Date: Jun 6, 2026

Adam Walsh Act “No-Risk” Determinations Are Unreviewable in Both Outcome and Method; Constitutional/Legal Challenges Are Channeled to Removal Petitions for Review

I. Introduction

Anqi Liu v. Markwayne Mullin (7th Cir. June 5, 2026) is the Seventh Circuit’s first precedential decision addressing the scope of judicial review over the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 amendment to the family-based immigration petition process. The case arose when Devon Nobles, a U.S. citizen convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a minor, filed two Form I-130 petitions seeking to classify his spouse, Anqi Liu (a Chinese citizen in H-1B status), as his “immediate relative”—a required step toward lawful permanent residence based on marriage.

USCIS denied the second petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I), concluding Nobles failed to show he “poses no risk” to Liu. Congress, through the Adam Walsh Act (AWA), assigns that “no-risk” determination to the Secretary of Homeland Security’s “sole and unreviewable discretion.”

Plaintiffs brought 13 counts, largely under the APA, challenging (i) USCIS’s evidentiary standard and procedures for the no-risk determination, (ii) the denial as arbitrary and capricious, (iii) application of the AWA to an adult spouse, and (iv) a set of constitutional claims. The central issues on appeal were:

Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review USCIS’s methods (standards/procedures) used to reach the AWA “no-risk” determination.
Whether the AWA applies when the I-130 beneficiary is an adult spouse.
Whether constitutional claims can be brought in district court (or otherwise outside a petition for review in removal proceedings).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court in full:

Counts I–III (statutory/APA challenges to USCIS’s evidentiary standard and adjudicatory process): dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that “determines” in § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) encompasses both the final no-risk decision and the process/method for reaching it, and the INA and APA bar review of either.
Count IV (AWA allegedly inapplicable to adult beneficiaries): reviewable as a “predicate legal question,” but dismissed on the merits because the statute unambiguously applies to beneficiaries of any age, including spouses.
Counts V–XIII (constitutional claims): dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in this posture because 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) channels constitutional and legal claims into a petition for review of a final order of removal. The court also explained that, even where a U.S. citizen petitioner cannot access removal proceedings, none of the asserted constitutional theories were “egregious” (or even “colorable”) enough to trigger any potential exception.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Jurisdiction, textualism, and the limits of judicial power

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. and Turner v. Bank of N. Am. anchored the court’s insistence that jurisdiction must be shown and cannot be expanded “by judicial decree.”
Trump v. CASA, Inc. reinforced that enforcing jurisdictional limits is a judicial duty, not a discretionary choice.
Alexander v. Sandoval, Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., United States v. Melvin, Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., and Duncan v. Walker supplied the interpretive tools: begin with text, give effect to words and structure, and end the inquiry when meaning is unambiguous.
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A. was invoked for the proposition that clear statutory text controls.

2. The Adam Walsh Act reviewability question: aligning with the majority of circuits

The Seventh Circuit explicitly aligned with the dominant out-of-circuit approach that AWA no-risk determinations are unreviewable in both substance and method:

Bourdon v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (key influence): read “determine” to include both the final decision and the method/process used to reach it.
Bakran v. Sec'y, DHS, Gebhardt v. Nielsen, Privett v. Sec'y, DHS, Roland v. USCIS, and Bremer v. Johnson: cited as consistent authority that courts lack jurisdiction to review the AWA no-risk determination framework.
The court noted a minority view: Castaneira v. Noem (D.C. Cir. 2025), which relied on a “strong presumption” of reviewability to allow review of whether In re Chawathe’s preponderance standard bound USCIS. The Seventh Circuit rejected that approach as inconsistent with its own immigration-specific jurisdiction cases and with the AWA’s “sole and unreviewable” text.

3. Distinguishing procedure-practice review: rejecting McNary’s analogy

McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., Inc. was the plaintiffs’ principal tool for arguing that a jurisdictional bar might still allow challenges to “practices or procedures.” The Seventh Circuit distinguished it: McNary construed the noun “determination” in a different statute with a different review structure, while the AWA uses “determines” (verb) and adds the unusually strong “sole and unreviewable discretion” language.

4. The Seventh Circuit’s own immigration jurisdiction framework

Britkovyy v. Mayorkas (and Dijamco v. Wolf) were pivotal: the APA’s general review provisions yield to immigration-specific jurisdiction stripping and channeling. The court used Britkovyy to undercut plaintiffs’ reliance on the APA’s pro-review presumption.
Holy Virgin Prot. Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russ. v. Chertoff provided the Seventh Circuit’s template for understanding § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and claim channeling under § 1252(a)(2)(D), while leaving open a narrow possibility for “egregious” constitutional violations.

