4. Analysis: Governing Precedents and Legal Reasoning
A. ACCA: A jury determination supported by a stipulation
Boone relied on Erlinger v. United States, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), which recognizes a defendant’s entitlement to a jury determination whether ACCA predicate offenses occurred on separate occasions. He argued that his stipulation was insufficient and sought a new jury proceeding.
The panel did not question Erlinger v. United States. Instead, it concluded that Boone’s case presented both a procedural obstacle to relief and an adequate evidentiary foundation for the finding actually made.
Invited error
Under United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306 (11th Cir. 2009), a party who induces the district court to make an alleged error ordinarily cannot obtain reversal on that ground. This rule extends beyond simply failing to object: it addresses affirmative conduct requesting or accepting the challenged procedure.
Boone expressly opposed the proposed instruction requiring the jury to determine whether the prior offenses occurred on separate occasions. The court omitted that instruction because of his objection. He therefore could not complain on appeal about the omission he had procured.
The stipulation supplied evidence for the special finding
Independently, the jury had expressly found separate occasions, and Boone’s stipulation directly supported that finding. The panel quoted the ordinary treatment of factual stipulations discussed in Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 200 (1997): jurors may accept stipulated facts as evidence and regard those facts as proved.
The attribution is important: the quoted passage appears in Justice O’Connor’s dissent, not the majority opinion. The panel used it to describe the conventional evidentiary effect of a stipulation, not as a majority holding resolving the constitutional question presented here.
The decision thus does not hold that a judge may replace the jury’s separate-occasions determination merely because a stipulation exists. Here, the stipulation supplied evidence, and the special verdict established that the jury made the required finding.
Boone’s argument that the state could have prosecuted the prior offenses together did not overcome these grounds. The panel did not develop a broader test for deciding when offenses form one occasion, nor did it resolve a disputed classification of his prior convictions as qualifying ACCA predicates.
B. Sufficiency: The cumulative evidentiary picture supported possession and knowledge
The court’s assessment was governed by a deferential appellate standard. United States v. Hill, 99 F.4th 1289, 1305 (11th Cir. 2024), supported its presentation of the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480, 497 (11th Cir. 2011), required reasonable inferences to favor the government, while United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016), instructed that a verdict stands if a reasonable construction of the evidence permits guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
These precedents explain why the panel did not reweigh the evidence or demand direct eyewitness testimony for every element. Its task was to determine whether the jury’s conclusions were reasonably available.
For possession, United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d 1229, 1235 (11th Cir. 2004), supplied the constructive-possession principle: a person possesses an object when he has the power and intention to exercise control over it, directly or through others. Boone’s recorded handling of a switch-equipped Glock demonstrated control, while the DNA evidence and matching firearm characteristics connected him to the recovered weapons.
For knowledge, the switch’s visible placement, Boone’s handling of the weapon, and the contemporaneous exchange about selling switches permitted the jury to infer that he understood the device and its function. The court relied on these circumstances together, rather than treating visibility or physical contact alone as conclusive proof of knowledge.
C. “In furtherance” requires a connection, not merely coexistence
The principal authority was United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2002). It requires proof that firearm possession helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced drug trafficking. A firearm’s presence within the defendant’s control during a drug offense does not, without more, satisfy § 924(c).
The relevant factors include:
- The nature of the drug activity;
- The firearm’s accessibility and type;
- Whether it was stolen or unlawfully possessed;
- Whether it was loaded;
- Its proximity to drugs or drug proceeds; and
- The circumstances of its discovery.
Those factors strongly favored the verdict: the firearms were stolen and loaded, located beside drugs and distribution materials, and positioned for ready use. Digital evidence also connected Boone to both firearm activity and drug sales.
United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1474 (11th Cir. 1986), supplied the broader observation that firearms and narcotics trafficking frequently have a powerful connection. That observation supplemented, rather than displaced, the individualized nexus analysis required by United States v. Timmons.
