Appeal Waivers Encompass Within-Guidelines Imprisonment Imposed After Probation Revocation

Introduction

In United States v. Brandie Nicole Appleton (6th Cir. Feb. 5, 2026), the Sixth Circuit confronted a recurring plea-agreement question: whether an appellate waiver barring an appeal of “any sentence within or below the guideline[s] range” also bars an appeal when the defendant initially receives probation, violates probation, and is later resentenced to a within-Guidelines term of imprisonment at a revocation hearing.

The defendant, Brandie Nicole Appleton, pleaded guilty to (1) possessing controlled substances with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and (2) possessing stolen ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). The government was the plaintiff-appellee. Appleton’s plea agreement included a broad waiver of appellate and collateral-attack rights, with limited exceptions not invoked on appeal.

The key issue was scope: does a post-revocation prison sentence—still within the original Guidelines range—remain covered by the original appeal waiver, or is it a distinct sentence outside the waiver?

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding that Appleton’s appeal waiver foreclosed review. The court reasoned that a revocation sentence is “part and parcel” of the sentence for the original conviction, not a freestanding sentence. Because Appleton waived the right to appeal “any sentence within or below” the Guidelines range “as determined by the Court,” and because the district court ultimately imposed a 44-month term within the original 41–51 month range, the waiver applied.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Enforcing knowing and voluntary appeal waivers

  • United States v. Morrison, 852 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2017): Cited for the baseline rule that the Sixth Circuit enforces appeal waivers when entered knowingly and voluntarily. The Appleton panel treated this as settled doctrine and focused instead on the waiver’s scope.
  • United States v. Milliron, 984 F.3d 1188 (6th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Toth, 668 F.3d 374 (6th Cir. 2012): Used to frame the analytical steps—once voluntariness is conceded, courts enforce waivers so long as the claim falls within the waiver’s scope. These cases also reflect the Sixth Circuit’s tendency to interpret waivers to cover varied procedural postures (e.g., challenges related to plea withdrawal).
  • United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2001): Cited in the same line of authority reinforcing enforcement of valid waivers.

2) Construing waivers using contract principles

  • United States v. Fowler, 956 F.3d 431 (6th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Bowman, 634 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 2011): Appleton relies on the Sixth Circuit’s approach to interpret waiver language using “ordinary contract law principles.” Fowler supports reading the waiver’s broad text according to its plain meaning. Bowman is treated as a narrower, fact-specific decision—important as a limiting example but not controlling here.

3) Revocation is not a new, unrelated sentence

  • United States v. Penn, 788 F. App'x 337 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407 (6th Cir. 2003)): The panel drew from Penn/Wheeler the core conceptual move: revocation sentences “are part and parcel of the sentence underlying the original conviction.” That characterization does the heavy lifting—if revocation is a continuation of the original sentencing package, then an original waiver about “any sentence” naturally reaches it.
  • United States v. Boone, 801 F. App'x 897 (4th Cir. 2020): Cited for persuasive support that an appeal waiver can apply to “the sentence imposed at [a] probation revocation hearing.” While nonbinding, it shows the Sixth Circuit aligning with other circuits’ treatment of revocation under waiver language.

4) Distinguishing cases where waiver language is not specific enough

  • United States v. Carruth, 528 F.3d 845 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam): Used as a contrast. Carruth found a waiver inapplicable to supervised-release revocation because the plea waiver lacked “specific language” covering that later proceeding. Appleton distinguishes Carruth by emphasizing notice and fit: Appleton’s revocation placed her back within the same original Guidelines range, and the district court’s action was treated as correcting an initial sentencing leniency rather than adding distinct punishment.

