Abandoning Acceleration Restores the Original Maturity Date for Colorado Foreclosure Limitations

Case: Jensen v. Bank of New York Mellon
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Date: November 5, 2026
Case number: 25-1430

Precedential status: This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited for its persuasive value. The decision applies existing Colorado law rather than announcing a new, binding rule.

1. Introduction

In Jensen v. Bank of New York Mellon, the Tenth Circuit considered whether earlier, withdrawn foreclosure proceedings had permanently started Colorado’s six-year limitations period for enforcing a mortgage debt. The court held that the lender’s abandonment of acceleration restored the note’s original maturity date for limitations-accrual purposes. Consequently, the earlier foreclosure notices did not establish that the Bank’s later claim was time-barred.

Linn Jensen, representing herself, challenged a proof of claim filed in her Chapter 13 bankruptcy by the Bank of New York Mellon, acting as trustee for mortgage-backed certificate holders. Newrez LLC, doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing, was also a defendant-appellee, although the opinion does not separately analyze its conduct.

The dispute centered on property in Colorado that Jensen acquired after the original borrowers had defaulted and after several unsuccessful foreclosure attempts. Her argument was straightforward: the Bank’s first foreclosure notice accelerated the debt, so the limitations period expired six years later. The court rejected that argument because it disregarded the legal effect of the Bank’s subsequent withdrawal of its foreclosure notices.

2. Background and Procedural History

Period Relevant events
2004 Mark and Sonya Ashmore mortgaged the property. The Bank later became the holder of the note, which required monthly payments through 2035 and was secured by a deed of trust.
2010–2011 Following default, the Bank sent a notice of intent to accelerate and later filed its first Notice of Election and Demand for Sale, or NED. It subsequently withdrew that notice without completing a sale.
2013 The Bank filed a second NED. An auction resulted in a sale to Resurgent Capital Services, LP, which paid Mr. Ashmore $2,000 to leave. The sale was later set aside, the note and deed of trust were reinstated, and the Bank withdrew the second NED.
2015 The Bank filed and withdrew a third NED.
2017 The Ashmores transferred their interests in the property to Jensen by quitclaim deed.
2019 and afterward The Bank filed a fourth NED and obtained judicial authorization for a foreclosure sale. Before the sale could be completed, Jensen filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy.

In bankruptcy, the Bank filed a proof of claim concerning the property. Jensen initiated an adversary proceeding asserting that the limitations period had expired six years after the first NED.

After trial, the bankruptcy court found that the Bank had abandoned acceleration by withdrawing the earlier notices. The district court affirmed. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the Tenth Circuit likewise affirmed.

3. Summary of the Opinion

The court’s decision rests on four principal conclusions:

  1. Colorado law governs. The property is in Colorado, and the deed of trust selects federal law and the law of the jurisdiction where the property is located.
  2. Acceleration ordinarily starts the limitations period for the remaining loan balance. When a lender makes future installments immediately payable, the limitations period begins running on those previously unmatured obligations.
  3. Acceleration may be abandoned. Under Colorado appellate authority, a clear affirmative act abandoning acceleration restores the note’s original maturity date for limitations-accrual purposes.
  4. The withdrawals established abandonment here. The Bank’s withdrawal of the earlier NEDs defeated Jensen’s argument that the first acceleration necessarily made its later enforcement efforts untimely.

The court also declined to consider Jensen’s undeveloped assertion that a pandemic-era Zoom trial had been unfair or unmanageable. It treated that issue as waived through inadequate appellate briefing.

4. Analysis of the Precedents Cited

A. Bankruptcy Appellate Review

Miller v. Bill and Carolyn Limited P'ship (In re Baldwin), 593 F.3d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010)

This decision supplies the basic framework for reviewing bankruptcy appeals: the court of appeals independently reviews the bankruptcy court’s decision using the same standards applied by the district court. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis focused on the bankruptcy court’s findings and legal conclusions rather than merely asking whether the district court’s affirmance was reasonable.

Aviva Life & Annuity Co. v. White (In re Millennium Multiple Emp. Welfare Benefit Plan), 772 F.3d 634, 638 (10th Cir. 2014)

This case reinforces the independent-review principle by explaining that the district court functions as a subordinate appellate tribunal whose rulings receive no deference. Its significance is procedural: an intervening district-court affirmance does not change the appellate court’s responsibility to examine the underlying bankruptcy decision directly.

Stillwater Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. v. CIT Grp./Equip. Fin., Inc., 383 F.3d 1148, 1150 (10th Cir. 2004)

This authority distinguishes the standards governing facts and law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions receive de novo review. That distinction matters because the bankruptcy court found after trial that the Bank had abandoned acceleration, while Colorado law supplied the consequences of that abandonment.

