CPR 52.30: Reopening a Refusal of Permission to Appeal Requires an Exceptional Process Failure and a Powerful Probability of a Different Result

1. Introduction

The appellants (the claimants below) applied under CPR 52.30 to reopen a final refusal of permission to appeal made by Males LJ on 3 June 2025. The underlying Commercial Court litigation concerned two alleged conspiracies (the “FESCO” and “NCSP” conspiracies) by which the claimants alleged they were unlawfully deprived of interests in major Russian port-related businesses. There were 22 defendants, with extensive interlocutory applications including jurisdiction challenges, strike-out/reverse summary judgment applications, and challenges based on alleged failures of “fair presentation” in ex parte service-out and related applications.

The key issue before the Court of Appeal in 2026 was not whether the claimants’ claims had merit, but whether the stringent conditions for reopening a concluded PTA refusal were met—i.e., whether the integrity of the PTA process had been “critically undermined” in the sense explained in Municipio de Mariana v BHP Group Plc [2021] EWCA Civ 1156, [2022] 1 WLR 191.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal dismissed the CPR 52.30 application. It held that:

• The PTA judge had “grappled” with the essential points; concise reasons were permissible given the nature of PTA decisions.
• The claimants’ complaints largely amounted to disagreement with evaluative conclusions (both on merits and procedural fairness), not an exceptional process failure.
• There was no “powerful probability” that any alleged error would have produced a different PTA outcome.
• On the NCSP limb, the court rejected the argument that later abuse-of-process contentions could undermine or “cure” an earlier breach of the ex parte duty of fair presentation, which is owed to the court and assessed at the date of the ex parte application.

Accordingly, it was not “necessary” to reopen the PTA decision “to avoid real injustice” (CPR 52.30(1)(a)), and the application failed without needing to consider alternative remedies.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

(a) Municipio de Mariana v BHP Group Plc [2021] EWCA Civ 1156, [2022] 1 WLR 191 (“Mariana”)

This was the controlling authority. The court treated Mariana as establishing the governing framework for reopening a final determination under CPR 52.30, including where the “appeal” is an application for permission to appeal. The judgment extracted and applied the following key propositions (as summarised at [26]–[33] of [2026] EWCA Civ 516):

• Finality is fundamental: mere error, importance, or high value is insufficient.
• Exceptional circumstances only: the jurisdiction is engaged only where the earlier proceeding’s integrity has been “critically undermined”.
• High materiality threshold: there must be a “powerful probability” that the result would have been different absent the process failure.
• Two-stage “grappling” inquiry (useful approach): (i) did the PTA judge grapple with the issues; (ii) if yes, was there an exceptional mistake (e.g., wholly misunderstanding a clearly articulated point) that corrupted the process?
• Reasons need not be elaborate: what “grappling” requires depends on the case; concise reasons may suffice.

The court’s dismissal of the application was driven by a careful insistence that CPR 52.30 is not an appeal on the merits “in disguise”. The claimants failed because their arguments were characterised as merits challenges reframed as procedural complaints.

(b) The Racing Partnership Ltd v. Done Brothers (Cash Betting) Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1300; [2021] FSR 2

This case was invoked indirectly in the claimants’ attempted critique of the first instance judge’s treatment of unlawful means conspiracy—specifically the point that it is not necessary for each defendant to appreciate the unlawfulness of the means. The Court of Appeal rejected the suggestion that this created a process flaw, noting the first instance judge’s reliance on a broader review which already encompassed the point (via Lakatamia below). The significance in [2026] EWCA Civ 516 is therefore negative: it illustrates that CPR 52.30 will not be engaged by a complaint that a judge did not expressly mention every doctrinal nuance, where the substance was addressed through incorporated authorities.

(c) Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Su [2021] EWHC 1907 (Comm)

This Commercial Court authority featured as the route by which the relevant unlawful means conspiracy principle (including the point associated with The Racing Partnership) was treated as having been brought into the first instance reasoning. For present purposes, its role was evidential and contextual: it undercut the contention that the PTA judge failed to engage with a supposed misstatement of the law.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

(A) What CPR 52.30 demands: “integrity of process”, not “wrong result”

The court approached the application through Mariana’s lens: the applicant must show an exceptional defect which undermined the integrity of the earlier PTA determination, coupled with a high-probability causal link to a different outcome.

The judgment repeatedly treats the claimants’ arguments as (in substance) submissions that:

• the first instance judge evaluated the evidence wrongly (e.g., “mini-trial”, “siloing”); and/or
• the PTA judge should have written more, addressed each ground separately, or adopted a different view.

Those are paradigmatic “wrong result” complaints. The court held that they do not meet CPR 52.30’s threshold.

(B) “Grappling with the issues” permits brevity where the dispute is evaluative

A central attack was that the PTA judge disposed of multiple grounds together and in a “conclusory” way. The Court of Appeal held that grouping grounds was legitimate where they shared a common complaint (here, that the first instance judge wrongly assessed merits/serious issue and allegedly conducted a mini-trial). The appellate judge’s reasoning—though concise—was sufficient to show he engaged with the substance.

