Existing Collision Evidence Can Make Forgoing a Reconstruction Expert Constitutionally Reasonable

1. Introduction

In Anderson v. State, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Joshua Edward Anderson’s conviction for murdering Kevin Lamarius Marshall by striking him with a truck. The appeal concerned the constitutional adequacy of Anderson’s trial representation, rather than a direct challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Anderson argued that trial counsel should have retained an accident reconstruction expert and preserved an objection to the omission of a jury instruction on accident. He also sought a new trial based on the cumulative prejudice allegedly resulting from those failures.

The decision principally reinforces an existing rule: counsel may reasonably present a defense through available testimony, video evidence, and argument instead of expert testimony, even when an expert might have strengthened that defense. It also illustrates the separate requirement that a defendant raise a particular ineffective-assistance claim in the trial court before pursuing it on appeal.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

The confrontation and collision

On July 4, 2019, Anderson went to the Browning residence in Covington, where Marshall was visiting. Anderson was dating the Brownings’ daughter, Kendra. The original plan involved a fishing trip followed by a holiday cookout.

After arriving, Anderson told Kenneth and Samantha Browning not to come outside for approximately 20 minutes. They nevertheless went outside. A confrontation developed, and Anderson attacked Marshall. Kenneth described Anderson taking Marshall over a handrail, pinning him down, and repeatedly striking him. Anderson testified that he had intervened because he believed Marshall was about to attack Larry Gray.

After the fight ended, Marshall left on foot. Anderson departed shortly afterward in his truck. Surveillance footage showed Marshall walking around a blind curve on the narrow road and Anderson subsequently driving around that curve at high speed.

Anderson testified that he saw Marshall in the road, immediately braked, and steered left but could not avoid striking him. A neighbor heard sliding tires followed by an impact. The medical examiner determined that Marshall died from blunt-force injuries sustained in a pedestrian-vehicle collision and that the vehicle was traveling more than 50 miles per hour.

Evidence bearing on intent

The prosecution’s case included Anderson’s conduct before and after the collision. After striking Marshall, Anderson left the scene, collected Kendra, abandoned his truck in the woods, and eventually traveled to New York. Kendra testified that Anderson later admitted hitting Marshall because he was tired of Marshall “talking smack.”

The defense maintained that the collision was reckless rather than intentional. Its central argument was that the blind curve, Anderson’s speed, and Marshall’s location left Anderson too little time to avoid impact once Marshall became visible.

Proceedings below

A jury found Anderson guilty of malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in September 2022. The trial court imposed life imprisonment with the possibility of parole for malice murder and an additional five-year sentence for aggravated assault. The felony-murder count was vacated by operation of law.

During proceedings on Anderson’s amended motion for new trial, the trial court vacated the separate aggravated-assault sentence and merged that count into malice murder for sentencing purposes. It denied the motion for new trial on May 14, 2026. Anderson then appealed.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court affirmed on three grounds:

1. No deficient performance concerning the expert: Counsel reasonably advanced the defense theory through existing evidence and closing argument. The Constitution did not require expert testimony simply because it might have been helpful.
2. Procedural bar concerning the accident instruction: Anderson had not raised in the trial court the specific claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object after the jury charge. His separate claim that the court erred by omitting the instruction did not preserve that ineffectiveness claim.
3. No cumulative-prejudice basis for relief: The appeal established no combination of counsel’s deficiencies whose prejudicial effects could be aggregated.

The Court did not decide whether the proposed expert testimony would have created a reasonable probability of a different verdict. Nor did it decide whether Anderson was entitled to an accident instruction.

4. Analysis

A. Governing ineffective-assistance principles

The Court applied the familiar two-part inquiry: a defendant must establish both objectively unreasonable representation and resulting prejudice. Performance is assessed in light of the circumstances and prevailing professional norms. Prejudice requires a reasonable probability that, without counsel’s error, the proceeding would have ended differently.

These requirements are independent. Failure to establish either defeats the claim, allowing a reviewing court to leave the other unresolved. That principle mattered because the trial court rejected the expert-related claim for lack of prejudice, whereas the Supreme Court affirmed its rejection on the performance prong.

The Court also distinguished factual and legal review: it deferred to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, while applying the governing law to those facts independently.

