Consent Judgments as Contractual Authority to Award “Expenses” Beyond § 1920 in EPA Fee Litigation

Introduction

In Gloria Holladay v. Gestamp Alabama, LLC (11th Cir. June 10, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), Gloria Holladay, a Materials Analyst, sued her employer, Gestamp Alabama, LLC, asserting multiple workplace claims: age discrimination under the ADEA; sex discrimination under Title VII; retaliation under the ADEA, Title VII, and the FLSA; and unequal pay under the EPA.

The district court granted summary judgment to Gestamp on all claims except the EPA claim, which settled via a court-approved consent judgment awarding $102,699.50 plus “reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.” Holladay then sought approximately $829,559.70 in fees, $19,481.55 in costs, and $9,891.52 in expenses. The district court substantially reduced fees and costs and denied expenses entirely, reasoning the claimed expenses were “not permitted by Section 1920 or controlling precedent.”

The appeal presented two clusters of issues: (1) merits—whether summary judgment was proper on Title VII termination, ADEA termination, retaliation, and Title VII wage discrimination; and (2) fee litigation—whether the district court properly reduced fees and costs, denied expenses, and declined to hold an evidentiary hearing. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed across the board except for the denial of expenses, which it vacated and remanded.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Title VII termination (mixed-motive): Affirmed. Holladay failed to show sex was a motivating factor in her termination.
  • ADEA termination (but-for causation): Affirmed. Gestamp articulated a legitimate reason (performance/supplier complaints), and Holladay failed to show pretext.
  • Retaliation (Title VII/ADEA/FLSA): Affirmed. Holladay’s emails complained of unfair pay but did not attribute disparity to a protected trait; thus no protected activity (and no causation in any event).
  • EPA vs. Title VII wage claim: Affirmed. EPA does not require discriminatory intent; Title VII does. Evidence sufficient for EPA did not necessarily satisfy Title VII.
  • Attorney’s fees and costs reduction: Affirmed. The district court acted within its discretion given limited success and excessive billing.
  • Denial of “expenses”: Vacated and remanded. The district court erred by treating “expenses” as limited by § 1920 despite the consent judgment’s express allowance of expenses.
  • No evidentiary hearing: Affirmed. Disputes were not of the type requiring a hearing.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review and summary judgment framework

  • King v. King, 69 F.4th 738 (11th Cir. 2023): Cited for de novo review of summary judgment. It frames the appellate posture: no deference on the merits where summary judgment is at issue.
  • Cohen v. United Am. Bank of Cent. Fla., 83 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1996): Quoted for the Rule 56 summary judgment standard (no genuine issue of material fact; entitlement as a matter of law), anchoring the court’s evaluation of the discrimination/retaliation claims.
  • Atlanta J. & Const. v. City of Atlanta Dep't of Aviation, 442 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006): Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard for fee/cost awards, while preserving de novo review of legal questions and clear-error review for factual findings.

2) Title VII termination—mixed-motive and motivating factor

  • McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024): Used to distinguish Title VII single-motive and mixed-motive theories, and to emphasize that mixed-motive changes causation (motivating factor), not the plaintiff’s burden of producing sufficient evidence.
  • Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016): Provides the operative mixed-motive summary judgment test— whether a reasonable jury could find, by a preponderance, that the protected trait was a motivating factor.
  • Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2002): Cited for the comparator-focused route to showing discrimination even if the employer offers unrebutted “good reasons,” requiring evidence that similarly situated male employees were treated more favorably. The panel relied on this logic to conclude Holladay lacked adequate comparator evidence.

3) ADEA termination—but-for causation and McDonnell Douglas

  • Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009): Sets the ADEA’s “but-for” causation requirement. The panel treated this as dispositive of the causation lens—age must be the determinative cause, not merely one motivating factor.
  • Mora v. Jackson Mem'l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2010): Reinforces the binary nature of ADEA causation (“either acted because of age or it did not”), supporting the court’s insistence on proof of determinative causation.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): Supplies the circumstantial-evidence burden-shifting structure. The panel applied it to assume a prima facie case, then moved to legitimate reason and pretext.
  • Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015): Provides the prima facie elements and the “long tenure” inference of qualification. It helped Holladay clear step one, but also set the stage for the pretext failure.
  • St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993): Cited for the rule that a plaintiff must show both falsity of the proffered reason and that discrimination was the real reason. This tightened the pretext inquiry against Holladay.
  • Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2022): Used for the “unworthy of credence” articulation of pretext, underscoring that the record supported Gestamp’s performance rationale.

4) Retaliation—protected activity and causation

  • Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2002), and Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., 940 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 2019): Provide the prima facie elements of retaliation under Title VII, the ADEA, and the FLSA (protected activity, adverse action, causal connection).
  • Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018): Clarifies that an employee’s complaint is protected if made with a reasonable good-faith belief that discrimination occurred. The panel used this framework but found Holladay’s emails did not allege discrimination based on sex or age—only unfairness.
  • Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1995): Cited for the principle that complaints of unfairness alone do not constitute protected activity. This was the key authority for rejecting Holladay’s retaliation theory at step one.

