Coached Abuse Allegations Can Establish Emotional Abuse and Support Termination When Conditions Cannot Be Corrected

1. Introduction

In In re E.C. and E.M., the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia considered whether a mother’s interference with her children’s paternal relationships, coached sexual-abuse allegations, and repeated criminal conduct involving the children supported an adjudication of abuse and the termination of her parental rights. The mother, A.C., challenged both the sufficiency of the evidence establishing abuse and the circuit court’s refusal to impose a less restrictive disposition.

The decision confirms that child abuse need not involve direct physical injury. Intentional conduct threatening a child’s emotional or psychological welfare—including coaching false allegations that disrupt a parental relationship and expose the child to unnecessary investigative procedures—can establish abuse. Termination nevertheless requires a separate showing that the conditions cannot reasonably be substantially corrected in the near future and that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

The court resolved the appeal through a memorandum decision under West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 21, without oral argument. Its significance lies principally in applying established statutory requirements and precedents to a sustained pattern of deception and interference, rather than announcing a new statutory test.

2. Background and Procedural History

Initial allegations and investigation

The Department of Human Services (“DHS”) filed its initial petition in June 2024 after receiving a report that three-year-old E.M. had disclosed possible sexual abuse by her father, T.M.-1. The petition also alleged that T.M.-2, whom A.C. identified as the father of three-month-old E.C., had abandoned that child.

The petition described A.C.’s earlier child-protection history. Her parental rights to another child had been involuntarily terminated following a 2018 proceeding involving exposure to sex offenders and domestic violence, an unsuitable home, and noncompliance with an improvement period. Two subsequent abuse-and-neglect proceedings had been dismissed.

By July 2024, an investigation involving a Child Advocacy Center (“CAC”) interview and a medical examination had not substantiated the sexual-abuse allegations concerning E.M. Nevertheless, in August, A.C. sought a domestic violence protective order against T.M.-1, asserting further disclosures of physical and sexual abuse and claiming that earlier allegations had been ignored. An emergency order interrupted contact between father and child until supervised visitation began in October.

Evidence of coaching and interference

Further investigation included police questioning, photographs, and another CAC interview. Apart from slight bruising on E.M.’s arm, the evidence supporting the renewed allegations consisted of A.C.’s representations. More importantly, a visitation supervisor later testified that E.M. spontaneously said her mother had “told her to say that her daddy hurt her.” The supervisor also described a good bond between E.M. and T.M.-1.

Evidence showed that A.C. cancelled six of eleven scheduled visits between them. Several cancellations were attributed to transportation problems, although she had declined transportation assistance when visits were arranged. A CPS worker also described requests for transportation assistance made only after the scheduled visit had passed.

Regarding E.C., T.M.-2 testified that he had been involved since birth and consistently provided support, but that A.C. sometimes stopped communicating with him, obstructed contact, and discouraged his participation in the proceedings. The circuit court dismissed the allegations against both men in December 2024.

Amended allegations and adjudication

The DHS amended its petition in December 2024 to allege psychological and mental abuse through interference with visitation and alienation from the children’s fathers. During subsequent hearings, paternity testing excluded T.M.-2 as E.C.’s biological father. A.C. then identified C.A. as another possible father; later testing established his paternity. The circuit court found that A.C. had misrepresented abandonment and intentionally interfered with establishing E.C.’s paternity.

A second amendment addressed repeated shoplifting. Evidence concerned twelve incidents between September 2024 and January 2025, with the children present during many of them. Testimony and reviewed footage established that A.C. used one child’s car seat to conceal stolen merchandise. Although criminal charges had been brought, she denied criminal conduct.

At the conclusion of adjudication in March 2025, the circuit court found that A.C. emotionally and psychologically abused the children by interfering with their paternal relationships and further abused them by using their presence to advance her criminal activity. It rejected her denials as lacking credibility. The court also found aggravated circumstances associated with the previous involuntary termination, noting similar false accusations in the earlier proceeding.

Disposition

A.C. requested a post-dispositional improvement period. Evidence in her favor included four recent parenting classes, successful supervised visits, and T.M.-1’s support for shared custody of E.M.

Other evidence pointed against further remediation. A psychologist testified that A.C. failed to accept responsibility and lacked the “capacity to care, protect or change” sufficiently to provide for her children. Her elevated lie score prevented meaningful interpretation of some assessments. A CPS worker likewise testified that no available services would correct the underlying problems.

Considering her continuing denials, recurring conduct, and substantial services in earlier proceedings, the circuit court found no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future. It also found termination necessary for the children’s welfare. Its August 20, 2025, order terminated A.C.’s parental rights. The permanency plan placed each child with the child’s respective nonabusing father.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed on both issues presented:

1. The abuse adjudication was sufficiently supported. Evidence of coaching, repeated false allegations, obstruction of paternal relationships, unnecessary investigative procedures, and criminal conduct involving the children established a threat to their health and welfare.
2. Termination was permissible without an intervening less restrictive alternative. Persistent dishonesty, continuing denial, unsuccessful prior remedial efforts, and the psychological evidence supported the finding that substantial correction was not reasonably likely in the near future.
3. Termination served the children’s welfare. The circuit court appropriately considered future harm and the children’s need for permanency.

