Constructive Possession and Intent-to-Sell May Be Inferred from Dominion Over a Shared Residence and Distribution Indicators

1. Introduction

People v Torres (2026 NY Slip Op 01252) is a Third Department decision affirming drug convictions after a no-knock search of an apartment associated with Orlando Torres (defendant) and a female roommate. Police recovered fentanyl, packaging materials, a digital scale, and cash. Although the roommate was involved in a controlled sale observed during the investigation, defendant was the only person present when the warrant was executed and no drugs were found on his person.

On appeal, defendant challenged only the weight of the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict convicting him of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (Penal Law § 220.16 [1] and [12]) and one count of criminally using drug paraphernalia in the second degree (Penal Law § 220.50 [3]). The central issue was whether the jury could reasonably find constructive possession, knowledge, and intent to sell (and/or liability as an accomplice) from the apartment-based evidence despite shared access and the absence of drugs on defendant’s person.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Appellate Division affirmed. It held that, while another verdict would not have been unreasonable because no contraband was found on defendant, the jury’s verdict was nevertheless supported by the weight of the evidence. The court concluded that evidence tying defendant to the apartment and to the storage bedroom—combined with the quantity of fentanyl, its concealment, the scale, packaging materials, and cash—permitted the jury to find constructive possession of fentanyl and paraphernalia, infer knowledge of the drug’s nature, and infer intent to sell. The court also held that the jury could rely on evidence of coordinated conduct with the roommate to support the verdict under accessorial liability (Penal Law § 20.00).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The opinion is principally an application of established New York doctrines—weight-of-the-evidence review, constructive possession, intent to sell inferred from surrounding circumstances, and accomplice liability—to a shared-residence factual pattern.

Weight-of-the-evidence framework

  • People v Warr, 237 AD3d 1262 (3d Dept 2025): Quoted for the standard two-step weight review—first asking whether a different verdict would be unreasonable, then weighing the probative force of conflicting testimony and inferences. The court used Warr as the immediate template for its analysis.
  • People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 (2006): Cited both for the weight-of-evidence methodology and for the appellate court’s obligation to give “due deference” to the jury’s credibility determinations. Romero also supported the court’s acknowledgement that another verdict could have been reasonable given the absence of contraband on defendant’s person.

Constructive possession and shared access

  • People v Manini, 79 NY2d 561 (1992): Supplied the key constructive-possession formulation—dominion and control “over the place where contraband was seized.” This principle anchored the court’s conclusion that residency plus control of the storage room could establish possession.
  • People v Leader, 27 AD3d 901 (3d Dept 2006): Cited in accord with Manini to confirm dominion and control as the operative test.
  • People v Torres, 68 NY2d 677 (1986): Cited for the rule that constructive possession may be proven circumstantially and that “exclusivity of access is not required.” This case directly countered the defense’s implicit theory that a roommate’s presence defeats constructive possession.
  • People v Victor, 139 AD3d 1102 (3d Dept 2016): Reinforced that shared access does not bar constructive possession and that circumstantial proof can suffice.
  • People v Banks, 14 AD3d 726 (3d Dept 2005): Supported the inference of dominion/control from residency and the presence of personal effects, a factual analogue the court used to connect defendant to the location where contraband was found.
  • People v Patterson, 199 AD3d 1072 (3d Dept 2021); People v Gaston, 147 AD3d 1219 (3d Dept 2017): Cited for the proposition that the jury may infer constructive possession even when possession is “shared.”

Drug possession, weight thresholds, and paraphernalia

  • People v Coston, 238 AD3d 1341 (3d Dept 2025): Used repeatedly to support (i) constructive possession in a residence with personal effects, and (ii) inferences of intent to sell from quantity, packaging materials, scales, and cash. Coston also framed the Penal Law § 220.16 (12) aggregate-weight theory.
  • People v Shabazz, 177 AD3d 1170 (3d Dept 2019): Cited for the elements of Penal Law § 220.50 (3) and for the proposition that paraphernalia found in a residence—evaluated alongside surrounding distribution indicators—can support a finding of knowing possession and prohibited purpose.

Knowledge of the drug’s nature

  • People v Sanchez, 86 NY2d 27 (1995): Cited for the inference that possession permits an inference of knowledge of the nature of the substance possessed.
  • People v Reisman, 29 NY2d 278 (1971): Cited alongside Sanchez for similar knowledge-inference principles; the opinion used these cases to bridge from constructive possession to culpable knowledge.

Intent to sell inferred from circumstances

  • People v Flynn, 233 AD3d 1087 (3d Dept 2024); People v Hayward, 213 AD3d 989 (3d Dept 2023); People v McCollum, 176 AD3d 1402 (3d Dept 2019): These cases supported the common evidentiary pattern the court relied upon—quantity inconsistent with personal use, scales, packaging materials, and cash—to infer intent to sell under Penal Law § 220.16 (1).

