Abercrombie Abrogates the Second Circuit’s Prior Prima Facie Test for Title VII Religious-Accommodation Claims: “Actually Required Accommodation” + “Motivating-Factor Avoidance”

1. Introduction

Bergin v. N.Y. State Unified Court System (2d Cir. July 15, 2026) is a significant Second Circuit decision recalibrating the prima facie framework for Title VII claims alleging an employer’s failure to accommodate an employee’s religion. The plaintiff, Jessica Bergin, a New York court officer, was placed on leave and ultimately terminated for noncompliance with a COVID-19 vaccination requirement after her request for a religious exemption was denied. She sued the New York State Unified Court System (“UCS”) under Title VII, asserting a single failure-to-accommodate claim.

The district court granted partial summary judgment to Bergin, largely relying on discovery statements it treated as judicial admissions and concluding UCS failed to show undue hardship. On appeal, UCS argued that the district court applied an outdated prima facie test and improperly deemed discovery statements judicial admissions. The Second Circuit agreed on both points, vacated, and remanded.

Key issues

  • Whether EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015) abrogated the Second Circuit’s earlier prima facie test requiring the employee to inform the employer of a religious conflict.
  • Whether UCS’s discovery statements about the “adequacy” of Bergin’s exemption request constituted binding judicial admissions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit held that Abercrombie abrogated the Circuit’s prior formulation of the prima facie case for failure-to-accommodate religion claims under Title VII (as stated in Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985) and reiterated in Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001) and Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2006)).

The Court adopted an Abercrombie-aligned standard: to state a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show (1) she actually required a religious accommodation and (2) the employer’s desire to avoid that actually required prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in (3) an adverse employment decision. Employer knowledge may be evidence of motive, but is not dispositive and is not a categorical requirement.

Separately, the Court held the district court erred by treating UCS’s discovery statements as judicial admissions. The Second Circuit emphasized that judicial admissions must be “intentional, clear, and unambiguous,” and—viewing the record in the light most favorable to UCS—UCS’s statements did not concede sincerity or “validity” of the request as a matter of law.

Disposition: The judgment was VACATED and the case REMANDED for proceedings consistent with the new framework.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The pre-Abercrombie Second Circuit prima facie line: Philbrook / Knight / Baker

The district court applied the long-standing Second Circuit test, derived from Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 476 (2d Cir. 1985), requiring a plaintiff to show: (1) a bona fide religious belief conflicting with an employment requirement, (2) that the employee informed the employer, and (3) discipline for noncompliance. That test was reaffirmed in Knight v. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156 (2d Cir. 2001) and Baker v. Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2006).

The Second Circuit’s key move in Bergin is to declare this formulation “no longer good law” because it contains an employer-knowledge/informing requirement that Abercrombie rejects and fails to center the motivating-factor concept that Abercrombie makes pivotal.

2) Supreme Court pivot: EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc.

EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768 (2015) held that Title VII disparate-treatment liability can attach when an employer acts with the motive of avoiding a religious accommodation, even without actual knowledge (or even where the applicant did not request an accommodation). In the Second Circuit’s reading, Abercrombie directly “broke the link” underpinning the older Circuit test by making motive central and by rejecting a rigid “informed employer” requirement.

Bergin thus treats Abercrombie not as a narrow hiring case, but as a broad interpretive rule for Title VII disparate-treatment accommodation claims—consistent with the statute’s text treating hiring and firing identically under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

3) Post-Abercrombie signals and doctrinal housekeeping

  • Lowman v. NVI LLC, 821 F. App'x 29 (2d Cir. 2020) is cited as consistent with Abercrombie’s emphasis on motive over knowledge.
  • Russo v. Patchogue-Medford Sch. Dist., 129 F.4th 182 (2d Cir. 2025) is discussed as not controlling on the prima facie issue because it assumed a prima facie case arguendo and focused on undue hardship.
  • Baraket v. Holder, 632 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2011) supports the proposition that passing observations are dictum, not binding.
  • Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Servs., Inc., 992 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2021) is used to reinforce that Abercrombie’s logic applies beyond hiring, including termination.
  • The Second Circuit’s approach to when Supreme Court precedent abrogates Circuit precedent is grounded in United States v. Sterkaj, 138 F.4th 95 (2d Cir. 2025) and Garcia Pinach v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 117 (2d Cir. 2025).
  • The Court’s textual “no special rules” move draws support from the Supreme Court’s broader Title VII textualism in Ames v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303 (2025).

4) Accommodation and undue hardship context: Hardison and Groff

Although the appeal turned on the prima facie step and judicial admissions (not a final undue-hardship holding), the Court situates religious accommodation within Title VII’s definition of “religion” and accommodation duty, quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), and emphasizing Title VII’s “favored treatment” for religious practice as described in Groff v. DeJoy, 600 U.S. 447 (2023).

5) Summary judgment and record-review standards

The Court reiterates familiar summary judgment principles from Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), de novo review per Nambiar v. Cent. Orthopedic Grp., LLP, 158 F.4th 349 (2d Cir. 2025), and cross-motion handling per Morales v. Quintel Ent., Inc., 249 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2001). The factual background is framed through the non-movant lens per McGucken v. Shutterstock, Inc., 166 F.4th 361 (2d Cir. 2026).

6) Judicial admissions doctrine

The Court applies the Second Circuit’s strict standard that a judicial admission must be “intentional, clear, and unambiguous,” citing In re Motors Liquidation Co., 957 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2020). It further notes that statements must have sufficient formality per Berner v. Brit. Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), and that doubt about counsel’s statement precludes treating it as binding, quoting Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261 (1880).

