Pardon-Based Expungement Is Charge-Specific and Permits Partial Expungement Orders (11 Del. C. § 4375)

Case: Cornette v. State (Supreme Court of Delaware)
Date: February 5, 2026
Disposition: Reversed and remanded

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Joseph Cornette’s effort to expunge a decades-old conviction after receiving an unconditional gubernatorial pardon. In 1993, Cornette pleaded guilty to Assault Second Degree and Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) after a drunk-driving collision that seriously injured another driver. He completed his sentence and, since the case closed in 1996, had no further arrests or convictions.

In 2022, Governor Carney granted Cornette an unconditional pardon for Assault Second Degree. Cornette then petitioned for discretionary expungement of the pardoned assault conviction under the Adult Expungement Reform Act. The Superior Court denied relief, reasoning that because the assault conviction was joined with a “non-expungable” DUI conviction in the same “case,” the Act required all charges in that case to be expungement-eligible before any expungement could be granted.

The Delaware Supreme Court was asked to decide a narrow but consequential statutory question: Does 11 Del. C. § 4375 allow expungement of a pardoned conviction even when other joined convictions in the same case are not eligible for expungement? Both Cornette and the State agreed the answer was yes, so the Court appointed amicus curiae to defend the Superior Court’s contrary interpretation.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court held that § 4375 makes expungement eligibility turn on the pardoned “crime,” not on the expungement-eligibility of the entire “case.” Accordingly, a pardoned conviction can be eligible for discretionary expungement even if other charges or convictions joined in the same prosecution (including a Title 21 DUI) are not expungable.

The Court further held that the statutory scheme authorizes partial expungement orders: if the trial court grants discretionary expungement, it may limit the order to records pertaining to the expunged charge and address the handling (destruction, segregation, or SBI custody) of other records so that non-expunged matters remain.

The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for the Superior Court to conduct the discretionary “manifest injustice” analysis under § 4374(f), now that eligibility is clarified.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

  • Osgood v. State — Cited for interpretive framing and for emphasizing the breadth of statutory definitions for “Case,” “Conviction,” and that “Expungement” applies to “all law-enforcement agency records and court records relating to a case in which an expungement is granted.” The Court used Osgood chiefly as support for de novo statutory review and as context for how expungement provisions operate in practice.
  • Arnold v. State — Provided the familiar Delaware interpretive rule: determine whether statutory language is ambiguous and avoid a literal reading that yields an unreasonable or absurd result.
  • Wilkerson v. State — Reinforced that the interpretive method depends on whether the statute is ambiguous and reiterated the General Assembly’s intent-focused approach.
  • Fuller v. State — Played a substantive role. The Court drew on Fuller to reject treating Title 21 traffic matters as categorically controlling adult-expungement eligibility when the statutory process centers on SBI criminal-history records. Fuller also supported the Court’s practical point: Title 21 violations may be relevant to discretionary considerations, but not as an automatic legal bar absent statutory text.
  • Doroshow, Pasquale, Krawitz & Bhaya v. Nanticoke Mem'l Hosp., Inc. (quoting Coastal Barge Corp. v. Coastal Zone Indus. Control Bd.) — Supplied Delaware authority for rejecting an interpretation that produces an unreasonable result in favor of a reasonable alternative.
  • Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi (quoting Sussex Cnty. Dep't of Elections v. Sussex Cnty. Republican Comm.) — Invoked for the anti-surplusage presumption: the General Assembly chooses language purposefully and courts should avoid readings that render terms meaningless (here, the “notwithstanding” clause and the deliberate use of “crime”).
  • Zambrana v. State (quoting Giuricich v. Emtrol Corp.) — Supported the inference that different words in different sections signal different legislative intent, central to contrasting “case” and “crime.”
  • Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Gp. — Key federal authority on “notwithstanding” clauses: they override conflicting provisions and must be given effect.
  • Garrison v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. — Cited via Wilkerson for the general principle that statutory interpretation aims to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.

The Court also relied on interpretive canons and treatises cited in the opinion—ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW and SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION—to justify the “scope-of-subparts” canon, the conjunctive/disjunctive canon, and related anti-surplusage principles.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Section 4375 eligibility is charge-by-charge, not “entire case”

The Court’s analysis began (and largely ended) with text and structure. Section 4375(a) authorizes a person “convicted of a crime” who is thereafter unconditionally pardoned to request discretionary expungement, subject only to the exclusions in § 4375(b). Importantly, § 4375 does not frame eligibility in terms of a “case.”

