Colorado Recognizes a Narrow Public-Policy Wrongful-Discharge Claim for Lawful Self-Defense at Work

I. Introduction

In Moreno, Mary v. Circle K, 2026 CO 46, the Colorado Supreme Court answered a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado: whether Colorado recognizes a public-policy exception to at-will employment allowing a wrongful-termination claim when an employee is fired for actions taken in self-defense.

Plaintiff Mary Ann Moreno, a 72-year-old Circle K employee, alleged she was terminated after responding to an armed robber at the store. Circle K contended she violated its “Don’t Chase or Confront” policy and disputed whether she acted in self-defense and whether that motivated the termination. The Colorado Supreme Court emphasized it was deciding only the legal existence of the exception—not the disputed facts, the meaning of the policy, or causation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held yes: Colorado law recognizes a narrow public-policy exception to at-will employment for lawful self-defense at work. The right to self-defense—grounded in section 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2025) and article II, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution—can support a wrongful-discharge claim when an employee is terminated for lawfully exercising self-defense in response to an unprovoked attack at work.

The case was returned to the district court for further proceedings on fact questions (including whether Moreno acted in self-defense and whether Circle K fired her for that reason).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992): The foundational decision creating Colorado’s public-policy wrongful-discharge tort and the four-part framework. The court relied heavily on Martin Marietta both for the doctrinal test and for the principle that an at-will “terminability condition” is unenforceable when it violates public policy.
  • Crawford Rehab. Servs., Inc. v. Weissman, 938 P.2d 540 (Colo. 1997), and Rocky Mountain Hosp. & Med. Serv. v. Mariani, 916 P.2d 519 (Colo. 1996): These cases supplied the “clear mandate” approach and cautioned courts against expanding public-policy exceptions without a clearly expressed policy that affects the public. The majority distinguished Weissman (rest breaks viewed as insufficiently public) and used Mariani for the “concrete, not hortatory” requirement.
  • Russell v. Courier Printing & Publ'g Co., 95 P. 936 (Colo. 1908): Invoked for the long-standing contract principle that agreements violative of public policy should not be enforced—the conceptual root of the public-policy discharge tort.
  • Lampe v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., 590 P.2d 513 (Colo. App. 1978), and Calvert v. Mayberry, 2019 CO 23, 440 P.3d 424: Used to explain what “clearly expressed” means: concrete guidance to employees and sufficient notice to employers.
  • Statutory/public-policy identification cases: Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo. App. 1989); Jones v. Stevinson's Golden Ford, 36 P.3d 129 (Colo. App. 2001); Flores v. Am. Pharm. Servs., Inc., 994 P.2d 455 (Colo. App. 1999). These supported the proposition that public policy can be expressed not only by prohibitions but also by statutory rights and broader statutory schemes.
  • “Job-related right or privilege” examples: Bonidy v. Vail Valley Ctr. for Aesthetic Dentistry, P.C., 186 P.3d 80 (Colo. App. 2008); Herrera v. San Luis Cent. R.R. Co., 997 P.2d 1238 (Colo. App. 1999); Hoyt v. Target Stores, 981 P.2d 188 (Colo. App. 1998); and the out-of-state workers’ compensation analogue Frampton v. Cent. Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973). The majority drew on these to treat “job-relatedness” as including rights that are exercised at work even if not employment-specific.
  • Self-defense contours: Castillo v. People, 2018 CO 62, 421 P.3d 1141; People v. Toler, 9 P.3d 341 (Colo. 2000); Beckett v. People, 800 P.2d 74 (Colo. 1990); Idrogo v. People, 818 P.2d 752 (Colo. 1991); People ex rel. Graves v. Dist. Ct., 86 P. 87 (Colo. 1906). These were used to demonstrate that Colorado’s self-defense doctrine is well-defined and that constitutional interpretation is informed by common law and statutory evolution.
  • Comparative authority on self-defense as public policy: State v. Merk, 164 P. 655 (Mont. 1917); Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614 (Utah 2015); Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001); and California’s framing in Semore v. Pool, 266 Cal. Rptr. 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
  • The court rejected Circle K’s reliance on Hoven v. Walgreen Co., 751 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2014), distinguishing Michigan’s narrower statute and Michigan’s approach to constitutions as sources of public policy for private-employer wrongful-discharge claims.
  • Certified-question and review standards: Skillett v. Allstate Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2022 CO 12, 505 P.3d 664; and the “context only” use of certified-question facts: In re Phillips, 139 P.3d 639 (Colo. 2006); Klabon v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 2024 CO 66, 556 P.3d 793.
  • Constitutional structure (constitutions as limits on government power): People v. Rodriguez, 112 P.3d 693 (Colo. 2005) (quoting Reale v. Bd. of Real Est. Appraisers, 880 P.2d 1205 (Colo. 1994)); People ex rel. Elder v. Sours, 74 P. 167 (Colo. 1903); and persuasive authorities United States v. Nicholls, 4 Yeates 251 (Pa. 1805), Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970). The majority used these to acknowledge the state-action baseline while still treating constitutions as policy sources.
  • The court declined to follow Slaughter v. John Elway Dodge Southwest/AutoNation, 107 P.3d 1165 (Colo. App. 2005), as inapposite because article II, section 3 expressly includes “defending” one’s life.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Clear expression of policy. The court found both sources sufficiently concrete:
    • Section 18-1-704 specifies when and how force may be used, imposes “reasonable belief” and proportionality limits, restricts deadly force, and denies justification to initial aggressors (with exceptions). That specificity, coupled with well-developed case law, provides a clear mandate for employees and notice to employers.
    • Article II, section 3 is brief but not merely hortatory because its operative meaning is bounded by Colorado jurisprudence and historically evolved alongside the statutory doctrine.
  2. Public (not merely proprietary) character. Distinguishing Weissman, the court treated self-defense as inherently public because it is an “essential, inalienable right” affecting public safety and crime deterrence. It also warned against defining “public impact” so narrowly that virtually no right would qualify.
  3. Job-related right/privilege. The court’s key move was to deem self-defense “job-related” because the need to defend oneself can arise at work. It framed the public-policy tort’s purpose as preventing employers from leveraging termination to force employees to surrender important legal rights—here, choosing between employment and physical safety.
  4. Constitutional provisions as sources of public policy. While acknowledging constitutions constrain government action, the court adhered to Mariani’s recognition that constitutional provisions may be sources of public policy in the wrongful-discharge context.

