Date: Aug 7, 2026

Fifth-Amendment Unavailability as “Good Cause” and Video-Corroborated Reliability for Hearsay at Supervised-Release Revocation

1. Introduction

In United States v. Delrico Clyburn (3d Cir. Aug. 6, 2026) (not precedential), the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s revocation of supervised release and a sentence at the top of the advisory revocation range.

The revocation stemmed from two alleged domestic-violence incidents involving Clyburn and his girlfriend, Ebony Murphy: an August 2024 event in which Murphy told police Clyburn assaulted her and stole her firearm, and a February 2025 event leading to Clyburn’s arrest on outstanding warrants. At the final revocation hearing, Murphy did not provide live testimony; when called, she invoked the Fifth Amendment. The Government instead relied on officer testimony recounting Murphy’s statements and on body-worn camera footage.

The appeal raised three core issues: (1) whether admitting Murphy’s out-of-court statements violated due process confrontation protections applicable in revocation proceedings; (2) whether the evidence sufficed to prove violations by a preponderance; and (3) whether the court adequately explained the revocation sentence and impermissibly relied on retributive considerations in light of Esteras v. United States.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Hearsay admitted properly: The court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Murphy’s statements because they bore significant indicia of reliability (detail, contemporaneous distress, injury/property corroboration, bodycam confirmation, and partial corroboration by Clyburn’s own testimony), and the Government showed good cause for her nonappearance because she invoked the Fifth Amendment.
Sufficient evidence: The Third Circuit rejected the claim that the Government relied only on “uncorroborated” statements; officer observations and video corroborated the account, and a single victim’s reliable out-of-court statements can suffice.
No procedural/plain error in sentencing: The district court meaningfully considered relevant § 3553(a) factors, tied them to Clyburn’s conduct and history, and did not plainly violate Esteras v. United States; the court’s remarks were reasonably read as addressing the supervised-release violations, not punishing the underlying conviction, and Esteras did not control as to the firearm violation given unresolved questions about mandatory revocations under § 3583(g).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)

Morrissey supplies the foundational due process framework for parole (and by extension supervised-release) revocations: the supervisee receives “minimum requirements of due process,” including a qualified right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless good cause exists to deny confrontation. The Clyburn panel treated this as the constitutional baseline for evaluating hearsay at revocation.

United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2009)

Lloyd is the Third Circuit’s central implementation of the confrontation/good-cause balance for revocation hearings (consistent with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C)). It also recognizes that a declarant’s refusal to testify may constitute good cause and that defendant admissions can bolster reliability. Clyburn relies heavily on Lloyd to validate (i) the balancing approach and (ii) Fifth-Amendment-based unavailability as good cause.

United States v. Rose, 152 F.4th 153 (3d Cir. 2025)

Rose functions as the opinion’s main “reliability” template: detail, corroboration, consistency with injuries, and distressed contemporaneous reporting are “indicia of reliability.” The panel imported these factors to find Murphy’s statements reliable despite a later recantation, emphasizing officers’ observations and the “realtime” bodycam footage as repeated confirmation.

Crawford v. Jackson, 323 F.3d 123 (D.C. Cir. 2003)

Cited via Lloyd, Crawford supports admitting hearsay in revocation proceedings where out-of-court statements are bolstered by the defendant’s own admissions. The panel used this to treat Clyburn’s admission that he ripped open Murphy’s fanny pack as corroborating the altercation’s “underlying circumstances,” even if he disputed the most incriminating details.

United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562 (3d Cir. 2004) and United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2008)

These cases appear primarily for standards of review and allocation of deference (clear error for factual determinations, de novo for legal issues). Their practical effect in Clyburn is to reinforce that revocation factfinding and reliability assessments receive substantial appellate deference.

United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2010) and Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007)

Together, Merced and Rita frame the sentencing-explanation obligation: meaningful consideration of § 3553(a) factors is required, but a within-Guidelines sentence may be explained more briefly. The panel found the district judge’s on-the-record remarks—focused on recidivism risk, criminal history, deterrence, public protection, and rehabilitation—adequate under this standard.

United States v. Flores-Mejia, 759 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc)

Flores-Mejia imposes an objection requirement to preserve claims of procedural sentencing error; absent a contemporaneous objection after sentence is imposed, review is for plain error. That doctrinal choice materially constrained Clyburn’s sentencing challenge on appeal.

Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025)

Esteras held that, in discretionary revocations under § 3583(e)(3), the statute’s incorporated sentencing factors omit § 3553(a)(2)(A) (seriousness of the offense, respect for law, and “just punishment for the offense”), and it clarified that the “offense” in that context is the underlying conviction, not the supervision violation. Clyburn used Esteras to argue the district court improperly “punished” him for his original conviction. The panel rejected the argument, emphasizing: (i) Esteras expressly left unresolved whether its analysis applies to mandatory revocations under § 3583(g) (relevant to the firearm violation), and (ii) the district court’s statements were best read as addressing the violation conduct (“what occurred that night”) and supervision-related sentencing goals, not retroactive retribution for the underlying heroin conspiracy.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Due process confrontation in revocation is qualified, not absolute. The court applied the revocation-specific framework from Morrissey v. Brewer, operationalized through Rule 32.1(b)(2)(C) and the balancing test in United States v. Lloyd: the supervisee’s confrontation interest is weighed against the Government’s good cause for not producing the witness.
Reliability drove the confrontation balance. Following United States v. Rose, the panel treated multiple features as reliability anchors: Murphy’s detailed account; her distressed state shortly after the alleged assault; consistency with observed injuries and damage; repeated corroboration by bodycam video; and partial corroboration by Clyburn’s own testimony (admitting the fanny-pack ripping).
Recantation did not defeat reliability on these facts. Rather than treating recantation as dispositive, the panel accepted the district court’s view that the recantation contained “inconsistencies” and that Murphy’s later statements again aligned with her initial account—making the first report more, not less, reliable in the court’s eyes.
“Good cause” was satisfied by Fifth-Amendment invocation. The panel relied on Lloyd for the proposition that refusal to testify—here, Murphy’s invocation of her Fifth Amendment right—may constitute good cause, and it accepted Clyburn’s own concession that such invocation “typically” suffices, especially where reliability is strong.
Preponderance sufficiency was met through corroborated hearsay and video. Applying § 3583(e)(3), the court treated corroborated victim statements as enough, citing Rose as an example where one victim’s reliable out-of-court statements supported revocation.
Sentencing explanation was adequate; Esteras was not plainly violated. Under United States v. Merced and Rita v. United States, the district court’s explanation tied sentencing choices to supervision-relevant concerns (public protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, criminal history, continued criminal behavior). Under United States v. Flores-Mejia, review was plain error, and the panel found none. On Esteras, the panel stressed statutory scope limits (unresolved mandatory revocations under § 3583(g)) and read the judge’s remarks as directed to the violation conduct, not the underlying conviction.

3.3. Impact

Although labeled “not precedential,” Clyburn illustrates several practical takeaways for Third Circuit revocation litigation:

Video evidence can substantially bolster hearsay reliability in the Rule 32.1/Morrissey balance, especially where the judge explicitly finds the footage confirms the out-of-court account.
Domestic-violence recantations are not automatically disqualifying where contemporaneous distress, physical observations, and later reaffirmation support the initial statement.
Fifth-Amendment invocation is a robust “good cause” showing for witness nonappearance in revocation, reducing the likelihood that confrontation objections will prevail when the hearsay is independently reliable.
Esteras-based challenges will likely turn on record clarity: whether the judge is punishing the underlying conviction (impermissible under § 3583(e)(3)’s factor set for discretionary revocations) or sanctioning breach-of-trust/violation conduct (generally permissible). Clyburn also highlights the continuing doctrinal uncertainty about Esteras in the § 3583(g) mandatory-revocation context.
Preservation matters: absent a post-sentence procedural objection under Flores-Mejia, appellate review becomes plain-error, making relief difficult even where the explanation is arguably concise.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release revocation: A post-incarceration court supervision period can be revoked if the judge finds the defendant violated conditions; revocation may lead to additional imprisonment and renewed supervision.
Preponderance of the evidence: The Government must show it is more likely than not that a violation occurred—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Hearsay at revocation hearings: Unlike trials, revocation hearings allow some hearsay if due process is satisfied. The court balances the defendant’s interest in confrontation against the Government’s reason for not producing the witness, with reliability and “good cause” as key inputs.
Indicia of reliability: Signs that an out-of-court statement is trustworthy—e.g., detail, timing close to the event, distressed demeanor, consistency with injuries or physical evidence, corroborating video, and defendant admissions.
Good cause for nonappearance: A legally sufficient reason the witness is not testifying live. Here, the witness’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination functioned as good cause.
Plain error review: A demanding appellate standard used when an issue was not preserved in the trial court; the appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously affected the proceeding’s fairness.
Esteras and “retribution” limits in revocation: For discretionary revocations under § 3583(e)(3), courts may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s “just punishment for the offense” rationale to punish the underlying conviction; however, courts may still sanction violation conduct and protect the public, and Esteras left open questions about mandatory revocations under § 3583(g).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Delrico Clyburn affirms a fact-intensive but familiar revocation principle: hearsay can be admitted consistently with due process when (1) it is sufficiently reliable—here, reinforced by contemporaneous distress, officer observations, defendant admissions, and bodycam video—and (2) the Government shows good cause for the witness’s absence—here, a Fifth-Amendment invocation.

On sentencing, the decision underscores the practical force of issue preservation (Flores-Mejia) and offers a restrained reading of Esteras v. United States, treating the district court’s remarks as focused on violation conduct and supervision goals rather than retributive punishment for the original conviction, while noting the continuing uncertainty of Esteras in mandatory revocation settings.