Consequently, the absence of an officer’s observation of Boone inside the building did not defeat the prosecution. The cumulative evidence permitted the necessary connection without that particular observation.
D. Machinegun knowledge under § 924(c): Existing circuit law controlled
The instructional challenge addressed in the court’s substantive analysis concerned Count 3, the § 924(c) offense. Boone argued that the jury should have been required to find that he knew the characteristics making the firearm a machinegun.
The ordinary plain-error framework
United States v. Johnson, 694 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2012), supplied the ordinary rule that an instructional claim first raised on appeal receives plain-error review. Under Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507–08 (2021), the defendant must establish error, plainness, and an effect on substantial rights—ordinarily a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Even then, correction is discretionary and requires a serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
United States v. Verdeza, 69 F.4th 780, 791 (11th Cir. 2023), further explains that, when statutory or rule text does not resolve an issue, the absence of directly controlling Supreme Court or circuit precedent prevents a finding of plain error.
Binding precedent foreclosed the proposed instruction
More directly, United States v. Haile, 685 F.3d 1211, 1217 (11th Cir. 2012), holds that § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) does not require proof that the defendant knew the firearm was a machinegun. Under that authority, omitting Boone’s proposed knowledge requirement was not error.
United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008), required the panel to follow that earlier circuit decision unless it had been overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the Supreme Court or the circuit sitting en banc.
The panel acknowledged possible tension with Rehaif v. United States, 588 U.S. 225 (2019). That decision requires knowledge of firearm possession and prohibited status under the statutory provisions it addressed. But it did not decide the machinegun-characteristics question under § 924(c). The statutes relevant to its knowledge holding were therefore different from the provision governing Boone’s Count 3 challenge.
Applying TL90108 L.L.C. v. Ford, 147 F.4th 1351, 1360 (11th Cir. 2025), the panel emphasized that doctrinal tension is insufficient: intervening Supreme Court reasoning must undermine the earlier decision’s fundamental foundations before a panel may depart from it.
Invited error independently barred review
Boone also faced a separate procedural bar. He and the government jointly proposed the material language of the instruction, and he specifically advocated the circuit’s pattern instruction.
United States v. Maradiaga, 987 F.3d 1315, 1322 (11th Cir. 2021), treats proposing the very language later challenged as a textbook instance of invited error. United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1240 (11th Cir. 2010), establishes that invited error forecloses review even when ordinary plain-error review might otherwise apply.
The decision’s scope must remain clear: its discussion of United States v. Haile concerns § 924(c), not a universal elimination of knowledge requirements for machinegun offenses. Separately, the panel found the evidence sufficient to establish Boone’s actual knowledge when reviewing Counts 3 and 5.
E. Alleged hearsay: Harmlessness made admissibility unnecessary to decide
During defense questioning, Detective Chaves recounted another officer shouting that Boone was throwing money. Boone challenged this statement as hearsay, stressing that Chaves had not personally seen him throw money.
The government argued that the statement explained its effect on Chaves—why he moved to detain Boone—rather than proving that Boone actually threw money.
Proctor v. Fluor Enters., Inc., 494 F.3d 1337, 1349 (11th Cir. 2007), supplied abuse of discretion as the evidentiary standard of review. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004), explained that this standard allows a range of permissible choices unless the district court makes a clear error of judgment.
Nevertheless, the panel did not resolve whether the statement was hearsay or whether admitting it was an abuse of discretion. Its actual reasoning rested on harmless error.
Under United States v. Barton, 909 F.3d 1323, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2018), reversal required a substantial prejudicial effect. Other evidence already placed cash near Boone and depicted him displaying money. More importantly, extensive independent evidence connected him to the firearms and trafficking activity.
United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999), permits overwhelming evidence of guilt to be considered when assessing harmlessness. On this record, the disputed statement had no meaningful demonstrated effect on the verdict. The opinion therefore should not be read as approving the government’s “effect on the listener” theory on its merits.