3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents Cited
A. The Governing ADA Framework
The ADA prohibits disability-based employment discrimination and includes within that prohibition an employer’s failure to reasonably accommodate the known limitations of an otherwise qualified employee, unless accommodation would impose an undue hardship. The word “known” makes employer notice central, while the reasonable-accommodation requirement makes the content and likely effectiveness of a leave request independently important.
The court applied a modified burden-shifting framework drawn from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2018), the employee initially must establish the elements of a failure-to-accommodate claim. If that showing is made, the employer must present evidence conclusively rebutting an element or establishing an affirmative defense.
Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040 (10th Cir. 2017), supplied the three initial elements: disability, qualification for the position, and a request for a plausibly reasonable accommodation. Its importance extends beyond the framework: it also establishes that an employee seeking leave must communicate the expected duration of the impairment, not merely nominate a period of absence.
The majority’s ruling addressed disputed components of this initial showing. It did not establish an entitlement to accommodation, resolve undue hardship, or determine ultimate liability.
B. Notice Depends on Functional Information, Not Diagnostic Labels
The controlling principle
Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 500 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2007), establishes that an employer ordinarily must know of the disability before it can be liable for failing to accommodate it. Unless the disability is obvious, the employee must supply that information. The opinion also relied on Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130 (7th Cir. 1996), for the practical justification: an employee cannot keep a disability secret and later fault the employer for failing to accommodate it.
But notice does not require medical precision. Drawing on Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 1999), the majority asked whether the employee supplied enough information that, in context, the employer could fairly be said to know of the disability. Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. supports the distinction between knowing an employee’s disabling limitations and knowing the condition’s specific name.
Why the combined evidence mattered
Four categories of evidence supported a jury question:
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Connected symptom reports: Javanzad repeatedly described serious symptoms and used language suggesting continuity and recurrence—she was “still” unwell, weak “again,” and unable to speak on “some days.”
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A physician-imposed work restriction: The medical note advised her to remain out of work pending symptom improvement and procedure results. This supported an inference of more than ordinary discomfort.
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The June 2 conversation: Her account linked stomach pain, breathing and speaking difficulties, further testing, and the need for additional time away.
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The employer’s own description: The termination letter expressly recognized a leave request for a “gastrointestinal disorder.”
None of these items necessarily established notice alone. Their cumulative significance was that they could show the employer understood an ongoing impairment affecting major activities, rather than a succession of unrelated minor illnesses.
The distinction from generalized illness complaints
Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 63 F.4th 555 (6th Cir. 2023), served both as a source of the governing approach and as a factual contrast. It identifies diagnoses, treatment plans, severe apparent symptoms, and physician-imposed restrictions as potentially relevant notice evidence. It also explains that employees need not use the word “disabled.”
Appliance Factory emphasized that Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC found messages describing headaches, fever, and general sickness inadequate. Those symptoms could reflect short-lived, nondisabling illnesses. The majority distinguished Javanzad’s communications because they described recurring, connected symptoms and significant functional problems, reinforced by a medical restriction and ongoing testing.
Cady v. Remington Arms Co., 665 F. App'x 413 (6th Cir. 2016), supplied a related example: complaints combined with knowledge of surgeries, medical visits, and imaging could allow a jury to find notice. The lesson is cumulative assessment, not that a particular diagnostic document is indispensable.
Conversely, Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 F. App'x 364 (6th Cir. 2013), illustrates the limits of notice from disconnected episodes. Knowledge of a respiratory infection and later dizziness or headaches did not necessarily reveal an underlying disability where the employee failed to connect those events. Javanzad’s references to continuing illness and post-infection stomach problems supplied the connection missing there.
Episodic symptoms and the interactive process
Under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D), an episodic impairment can qualify as a disability if it substantially limits a major life activity when active. Accordingly, temporary improvement and an earlier unrestricted return-to-work note did not conclusively negate later notice of recurring limitations. They remained relevant evidence, but not dispositive evidence.
Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (10th Cir. 1999), marks the balance between employee disclosure and employer inquiry. An employer need not be clairvoyant, but once information suggests the possibility of a reasonable accommodation, both parties must proceed interactively. The “no clairvoyance” proposition draws on Miller v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627 (8th Cir. 1995).
E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 2005), reinforces the employer’s responsibility to seek clarification when a communication sufficiently signals a possible disability-related accommodation need but leaves its precise nature ambiguous.
These authorities support inquiry rather than rejection merely because the medical picture is incomplete. The opinion did not, however, impose liability solely for a defective interactive process or decide a separate claim concerning the employer’s insistence on telephone communication.
C. An Accommodation Request Must Connect the Requested Assistance to the Condition
E.E.O.C. v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028 (10th Cir. 2011), establishes that an accommodation request need not be written, personally made by the employee, or phrased using “reasonable accommodation.” It must nevertheless communicate that the employee wants assistance because of disability. A request for “home time” failed there because the necessary connection to illness was absent.