Accessorial liability (accomplice liability)

  • People v Bello, 92 NY2d 523 (1998); People v Kaplan, 76 NY2d 140 (1990); People v Lewis, 208 AD3d 989 (4th Dept 2022): Cited for the standard that a defendant is liable for another’s conduct when, acting with the required mental state, he intentionally aids in bringing about the criminal result.
  • People v Dean, 200 AD2d 582 (2d Dept 1994): Cited to support the permissibility of inferring intentional aid from coordinated conduct, reinforcing the jury’s ability to view defendant’s conduct in relation to the roommate’s trafficking activity.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The court separated “legal possibility” from “weight.” Applying People v Warr and People v Romero, the court first acknowledged that acquittal would not have been unreasonable, emphasizing a defense-friendly point: no drugs were found on defendant.
  2. The court then credited circumstantial dominion-and-control proof. The opinion marshaled multiple facts to support constructive possession under People v Manini: defendant’s driver’s license listed the apartment; both names were on the mailbox; surveillance showed both residents entering and exiting; defendant was found inside during execution; and—critically—personal effects tied him to the storage bedroom where fentanyl was hidden (including an insurance identification card on the same shelving unit as the concealed drugs, plus men’s clothing).
  3. Shared access did not defeat the inference. Relying on People v Torres (1986) and People v Victor, the court stressed that exclusivity is unnecessary: the jury could find defendant constructively possessed the drugs even if the roommate also had access and control.
  4. From possession, the jury could infer knowledge. Using People v Sanchez and People v Reisman, the court held that once constructive possession was established, the jury could infer defendant knew the nature of the substance. The court also emphasized corroborating circumstances: concealment in a sneaker, distribution/use indicators in the apartment, and the overall narcotics context.
  5. Intent to sell was inferred from quantity and distribution tools. Under the Penal Law § 220.16 (1) theory, the court treated the combination of (i) 19–21 grams of fentanyl, (ii) a digital scale, (iii) sandwich bags consistent with packaging, and (iv) cash (including $1,250 in a safe) as a classic “financial gain” inference, consistent with People v Coston, People v Flynn, People v Hayward, and People v McCollum.
  6. The weight-based possession count (Penal Law § 220.16 [12]) was satisfied by lab proof plus the same possession theory. The opinion treated the lab-confirmed aggregate weight as meeting the statutory threshold once possession was established.
  7. Paraphernalia liability followed the same constructive-possession logic. The scale’s presence in the residence, viewed alongside concealment and quantity, supported a finding that defendant knowingly possessed it “under circumstances evincing an intent” to use it unlawfully (Penal Law § 220.50 [3]), consistent with People v Shabazz.
  8. Accessorial liability served as an alternative (and reinforcing) pathway. Even if the jury believed the roommate was the primary possessor/seller, the court held the jury could find defendant intentionally aided her possession/trafficking based on coordinated conduct and the shared apartment evidence, invoking Penal Law § 20.00 as explained in People v Bello, People v Kaplan, People v Lewis, and People v Dean.

C. Impact

Although not doctrinally revolutionary, People v Torres (2026) is significant in how it consolidates several prosecution pathways in shared-residence drug cases:

  • Practical reinforcement of “shared residence” constructive possession: The decision underscores that personal identifiers (mailbox listing, ID documents, clothing) in or near the contraband’s location can be enough for dominion-and-control inferences even where a roommate is demonstrably involved in sales.
  • Intent-to-sell inference remains highly circumstantial: Quantity plus tools of distribution (scale, packaging) plus cash continues to be treated as powerful evidence of intent to sell, even absent drugs on the defendant’s person.
  • Accomplice liability as a “backstop” theory: Where evidence suggests a co-occupant is the direct seller, courts may still sustain convictions if jurors can reasonably infer coordinated conduct and intentional aid.
  • Appellate posture matters: By framing the issue as weight (not legal sufficiency), the opinion illustrates the considerable deference appellate courts give juries on credibility and competing inferences under People v Romero.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Weight of the evidence
A discretionary appellate review asking not merely whether some evidence supports guilt, but whether the jury’s verdict is the more credible and persuasive outcome when the evidence is viewed neutrally. The court may set aside a verdict it finds unjustified by the record, but it still defers to the jury’s live credibility assessments.
Constructive possession
Possession without physical custody. The prosecution must show the defendant exercised “dominion and control” over the place where the contraband was found (e.g., a bedroom, closet, storage area). Shared access does not automatically defeat constructive possession.
Accessorial liability (Penal Law § 20.00)
Liability for another person’s crime when the defendant intentionally aids or encourages that crime while sharing the required mental state. It is not enough to be present; the defendant must intentionally assist in bringing about the criminal result.
Intent to sell (Penal Law § 220.16 [1])
Often inferred from circumstantial evidence such as large quantities of drugs, packaging materials, scales, customer-facing paraphernalia, and significant cash—rather than direct evidence of a sale by the defendant.
Aggregate weight possession (Penal Law § 220.16 [12])
A separate third-degree possession theory requiring proof that the total weight of the narcotic-containing substance meets the statutory threshold (here, one-half ounce or more), typically established through laboratory testing.

5. Conclusion

People v Torres (2026) affirms that New York juries may find constructive possession, knowledge, intent to sell, and even accomplice liability from a web of circumstantial indicators tying a defendant to a shared residence and to the specific area where drugs are stored. The decision’s central lesson is evidentiary: even without drugs on the defendant’s person—and even with a roommate implicated in sales—residency, personal effects near the contraband, concealment, drug-distribution tools, and cash can collectively carry the People’s burden on weight-of-the-evidence review.