The appellate court found neither reversible error in adjudication nor an abuse of discretion in disposition.

4. Legal Framework and Standards of Review

Appellate review

The opinion separates three standards: substantive rulings receive review for abuse of discretion, factual findings for clear error, and legal questions de novo. This division matters because the appeal challenged both the legal sufficiency of the established conduct and factual findings resting substantially on witness credibility.

Adjudicating abuse

West Virginia Code § 49-4-601(i) requires findings that the child is abused or neglected and that the parent is abusing or neglecting. Those findings must concern conditions existing when the petition was filed and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The opinion quotes West Virginia Code § 49-2-201 as defining an abused child to include one whose health or welfare is harmed or threatened by a parent who knowingly or intentionally inflicts, or attempts to inflict, mental or emotional injury upon that child or another child in the home. The statutory language therefore reaches threatened emotional harm, not merely completed physical injury.

The case involved successive amended petitions addressing interference and criminal conduct. Although the court recited the filing-date requirement, it did not separately analyze the procedural or temporal rules governing amendments. The decision should not be read as announcing a broader exception to that requirement.

Terminating parental rights

Under West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(c)(6), termination requires both:

• No reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse or neglect can be substantially corrected in the near future; and
• A determination that termination is necessary for the child’s welfare.

Section 49-4-604(d) connects the first requirement to a parent’s demonstrated inadequate capacity to resolve the underlying problems independently or with assistance. Accordingly, an abuse finding alone does not establish that termination is appropriate; the court must separately assess prospects for correction and the child’s welfare.

5. Analysis of the Precedents Cited

In re K.S.

The court cited syllabus point 1 of In re K.S., -- W. Va. --, 930 S.E.2d 400 (2026), for the governing standards of appellate review. This precedent supplied the analytical framework: factual disputes and credibility-based findings were not reconsidered as though the appellate court were conducting a new trial, while legal questions remained subject to independent review.

In re Joseph A. and In re S.C.

Syllabus point 1 of In re Joseph A., 199 W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997), quoting syllabus point 1 of In re S.C., 168 W. Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981), establishes that the statute does not prescribe a particular manner or mode of evidence through which the DHS must satisfy its burden.

These authorities supported consideration of the combined evidentiary record: the visitation supervisor’s account, CPS testimony, the child’s spontaneous statement, the history of cancelled visits, evidence concerning paternal support, and testimony and footage relating to shoplifting. Their relevance is evidentiary flexibility, not relaxation of the clear-and-convincing standard.

In re D.H.-1

The closest factual analogy was In re D.H.-1, No. 17-0953, 2018 WL 4944960 (W. Va. Oct. 12, 2018), a memorandum decision affirming emotional-abuse findings where unfounded sexual-abuse allegations caused children to undergo medical evaluations, forensic interviews, and related proceedings.

This precedent helped connect the mother’s conduct to threatened emotional harm. The investigative consequences were not merely background events: where allegations were falsely generated, the resulting examinations and interviews formed part of the harmful interference with the child’s welfare. Here, that analogy was strengthened by direct evidence of coaching and deliberate obstruction of contact.

In re Kristin Y. and In re R.J.M.

Syllabus point 5 of In re Kristin Y., 227 W. Va. 558, 712 S.E.2d 55 (2011), quoting syllabus point 2 of In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980), establishes that termination may occur without intervening less restrictive alternatives when there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions can be substantially corrected.

These authorities directly answered A.C.’s argument that another remedial opportunity had to precede termination. They do not dispense with statutory findings. Rather, they establish that courts need not move mechanically through lesser dispositions when the evidence already demonstrates that correction is not reasonably foreseeable.

State v. C.N.S.

Syllabus point 3 of State v. C.N.S., 173 W. Va. 651, 319 S.E.2d 775 (1984), requires clear and convincing evidence that there is no reasonable likelihood of substantial correction in the near future before custodial rights may be severed.

This precedent supplied an important safeguard. The issue was not simply whether A.C. had behaved improperly, but whether the DHS proved sufficiently that the underlying conditions would persist. The court found that burden satisfied through the recurring pattern, psychological evidence, prior services, and continued refusal to acknowledge the conduct.

In re Timber M. and In re Charity H.

In re Timber M., 231 W. Va. 44, 55, 743 S.E.2d 352, 363 (2013), quoting In re Charity H., 215 W. Va. 208, 217, 599 S.E.2d 631, 640 (2004), explains that failure to acknowledge the problem can make it untreatable and render an improvement period futile at the child’s expense.

These decisions supplied the link between continuing denial and an unfavorable rehabilitation prognosis. A.C.’s attendance at classes and successful visits did not resolve the court’s concern that she refused to recognize the conduct requiring correction. The opinion applied this principle to the whole record; it did not establish that contesting an allegation, standing alone, automatically justifies termination.