5) Sixth Circuit’s expansive understanding of “sentence” in waiver provisions

  • United States v. Nykoriak, 803 F. App'x 919 (6th Cir. 2020): Cited for the proposition that broadly written waivers generally bar appeals of “all parts of a sentence,” reinforcing a broad, functional view of the term. Nykoriak is particularly relevant because it rejected an attempt to avoid a waiver in a post-judgment supervision-related context.
  • United States v. Hollins-Johnson, 6 F.4th 682 (6th Cir. 2021): Supports the idea that challenges to the “manner or timing” of punishment are still challenges to the “sentence imposed,” and therefore fall within broad waivers. The Appleton court also invoked Hollins-Johnson to explain why Bowman’s narrower holding often does not control where waiver language is broader.
  • United States v. McGee, 516 F. App'x 515 (6th Cir. 2013) and Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970): Cited to show the durability of plea agreements and waivers across later developments (e.g., resentencing post-remand, changes in law). The implication for Appleton is that a later procedural posture (here, revocation) does not dissolve the waiver absent an applicable exception.
  • Restitution-waiver line: United States v. Hack, 999 F.3d 980 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476 (6th Cir. 2021); United States v. Winans, 748 F.3d 268 (6th Cir. 2014): These cases underscore how broadly the Sixth Circuit reads “sentence” in waiver practice, often encompassing components beyond prison time. Appleton extends that same breadth to probation revocation resentencing.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Start with the waiver’s text. Appleton waived the right to appeal “any sentence within or below the guideline[s] range as determined by the Court” and waived collateral attacks and § 3582(c)(2) motions, subject to limited exceptions (involuntariness, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance). The court applied “ordinary contract law principles” to interpret that language as broad.
  2. Identify the relevant Guidelines range. At the original sentencing, the district court calculated offense level 15, criminal history category VI, producing a range of 41–51 months. The later 44-month prison sentence fell within that same range.
  3. Characterize revocation as part of the original sentence. Relying on Penn/Wheeler, the court treated revocation as an enforcement mechanism of the original sentencing decision—not an independent punishment. Probation is conditional by design, and revocation is an anticipated legal consequence of violating those conditions.
  4. Reinforce that probation inherently carries notice of revocation consequences. The panel emphasized statutory structure:
    • 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (probation conditions);
    • 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (revocation authority);
    • 18 U.S.C. § 3565(b)(1) (mandatory revocation for certain drug-possession circumstances).
    The court also highlighted the district judge’s express warning at sentencing that unlawful conduct would have “repercussions.”
  5. Reject the “procedural posture” escape hatch. Allowing an appeal simply because imprisonment was imposed after revocation would, in the court’s view, nullify the waiver’s plain commitment to forego appeal of “any” within-Guidelines sentence—an outcome inconsistent with Sixth Circuit waiver doctrine.
  6. Distinguish Bowman. Bowman turned on imprecision: the waiver did not mention the issue Bowman appealed (a consecutive sentence issue connected to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c)). Here, Appleton’s challenge went to the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the imprisonment term itself—squarely within a broad “any sentence” waiver tied to the Guidelines range.

Impact

Practical consequence for plea bargaining in the Sixth Circuit: defendants who accept broad “within-or-below Guidelines” appeal waivers should expect those waivers to apply even if the initial disposition is probation and imprisonment is imposed only after probation revocation—so long as the eventual prison term remains within the Guidelines range “as determined by the Court” for the underlying offense and no stated exception applies.

Doctrinal consequence: Appleton strengthens the Sixth Circuit’s broad, integrated view of sentencing and post-sentencing supervision proceedings under waiver clauses. It also signals skepticism toward attempts to reframe revocation resentencing as categorically distinct from the original “sentence” for waiver purposes.

Drafting consequence: the opinion implicitly encourages litigants to attend closely to waiver specificity. The court distinguished Carruth and narrowed Bowman’s utility where waiver language is broad, suggesting that parties who want to preserve appellate rights relating to revocation must negotiate for explicit carve-outs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Appeal waiver: a plea-agreement term where the defendant gives up some or all rights to appeal or collaterally attack the conviction/sentence. Courts generally enforce these if the defendant agreed knowingly and voluntarily and the appeal falls within the waiver’s scope.
  • Guidelines range: an advisory sentencing range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines based on offense level and criminal history. Here, that range was 41–51 months.
  • Probation revocation: if a defendant violates probation conditions, the court may revoke probation and resentence the defendant. Some violations (including certain drug possession scenarios) require revocation by statute. The Sixth Circuit treats the resulting sentence as part of the original sentencing package.
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: procedural challenges claim the court used the wrong process (e.g., incorrect calculation, inadequate explanation). Substantive challenges claim the outcome is unreasonable in light of sentencing factors. Appleton tried to raise these, but the waiver barred review.
  • Collateral attack (e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2255 / § 2241): a later challenge to the conviction or sentence outside direct appeal, often alleging constitutional or jurisdictional errors. Appleton’s waiver also purported to bar such attacks, though that aspect was not the dispute on appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. Brandie Nicole Appleton establishes (and publicly reinforces) a clear Sixth Circuit rule: a broad waiver of appellate rights covering “any” within-Guidelines sentence extends to a prison term imposed after probation revocation when that term falls within the original Guidelines range for the underlying conviction. The decision rests on (1) contract-based interpretation of waiver text, (2) the conception of revocation as “part and parcel” of the original sentence, and (3) the conditional nature of probation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3563 and 3565.

The broader significance is institutional: Appleton continues the Sixth Circuit’s robust enforcement of plea waivers across post-judgment developments, limiting appellate review where defendants have traded that right for the benefits of a plea bargain.