Dinse v. Carlisle Foodservice Prods. Inc., 541 F. App'x 885 (10th Cir. 2013), provides another contrast: a request for a laptop did not trigger accommodation duties where the employee did not connect it to disability and instead represented it as unrelated to disability-created difficulties.
Javanzad’s communications could reasonably be understood differently. She discussed stomach symptoms and an endoscopy while asking about extending leave; supplied a note recommending continued absence; and described her limitations while seeking additional time during the June 2 call. The termination letter’s acknowledgment that she sought leave for a gastrointestinal disorder further supported the connection.
Her use of FMLA terminology did not prevent those communications from functioning as an ADA request. The substance and context of the request, rather than its statutory label, controlled. Nevertheless, the earlier childcare-related communications did not themselves establish a disability-related accommodation request; the majority relied on the later medical linkage.
D. Estimated Recovery Versus Indefinite Leave
The established boundary
Cisneros v. Wilson, 226 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2000), recognizes that medical leave may be reasonable when it allows recovery sufficient to perform essential job functions in the future. It also rejects indefinite leave. Without an expected duration of impairment, an employer cannot assess whether the employee will be able to work in the near future.
The crucial distinction is between how much leave an employee asks for and why that period is expected to restore the ability to work. A nominally short request may still be indefinite in substance if nothing indicates when work-preventing limitations will improve.
Why Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corp. favored the EEOC
Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corp., 21 F.4th 666 (10th Cir. 2021), was the majority’s principal guide. There, an employee experienced elevated post-traumatic stress symptoms. Medical information supplied an estimated symptom duration and an anticipated return following treatment.
The decision rejected an unduly rigid demand for a definite impairment end date, particularly for chronic conditions. A chronic condition may persist indefinitely while the current episode preventing work has an estimable duration. It also recognized that discussions beginning as FMLA matters can develop into ADA accommodation discussions, and that employers must consider multiple employee and medical communications together.
Applying that reasoning, the majority viewed Javanzad’s statements as potentially conveying more than a desire to wait for a diagnosis. She described an expected sequence: endoscopy, identification of the problem, appropriate treatment, and return within a few weeks. That could constitute an estimate of when the current work-preventing symptoms would subside.
The endoscopy was diagnostic, not itself curative. The majority’s reasoning depended on the communicated expectation of subsequent treatment and improvement—not on an assumption that undergoing the test would automatically restore her ability to work.
Distinguishing the cases rejecting open-ended requests
In Cisneros v. Wilson, the employee’s doctors characterized recovery timing as uncertain or unknown. Her own affidavit expressing a contrary recovery expectation did not create a triable issue. The majority distinguished that situation because Javanzad testified that she had actually communicated her expected recovery period to the employer, and no medical evidence contradicted that estimate.
In Punt v. Kelly Servs., a request for one week away was accompanied by unspecified further absences for tests, appointments, radiation, and other cancer-related needs. It did not indicate when consistent attendance would become possible. Javanzad’s request, in the majority’s view, instead could be read as identifying an anticipated return after a defined medical evaluation and short recovery period.
Freeman v. City of Cheyenne, No. 23-8022, 2024 WL 464069 (10th Cir. 2024), likewise involved an extension request unsupported by an expected duration of impairment. A diagnosis alone did not supply that missing timeline. The majority distinguished Javanzad’s affirmative recovery estimate from the absence of duration information in that case.
The role of Aubrey v. Koppes
In Aubrey v. Koppes, 975 F.3d 995 (10th Cir. 2020), an employer argued that leave to attend a neurological appointment was indefinite because the specialist’s eventual conclusions were unknown. The court rejected that argument in light of medical evidence identifying an approximate recovery period.
The majority used that reasoning to resist treating every pending diagnostic appointment as inherently open-ended. Javanzad’s circumstances were less medically specific: her doctor had not supplied an impairment-duration estimate to the employer. Nevertheless, her communicated expectation, the work-restriction note, and the absence of contrary medical predictions together supported a factual dispute.
The eventual gastritis diagnosis and improvement also accorded with her anticipated course. Those later facts did not themselves notify Appliance Factory before termination, however. Their role was corroborative; the operative question remained what her earlier communications conveyed.
The resulting rule is narrow. The court did not hold that an employee’s unsupported prediction always makes leave reasonable, or that pending testing automatically entitles an employee to an extension. It held that this combined record permitted competing reasonable inferences.
E. Judge Matheson’s Partial Dissent: How Much Support Must an Estimate Have?
The disagreement was not over whether a diagnosis was required for notice. Judge Matheson agreed that the evidence could establish both notice and a disability-related request. His concern was whether the employer had received a meaningful estimate of the impairment’s duration.
