A.R.S. § 12-821 Does Not Abrogate Nullum Tempus for Public-Entity Plaintiffs

Introduction

In CHANDLER v. ROOSEVELT, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed whether the one-year statute of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-821 applies when one public entity sues another public entity. The plaintiff, the City of Chandler, sued the Roosevelt Water Conservation District after RWCD asserted that a long-term water service agreement had ended and refused to deliver water under that agreement.

The central legal issue was whether Arizona’s common-law doctrine of nullum tempus occurrit regi—“time does not run against the king”—still protects a governmental plaintiff from statutes of limitation, despite § 12-821’s command that “[a]ll actions against any public entity or public employee” must be brought within one year.

Summary of the Opinion

The Court held that § 12-821 does not expressly abrogate the nullum tempus doctrine in actions brought by one public entity against another. Because nullum tempus concerns the State’s status as a plaintiff, a statute must clearly address governmental plaintiffs before it can displace the doctrine.

The Court vacated the court of appeals’ opinion, rejected RWCD’s limitations defense, and remanded with instructions to deny RWCD’s motion for summary judgment, grant Chandler’s cross-motion for summary judgment, and declare the 2002 Agreement valid and enforceable. Chandler was also awarded attorney fees on appeal under A.R.S. § 12-341.01.

Analysis

New Rule Established

The decision establishes that A.R.S. § 12-821’s one-year limitations period does not apply to suits brought by a public entity unless the Legislature expressly, or by necessary implication, abrogates nullum tempus as to governmental plaintiffs. The phrase “all actions against any public entity” is not enough, standing alone, to overcome the common-law rule.

Precedents Cited

Core Nullum Tempus and Common-Law Abrogation Cases

  • Pleak v. Entrada Prop. Owners' Ass'n — The Court relied heavily on this case for the principle that common law is changed or abrogated by statute only when the Legislature does so expressly or by necessary implication.
  • In re Thelen's Estate — Cited for the interpretive presumption that statutes should be read, where possible, consistently with the common law.
  • City of Phoenix v. Glenayre Elecs., Inc. — RWCD and the dissent relied on this case, but the majority distinguished it. Glenayre involved A.R.S. § 12-552(A), a statute of repose containing a “notwithstanding any other statute” clause and operating within Title 12, chapter 5. By contrast, § 12-821 is in chapter 7 and focuses on defendants, not governmental plaintiffs.
  • City of Bisbee v. Cochise County ("Bisbee III") — A foundational nullum tempus case. It held that statutes of limitation do not run against the State when it sues in its sovereign capacity unless the Legislature expressly provides otherwise.
  • Trimble v. Am. Sav. Life Ins. Co. — Important because the court held that broad language such as “no civil action” was still insufficient to bar a public-benefit enforcement action by the State.
  • Gila Land & Cattle Co. v. Eads, State ex rel. Sullivan v. Moore, State v. Martin, and State ex rel. Conway v. Versluis — These cases reinforced the longstanding Arizona rule that limitations periods do not bind the State absent an express statutory command.
  • Tucson Unified Sch. Dist. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. — The Court used this case to reject RWCD’s argument that Chandler was acting in a proprietary, rather than sovereign, capacity. The nature of the plaintiff controls, not whether the governmental entity is acting commercially.
  • State ex rel. Dep't of Health Servs. v. Cochise County — Cited for the principle that limitations designed to protect governmental entities from private lawsuits should not automatically bar suits brought by the sovereign.

