Expert “Provocation/Reasonable Person” Opinions Are Inadmissible When They Invade the Jury’s Common-Sense Role and Lack Daubert Reliability (State v. Starkey)

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Antwon Starkey’s Cabell County convictions for second-degree murder and felon in possession of a firearm following the December 12, 2017 shooting death of Kafrederick McEachin at a Huntington gas station. Surveillance video captured the encounter: Mr. McEachin held the door as Starkey entered; Starkey then drew a pistol, fired as Mr. McEachin fled, and shot again after Mr. McEachin collapsed—killing him.

Starkey’s motive was not contested: he believed Mr. McEachin was involved in an earlier shooting (November 29, 2017) in which Starkey’s stepdaughter was injured. With identity and actus reus effectively stipulated at trial, the case turned on Starkey’s state of mind—specifically, whether he could mitigate culpability through a theory of diminished capacity rooted in “provocation.”

The key appellate issue was narrow but consequential: whether the circuit court erred by excluding a forensic evaluator’s expert opinions that framed Starkey’s actions as a “reaction to provocation” that would cause a “reasonable person” to lose control, leaving “hardly time” to cool off.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard governing expert admissibility, the Court held the circuit court was not “clearly wrong” in excluding the forensic evaluator’s “provocation/reasonable person opinions” under Daubert principles and Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence.

The Court endorsed two core determinations made below:

• Helpfulness / fit: Whether Starkey was “provoked” and whether his reaction was “reasonable” were factual determinations within the everyday understanding of lay jurors; the proposed opinions risked supplanting the jury’s common-sense role.
• Reliability: The evaluator could not identify empirical support for key assertions (e.g., that a “reasonable person so provoked” would not have time to cool off), undermining admissibility under the reliability screen associated with Daubert and Rule 702.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993)

The Opinion invokes Daubert for the gatekeeping proposition that trial judges must ensure scientific testimony is both relevant and reliable. Although the Court ultimately rested heavily on “helpfulness” (the Rule 702 “assist the trier of fact” requirement), Daubert mattered because the evaluator’s central “cooling off” and “reasonable person” conclusions were presented in an expert register but lacked demonstrated empirical grounding.

Syl. Pt. 3, Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W. Va. 512, 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995)

Gentry supplies West Virginia’s foundational synthesis of Rule 702’s requirements and explicitly aligns state practice with Daubert. The Opinion quotes Gentry for the three requirements of expert testimony—expert qualification, specialized knowledge, and assistance to the trier of fact—and emphasizes Gentry’s “common sense inquiry” into whether an untrained layperson can intelligently resolve the issue without expert “enlightenment.” This “common sense” filter became the dispositive lens through which the Court viewed provocation/reasonableness testimony.

Syl. Pt. 6, Helmick v. Potomac Edison Co., 185 W. Va. 269, 406 S.E.2d 700 (1991)

Helmick is cited for the governing standard of review: expert admissibility is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be reversed unless “clearly wrong.” This deference is critical in cases like Starkey where the record supports more than one plausible view of whether expert framing would help or mislead the jury.

Syl. Pt. 4, in part, Rozas v. Rozas, 176 W. Va. 235, 342 S.E.2d 201 (1986)

Rozas reinforces that trial courts may exclude expert evidence that is “unnecessary, cumulative, confusing or misleading.” The Opinion’s concern that provocation/reasonable-person opinions would “supplant” the jury’s independent common sense aligns with Rozas’s caution against confusing or misleading expert testimony—particularly testimony that effectively answers the very normative question jurors are tasked to decide.

Watson v. Inco Alloys Int'l, Inc., 209 W. Va. 234, 243, 545 S.E.2d 294, 303 (2001)

Watson is used to sharpen the Rule 702 helpfulness inquiry: expert testimony is helpful when the subject is not within “the common knowledge and experience of a lay juror.” The Court used this framing to reject Starkey’s argument that jurors needed expert assistance to understand how someone in his circumstances would react upon encountering a perceived threat.