5. Constitutional-claim channeling and the post–St. Cyr landscape

INS v. St. Cyr framed the constitutional-avoidance concern when statutes threaten to eliminate review of pure questions of law. The court treated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) as Congress’s response to St. Cyr.
Wilkinson v. Garland and Patel v. Garland were cited to confirm that § 1252(a)(2)(D) is intended to preserve constitutional/legal review within petitions for review of removal orders, thereby supporting constitutionality of broad jurisdiction-stripping elsewhere.
Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. Physicians reinforced the general principle that total foreclosure of any forum for constitutional claims raises serious questions—yet the Seventh Circuit avoided deciding the outer limits because it found no “egregious” (or “colorable”) violations here.

6. Merits constraints on claimed constitutional rights in spousal immigration

Dep't of State v. Muñoz was dispositive against a claimed constitutional right for a citizen to live in the United States with a noncitizen spouse; any such solicitude is “legislative grace.”
Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan supported Congress’s plenary power over immigration regulation.
Schellong v. INS was used to reject the bill-of-attainder theory in the immigration-benefits context.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and McCauley v. City of Chicago supported dismissal of conclusory equal-protection allegations alleging bias against interracial marriage.

7. Procedural posture and pleading-stage standards

Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co. provided the rule for accepting well-pleaded allegations as true at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Dhakal v. Sessions and Jakupovic v. Curran established de novo review standards for Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals.
Zellner v. Herrick and Hoskins v. Poelstra supported affirming a sua sponte merits dismissal where the claim is plainly foreclosed by law.
St. Vincent Med. Grp., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice clarified that the APA does not itself create subject-matter jurisdiction.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core holding on statutory review: “determines” + “sole and unreviewable discretion” bars review of both ends and means

The court’s jurisdiction analysis turns on a tightly linked statutory triad: (i) the AWA’s no-risk clause in 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I), (ii) the INA’s jurisdiction stripping in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), and (iii) the APA’s exceptions for actions “committed to agency discretion by law” and where “statutes preclude judicial review,” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1)-(2).

Plaintiffs attempted to draw a line between an unreviewable ultimate no-risk determination and reviewable procedural/standards challenges (e.g., the “beyond any reasonable doubt” evidentiary burden and alleged failure to consider evidence). The Seventh Circuit refused that line for textual reasons:

The verb “determines” naturally includes investigative and evaluative steps, not just the final yes/no conclusion. By pairing that verb with “sole and unreviewable discretion,” Congress insulated not only the outcome but also the adjudicative framework used to reach it.
Once the court accepted that the method is part of the “determines” function, plaintiffs’ APA claims necessarily became forbidden “review” of a decision/action specified by statute to be discretionary under Subchapter II.

This reading also served a functional purpose consistent with the text: if courts could police the evidentiary standard, compel notice-and-comment rulemaking, or require additional explanation/weighting of evidence, they would effectively reintroduce judicial control over what Congress labeled “sole” discretion.

2. A narrow island of review: “predicate legal questions” remain reviewable

The court accepted—consistent with other circuits—that it can decide “predicate legal questions,” such as whether § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii) applies at all to the petition. This is a crucial structural point: jurisdiction stripping does not necessarily foreclose courts from determining what statute governs.

But on the merits of Count IV, the court held the AWA’s text unambiguously applies to adult beneficiaries because it refers to “the alien with respect to whom a petition described in clause (i) is filed,” and clause (i) covers “spouses” (and other immediate relatives) without an age limit. The court emphasized that when Congress intends age limitations, it states them (as with the “parents” category requiring the citizen to be at least 21).

3. Constitutional claims: broad channeling to petitions for review, with only a reserved possibility of an “egregious” exception

The court read 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)—which bars review “notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory)”—to include constitutional sources (“nonstatutory” includes the Constitution, as recognized in Marbury v. Madison). It then treated 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) as the exclusive path for constitutional and legal claims: only in a petition for review of a final removal order.

