-use conviction failed because the State did not introduce evidence proving an essential element. Under State v. Frazier, 162 W. Va. 602, 252 S.E.2d 39 (1979), double jeopardy prohibits giving the prosecution another trial merely to supply evidence missing from its first attempt. Crawford therefore cannot be retried on that charge.
This 1979 decision is distinct from the 2012 State v. Frazier discussed above concerning surrogate autopsy testimony.
The drug convictions, by contrast, were vacated because constitutionally inadmissible evidence had been received at trial. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), distinguishes that kind of trial error from evidentiary insufficiency. A defective trial does not itself establish that the prosecution failed to prove its case in the double-jeopardy sense. A properly conducted retrial is therefore permitted.
The court explained why it still needed to decide firearm-use sufficiency even though it was vacating the predicate drug convictions. Vacating those convictions alone could have left the firearm charge available for retrial. Resolving the independent insufficiency claim prevented the same erroneous possession-based theory from recurring.
The opinion did not separately develop an extended harmless-error analysis of the laboratory evidence. Its reasoning nevertheless emphasized that Neu’s report supplied the only evidence identifying the substances as cocaine and fentanyl. Unlike the evidence in State v. Blevins and State v. Flack, that report was central to proving the charged offenses.