The Superior Court had treated the Act’s definition of “case” (a “charge or set of charges” that could be joined) and other “entire case” provisions as establishing a general all-or-nothing principle. The Supreme Court rejected that approach for several reasons:

  • Textual contrast within the same statutory scheme: other provisions expressly require “all charges in the case” or the “entire case” to be eligible (e.g., §§ 4373(a)(1), 4373(a)(2), and 4374(a)(4)). The Court held that the General Assembly’s choice to omit such “entire case” language from § 4375 was intentional and controlling.
  • Scope-of-subparts canon: the Superior Court imported language (“all charges related to the case”) from a defined term relevant to a different eligibility path (mandatory expungement) and applied it to pardon-based expungement. The Supreme Court held that was a misuse of statutory structure.
  • “Notwithstanding” clause as an override: § 4375 begins “[n]otwithstanding any provision of this subchapter or any other law to the contrary,” which, under Cisneros v. Alpine Ridge Gp., signals that conflicting eligibility limits elsewhere cannot be used to narrow § 4375. Reading an “entire case” requirement into § 4375 would drain the “notwithstanding” clause of operative effect.
  • Legislative intent and later clarification: the Court emphasized § 4371’s stated purpose—mitigating the lasting collateral harm of criminal history—and cited Senate Bill 38 (2021) as clarifying that a discretionary expungement after an unconditional pardon “is not to be restricted by” § 4374’s eligibility requirements or exclusions. The Superior Court’s approach would allow a pardoned conviction to “continue indefinitely” solely due to joinder with another conviction.

The Court therefore held that Cornette’s pardoned Assault Second Degree conviction is eligible for discretionary expungement because it is not among the crimes excluded in § 4375(b).

B. Title 21 (DUI) presence is not a categorical bar under § 4375

Although the Superior Court treated DUI as “non-expungable” and thus fatal to the petition, the Supreme Court explained that § 4375 is governed by its own exclusion list (§ 4375(b)), and the Act’s general Title 21 exclusions are textually fenced off when § 4375 applies (including by carve-outs and the selective incorporation of § 4374 procedures). The Court nonetheless acknowledged a practical distinction: Title 21 history can still be relevant to the “manifest injustice” discretionary determination under § 4374(f), but it cannot serve as an automatic eligibility veto under § 4375.

C. Partial expungement orders are authorized and workable

Amicus argued that expungement cannot practically be granted for only part of a case, pointing to the definition of “Expungement” as applying to records “relating to a case.” The Court rejected the premise that the definition compels all-or-nothing destruction:

  • Order language in § 4374(f): when granting discretionary expungement, the court enters an order expunging records “relating to the charge or case.” Applying the conjunctive/disjunctive canon, “or” creates real alternatives. Reading “charge or case” to mean only “case” would collapse the two terms and make “charge” surplusage.
  • Definition of expungement includes three mechanisms: records may be “destroyed, segregated, or placed in the custody of” SBI. That flexibility allows a court to expunge the pardoned charge while preserving non-expunged charges, including through segregation or controlled custody rather than indiscriminate destruction.

The Court concluded that if expungement is granted on remand, the Superior Court may enter a partial expungement order limited to records pertaining to the pardoned conviction, with instructions ensuring other records remain appropriately available.

3.3 Impact

  • New operative rule for pardon-based expungement: Eligibility under § 4375 is determined by the pardoned “crime” and § 4375(b)’s exclusions, not by whether all joined charges in the same case are expungable.
  • Partial expungement becomes a recognized remedy: Trial courts must now treat “charge or case” as authorizing expungement orders that can surgically target particular charges, which may change SBI/court record handling practices and require more tailored expungement directives.
  • Reduced joinder penalty: Petitioners will no longer be categorically barred from clearing a pardoned conviction simply because it was prosecuted alongside a non-expungable offense—mitigating an arguably arbitrary consequence of charging decisions and plea negotiations from years earlier.
  • Discretion shifts to merits: Because eligibility is broadened/clarified, litigation will likely move to the manifest injustice inquiry under § 4374(f), where courts weigh the continuing harm of record dissemination against public interests.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Unconditional pardon: executive forgiveness that removes legal consequences of the conviction to the extent provided by law; here, it serves as the statutory trigger to request discretionary expungement under § 4375.
  • Mandatory vs. discretionary expungement: mandatory expungement applies when statutory criteria are met (processed through SBI under § 4373), while discretionary expungement requires a Superior Court petition and a judicial finding of “manifest injustice” under § 4374(f).
  • “Manifest injustice” (11 Del. C. § 4374(f)): the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that continued existence and possible dissemination of the record causes (or may cause) circumstances constituting manifest injustice.
  • “Case” vs. “crime”: the Act defines “case” as a charge or set of joinable charges; § 4375 instead uses “crime,” signaling that pardon-based expungement focuses on the specific pardoned offense.
  • “Notwithstanding” clause: a drafting device meaning “in spite of”; it instructs courts that § 4375 controls even if other provisions would conflict.
  • Partial expungement: an expungement order that applies only to some charges/records, accomplished through destruction and/or segregation/SBI custody so that remaining records are preserved.
  • Nolle prosequi: a formal decision by the prosecution to discontinue a charge.

5. Conclusion

Cornette v. State establishes that 11 Del. C. § 4375 creates a charge-specific path to discretionary expungement following an unconditional gubernatorial pardon. A pardoned conviction’s eligibility does not depend on whether other joined convictions in the same prosecution are expungable. The decision also confirms that Delaware courts may enter partial expungement orders, tailoring relief to the expunged charge while preserving non-expunged records through segregation or SBI custody.

The ruling aligns statutory text, interpretive canons, and the Act’s remedial purpose: reducing the enduring collateral harms of criminal history where the General Assembly has authorized relief—especially when the executive has granted an unconditional pardon.