B. Precedents cited and their influence

The constitutional framework

Troutman v. State, 320 Ga. 489, 494 (2024). This decision supplied the opinion’s governing standards for deficient performance, prejudice, and appellate review. It also supported the Court’s decision not to consider prejudice after concluding that Anderson had failed to establish deficient performance concerning the omitted expert.

Strategic decisions about expert testimony

Middlebrooks v. State, 310 Ga. 748, 752 (2021). The Court relied on this precedent for the principle that choosing whether to present an expert ordinarily involves trial strategy and does not establish ineffectiveness when reasonable. Its more specific contribution was the recognition that counsel may reasonably counter harmful evidence through other means even when expert testimony could help. That proposition closely matched Anderson’s circumstances: existing evidence supported the same limited-reaction-time theory that the proposed expert would have advanced.

Treadaway v. State, 308 Ga. 882, 893 (2020). The opinion cited this case as additional authority for treating reasonable decisions about expert witnesses as strategic judgments. It did not discuss that case’s underlying facts or identify a separate rule arising from it.

Martin v. State, 306 Ga. 747, 751 (2019). This case likewise reinforced the established expert-witness strategy principle. Together with the other authorities, it showed that the Court was applying an existing doctrine rather than creating an exception peculiar to vehicle-collision prosecutions.

Matthews v. State, 301 Ga. 286, 289 (2017). This precedent provided particularly direct support for the result. The Court cited it for the proposition that counsel may reasonably use argument to advance a defense theory rather than call an expert witness. In Anderson’s case, that argument rested on evidence actually presented to the jury; it was not an unsupported substitute for proof.

Marrow v. State, 322 Ga. 370, 375 (2025). This decision supplied the demanding standard for overturning a strategic choice: the defendant must show that “no competent attorney would have made the same decision under similar circumstances.” The question was therefore not whether hiring an expert would have been preferable, but whether proceeding without one fell outside the range of competent representation.

Preservation of specific ineffectiveness claims

Rickman v. State, 304 Ga. 61, 66 (2018). The Court invoked this authority because appellate counsel had not asserted the specific ineffectiveness claim in the trial court. Its significance was the distinction between challenging the judge’s ruling and challenging counsel’s handling of that ruling. Those are separate claims, even when they concern the same omitted instruction.

Tabor v. State, 315 Ga. 240, 250 (2022). This precedent addressed whether a claim might have been raised implicitly. The absence of a trial-court ruling on counsel’s alleged failure to object indicated that the trial court had not understood such an ineffectiveness claim to be before it. Together, these preservation authorities foreclosed appellate consideration of the claim.

Cumulative prejudice

Gines v. State, 324 Ga. 46, 68 (2026). This case supplied the cumulative-prejudice standard: the combined effects of assumed deficiencies must create a reasonable probability that the result would otherwise have been different. The inquiry concerns aggregate prejudice, not simply the number of allegations made.

Bradford v. State, 323 Ga. 675, 694 (2026). This precedent supported rejecting cumulative relief when the defendant has not shown multiple errors by trial counsel. Here, the expert claim failed on performance, and the instruction-related claim was procedurally barred, leaving no qualifying combination for cumulative analysis.

C. Why the omitted expert did not establish deficient performance

At the new-trial hearing, Anderson presented an accident reconstruction expert who analyzed the curve, the parties’ speeds, and ordinary perception-and-reaction time. After allowing 1.5 to 1.6 seconds for perception and reaction, the expert estimated that Anderson had a little less than one second to take evasive action. The expert also testified that Anderson lacked sufficient time to stop completely before reaching Marshall.

This testimony could have added scientific precision to the defense. But the Court distinguished potential usefulness from constitutional necessity. Counsel had already developed substantially the same factual theory through:

• The undisputed existence of the blind curve;
• Surveillance footage showing the relative movements of Marshall and Anderson;
• Evidence establishing Anderson’s high speed;
• Anderson’s testimony that he braked and attempted to steer away; and
• The neighbor’s testimony about sliding tires immediately before impact.

