Deferred-Payment Content Licensing: Unbilled Work and Unilateral Withdrawal Do Not Defeat Contractual Authorization

Case: Thomas v. Leyline Publishing
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Decided: November 4, 2026
Opinion: Judge Carl E. Stewart, joined by Chief Judge Elrod and Judge King
Disposition: Summary judgment for all defendants affirmed.

1. Introduction

This decision concerns the relationship between intellectual-property ownership, contractual permission to commercialize content, and deferred compensation. The Fifth Circuit held that a licensing agreement permitting payment after commercial use could not reasonably be interpreted to require payment before any authorized use. The creator’s failure to invoice certain work, and his later attempt to withdraw from the collaboration, did not eliminate the publisher’s existing contractual rights.

Shawn Thomas developed Realms of Kymoria (“RoK”), a tabletop role-playing game intended for therapeutic use. He established The TableTop Adventure, L.L.C., to market and distribute the associated intellectual property. The opinion collectively refers to Thomas and his company as “TableTop.”

The defendants were Leyline Publishing, L.L.C.; Leyline Education, P.L.L.C.; psychologist Anthony Bean; and therapist Alicia Figliuolo. Their businesses, associated with Geek Therapeutics, provided therapeutic gaming resources and training. After Thomas received a Therapeutic Game Master Certification and participated in a podcast, the parties began discussing the development and publication of RoK.

The parties entered into two licensing agreements. They agreed that the first, which contemplated a $50,000 payment for business-model content, was no longer operative. Their dispute therefore centered on the second licensing agreement (“SLA”), drafted by TableTop and executed in March 2022.

The SLA preserved Thomas’s ownership of the broader Kymoria setting and intellectual property pending any future sale, while authorizing Leyline to commercialize specified content. It established writing and consulting rates, royalties, and alternative payment schedules for products intended for a Kickstarter campaign. It also designated Thomas as Creative Director and required appropriate credit.

The relationship deteriorated after a reported leak suggested that Wizards of the Coast might substantially revise its Open Game License. TableTop wanted to redesign RoK to avoid dependence on the Dungeons & Dragons system; Leyline opposed that approach because of commercial and development concerns. TableTop subsequently demanded that Leyline stop using RoK materials and Thomas’s identity. Leyline declined, relying on the SLA.

The resulting litigation raised five principal questions: whether the SLA authorized use of allegedly unpaid content; whether derivative marketing materials exceeded its scope; whether reserved intellectual-property ownership prevented use of the RoK name; whether TableTop’s withdrawal terminated permission to use Thomas’s name and image; and whether unjust enrichment remained available despite the contract.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on every claim. Its principal conclusions were:

  1. The SLA was a valid, binding contract. Its drafting, acceptance, and the parties’ year of performance demonstrated mutual assent.
  2. Advance payment was not a universal condition of licensed use. Reading the agreement as a whole, Leyline’s agreement to pay—not necessarily completed payment—authorized use of content submitted under the SLA.
  3. TableTop failed to identify specific unauthorized content. This evidentiary failure independently supported judgment against its content-use and derivative-works claims.
  4. Reserved ownership did not prevent authorized marketing. Retaining the broader Kymoria intellectual property did not negate Leyline’s contractual right to market and sell RoK content under the game’s name.
  5. Unilateral withdrawal did not revoke contractual authorization. The cease-and-desist letter did not itself terminate the SLA or erase permission to identify Thomas as RoK’s creator.
  6. The contract barred unjust enrichment for the same subject matter. Withholding invoices did not create a genuine dispute about whether the SLA governed the services and promotional uses at issue.

The decision applies established contract and summary-judgment principles to a creative-content licensing arrangement. It does not announce that every license survives nonpayment or that all commercial uses of a creator’s identity are necessarily permissible.

3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents Cited

A. Summary Judgment: Concrete Evidence, Not Unspecified Uncertainty

The evidentiary framework was central to the result. The court reviewed the judgment de novo, independently assessing whether the record presented a genuine dispute requiring trial.

