Date: Aug 26, 2026

Eleventh Circuit: No Per Se Renewed Faretta Hearing After Superseding Indictment; Child-Witness Two-Way CCTV Permissible Even Against a Pro Se Defendant

I. Introduction

In United States v. Samuel Arthur Thompson (11th Cir. 2026-08-24), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed convictions arising from an investigation that began with alleged remote interference with the Jacksonville Jaguars’ stadium videoboard system, and ultimately uncovered extensive child sexual abuse material, alleged production of such material, firearms possession by a felon, and failures to comply with sex-offender travel-registration obligations.

The appeal presented three clusters of issues: (1) whether Thompson’s waiver of counsel remained valid after a second superseding indictment increased the number of counts and sentencing exposure; (2) whether the Sixth Amendment was violated when one child witness testified via two-way closed-circuit television under 18 U.S.C. § 3509(b)(1), particularly given Thompson’s pro se status; and (3) whether the district court erred in discovery/continuance rulings and in denying suppression and related subpoena requests tied to a Franks challenge.

II. Summary of the Opinion

Right to counsel / self-representation: Thompson’s initial waiver at a 2022 Faretta hearing remained valid after the second superseding indictment. The court rejected a rule requiring a new Faretta hearing whenever a superseding indictment increases penalties, emphasizing that “matters of reality, and not mere ritual” control.
Discovery and continuance (due process): No due process violation occurred. The government’s limits on providing “native” device copies were consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m), and Thompson failed to show “specific substantial prejudice” from the denial of a continuance.
Confrontation Clause / child witness: Allowing one child to testify by two-way CCTV satisfied Maryland v. Craig because the court made a case-specific finding that the child would suffer paralyzing anxiety in Thompson’s presence, and the remaining confrontation features (oath, cross-examination, demeanor observation) were preserved.
Self-representation during CCTV testimony: No plain error where Thompson observed from another room and standby counsel asked questions as Thompson directed; the “core” of self-representation (control of the defense) remained intact.
Rule 17(b) subpoenas and suppression: The district court did not abuse discretion denying subpoenas sought to support a Franks v. Delaware hearing, and the search warrant was supported by probable cause and complied with particularity requirements.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Waiver of counsel and continuing validity after superseding indictment

The court applied settled Sixth Amendment doctrine: the right to counsel and the “correlative right to dispense with a lawyer’s help” (Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann) cannot be enjoyed simultaneously (United States v. Hakim). A defendant may proceed pro se, but must do so “with eyes open” (Faretta v. California).

The opinion relied on circuit standards for assessing waiver validity (United States v. Shamsid-Deen; United States v. Owen; United States v. Stanley)—including the eight-factor framework reiterated from United States v. Owen. Critically, the panel emphasized that a formal Faretta hearing is “preferred,” not “required” (United States v. Cash), and that the decisive consideration is “the defendant’s understanding,” not the “trial court’s express advice” (United States v. Owen).

The court’s rejection of a mandatory “repeat Faretta” rule after every superseding indictment was anchored in the Supreme Court’s admonition that “matters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling” (McCarthy v. United States). The panel treated Thompson’s rearraignment colloquy—where charges and penalties were summarized and Thompson confirmed understanding—together with his repeated reaffirmations of self-representation as satisfying the constitutional requirement.

2. Due process, discovery limits, and continuances

On due process framing, the panel invoked the “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense” line from Crane v. Kentucky and Chambers v. Mississippi, but sharply limited discovery-based due process claims using Weatherford v. Bursey (“no general constitutional right to discovery”) and Wardius v. Oregon (due process has “little to say” about discovery amounts outside defined exceptions). The opinion referenced the canonical exceptions Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States, noting Thompson did not claim their application.

The panel also relied on discretionary authority to restrict discovery (United States v. Campa) and the framework for continuance review (United States v. Valladares; United States v. Garmany; United States v. Verderame; United States v. Pendergrass), including the requirement that an appellant show “specific substantial prejudice” by identifying evidence that would have been presented with more time (United States v. Valladares).

3. Confrontation Clause and child-witness testimony by CCTV

The court situated the Confrontation Clause issue in the modern face-to-face baseline recognized in Pitts v. Mississippi, while applying the child-witness exception crafted in Maryland v. Craig. Under Craig, two essential constraints govern: (1) a case-specific necessity finding that trauma is caused by the defendant’s presence (not merely by the courtroom), and (2) preservation of confrontation’s functional elements: oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor.