C. Scope and Limiting Principles

The majority expressly “cabins” its holding:

  • It is limited to self-defense as an “essential, inalienable right” (not broader conduct).
  • It applies only when an employee lawfully exercises self-defense in response to an unprovoked attack at work.
  • It does not decide whether Moreno acted in self-defense, whether Circle K’s policy prohibited self-defense, or what actually motivated the termination.

D. The Dissent’s Critique (Chief Justice Márquez, joined by Justice Hood)

The dissent argued the majority effectively rewrote Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz by: (i) treating any “inalienable” right as automatically “public,” and (ii) treating any right that could be exercised at work as “job-related.” It warned this logic could destabilize at-will employment and undermine workplace-safety policies (such as de-escalation rules). It also questioned whether constitutional provisions—aimed at government conduct—should supply public policy against private employers in this context.

E. Impact

  • Expanded wrongful-discharge exposure in workplace-violence scenarios. Employers in Colorado now face potential tort liability if they terminate an employee for lawful self-defense during an unprovoked workplace attack.
  • Policy drafting and enforcement pressure. Employers with “no chase/no confront” or violence-prevention policies must ensure policies (and training/enforcement) distinguish between prohibited confrontation over property and permissible self-defense under section 18-1-704.
  • Fact-intensive litigation likely. Disputes will often turn on whether the employee’s conduct was legally justified (reasonable belief, proportionality, initial aggressor, etc.) and on causation (was the termination “for” self-defense?).
  • Doctrinal signaling beyond self-defense. Despite the majority’s “narrow” label, future plaintiffs may cite the opinion’s reasoning about inalienable rights, public impact, and job-relatedness—precisely the dissent’s concern.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • At-will employment: An employment relationship that can be ended by either party at any time, for almost any reason, absent a contract or statutory restriction.
  • Public-policy exception (wrongful discharge): A tort claim allowing an employee to sue when a firing would undermine a clearly expressed public policy (e.g., forcing illegal conduct or penalizing protected civic/worker rights).
  • Certified question: A procedure allowing a federal court to ask a state supreme court to decide an unsettled state-law issue that may determine the federal case’s outcome.
  • Affirmative defense / legal justification: Self-defense under section 18-1-704 is a recognized legal justification; when proven, it negates criminal liability for otherwise unlawful force.
  • “Clearly expressed” public policy: The policy must be concrete enough to guide conduct and provide employers notice; broad aspirational language alone may be insufficient.
  • “Job-related right or privilege”: In this opinion, a right can qualify not only when tied to pay/conditions, but also when it is a right employees may need to exercise at work (here, self-defense).

V. Conclusion

Moreno, Mary v. Circle K establishes that Colorado’s statutory and constitutional protections of self-defense can supply the “clear mandate of public policy” necessary for a wrongful-discharge claim—but only where an employee is terminated for the lawful exercise of self-defense in response to an unprovoked workplace attack. The decision strengthens employee protections in workplace-violence contexts while setting up future litigation over the doctrine’s boundaries, the role of employer safety policies, and how broadly courts will read the opinion’s reasoning about inalienable rights and job-relatedness.