Sanders v. Christwood, 970 F.3d 558, 561 (5th Cir. 2020), supplied both the standard of review and the Rule 56 principle that summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Under Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), a dispute is genuine only if the evidence could permit a reasonable jury to find for the nonmoving party. This distinction mattered because TableTop treated uncertainty about the content at issue as though uncertainty alone required a trial. The court instead asked whether TableTop had produced evidence capable of supporting a favorable verdict.

Carnaby v. City of Houston, 636 F.3d 183, 187 (5th Cir. 2011), and Clark v. Am.'s Favorite Chicken Co., 110 F.3d 295, 297 (5th Cir. 1997), reinforced that subjective beliefs, speculation, conclusory allegations, and unsupported assertions cannot defeat summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986), likewise supported the requirement for an evidentiary response rather than reliance on allegations alone.

The most consequential authority was Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). It requires the party opposing summary judgment to identify specific record evidence and explain precisely how it supports the claim. TableTop repeatedly failed this requirement: it did not identify the particular copyrighted content allegedly used without permission or the particular derivative material allegedly created unlawfully.

The district court also relied on Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994), which rejects “metaphysical doubt,” conclusory allegations, unsupported assertions, and a mere scintilla of evidence. That principle defeated TableTop’s suggestion that some disputed content might have belonged exclusively to the first, inoperative agreement. Without identifying that content, the suggestion remained hypothetical.

Finally, Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434, 438 (5th Cir. 2012), established that an appellate panel may affirm on any ground supported by the record. Consistently with that rule, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the failure to identify unauthorized content independently justified affirmance, even apart from its interpretation of the SLA.

Significance: A licensing plaintiff must connect an identifiable work, an identifiable challenged use, and an identifiable contractual restriction. A generalized claim that some content remains unpaid does not establish infringement.

B. Appellate Preservation: Reviewing an Issue Does Not Preserve Every New Theory

Leyline argued that TableTop had forfeited all five appellate arguments. The Fifth Circuit rejected that sweeping position but carefully limited the scope of review.

Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021), supplied the general rule: arguments not raised in the district court are forfeited. The opinion also used Rollins v. Home Depot USA to explain why inadequately briefed appellate arguments, including the abandoned breach-of-contract theory and certain name-and-image theories, would not be considered.

Four general issues had been raised to some extent in TableTop’s summary-judgment response. The derivative-works issue was different: TableTop had pleaded it but had not meaningfully defended it in that response. Nevertheless, Leyline had addressed it in seeking summary judgment, and the district court had decided it.

Lampton v. Diaz, 639 F.3d 223, 227 n.14 (5th Cir. 2011), explained why review remained appropriate. Forfeiture ordinarily should not prevent consideration of an issue that fairly appears in the record as having been raised or decided, particularly when a developed record and lower-court determination are available. Leyline also had an opportunity to respond on appeal.

The court additionally cited JMI Contractors, L.L.C. v. Medellin, 738 S.W.3d 775, 792 (Tex. 2026), for its description of the longstanding federal practice permitting review of issues “pressed or passed on below.” That citation supported consideration of the derivative-works issue; it did not create an unrestricted exception to preservation requirements.

Shambaugh & Son, L.P. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 91 F.4th 364, 371 (5th Cir. 2024), supplied the limiting principle. Appellate briefing cannot cure forfeiture of new arguments because doing so would invite review on undeveloped records. The panel therefore considered preserved issues while excluding new substantive supporting theories.

Significance: Preservation operates at more than one level. An issue may be reviewable because the district court decided it, yet particular arguments supporting that issue may still be forfeited.

C. Contract Formation and the Relationship Between State Law and Copyright

The parties agreed that Texas law governed the SLA. Under Lulirama Ltd., Inc. v. Axcess Broad. Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 880 n.7 (5th Cir. 1997), Texas law determines whether the parties contractually created a license insofar as that law is consistent with the Copyright Act and its policies. This authority allowed the court to analyze authorization through ordinary contract principles rather than treating the copyright allegations as detached from the parties’ agreement.

Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Aircraft Network, L.L.C., 213 S.W.3d 455, 465 (Tex. App. 2006), quoting Prime Prods., Inc. v. S.S.I. Plastics, Inc., 97 S.W.3d 631, 636 (Tex. App. 2002), identified the elements of a valid contract: offer, acceptance, meeting of the minds, consent, and execution and delivery with the intent to be mutually bound.

Those elements were established through objective conduct. TableTop drafted the detailed agreement, presented it to Leyline, performed services under it, and submitted invoices according to its rates. Bean signed it, and Leyline paid every invoice TableTop submitted. TableTop expressly acknowledged performing under the SLA for approximately one year.

The absence of Thomas’s signature did not defeat formation. In a footnote, the court relied on Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Buster & Cogdell Builders, LLC, 668 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Tex. App. 2023), for the rule that signatures are unnecessary unless the parties expressly make them a condition of assent. The SLA imposed no such requirement.

This reasoning established the agreement’s enforceability on the record before the court. It should not be extended to mean that every intellectual-property transfer is exempt from otherwise applicable statutory writing requirements; the opinion did not decide that broader question.

D. Deferred Payment: The Promise to Pay Triggered Authorization Under This SLA

The central interpretive dispute concerned language limiting authorized content to what Leyline “purchased” and describing content acquired “by paying the agreed upon fees.” TableTop argued that these provisions made actual payment a prerequisite to any license.

Other provisions, however, expressly contemplated commercialization before completed payment. For Kickstarter products, payments could begin after campaign proceeds entered Leyline’s bank account and then be spread over ten months. A separate four-month schedule applied if the Kickstarter failed or another contingency arose. The agreement expressly sought to avoid substantial upfront costs while protecting Thomas’s right to compensation.

In re Ford Motor Co., 211 S.W.3d 295, 298 (Tex. 2006), required the court to read these provisions together rather than isolate the word “purchased.” TableTop’s proposed universal prepayment rule conflicted with the agreement’s express deferred-payment structure.

The court consequently held that Leyline’s agreement to pay triggered its authorization to use and sell submitted content. Actual payment was not invariably required before use. Under Evergreen Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Tan It All, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 669, 676 (Tex. App. 2003), the SLA was unambiguous and enforceable as written because TableTop’s competing interpretation was not reasonable when measured against the entire agreement.

License scope and breach were distinct questions

In the district court, TableTop argued that Leyline materially breached the agreement by failing to pay for more than 3,000 hours of unbilled work. The district court relied on Bunting v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 3-98-CV-2490-BD, 2000 WL 191672, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 14, 2000), for the proposition that failing to pay a claim never made cannot constitute breach.

On appeal, TableTop shifted its emphasis: it argued that no license attached to unpaid content, whether or not nonpayment constituted breach. The Fifth Circuit treated the breach argument as abandoned and addressed the preserved scope argument. Accordingly, the district court’s reliance on Bunting v. State Farm Lloyds should not be mistaken for a separate appellate holding resolving every possible payment breach.

Important limit: The decision did not excuse Leyline from paying agreed compensation. It distinguished the existence of licensed authority from satisfaction of payment obligations. Nor did it hold that payment can never be an express condition precedent in another agreement.

E. Derivative Works: Missing Identification and Authorized Marketing

Nola Spice Designs, L.L.C. v. Haydel Enters., Inc., 783 F.3d 527, 551 (5th Cir. 2015), supplied the statutory concept of a derivative work: a work based on one or more preexisting works. The court also recognized the copyright owner’s exclusive derivative-work right under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2).

TableTop nevertheless failed to identify the allegedly infringing derivative material. Its contention that the district court’s uncertainty itself precluded summary judgment reversed the evidentiary burden. Under Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., the relevant problem was TableTop’s failure to produce and explain supporting evidence, not an obligation on the court to locate the challenged material independently.

The court also endorsed the district court’s contractual analysis. The SLA broadly authorized Leyline to incorporate supplied content into its business model and to sell, lease, or use that content for clients. It did not prohibit derivative marketing materials. TableTop, as drafter, could have included such a restriction but did not.