He emphasized Javanzad’s conditional language—“might” and “probably”—and her acknowledgment that she did not know how much time she needed before undergoing the endoscopy. The physician’s note required symptom improvement and test results but supplied no prognosis. In his view, those communications described hoped-for leave rather than a reasonably grounded recovery period.
The dissent read Cisneros v. Wilson as the closer analogy. It distinguished Herrmann v. Salt Lake City Corp. and Aubrey v. Koppes because those employers had received professional estimates of symptom duration. Appliance Factory had received no comparable medical timeline.
Citing Kelly v. Town of Abingdon, 90 F.4th 158 (4th Cir. 2024), the dissent stressed that adequacy depends on how a reasonable employer would understand the employee’s communications in context. An uncommunicated suspicion of gastritis could not inform that understanding.
This exposes the opinion’s central tension: the majority accepted a contextual, provisional estimate as sufficient for a jury question; the dissent considered that estimate too speculative without a communicated medical foundation. The majority’s approach governs the remand, but the dissent identifies an important boundary for future litigation.
F. Summary Judgment and the Treatment of Evidence
Why the appellate posture mattered
Snyder v. Beam Techs., Inc., 147 F.4th 1246 (10th Cir. 2025), supplied de novo review and the requirement to draw reasonable inferences for the nonmoving party. Jarvis v. Liggett, 179 F.4th 763 (10th Cir. 2026), likewise supported presenting the factual background favorably to the EEOC where the record permitted that account.
Rocky Mountain Prestress, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 960 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2020), establishes that more than a scintilla of evidence is necessary: the record must permit a reasonable jury verdict. Thus, the appellate court was not simply accepting allegations. It identified evidence supporting genuinely competing factual conclusions.
The June 2 call was properly before the court
Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664 (10th Cir. 1998), limits appellate review ordinarily to materials adequately presented to the district court and does not require judges to comb an undifferentiated record. The EEOC satisfied that requirement by citing the call and explaining its significance to notice in its summary-judgment response.
Appliance Factory also argued that the complaint admitted the parties had failed to connect by telephone. The majority rejected that reading because the relevant allegations could refer to unsuccessful communications on June 5 without excluding an earlier June 2 conversation.
United States v. Gallegos, 111 F.4th 1068 (10th Cir. 2024), quoting Std. Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588 (2013), requires an express waiver conceding a fact before a statement operates as a judicial admission. U.S. Energy Corp. v. Nukem, Inc., 400 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2005), similarly requires a formal, deliberate declaration. An allegation reasonably susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the call did not meet that demanding standard.
The unemployment-benefits statement did not defeat notice
The district court had referenced Javanzad’s statement in an unemployment-benefits application that she was not disabled. The appellate court identified three problems with using that statement to resolve notice: uncertainty about what she understood “disability” to mean, the impropriety of resolving credibility at summary judgment, and the absence of evidence that Appliance Factory knew of the statement.
Cleveland v. Pol'y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999), supported examining differences between benefits-program terminology and ADA standards rather than assuming that disability-related statements are necessarily inconsistent. Helvie v. Jenkins, 66 F.4th 1227 (10th Cir. 2023), supplied the prohibition against credibility determinations at summary judgment.
The employer-knowledge point is especially important: information unknown to the employer could not establish what the employer understood when it denied additional leave and terminated employment.
G. Questions Reserved and the Other ADA Claims
Notice of an asserted impairment and proof of an actual statutory disability are distinct inquiries. The opinion’s use of Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc. and Albert v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004), illustrates that distinction. The latter separates whether asthma substantially limited breathing from what the employer knew about accommodation needs. Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC similarly supports examining symptom communications as a notice question.
The district court had not decided whether Javanzad’s impairment satisfied the ADA definition and had denied related expert-exclusion motions as moot. Following Ortega v. Grisham, 148 F.4th 1134 (10th Cir. 2025), and Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), the appellate court declined to decide an issue not passed upon below. The disability question and associated evidentiary rulings therefore remain for remand.
Edmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co., 17 F.4th 975 (10th Cir. 2021), supported both the notice requirement for disability-based disparate treatment and the need to connect requested assistance to disability. Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC, 830 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2016), establishes that an adequate accommodation request can constitute protected activity for retaliation purposes.
Because the district court rejected the discharge and retaliation claims for the same reasons as the accommodation claim, correcting those reasons required reversing summary judgment on all three. That does not mean the claims have identical elements or that discriminatory or retaliatory causation has been established.
Finally, United States v. Ellis, 23 F.4th 1228 (10th Cir. 2022), explains the opinion’s treatment of unpublished authorities. Decisions such as Cady v. Remington Arms Co., Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., Dinse v. Carlisle Foodservice Prods. Inc., and Freeman v. City of Cheyenne were used for persuasive value, not as binding precedent.