Using that evidence, counsel argued that Anderson could not see Marshall until rounding the curve, that only seconds separated visibility from impact, and that braking indicated an effort to avoid the collision. The expert would therefore have supported an existing defense theory rather than supplied a theory otherwise missing from the trial.

The holding is consequently fact-sensitive. It does not establish that reconstruction experts are unnecessary whenever a collision occurs near a blind curve. Nor does it mean that argument alone can replace essential technical evidence. It establishes that, on this record, competent counsel could reasonably rely on evidence permitting the jury to understand the defense without expert assistance.

D. Why the accident-instruction claim was barred

Trial counsel objected during the charge conference when the court declined to instruct the jury on accident, but did not object again after the charge was delivered. In the motion for new trial, Anderson challenged the trial court’s refusal to give the instruction. He did not separately allege that counsel’s failure to object after the charge constituted ineffective assistance.

This distinction controlled the appeal. An allegation that the judge made an instructional error does not automatically present a constitutional claim about defense counsel’s performance. Because the specific ineffectiveness theory was not raised and the trial court did not rule on it, the Supreme Court treated it as procedurally barred.

Importantly, the Court did not resolve whether counsel’s conduct was unreasonable or prejudicial. It also did not approve the refusal to give the accident instruction on its merits. The disposition rested on preservation.

E. Why cumulative prejudice did not warrant a new trial

Cumulative-prejudice review considers whether multiple deficiencies, assessed together, undermine confidence in the outcome. It does not independently transform unsuccessful or procedurally unavailable allegations into established errors.

Here, the Court found no deficient performance concerning expert testimony and could not consider the instruction-related ineffectiveness claim because it was barred. There was therefore no set of qualifying deficiencies to aggregate. The procedural disposition of the second claim should not be confused with a substantive finding that counsel acted properly on that issue.

5. Potential Impact

Expert-witness litigation

The decision reinforces the substantial latitude afforded to reasonable defense strategies. In future cases, identifying a helpful expert will not alone establish ineffective assistance. Defendants will need to explain why the evidence and advocacy actually available at trial were inadequate enough to make proceeding without the expert objectively unreasonable.

Conversely, the opinion leaves room for different outcomes where technical testimony supplies an indispensable explanation, where existing evidence cannot meaningfully support the defense, or where other circumstances make omission of an expert unreasonable.

Preservation practice

The opinion underscores the importance of identifying each alleged deficiency distinctly during new-trial proceedings. Counsel should not assume that a claim of judicial error necessarily preserves an associated ineffective-assistance claim. A developed trial-court record and ruling can be crucial to subsequent appellate review.

Limits of the decision

The opinion does not change the substantive elements of malice murder, establish that short reaction time disproves intent, or determine when an accident instruction must be given. Its principal contribution lies in applying established ineffective-assistance and preservation rules to a collision-based murder prosecution.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Deficient performance

Representation falling below an objective standard of reasonable professional conduct—not merely a strategy that failed or could have been improved.

Prejudice

A reasonable probability that counsel’s error changed the result. Helpful omitted evidence does not automatically satisfy this requirement.

Strategic deference

Courts allow competent lawyers a range of reasonable ways to defend a case rather than judging every choice by hindsight.

Procedural bar

A rule preventing consideration of a claim because it was not properly presented at the required earlier stage. It does not necessarily resolve whether the claim would otherwise succeed.

Accident instruction

An instruction explaining when an unintended occurrence does not create criminal liability. Describing a collision as an “accident” does not itself establish entitlement to that instruction; this opinion did not decide entitlement.

Cumulative prejudice

The combined harmful effect of multiple deficiencies, which may matter even when each deficiency considered separately would not justify relief.

De novo review

Independent appellate consideration of a legal question, while respecting factual findings under the applicable deferential standard.

Merger for sentencing

Treating one offense as absorbed into another so that no separate sentence is imposed. Here, aggravated assault merged into malice murder.

7. Conclusion

Anderson v. State affirms that the constitutional right to effective counsel does not require every potentially useful expert. Where existing evidence reasonably supports the defense theory, counsel may present that theory without reconstruction testimony.

Equally important, a specific ineffective-assistance claim must be properly presented below. The Court’s affirmance rests on those performance and preservation principles—not on a determination that the proposed expert lacked value or that an accident instruction was unwarranted.