B. Governing State Law and Predicting State Supreme Court Decisions

Lindsay v. Beneficial Reins. Co. (In re Lindsay), 59 F.3d 942, 948–49 (9th Cir. 1995)

The Tenth Circuit cited this Ninth Circuit decision to support applying the law of the state where the real property is located. In that case, Texas law governed foreclosure of Texas property, with the deed of trust providing additional support for that choice.

The same considerations favored Colorado law here: the property was in Colorado, and the security instrument expressly selected the law of the property’s jurisdiction, together with applicable federal law. The citation supports the governing-law analysis; it does not establish a categorical rule resolving every possible real-property choice-of-law dispute.

Evanston Ins. Co. v. Law Off. of Michael P. Medved, P.C., 890 F.3d 1195, 1198, 1200 (10th Cir. 2018)

This case explains how a federal court determines state law when the state’s highest court has not decided the precise issue. The federal court must predict that court’s answer and ordinarily follow intermediate state appellate decisions unless persuasive evidence indicates that the highest court would rule differently.

That methodology was central to the result. Jensen supplied no persuasive reason to reject the Colorado Court of Appeals’ abandonment doctrine or to substitute New York common law for it.

C. Acceleration and Abandonment

Hassler v. Acct. Brokers of Larimer Cnty., Inc., 274 P.3d 547, 553 (Colo. 2012)

This Colorado Supreme Court decision establishes the effect of accelerating an installment loan: the entire remaining balance becomes immediately due, triggering the limitations period for installments that had not previously matured.

It therefore supports the starting premise of Jensen’s argument. An effective acceleration can begin the limitations clock for the remaining debt. But that premise does not resolve what happens when the lender subsequently abandons acceleration.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Peterson, 442 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Colo. App. 2018), modified on reh’g (Jan. 10, 2019)

This decision provides the central substantive rule: following the “great weight of authority,” Colorado permits a lender to abandon acceleration of a note. It defeats the proposition that acceleration is necessarily an irreversible election fixing the limitations period for all future enforcement.

The Tenth Circuit followed this intermediate appellate authority under the predictive approach described in Evanston Ins. Co. v. Law Off. of Michael P. Medved, P.C..

Igou v. Bank of Am., N.A., 459 P.3d 776, 780 (Colo. App. 2020)

This case supplies both the operative requirement and its consequence. A creditor must manifest abandonment through a clear affirmative act; effective abandonment then restores the note’s original maturity date for limitations-accrual purposes.

The Bank’s withdrawal of the earlier NEDs satisfied that requirement on the record before the court. The decision thus rests on affirmative conduct, not merely the passage of time or a lender’s unexplained failure to complete foreclosure.

Goodwin v. Dist. Ct., 779 P.2d 837, 843–44 (Colo. 1989)

The opinion discusses this Colorado Supreme Court decision through Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Peterson. Its relevant principle is that waiver applies to acceleration.

That higher-court principle supports the intermediate appellate decisions recognizing abandonment: if acceleration is subject to waiver, treating it as invariably permanent would be difficult to reconcile with Colorado Supreme Court doctrine. The Tenth Circuit did not suggest that this case independently resolved every procedural requirement for abandoning acceleration.

D. Self-Representation and Appellate Briefing

Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005)

This authority requires liberal construction of a self-represented litigant’s arguments but prohibits the court from becoming that litigant’s attorney by constructing arguments or searching the record on her behalf. It defines the assistance Jensen could receive without exempting her from the obligation to present reviewable arguments.

United States v. Woodmore, 135 F.4th 861, 877 (10th Cir. 2025)

This case establishes appellate-briefing waiver where an opening brief omits an argument or presents it only perfunctorily. Jensen’s passing reference to difficulties with the Zoom trial did not explain what was unfair, how the proceeding was mismanaged, or whether the format produced adverse findings.

The Tenth Circuit therefore declined review. It did not decide that remote trials are inherently fair or that Jensen’s particular trial was substantively free from error.

5. Legal Reasoning

A. Connecting Debt Enforcement to the Security Lien

The court read two Colorado statutes together. Colorado Revised Statutes § 13-80-103.5(1)(a) establishes a six-year limitations period for actions enforcing rights under instruments securing or evidencing debt. Section 38-39-207 provides that a lien is extinguished when enforcement of the secured indebtedness or obligation becomes time-barred.