Statutory Interpretation and Procedure Cases

  • Rosenburg v. Sanders — Provided the standard for reviewing summary judgment de novo.
  • State v. Anderson, Franklin v. CSAA Gen. Ins. Co., Nicaise v. Sundaram, 4QTKIDZ, LLC v. HNT Holdings, LLC, Planned Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Mayes, and State v. Salazar-Mercado — These cases supplied the Court’s general rules for statutory interpretation: begin with text, consider context, and use secondary tools only if ambiguity exists.
  • State v. Jones — The court of appeals had relied on this case for the proposition that “all” is an expansive word. The Supreme Court did not dispute that general meaning but held that “all actions” still did not expressly address governmental plaintiffs or nullum tempus.
  • Daou v. Harris and Est. of Dominguez v. Dominguez — Used to support the presumption that the Legislature knows existing law and that courts should not insert language the Legislature omitted.
  • City of Bisbee v. Cochise County and City of Bisbee v. Cochise County ("Bisbee II") — The Court reviewed the Bisbee litigation to show that even broad limitations language was previously held insufficient to defeat nullum tempus.
  • Pioneer Roofing Co. v. Mardian Constr. Co. and Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist. No. 97 v. Houser — These cases informed the statutory history of § 12-821 and its predecessors.

Dissenting Authorities

Justice Bolick dissented, arguing that the words “all actions against any public entity” plainly include suits brought by other public entities. The dissent relied on cases including Seisinger v. Siebel, Garibay v. Johnson, and Aroca v. Tang Inv. Co. for the principle that statutes prevail over conflicting common law. It also cited Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, James v. City of Peoria, Pritchard v. State, Cao v. PFP Dorsey Invs., Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, State v. Gordon, Ariz. Free Enter. Club v. Hobbs, and Kyle v. Daniels to emphasize textual clarity, legislative supremacy, and the prohibition on judicial rewriting of statutes.

Legal Reasoning

The majority’s reasoning proceeded in several steps:

  1. Arizona has adopted the common law through A.R.S. § 1-201 unless inconsistent with state or federal law.
  2. Nullum tempus has long been part of Arizona common law and protects governmental plaintiffs from limitations periods.
  3. Common-law doctrines are not displaced unless the Legislature clearly says so or necessary implication requires it.
  4. Section 12-821 is defendant-focused: it applies to actions “against” public entities. But nullum tempus is plaintiff-focused: it protects the State or public entity when it brings suit.
  5. Because § 12-821 does not expressly mention governmental plaintiffs, public-entity plaintiffs, or nullum tempus, it does not clearly abrogate the doctrine.
  6. Statutory history and related statutes confirmed that when the Legislature intends to bind the State to a limitations period, it knows how to say so expressly.

Impact

This decision is significant for Arizona public law and intergovernmental litigation. Public entities suing other public entities may invoke nullum tempus unless a specific statute clearly provides otherwise. The ruling also limits the reach of § 12-821: it remains fully applicable to private plaintiffs suing public entities, but it does not automatically bar suits brought by governmental plaintiffs.

The opinion may prompt legislative action. If the Arizona Legislature wants § 12-821 to apply to public-entity plaintiffs, it must amend the statute with clear language. Until then, courts will presume that nullum tempus survives.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Nullum tempus: A common-law doctrine meaning time does not run against the sovereign. In practice, it means statutes of limitation usually do not bar suits brought by the State or its political subdivisions.
  • Statute of limitations: A deadline for filing a lawsuit after a claim accrues.
  • Abrogation: The Legislature’s elimination or modification of a common-law rule.
  • Necessary implication: A doctrine is displaced not by express words, but because the statute cannot sensibly operate unless the common-law rule gives way.
  • Governmental vs. proprietary capacity: A distinction between sovereign functions and business-like functions. The Court held that this distinction does not matter for nullum tempus in Arizona.
  • Summary judgment: A judgment entered without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Conclusion

CHANDLER v. ROOSEVELT confirms the continued strength of nullum tempus in Arizona. Section 12-821’s broad phrase “all actions against any public entity” is not enough to impose a one-year limitations period on governmental plaintiffs. The Legislature must speak clearly if it intends to subject the State or its political subdivisions to such deadlines.

The key takeaway is simple: when a public entity sues to enforce public rights, Arizona courts will not infer a limitations bar unless the Legislature clearly creates one.