Proper scope: This reasoning concerns marketing materials within this agreement’s broad commercialization grant. It does not establish that contractual silence alone authorizes every derivative adaptation. The absence of identified infringing material remained an independent basis for judgment.

F. Trademark Use: Retained Ownership Did Not Negate Commercialization Rights

TableTop argued that its reservation of the Kymoria setting, logo, website content, and broader intellectual property prevented Leyline from using the RoK name. It also relied on language allowing Leyline to use its “own branding.”

The court distinguished ownership from permission to use. Preserving ownership of the overall Kymoria property did not negate the express authorization to produce, market, and sell RoK content. The reference to Leyline’s branding permitted presentation under Geek Therapeutics; it did not require Leyline to avoid naming the game it was authorized to sell.

The trademark application Bean filed with Thomas’s authorization was subsequently withdrawn. The court therefore located Leyline’s authority in the SLA, not in an existing registration or completed transfer of the entire intellectual property.

The opinion’s reference to the “non-existent” trademark should be read cautiously. Withdrawal of a registration application does not, by itself, decide whether unregistered trademark rights exist. The operative reasoning was contractual authorization, not a general holding that only registered marks receive legal protection.

G. Name and Image: Contractual Consent Survived the Attempted Withdrawal

TableTop challenged promotional references to Thomas as founder, co-creator, and Creative Director, together with use of his headshot. It argued that these uses falsely suggested continuing involvement after its withdrawal.

Withdrawal was not contractual termination

The court cited Morgan v. Bronze Queen Mgmt. Co., LLC, 474 S.W.3d 701, 706 (Tex. App. 2014), which recognizes that an offer may be revoked before acceptance. By contrast, the SLA had already become binding. A cease-and-desist letter could not simply revoke that completed agreement.

This distinction does not eliminate contractual termination rights. It means that a party must establish a contractual or legal basis for ending authorization, rather than equating an announcement of withdrawal with effective termination.

Defamation

Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 114 (Tex. 2000), requires consideration of a publication as a whole and recognizes that literally true statements may convey a defamatory meaning through omission or juxtaposition.

The court nevertheless found no actionable misrepresentation here. Thomas’s role as creator was historically true, TableTop made comparable representations in its public complaint, and the SLA contemplated credit. The record also failed to substantiate the allegation that Leyline actually described Thomas as “Creative Director”; the court noted that Thomas himself was the only identified user of that designation.

The result therefore rests on the particular record and continuing authorization. It should not be reduced to a rule that an individually true statement can never create a defamatory overall impression, a proposition inconsistent with the cited Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc. standard.

Misappropriation

Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654, 657–58 (5th Cir. 2000), citing Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994), identified the relevant elements: appropriation of a person’s name or likeness for its associated value rather than incidentally or for newsworthiness; identifiability; and a resulting advantage or benefit to the defendant.

The decisive point was authorization. Thomas had consented to the pertinent promotional identification, and TableTop had not shown that its attempted withdrawal extinguished that consent under the binding SLA. The court did not need to determine every possible benefit Leyline might have received.

False endorsement and unfair competition

The opinion quoted 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a), addressing unauthorized use of registered marks likely to cause confusion. It rejected TableTop’s Lanham Act theories because the creator descriptions were true and contractually authorized.

There is an analytical limitation worth noting: false-endorsement claims are commonly associated with § 1125(a), while the provision quoted by the opinion concerns registered marks. The court did not separately explore that statutory distinction. Likewise, historical accuracy and present endorsement are conceptually different questions. The safest reading is therefore a record-specific rejection of the asserted claims, not a universal rule that truthful attribution can never misleadingly suggest current endorsement.

H. Unjust Enrichment: An Existing Contract Controlled the Same Subject Matter

Molzan v. Bellagreen Holdings, L.L.C., 112 F.4th 323, 335–36 (5th Cir. 2024), provided both the service-based elements described by the opinion and the dispositive limitation: unjust enrichment is unavailable when a valid contract governs the services or materials furnished.

The opinion described the relevant elements as valuable services or materials furnished to the defendant, accepted and enjoyed by the defendant, with reasonable notice that compensation was expected. But the court resolved the claim through the contractual bar rather than a detailed element-by-element inquiry.