The panel harmonized § 3509(b)(1) with Craig and drew interpretive support from United States v. Garcia (9th Cir.), explaining that “unable to testify” does not require total silence; it suffices that testifying in the defendant’s presence would impair the child’s ability to communicate (“cannot reasonably communicate,” consistent with Craig). The panel cited United States v. Cox as an example of similar application.

4. Self-representation limits and standby counsel participation

To address the pro se overlay, the opinion relied on the principle that self-representation is protected but “not absolute” (Barnes v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.) and that standby counsel may participate so long as it does not “seriously interfere” with the “core” right—preserving “actual control” over the defense (McKaskle v. Wiggins). Applying plain-error review (United States v. Alfonso; United States v. Tovar) because the self-representation theory was not preserved, the panel found no obvious constitutional violation where Thompson watched live, conferred, and directed standby counsel’s cross-examination.

5. Franks, Rule 17(b), probable cause, and particularity

On the denied Franks-related subpoenas, the court applied the Franks threshold via United States v. Goldstein and reviewed Rule 17(b) necessity determinations under United States v. Muho. It underscored that Rule 17(b) is not a discovery tool (United States v. Rinchack), and demanded concrete “relevancy and necessity” rather than a hope a witness might “shed some light” (United States v. Hegwood). The opinion noted the Eleventh Circuit’s adoption of pre-1981 Fifth Circuit precedent (Bonner v. City of Prichard).

On suppression, the court applied standard warrant review principles and deference to issuing judges: probable cause is a “fair probability” under a common-sense reading (Illinois v. Gates; United States v. McCall), and receives “great deference” (United States v. Carroll). It also applied deference to credibility determinations on whether warrant attachments were provided during execution (United States v. Grushko) and appellate standards for suppression rulings (United States v. Rivers).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. A superseding indictment does not trigger an automatic “reset” of a valid waiver

The opinion’s central procedural holding is practical: once a defendant has validly waived counsel, later case developments (including additional counts and increased exposure) do not automatically invalidate the waiver or require a new formal Faretta hearing. The constitutional question remains whether, as a matter of record reality, the defendant understands the risks and persists in the choice.

Applying that standard, the panel found the rearraignment colloquy substantively addressed what changed: the government summarized each count and penalties; Thompson confirmed he understood and had the indictment. The same magistrate judge repeatedly confirmed Thompson’s continued choice to proceed pro se. Thus, nothing suggested an unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary continuation of self-representation.

2. Discovery: “reasonable availability” under § 3509(m) does not mean unsupervised “native format” access

Thompson’s discovery demands collided with Congress’s special regime for child pornography evidence. The court treated 18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) as a firm constraint: the government cannot relinquish control over property that “constitutes child pornography,” provided it is “reasonably available” for inspection. The panel read “reasonably available” according to the statute’s text—“ample opportunity for inspection, viewing, and examination” at a government facility— not as a right to possess sanitized mirrors of devices or to conduct review free from supervision.

Factually, the court emphasized the government’s repeated access provisions and file-copy accommodations (including review of vast numbers of files to prevent transfer of contraband). This record supported the district court’s exercise of discretion and defeated Thompson’s reframing of discovery disputes as due process violations.

3. Continuance: no due process violation absent specific, substantial prejudice

Even in complex cases, the Eleventh Circuit requires concrete prejudice. The panel faulted Thompson for failing to identify specific evidence that would have been presented had trial been continued. It also agreed with the district court’s finding that Thompson’s own choices—switching experts and refusing review unless evidence was provided in his preferred format—drove preparation problems. Under this record, denial of a continuance was not “so arbitrary as to violate due process” (United States v. Verderame).

4. Confrontation Clause: § 3509(b)(1) applied consistently with Craig

The court treated the pretrial hearing (including questioning of the child and the court’s observations) as providing the case-specific finding required by Maryland v. Craig. Importantly, the child’s testimony linked the anticipated trauma to Thompson’s presence (risk of anxiety attack, “locking up” in Thompson’s presence), satisfying the requirement that distress stem from the defendant—not the courtroom.

The court then confirmed that the substitute procedure preserved the confrontation features Craig demands: testimony under oath, full cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by judge, jury, and defendant. With those conditions met, dispensing with face-to-face confrontation was constitutional.