State v. Mitter, 168 W. Va. 531, 538, 285 S.E.2d 376, 380 (1981)

Mitter provides the criminal-law anchor for excluding state-of-mind expert testimony when jurors can infer mental state from surrounding facts using “common sense view of human affairs.” The Opinion treats Starkey’s proffer as falling squarely within Mitter: even if the backstory was emotionally charged, the jurors could evaluate provocation and reasonableness from the evidence without an expert’s normative overlay.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three linked steps.

1. Identify the nature of the excluded testimony as normative fact-finding.

   The circuit court labeled the proffer as “provocation/reasonable person opinions.” That label mattered: “provocation” and the “reasonable person” standard are not merely clinical descriptions of a defendant’s symptoms; they are legal-laden evaluations that track the jury’s moral and social judgment functions.

2. Apply Rule 702’s “assist the trier of fact” requirement through a “common knowledge” lens.

   Quoting Gentry and Watson, the Court held jurors could determine provocation and reasonableness using everyday experience. The Opinion stresses that these determinations are “themselves factual determinations the jury must make,” and that allowing an expert to opine on them risks replacing jurors’ common sense with the expert’s imprimatur.

3. Reinforce exclusion through reliability concerns.

   At the Daubert hearing, the evaluator could not cite empirical studies supporting the claim that a “reasonable person so provoked” would lack time to cool off. While the Court did not build an extended methodological critique, it affirmed that the absence of reliable scientific support further justified exclusion under Rule 702 and Daubert.

3.3. Impact

Although issued as a memorandum decision, the Opinion’s practical influence is likely to be felt in three recurring contexts:

• Diminished capacity theories framed as “provocation.”

  Defendants may still present narrative and factual evidence of stressful events and perceived threats, but this case signals skepticism toward experts translating those facts into “reasonable person” provocation conclusions—especially where the testimony resembles argument on mitigation rather than clinically grounded mental impairment evidence.

• Limits on forensic evaluators’ role under W. Va. Code § 27-6A-2(a).

  The evaluator was appointed to assess competency and criminal responsibility/diminished capacity. The decision underscores that, even when an evaluator is properly appointed and qualified, admissibility turns on Rule 702: the evaluator’s role does not automatically authorize testimony on ultimate normative questions that the jury can resolve without expert help.

• Re-centering “common sense” in mens rea disputes.

  By relying on Mitter and the “common knowledge” principle, the Court reinforces a boundary: expert testimony is less likely to be admitted when it would merely provide a credentialed version of inferences jurors routinely draw about anger, retaliation, fear, and impulse from the surrounding circumstances.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 702 (expert testimony): An expert may testify only if the testimony is based on specialized knowledge and helps the jury decide an issue. If jurors can decide the issue using everyday reasoning, the testimony may be excluded as unhelpful.
• Daubert (reliability screen): The judge acts as a gatekeeper to prevent “expert” opinions that sound scientific but are not reliably supported. Here, the evaluator’s inability to point to empirical support for “cooling off” claims weakened admissibility.
• “Provocation” and the “reasonable person” idea: These concepts ask whether circumstances would cause an ordinary person to lose self-control and whether there was time to cool off. They are not purely medical questions; they reflect community judgment—precisely the kind of judgment juries are designed to make.
• Rule 703 (basis of expert opinion): Rule 703 allows experts to base opinions on information they learned or observed, but it does not eliminate Rule 702’s separate requirements of helpfulness and reliability. In other words: having a permissible “basis” does not guarantee admissibility.

5. Conclusion

State of West Virginia v. Antwon Starkey reinforces a clear evidentiary boundary in criminal trials: expert testimony is not automatically admissible simply because it concerns a defendant’s mental state. When the proffered “expert” opinion effectively tells the jury that the defendant was “provoked” and that a “reasonable person” would have reacted similarly—matters within lay understanding and central to the jury’s normative fact-finding—West Virginia courts may exclude it under Rule 702, especially where the opinion lacks reliable scientific support as contemplated by Daubert and Gentry.