Appeal Waiver Enforcement Despite Alleged Colloquy “Confusion” and Absent Hunter-Level Miscarriage of Justice: United States v. McReynolds, II

1. Introduction

Kenneth McReynolds, II pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), after deputies responding to a domestic-violence call recovered a firearm from his residence. The district court imposed a 90-month sentence within a calculated advisory Guidelines range of 77 to 96 months.

On appeal, McReynolds sought to challenge a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) (firearm possessed “in connection with another felony”), arguing that the court improperly relied on inconsistent testimony supporting the “other felony” (second-degree kidnapping). The government responded with a threshold bar: McReynolds had signed a plea agreement containing a broad waiver of appeal and post-conviction challenges except in three limited circumstances.

The key issue was not the merits of the Guidelines enhancement, but whether McReynolds’s appeal waiver was knowing and voluntary—and, even if it was, whether alleged sentencing error could escape the waiver under a “miscarriage of justice” theory.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed the appeal, holding the sentence-appeal waiver enforceable. The panel concluded:

• The district court adequately explained the waiver during the Rule 11 plea colloquy and specifically questioned McReynolds about it.
• The record made it manifestly clear McReynolds understood the waiver’s significance: he signed directly under the waiver, confirmed understanding in court, and asked no clarifying questions despite invitation.
• McReynolds’s claim of Guidelines error—premised on allegedly inconsistent testimony—did not meet the “miscarriage of justice” standard described in Hunter v. United States, particularly given the absence of constitutional error and the sentence’s distance from the statutory maximum.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993)

Bushert supplies the Eleventh Circuit’s canonical enforceability test: the government must show either (1) the district court specifically questioned the defendant about the appeal waiver during the Rule 11 colloquy, or (2) it is manifestly clear from the record that the defendant otherwise understood the waiver’s full significance.

McReynolds relied on Bushert for the proposition that “confusing” colloquy language can doom a waiver. The panel distinguished Bushert on its facts. In Bushert, the district court told the defendant he waived appeal “under some circumstances,” which suggested that meaningful appellate review remained available and thereby muddied the waiver’s scope. Here, by contrast, the district court identified the waiver and its limited exceptions and did not affirmatively imply broad appeal rights remained.

2) United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064 (11th Cir. 2008)

Johnson is cited for the standard of review: the validity of sentence-appeal waivers is reviewed de novo. This frames the appellate inquiry as independent review of the waiver’s enforceability, rather than deference to the district court’s conclusion.

3) United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2006)

Bascomb provides the broader doctrinal backdrop: the Eleventh Circuit “consistently enforced knowing and voluntary appeal waivers according to their terms.” The panel invoked this consistency principle to reinforce that once the record satisfies the knowing-and-voluntary requirement, enforcement is the norm rather than the exception.

4) United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 2001)

Weaver supports the practical Rule 11 application: waivers are enforced when the court references the waiver during the plea colloquy and the defendant confirms understanding and voluntariness. The McReynolds panel treated the colloquy’s direct questioning and the defendant’s unequivocal “Yes, Your Honor” response as squarely within Weaver’s enforceability paradigm.

5) United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185 (11th Cir. 1994)

Medlock is cited for the “strong presumption” that a defendant’s sworn statements during the plea colloquy are true. This presumption is crucial: it prevents defendants from undoing plea terms via later, unsupported claims of misunderstanding when the contemporaneous record reflects comprehension.

6) Hunter v. United States, 608 U.S. ___, 146 S. Ct. 1702 (2026)

Hunter is the opinion’s most contemporary and policy-significant anchor. The panel quoted Hunter for the proposition that appeal waivers are not invalidated by “standard fare errors in misapplying sentencing law” that judges “could reasonably make,” and that only egregious error causing a “miscarriage of justice” can defeat enforcement.

The panel used Hunter to dispose of McReynolds’s attempt to repackage an evidentiary/Guidelines dispute (inconsistent testimony supporting the enhancement) as a waiver-defeating injustice. Because McReynolds did not allege constitutional error, and his sentence was well within the statutory maximum, the court found no Hunter-level miscarriage of justice.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Rule 11(b)(N) compliance and waiver clarity

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(N) requires that before accepting a guilty plea, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine the defendant understands, any plea-agreement term “waiving the right to appeal” the sentence.