5. Self-representation: CCTV procedures may be compatible with pro se control via standby counsel

The panel drew a line between physical performance of questioning and “actual control” of the defense. Because Thompson contemporaneously observed testimony, conferred, and directed standby counsel’s questions, the panel concluded that the “core” right described in McKaskle v. Wiggins was not obviously impaired. Under plain-error review, that was decisive: even if one might debate ideal procedures for pro se defendants, no “obvious” constitutional violation was shown.

6. Franks subpoenas and suppression: necessity, probable cause, and particularity

The court’s Rule 17(b) analysis reinforces that subpoenas must be justified with specific proffers showing necessity to an “adequate defense,” not speculation. Thompson’s stated purpose—to show he allegedly had permission to access Jaguars systems—did not connect to the key Franks elements: deliberate or reckless falsity/omissions by the affiant and materiality to probable cause.

On probable cause for the computer-damage investigation, the panel invoked § 1030(e)(11)’s broad “loss” definition (including interruption-of-service costs and response costs). It treated jumbotron outages during NFL games and the ensuing investigation as an intuitive fit for “loss,” supporting a fair probability that evidence would be found at Thompson’s home.

On particularity, the dispute became factual: whether attachments incorporated by reference were left with Thompson. The district court credited Agent Norris’s testimony; under United States v. Grushko, that credibility choice was effectively conclusive absent clear error.

C. Impact

Procedural clarity for pro se cases: The opinion signals that in the Eleventh Circuit a valid Faretta waiver does not require “mechanical repetition” after superseding indictments. Courts should ensure updated understanding on the record, but need not convene a new ritualized hearing if the rearraignment and subsequent proceedings show informed persistence.
Discovery in CSAM prosecutions: The decision strengthens the government’s ability to insist on supervised, facility-based review of digital evidence containing (or strongly indicative of containing) child sexual abuse material, and rejects the notion that “reasonable availability” demands defendant-controlled copies or “native format” access without oversight.
Child-witness protections with constitutional safeguards: The court reaffirms that § 3509(b)(1) is a constitutionally viable mechanism when trial courts make defendant-specific trauma findings and preserve cross-examination and demeanor observation.
Pro se defendants and protected witnesses: The panel’s plain-error holding indicates that excluding a pro se defendant from the courtroom during a child’s testimony, while routing questioning through standby counsel under the defendant’s direction, is at least constitutionally permissible in the absence of preserved objection and clear contrary authority.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Faretta hearing / waiver of counsel: A court must ensure a defendant who chooses to represent himself understands the charges, penalties, and the disadvantages of proceeding without a lawyer. A formal hearing is common, but the constitutional test is whether the defendant actually understood the risks and freely chose self-representation.
Confrontation Clause (face-to-face vs. functional confrontation): The Sixth Amendment generally requires the defendant can confront witnesses face-to-face. Under Maryland v. Craig, that requirement can yield for child witnesses if the court finds the child would be traumatized specifically by the defendant’s presence and if oath, cross-examination, and demeanor observation are preserved through alternative procedures like closed-circuit television.
18 U.S.C. § 3509(m) (“reasonably available”): In child pornography cases, the government generally cannot hand over the actual contraband or devices containing it. Instead, it must provide an ample opportunity to inspect and examine the material at a government facility. The statute does not require unsupervised access or copies for personal possession.
Franks hearing: A defendant can challenge a search warrant by showing, preliminarily, that the warrant affidavit contained deliberate or reckless falsehoods (or omissions) that were necessary to probable cause. If that showing is made, the court holds an evidentiary hearing.
Probable cause: Probable cause is not certainty; it is a fair probability, assessed in a common-sense way, that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Samuel Arthur Thompson reinforces a pragmatic Sixth Amendment approach: valid self-representation does not demand repeated Faretta formalities after every superseding indictment, so long as the record shows informed, voluntary persistence. It also confirms that federal courts may protect child witnesses through § 3509(b)(1) two-way CCTV consistent with Maryland v. Craig, and that such protections can coexist with a defendant’s pro se status where standby counsel conducts questioning under the defendant’s direction. Finally, the decision underscores strict statutory limits on CSAM discovery transfer under § 3509(m) and reiterates the demanding showings required for continuances, Rule 17(b) subpoenas, and suppression based on alleged warrant defects.