The SLA governed the content, commercialization rights, and compensation associated with Thomas’s portrayal as RoK’s public face. TableTop’s assertion that coverage was disputed did not itself establish a genuine factual issue. Neither withdrawal nor withheld invoices displaced the agreement.

Important limit: The bar concerns the same subject matter governed by the valid contract. The opinion does not eliminate restitution claims involving genuinely different services or benefits outside an agreement’s scope.

4. Impact and Limits of the Decision

For creative-content licensing

The decision favors commercially coherent interpretation of agreements that combine content delivery, crowdfunding, and deferred compensation. A creator cannot isolate purchase terminology to impose universal prepayment where other provisions expressly allow commercialization before full payment.

At the same time, publishers should not read the decision as permission to ignore payment obligations. The holding concerns authorization under this SLA, not immunity from properly supported contract claims.

For drafting and termination

The dispute illustrates the importance of stating clearly:

  • whether authorization begins upon delivery, acceptance, an agreement to pay, invoicing, or actual payment;
  • which content is covered and which remains outside the license;
  • whether derivative marketing materials and other adaptations are permitted;
  • how names, likenesses, titles, trademarks, and historical credits may be used;
  • what events trigger termination and what rights survive it; and
  • how unpaid compensation, royalties, and post-termination accounting are handled.

The SLA itself contemplated exceptions to continued use, including refusal to honor royalties and certain transfers outside Leyline’s business. The court did not find those exceptions established. Their presence underscores why the decision should not be characterized as creating an unconditional perpetual license.

For litigation strategy

Future plaintiffs will need evidence identifying each disputed work and use, together with the contractual language allegedly exceeded. Itemized delivery records, invoices, acceptance communications, and copies of challenged promotional materials may determine whether a claim survives summary judgment.

The preservation discussion also discourages waiting until appeal to develop a licensing theory. A general objection below does not necessarily preserve every later distinction between contractual formation, scope, conditions, and breach.

Broader doctrinal significance

The opinion’s principal contribution is its application of established doctrines to an integrated creative-development arrangement. Contract law supplied the scope of authorization; copyright and related claims could not disregard that authorization; summary-judgment rules required concrete proof; and unjust enrichment could not replace the compensation structure the parties had agreed upon.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

License versus ownership
A creator can retain ownership while allowing someone else to use or sell specified material. Keeping the underlying intellectual property does not automatically cancel those permissions.
Condition precedent versus payment obligation
A condition precedent must occur before a right arises. A payment obligation is a promise that may become due later. Under this SLA, completed payment was not a universal prerequisite to licensed use.
Consideration
The bargained-for exchange supporting a contract. A binding promise to pay can supply consideration even before the money is paid.
Unambiguous contract
An agreement with only one reasonable interpretation when read as a whole. The parties’ disagreement does not itself make the contract ambiguous.
Derivative work
A work based on an existing work, such as an adaptation. Whether creating it is authorized depends on the relevant rights and the scope of any license.
Summary judgment
A decision without trial because the evidence presents no genuine dispute about facts that could affect the result.
Forfeiture
Loss of an argument through failure to raise or adequately develop it at the proper stage of litigation.
Revocation versus termination
Revocation commonly concerns withdrawing an offer before acceptance. Ending an existing contract ordinarily requires a contractual or legal basis for termination.
Unjust enrichment
A restitutionary means of addressing unfairly retained benefits. It generally cannot replace a valid contract governing the same services or materials.

6. Conclusion

Thomas v. Leyline Publishing establishes that this deferred-payment SLA authorized commercialization upon Leyline’s agreement to pay, rather than only after completed payment. Unbilled work and unilateral withdrawal did not extinguish that authorization.

Equally important, the court required specific evidence of unauthorized uses. The decision’s broader lesson is that retained ownership, dissatisfaction with a collaboration, and generalized allegations of unpaid work do not substitute for contractual termination rights or proof of infringement. Clear drafting and precise evidentiary identification remain essential.