The panel emphasized several features of the plea proceeding supporting compliance:

• The court warned McReynolds to stop it if he did not understand anything, and it would otherwise assume understanding.
• The court explained it was not bound by advisory Guidelines and that McReynolds could not withdraw his plea just because he disliked the sentence.
• With the plea agreement in front of McReynolds, the court directly questioned him about the waiver and its limited exceptions and confirmed his signature under the waiver provision.

2) Rejecting the “post-appellate relief” confusion argument

McReynolds argued the district court’s reference to “post-appellate relief” made the explanation confusing. The panel treated this as insufficient to create the kind of ambiguity condemned in Bushert. The decisive difference was that the district court here did not tell McReynolds he could appeal “under some circumstances” in a way that suggested broad residual appellate rights. Instead, the court tied appellate and post-conviction relief to only the enumerated exceptions in the agreement.

3) The record-based “manifestly clear” confirmation

Even apart from the court’s direct questioning, the panel relied on the overall record to conclude understanding: written acknowledgments, signatures (including directly under the waiver), counsel’s affirmation of voluntariness, and McReynolds’s own confirmation that he understood everything discussed and had no questions. Invoking Medlock, the court treated these in-court admissions as presumptively truthful.

4) Miscarriage-of-justice backstop narrowed by Hunter

The opinion reflects an increasingly structured two-step approach:

1. Validity: Was the waiver knowing and voluntary under Bushert/Weaver and Rule 11(b)(N)?
2. Escape hatch: Even if valid, would enforcing it produce a “miscarriage of justice” under Hunter?

McReynolds failed at step two because his claim sounded in ordinary sentencing factfinding and Guidelines application. The panel also noted practical markers cutting against “miscarriage”: no constitutional claim, and a 90-month sentence that was roughly half the 15-year statutory maximum.

C. Impact

1) Reinforcement of waiver enforcement in Guidelines disputes

The opinion underscores that defendants cannot generally circumvent appeal waivers by reframing routine Guidelines disagreements—such as credibility disputes over testimony supporting an enhancement—as “injustice.” After Hunter, the miscarriage-of-justice concept is portrayed as reserved for truly extraordinary defects, not contestable sentencing judgments.

2) Colloquy drafting: precision matters, but “imperfect phrasing” is not enough

By rejecting the “post-appellate relief” confusion argument, the decision signals that minor imprecision will not necessarily invalidate a waiver where the colloquy, taken as a whole, conveys that appeal rights are largely surrendered and enumerates the exceptions. The practical message to district courts is to continue clearly stating: (a) the waiver exists, (b) the general rule is “no appeal,” and (c) exceptions are limited and specific.

3) Doctrinal integration of Hunter into plea-waiver litigation

The opinion illustrates how quickly Hunter v. United States is being used as the governing lens for the “miscarriage of justice” limitation on waiver enforcement. Future litigants in the Eleventh Circuit can expect to confront Hunter when arguing that an otherwise valid waiver should not be enforced.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Appeal waiver: A plea-agreement term where the defendant gives up the right to appeal the sentence (and often to collaterally attack it), usually with narrow exceptions (e.g., sentence above the statutory maximum, above the guideline range as determined by the court, or ineffective assistance of counsel).
• Rule 11 colloquy: The judge’s in-court questioning to ensure a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary and that the defendant understands key consequences, including any appeal waiver (Rule 11(b)(N)).
• “Knowing and voluntary”: The defendant understood what rights were being surrendered and chose to surrender them without coercion.
• De novo review: The appellate court decides the issue independently, without deferring to the district court.
• “Manifestly clear from the record”: Even if a colloquy were imperfect, the total record (signed agreement, acknowledgments, answers under oath) shows the defendant understood the waiver.
• Guidelines enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B)): A sentencing increase applied when a firearm is possessed “in connection with another felony.” Here, the alleged other felony was second-degree kidnapping, raising the guideline range.
• Miscarriage of justice (post-Hunter): A narrow, exceptional category of error—more than routine sentencing mistakes—serious enough to risk bringing the judicial system “into disrepute.”

5. Conclusion

United States v. McReynolds, II is a waiver-enforcement decision with two principal takeaways. First, under Bushert, Weaver, and Rule 11(b)(N), an appeal waiver will be enforced where the district court directly addresses it, confirms the defendant’s understanding, and the written and oral record aligns—despite later claims that a particular phrase was confusing. Second, guided by Hunter v. United States, ordinary disputes over sentencing factfinding or Guidelines application—such as alleged inconsistency in testimony supporting an enhancement—do not constitute the kind of egregious error that defeats an otherwise valid waiver.