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The new prima facie rule centers “actually required accommodation” and “motivating factor”

The Court reads Abercrombie as resetting the prima facie inquiry away from employee notice and toward employer motive: Title VII disparate-treatment “prohibits certain motives, regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” Accordingly, a plaintiff need not prove she requested an accommodation (or that the employer had actual knowledge), but must show that the employer acted, at least in part, to avoid providing an accommodation the employee actually required.

Bergin’s doctrinal reformulation is explicit and operational: the prima facie case is now:

  1. the plaintiff actually required an accommodation of her religious practice; and
  2. the employer’s desire to avoid that actually required prospective accommodation was a motivating factor in
  3. an adverse employment decision.

2) Abrogation analysis: why the Circuit could (and must) depart from Philbrook/Knight/Baker

Bergin gives a structured account of vertical stare decisis: the Circuit follows its own precedent unless a later Supreme Court decision undermines the foundational assumptions. Applying Sterkaj and Garcia Pinach, the Court finds Abercrombie did exactly that: it rejected a requirement embedded in the earlier test (employer notice) and imposed a motive-centric approach inconsistent with the older formulation.

3) Rejecting attempts to confine Abercrombie to hiring

The Court refuses to treat Abercrombie as limited to hiring because Title VII’s text places hiring and firing side-by-side in the same operative clause. The opinion’s reasoning is textual: courts should not “add words to the law” by creating a hiring-only knowledge/motive rule.

4) Correcting the district court’s “judicial admission” approach

The district court treated UCS discovery statements that Bergin’s initial submission was “perfectly adequate” and “explained a religious belief” as conceding that her request was “valid” and effectively sincere. The Second Circuit, reviewing the discovery record in context and in the light most favorable to UCS, holds that UCS consistently maintained it needed more information to assess sincerity—particularly given the standardized use of a supplemental form.

Because judicial admissions require clarity and unambiguity, and because UCS’s statements were intertwined with its position that additional information was necessary, the Court holds those statements could not be treated as dispositive admissions on sincerity/adequacy.

5) What the Court does not decide

The Second Circuit expressly “intimate[s] no view” on whether the record ultimately creates a genuine dispute as to UCS’s knowledge or whether knowledge suffices to infer motive. It also leaves to the district court, in the first instance, questions concerning the import of Bergin not challenging the exemption procedure generally and how that might bear on motive.

C. Impact

1) Immediate doctrinal impact in the Second Circuit

Bergin is a clear precedential reset: district courts within the Second Circuit should no longer apply the Philbrook/Knight/Baker notice-based prima facie test as controlling law for religious-accommodation disparate-treatment claims under Title VII. Instead, they must apply the Abercrombie motivating-factor framework as articulated here.

2) Litigation and summary judgment consequences

  • More focus on motive evidence: Parties will litigate evidence of why the employer denied an accommodation (process, comparators, internal communications, consistency of criteria), not merely whether the employee gave notice.
  • Knowledge becomes evidentiary, not elemental: Plaintiffs may use employer knowledge to support an inference of motive, but defendants can contest motive even with knowledge—and plaintiffs can proceed even without proving formal notice, so long as motive can be shown.
  • Judicial admissions will be harder to establish from discovery phrasing: The opinion discourages converting contextual discovery testimony into binding concessions, which should reduce summary-judgment outcomes hinging on isolated snippets.

3) Broader policy and institutional implications

For employers using large-scale exemption review processes (as UCS did via a committee and supplemental forms), Bergin suggests that procedural uniformity will not, by itself, resolve Title VII exposure. The critical question becomes whether the employer’s handling of an employee’s “actually required” accommodation reflects a motivating desire to avoid that accommodation—an inquiry that may turn on how the process is designed and applied in practice.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Prima facie case

A “prima facie case” is the initial set of elements a plaintiff must show to get a claim off the ground. It is not the final merits determination, but it frames what must be proven and what the employer must respond to.

Failure-to-accommodate as disparate treatment

The opinion treats religious accommodation claims as fitting within Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision: the law targets wrongful reasons (“motives”) for employment decisions. That is why the employer’s desire to avoid accommodating religion is central.

Motivating factor

A “motivating factor” means the forbidden reason (here, avoiding a required religious accommodation) played some role in the decision—even if other reasons also contributed.

Judicial admission

A “judicial admission” is a binding concession in litigation that removes an issue from dispute. Because it is so powerful, courts require it to be intentional and unmistakably clear—not a debatable interpretation of discovery testimony or interrogatory phrasing.

Undue hardship (context)

Title VII requires reasonable accommodation unless it would impose an “undue hardship.” While Bergin did not resolve undue hardship on appeal, it situates the accommodation duty within the Supreme Court’s guidance (including Groff v. DeJoy) that Title VII provides affirmative protection for religious practice in the workplace.

5. Conclusion

Bergin’s principal contribution is doctrinal clarity: in the Second Circuit, Abercrombie displaces the older notice-based prima facie accommodation test. Plaintiffs must now focus on showing (1) an accommodation was actually required and (2) the employer acted with a motivating desire to avoid that accommodation in (3) an adverse employment action. Employer knowledge remains relevant, but not an absolute prerequisite.

The opinion also reinforces a disciplined approach to summary judgment and admissions: courts should not convert contextual discovery statements into judicial admissions unless they are unequivocal. On remand, the district court must reassess the record through Abercrombie’s motive-centered lens rather than the abrogated Philbrook/Knight/Baker framework.