5) EPA vs. Title VII wage discrimination—intent and burdens

  • Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992): Central to the court’s distinction: the EPA is “strict liability” in the sense that intent is not required, and the employer bears the burden to prove a “factor other than sex.” The opinion also relies on Miranda to reject importing EPA standards into Title VII analysis.
  • Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994): Quoted for the practical consequence of divergent burdens: if evidence is in equipoise, the plaintiff can prevail under the EPA, but the employer prevails under Title VII because the risk of nonpersuasion remains with the plaintiff. The panel used Meeks to explain how Holladay’s evidence could survive under the EPA but fail under Title VII.

6) Attorney’s fees and costs—lodestar, reductions, and hearing

  • Caplan v. All Am. Auto Collision, Inc., 36 F.4th 1083 (11th Cir. 2022): Cited for lodestar calculation and approval of across-the-board reductions where billing is excessive/voluminous. It validated the district court’s approach to cutting the requested fee significantly.
  • Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974): The source of the “twelve factors” used to evaluate reasonableness of fees.
  • Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983): Provides the requirement to exclude hours not “reasonably expended,” and informs how limited success affects fees.
  • Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712 (11th Cir. 2002): Reinforces that courts should not award fees for unrelated unsuccessful claims and approves reductions when overall success is limited compared to the litigation’s scope.
  • Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988): Supports reducing fees for limited success even when claims are related, and sets the standard for when an evidentiary hearing is needed in fee disputes.
  • Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994): Requires district courts to articulate reasons and calculations sufficiently for meaningful appellate review. The panel relied on it to uphold the explanation supporting the fee reduction.
  • Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., 917 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1990): Confirms no automatic right to an evidentiary hearing on fees; hearings are reserved for genuine material factual disputes not resolvable on the written record.

7) “Expenses” vs § 1920 “costs”—consent judgments, contracts, and statutory limits

  • Evans v. Books-A-Million, 762 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2014): The cornerstone for the panel’s holding on remand. Evans recognizes a distinction between taxable “costs” under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and “expenses” that may be awarded as part of attorney’s fees if reasonably incurred in preparation, settlement, or litigation.
  • Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988): Cited for the rule that, absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization, courts are constrained by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920 regarding witness-related and cost taxation. Gestamp invoked Glenn to argue the EPA does not authorize expenses—but the panel distinguished the case because a consent judgment supplied contractual authorization here.
  • Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987): Quoted (through Glenn) for the Supreme Court’s strict approach to costs: courts may not exceed statutory cost limits without explicit authorization. This served as the baseline from which the panel found an alternative authorization—contract—via the consent judgment.
  • Turner v. Orr, 785 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1986): Used to construe consent judgments as contracts. That principle allowed the panel to treat the parties’ consent judgment language (“fees…together with expenses and costs”) as enforceable contractual authorization.
  • Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004): Cited for interpreting clear consent-judgment language according to its plain meaning. This supported enforcing the “expenses” term as written rather than collapsing it into § 1920 costs.
  • Holladay v. Gestamp Ala., LLC, No. 2:21-CV-01712-AMM, 2025 WL 2486018 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 28, 2025), and Holladay v. Gestamp Ala., LLC, No. 2:21-CV-01712-AMM, 2024 WL 5425135 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 28, 2024): The first is the order denying expenses under § 1920; the second is the consent judgment containing the operative “expenses” language the Eleventh Circuit enforced.

Legal Reasoning

A. Why the panel affirmed summary judgment on the merits

The court’s merits analysis is orthodox and sharply separated by statutory scheme:

  • Title VII termination (mixed-motive): Applying 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and the evidentiary standard described in Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., the panel required evidence permitting a jury to find sex was a motivating factor. Holladay’s theory depended on undermining Gestamp’s performance rationale and showing comparator evidence (per Rojas v. Florida); the panel found the record lacked a similarly situated male comparator with comparable performance issues who was treated better.
  • ADEA termination: Under Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. and Mora v. Jackson Mem'l Found., Inc., Holladay had to show age was the but-for cause. Even granting the prima facie case under Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., Gestamp produced a legitimate reason (supplier complaints, inventory shortages), and Holladay did not satisfy St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks (falsity plus discriminatory reality). The court thus held no triable pretext.
  • Retaliation: Under Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp. and Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., the threshold question was whether Holladay engaged in statutorily protected activity. The panel held her emails were pay complaints grounded in tenure/loyalty, not allegations of discrimination based on sex or age, and under Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs “unfairness” complaints do not suffice. The court also noted an independent causation failure because termination discussions predated the emails.
  • EPA vs Title VII wage discrimination: Relying on Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc. and Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, the panel emphasized that the EPA can permit recovery without proving discriminatory intent, while Title VII requires intent and keeps the risk of nonpersuasion on the plaintiff. Therefore, survival of an EPA claim does not compel survival of a parallel Title VII wage claim.