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Threatened emotional harm was sufficient

A.C.’s first argument emphasized insufficient proof that the children had been harmed or threatened. The court answered by focusing on the statutory protection against threatened mental or emotional injury. Disrupting a child’s relationship with a nonabusing parent through coached accusations can threaten welfare even without visible injury.

The court did not rest its conclusion solely on investigations failing to substantiate sexual abuse. It relied on affirmative evidence: the child’s statement identifying coaching, the visitation supervisor’s observations, repeated obstruction of contact, and misleading representations about paternal involvement. That distinction is essential because an unsubstantiated report is not necessarily a knowingly false one.

Criminal conduct supplied an additional basis

The shoplifting evidence reinforced the adjudication independently of the visitation dispute. The significant facts were repetition, the children’s presence during many incidents, and the deliberate use of a child’s car seat to conceal merchandise. The court viewed the children as being used to facilitate criminal acts, rather than merely present during an isolated parental lapse.

The opinion does not establish that every alleged offense committed near a child automatically constitutes abuse. Its analysis depended on the particular conduct and resulting threat to welfare.

Past services informed the prospects for correction

The prior termination and services history mattered principally because they illuminated whether another intervention would work. A.C. had already received supervised visitation, parenting instruction, and therapy, yet the court found similar deception and interference recurring.

The earlier termination was therefore not treated as a substitute for proving current abuse. Nor did the two dismissed proceedings independently establish misconduct. The appellate reasoning emphasized current evidence together with the demonstrated limits of previous remedial efforts.

Positive interactions did not resolve the underlying problem

The court considered favorable evidence, including recent classes, satisfactory supervised visits, and T.M.-1’s willingness to share custody. Nevertheless, those facts did not necessarily establish that A.C. could stop manipulating relationships or exposing the children to risk outside a supervised setting.

The psychological evidence reinforced that distinction. Some assessments could not be meaningfully interpreted because of the elevated lie score; the opinion did not treat that score as an independent diagnosis or a stand-alone basis for termination. It formed part of a broader record supporting the finding that the central problems remained unaddressed.

Welfare remained a separate requirement

Finally, the court separately upheld the finding that termination was necessary for the children’s welfare, emphasizing future risk and permanency. Placement with nonabusing fathers did not eliminate the need to evaluate whether preserving A.C.’s parental rights would perpetuate harmful interference. Conversely, the decision does not suggest that the availability of a suitable other parent automatically warrants termination.

7. Potential Impact and Limits

• Emotional-abuse litigation: The decision supports close examination of deliberate coaching and obstruction as child-welfare issues, rather than treating them solely as parental disagreements.
• Evidence gathering: Contemporaneous observations, visitation records, transportation arrangements, and contradictory accounts may collectively establish a pattern that individual incidents would not reveal.
• Improvement periods: Recent service attendance may carry limited weight when it does not address the specific behavior causing harm and when comparable services have previously failed.
• Disposition: Courts may proceed directly to termination when the required findings are supported, but must still establish both the lack of a reasonable prospect of correction and necessity for the child’s welfare.
• Good-faith reporting: The decision should not be read as penalizing sincere reports merely because an investigation is inconclusive. Its reasoning depended on findings of falsity, coaching, and sustained interference.

The opinion’s reach is therefore substantial but fact-sensitive. It applies established principles to an unusually developed record; it does not authorize termination based simply on parental conflict, disputed allegations, a prior termination, or imperfect cooperation.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Adjudication

The stage at which the court decides whether abuse or neglect occurred and whether the parent is responsible.

Disposition

The later stage at which the court determines the appropriate protective outcome, including services, placement, or termination.

Clear and convincing evidence

A demanding civil standard requiring substantially more certainty than merely deciding that something is more likely than not, though less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Improvement period

A court-supervised opportunity to correct the conditions causing abuse or neglect. It is not an automatic entitlement whenever a parent requests additional time.

Less restrictive alternative

A protective arrangement that preserves more parental rights than termination. The court need not try one when the governing requirements for proceeding directly to termination are established.

Parental alienation in this opinion

The concrete acts of coaching accusations, obstructing contact, and misleading others about parental involvement—not a separately adopted clinical diagnosis.

Permanency

A stable, lasting caregiving arrangement that avoids prolonged uncertainty for the child.

Syllabus point

A numbered statement of a legal rule in a West Virginia opinion, cited here as “Syl. Pt.”

9. Conclusion

In re E.C. and E.M. confirms that deliberate manipulation of a child’s allegations and parental relationships can constitute emotional abuse when it threatens the child’s welfare. Repeated criminal conduct involving the children strengthened that conclusion.

Termination, however, rested on additional findings: persistent denial, unsuccessful prior services, an inadequate prospect of correction, and the children’s need for protection and permanency. The decision’s central lesson is that courts must evaluate meaningful behavioral change—not simply participation in services—while preserving the demanding evidentiary safeguards governing termination of parental rights.