Thus, the limitations issue concerned more than a procedural deadline for a particular foreclosure filing. If enforcement of the secured obligation were barred, the lien could also be extinguished. Determining when the limitations period accrued was therefore critical.

B. Distinguishing Acceleration from an Irrevocable Maturity Date

An installment loan normally requires payment over time. Acceleration changes that schedule by making the remaining balance due immediately. Jensen treated the first acceleration as permanently replacing the contractual payment schedule.

Colorado’s abandonment doctrine rejects that assumption. A lender can reverse its election to accelerate through a clear affirmative act. Here, the bankruptcy court found that withdrawing the earlier foreclosure notices manifested that intent, and the Tenth Circuit upheld the resulting application of Colorado law.

The relevant legal event was therefore not simply the first NED. The court had to consider the subsequent withdrawals as well. Those withdrawals restored the original maturity date for limitations-accrual purposes and undermined Jensen’s calculation based exclusively on the first foreclosure attempt.

C. Rejecting the Proposed Use of New York Law

Jensen urged application of New York law but identified no basis for its controlling the dispute. The location of the property and the deed’s governing-law clause pointed to Colorado. Nor did she show that Colorado’s Supreme Court would reject the existing Colorado appellate authorities in favor of New York common law.

The court therefore had no need to resolve the substance of New York’s acceleration rules. Its conclusion was that Jensen had not justified importing them into this Colorado dispute.

D. Limits of the Holding

The opinion should not be read to establish that every withdrawal of every foreclosure proceeding necessarily abandons acceleration under all circumstances. Its reasoning applies the clear-affirmative-act requirement to the withdrawals and findings in this record.

Nor does the decision separately determine the timeliness of every unpaid installment, authorize revival of an already extinguished lien, or decide every possible requirement concerning notice of abandonment. Restoring the original maturity date is not equivalent to declaring that all historical arrears are indefinitely collectible.

Finally, the appellate disposition upheld the claim ruling; it did not itself order or complete a foreclosure sale.

6. Potential Impact

  • Foreclosure disputes: A limitations analysis must examine the full sequence of acceleration and abandonment, rather than count six years from the earliest foreclosure notice alone.
  • Lender documentation: Clear records of withdrawals and other affirmative acts may be important evidence that acceleration was abandoned. Mere inactivity does not satisfy the stated test by itself.
  • Bankruptcy claims litigation: A secured claim challenged on limitations grounds may remain enforceable when an earlier acceleration was effectively abandoned. Bankruptcy does not eliminate the need to analyze the underlying state-law claim.
  • Subsequent property owners: Acquiring property after default does not make the history of the secured debt irrelevant. The opinion concerns enforcement against the property and does not establish that Jensen personally assumed the original borrowers’ payment obligations.
  • Federal application of state law: The decision illustrates the importance of intermediate state appellate rulings where the state supreme court has not addressed the precise question.
  • Appellate practice: Even a self-represented appellant must explain alleged procedural unfairness sufficiently to permit meaningful review.

These implications remain subject to the decision’s limited precedential status. Its principal contribution is persuasive confirmation of existing Colorado doctrine, not a new binding circuit rule.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Acceleration
Making the entire remaining loan balance payable immediately instead of continuing with monthly installments.
Abandonment of acceleration
A lender’s clear affirmative reversal of its earlier decision to demand immediate payment of the entire balance. It does not, by itself, forgive the debt.
Accrual
The point at which a legal claim arises and the limitations clock begins running.
Notice of Election and Demand for Sale
The foreclosure notice filed with the public trustee in the proceedings described here. The Bank’s withdrawals of these notices were the affirmative acts supporting abandonment.
Proof of claim
A creditor’s formal assertion in bankruptcy that it holds a claim entitled to recognition in the case.
Quitclaim deed
A deed transferring whatever ownership interest the transferor possesses, without guaranteeing an unencumbered title.
De novo and clear-error review
De novo review means deciding a legal issue afresh. Clear-error review gives greater deference to the trial court’s factual findings.
Law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel
Doctrines that can make prior rulings controlling within the same litigation or prevent relitigation of resolved claims or issues. They explain why a nonprecedential decision can still have binding consequences in particular proceedings.

8. Conclusion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed because Jensen’s limitations theory accounted for acceleration but not its abandonment. Under the Colorado authorities applied by the court, clear affirmative abandonment restores the note’s original maturity date for limitations-accrual purposes. The withdrawals of the earlier foreclosure notices established that abandonment here.

The broader lesson is that foreclosure limitations cannot reliably be assessed from the first acceleration date alone. The complete enforcement history matters—while the decision’s nonprecedential status and fact-specific application limit its reach.