B. Why the panel affirmed the fee and cost reductions (but not the denial of expenses)

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the fee reduction as a conventional application of the lodestar method and “results obtained” principles. Citing Caplan v. All Am. Auto Collision, Inc., Hensley v. Eckerhart, Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, and Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., the panel agreed the district court could reduce hours and apply an across-the-board cut where billing was excessive and success was limited (one settled EPA claim out of six claims).

The panel also rejected the evidentiary-hearing argument under Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr. and Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, concluding the disputes concerned reasonableness—issues the court can resolve on the written record.

C. The key holding: “expenses” cannot be denied solely because they are not taxable “costs” under § 1920 when a consent judgment authorizes them

The only reversal concerned the district court’s denial of $9,891.52 in “expenses.” The appellate reasoning proceeds in three steps:

  1. Costs and expenses are distinct categories. Under Evans v. Books-A-Million, items not taxable as “costs” under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 may still be recoverable as part of a fee award when the governing authority permits it and the items were reasonably incurred for preparation, settlement, or litigation. The district court erred by stopping the analysis once it found the expenses did not fit § 1920.
  2. The EPA’s default fee-shifting language is narrower. The panel acknowledged Gestamp’s reliance on Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp. and Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., which limit recoverable cost items absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization. It also noted that 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) expressly provides a “reasonable attorney’s fee” and “costs,” not a broad “expenses” category.
  3. But this case had contractual authorization: the consent judgment. The decisive fact was the consent judgment’s plain language awarding “reasonable attorneys’ fees together with expenses and costs.” Under Turner v. Orr, a consent judgment is construed like a contract, and under Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., clear terms are given their plain meaning. The panel held the district court abused its discretion by ignoring this contractual commitment and treating “expenses” as if they were merely § 1920 “costs.” On remand, the district court must determine whether the submitted expenses were “reasonably incurred in the course of case preparation, settlement, or litigation” under the Evans standard.

Impact

  • Fee litigation after settlements: The decision underscores that settlement/consent-judgment drafting can expand (or limit) recoverable litigation outlays beyond default statutory cost taxation. Parties who include “expenses” should expect courts to evaluate those expenses for reasonableness, not reject them categorically under § 1920.
  • Contract-first approach to consent judgments: By treating the consent judgment as “contractual authorization” within the meaning discussed in Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., the panel signals that even where a fee-shifting statute is narrow, negotiated consent language may supply an independent basis for awarding additional categories of litigation spending—subject to reasonableness review.
  • Practical guidance for district courts: District courts must separate (a) taxable costs (28 U.S.C. § 1920) from (b) fee-related expenses authorized by statute or contract, and must articulate the correct legal basis for denying or reducing each.
  • Employment merits remain conventional: The opinion also reiterates (without changing) settled Eleventh Circuit doctrine: mixed-motive Title VII requires motivating-factor evidence; ADEA requires but-for causation; retaliation requires protected activity tied to discrimination; and EPA proof does not substitute for Title VII intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Mixed-motive (Title VII)
The employer may have multiple reasons for an action; the plaintiff wins liability if a protected trait (e.g., sex) was one motivating factor. This does not eliminate the need for evidence—there must still be enough for a jury to find sex played a role.
But-for causation (ADEA)
The plaintiff must show the adverse action would not have happened but for age. It is a stricter causation standard than “motivating factor.”
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting
A three-step method for circumstantial evidence: (1) plaintiff shows a prima facie case; (2) employer provides a legitimate reason; (3) plaintiff must show the reason is pretext.
Protected activity (retaliation)
Complaining about workplace unfairness is not necessarily protected. The complaint must, at least in substance, oppose discrimination prohibited by the statute (e.g., unequal pay because of sex or age).
EPA “strict liability” vs Title VII intent
For EPA unequal pay, the plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent; the employer must prove a permissible reason (“factor other than sex”). Title VII wage discrimination generally requires proof the employer acted with discriminatory intent.
Costs vs expenses
“Costs” are narrow, statutory items taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (e.g., certain filing fees, transcripts). “Expenses” often include litigation outlays like travel, postage, mediation, or legal research; they are recoverable only if a statute or contract authorizes them, and then only if they are reasonable.
Consent judgment as contract
A consent judgment is a court-approved settlement with binding terms. Courts interpret its clear language like a contract and enforce what the parties agreed to.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed the district court’s merits and fee determinations, but it carved out an important rule for post-settlement fee disputes: when a consent judgment expressly authorizes “expenses” in addition to “costs,” a district court may not deny expenses simply because they are not taxable under § 1920. Instead, the court must treat the consent judgment as contractual authorization and evaluate whether the claimed expenses were reasonably incurred in preparing, settling, or litigating the case.

The decision’s broader significance is practical: it elevates careful settlement drafting and disciplined fee substantiation, and it requires courts to keep analytically distinct the statutory taxonomy of taxable “costs” and the potentially broader, contract-authorized category of recoverable “expenses.”