The court’s handling of the two plaintiffs illustrates the channeling logic:

Liu (noncitizen): even though she is not in removal proceedings now and cannot force DHS to start them (citing Juarez v. Holder and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.), her claims are still “channeled” because the government could place her in removal proceedings later, at which point § 1252(a)(2)(D) would allow review in a petition for review.
Nobles (citizen): he cannot be placed in removal proceedings, so channeling offers no eventual forum. Rather than decide whether Congress can entirely bar such claims, the court relied on Holy Virgin Prot. Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russ. v. Chertoff to “save for another day” any extreme scenario, and held that Nobles’s claims were not “egregious” (nor even “colorable”) enough to justify jurisdiction.

Finally, even apart from jurisdiction, the court signaled the weakness of key constitutional theories: Dep't of State v. Muñoz foreclosed a fundamental right to reside in the United States with a noncitizen spouse; and the equal-protection/bias allegations were conclusory under Twombly.

C. Impact

1. Seventh Circuit alignment with the majority—deepening the split with the D.C. Circuit

The decision places the Seventh Circuit with the Third, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits in reading § 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) to bar review of both the AWA no-risk outcome and the agency’s decision-making framework. It explicitly declines to follow Castaneira v. Noem, widening the practical consequences of the circuit split: litigants in the Seventh Circuit cannot use district-court APA litigation to attack USCIS’s AWA evidentiary standard, adjudicatory processes, or explanatory sufficiency.

2. Practical insulation of USCIS’s AWA adjudication framework

By holding that “determines” includes process, the court forecloses common administrative-law strategies:

Challenging the “beyond any reasonable doubt” standard as ultra vires (or as requiring notice-and-comment).
Arguing “arbitrary and capricious” adjudication based on alleged failure to consider evidence or to explain the denial.
Pressing courts to enforce In re Chawathe as binding on AWA no-risk determinations (at least outside the D.C. Circuit’s approach).

3. Adult beneficiaries are unequivocally within the AWA bar

The court’s merits ruling on Count IV removes a recurring argument that AWA protections are limited to child beneficiaries. In the Seventh Circuit, spouses (and other immediate relatives) are covered regardless of age.

4. Constitutional claims are largely confined to removal petitions for review—and citizens face steep hurdles

The court reinforces that § 1252(a)(2)(D) is the designated vehicle for constitutional/legal challenges, but the case also highlights a structural asymmetry: citizen petitioners cannot access the petition-for-review pathway. The Seventh Circuit avoids deciding whether Congress can bar citizen constitutional claims completely, but it signals that only truly extraordinary facts (the “egregious” scenario referenced in Holy Virgin Prot. Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russ. v. Chertoff) might justify jurisdiction.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Form I-130 (family petition): A U.S. citizen’s request for USCIS to recognize a family relationship (here, marriage) so the noncitizen can pursue permanent residence.
Adam Walsh Act (AWA) bar and “no-risk” determination: If the citizen petitioner has a qualifying conviction (“specified offense against a minor”), USCIS cannot approve the I-130 unless DHS decides—using “sole and unreviewable discretion”—that the citizen poses “no risk” to the beneficiary.
“Sole and unreviewable discretion”: Statutory language indicating Congress intended the decision to be made only by the agency and not second-guessed by courts. Here, the Seventh Circuit read it to cover both what USCIS decides and how it decides.
Jurisdiction stripping and claim channeling (§ 1252): “Jurisdiction stripping” limits courts’ power to hear certain challenges; “channeling” directs claims into a specific procedure. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) channels constitutional and legal claims into a petition for review of a final removal order.
APA review and its limits: The APA usually allows review of final agency action, but not when a statute precludes review or commits the matter to agency discretion. Also, the APA does not itself supply subject-matter jurisdiction.
“Predicate legal question”: A threshold legal issue a court can decide—such as whether a statute applies—before reaching (or refusing to reach) discretionary merits.
“Colorable” vs. “egregious” constitutional claims: Some circuits permit review of “colorable” constitutional claims even where review is generally barred. The Seventh Circuit did not adopt that rule, but (following its own precedent) noted that only exceptionally extreme (“egregious”) constitutional violations might justify review, and found none here.

V. Conclusion

Anqi Liu v. Markwayne Mullin establishes in the Seventh Circuit that the Adam Walsh Act’s “no-risk” determination is insulated from judicial review not only as to the final outcome but also as to the evidentiary standard and adjudicatory processes used to reach it. Courts may decide limited “predicate legal questions” (such as whether the AWA applies), but the AWA unambiguously applies to adult beneficiaries, including spouses. Constitutional and legal challenges are generally channeled into petitions for review in removal cases under § 1252(a)(2)(D), and this decision signals that only extraordinary, truly “egregious” constitutional violations might open any alternative path—an exception the court found inapplicable on these facts.