This is a practical clarification of “grappling”: the standard is functional (did the PTA judge address the essentials), not formal (did they write separately on each pleaded ground).

(C) The “siloing/disaggregation” complaint was treated as part of a merits challenge

The claimants argued that the first instance judge wrongly disaggregated interconnected transactions rather than assessing the conspiracy “in the round,” and that the PTA judge failed to grapple with that point. The Court of Appeal held:

• the point was within the overarching merits grounds, and the PTA judge’s conclusion on those grounds necessarily encompassed it; and
• there was no powerful probability that an express discussion would have produced a different PTA result, especially given that separating defendants and components is inherent in multi-party conspiracy pleading and familiar case-management.

(D) The NCSP fair presentation issue: later forensic stances cannot erase earlier ex parte breaches

The most legally instructive part of the decision lies in the court’s treatment of the interaction between:

• an alleged abuse of process argument (ground 11 in the proposed appeal) relating to what a defendant did or did not argue at a later hearing; and
• fair presentation failures at an earlier ex parte service-out stage (September 2023).

The Court of Appeal identified a “basic fallacy” in the claimants’ case: the duty of fair presentation is owed to the court and is tested at the time of the ex parte application. A later hearing position taken by a defendant cannot “excuse or expunge” a claimant’s earlier failure to investigate and disclose material matters. Even if (hypothetically) a defendant were later constrained on merits by abuse principles, that would not prevent the defendant drawing to the court’s attention that the court’s process was compromised at the ex parte stage.

This reasoning reinforces the conceptual separation between:

• merits-related procedural bars (e.g., abuse of process in re-litigating an issue), and
• the court-centred integrity duty of candour on ex parte applications, which exists because the court acts without hearing the other side.

(E) Evaluative/discretionary character of fair presentation decisions and appellate restraint

The claimants contended that “fair presentation” is not discretionary and that treating it as such would immunise decisions made by judges who also heard the ex parte application. The Court of Appeal rejected this, explaining that:

• the underlying assessments (materiality, seriousness, regrant/refusal) are evaluative and attract appellate restraint; and
• the PTA judge’s references to “discretion” were shorthand for orthodox appellate principles (error of law, irrelevant factors, failure to consider relevant factors, or outcomes outside the reasonable range).

It also accepted as legitimate the PTA judge’s observation that the first instance judge was particularly well placed to evaluate the seriousness of any non-disclosure, having both granted relief and then heard an extensive inter partes challenge.

(F) “Other compelling reason” need not be separately addressed where “no real prospect” is clear

The claimants argued the PTA judge failed to grapple with the “other compelling reason” limb for permission. The court held it was unrealistic to suggest the PTA judge overlooked the test; more likely, he considered that the absence of real prospects made permission inappropriate, and in any event the alleged “unsettled points” were, on analysis, disputes about application of settled principles to facts.

3.3 Impact

(1) CPR 52.30 applications: reinforced strictness and practical guidance

Although firmly rooted in Mariana, the decision is a further appellate illustration that CPR 52.30:

• does not provide a “second bite” at PTA; and
• requires a demonstrable process corruption (not simply an arguable error), plus a powerful probability of a different outcome.

The judgment also signals that attempts to repackage disagreements about evaluative assessments as “failure to grapple” will be closely scrutinised and usually rejected.

(2) Ex parte fair presentation: strengthened separation from inter partes merits dynamics

The decision’s clearest practical effect is to underline that ex parte candour is:

• court-facing (owed to the court),
• time-specific (assessed at the ex parte date), and
• not contingent on what the respondent later chooses to argue or omit.

That makes it harder for applicants to argue that later procedural developments (including potential abuse points) neutralise earlier non-disclosure findings.

(3) PTA reasoning: acceptance of structured brevity

The judgment supports the practice that a PTA judge may:

• address groups of grounds together where they share the same core defect; and
• give concise reasons where the issues are essentially evaluative and fact-sensitive.

This is significant for litigants who attempt to found CPR 52.30 applications on the level of detail in a PTA refusal.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• CPR 52.30 (reopening appeals/PTA refusals): An exceptional “safety valve” allowing a concluded appellate decision to be reopened only where this is necessary to avoid real injustice, the circumstances are exceptional, and there is no effective alternative remedy. The focus is on a process failure that undermined the integrity of the earlier decision.
• “Grappling with” a point: The judge must deal with the essential substance of an argument, but need not produce a lengthy judgment or respond to every sub-point separately. Adequacy depends on context.
• “Powerful probability” of a different result: It is not enough to show a possible different outcome; the applicant must show that, but for the process failure, the outcome would probably have been different (a high materiality bar).
• Fair presentation (ex parte): When seeking orders without notice (e.g., permission to serve out), the applicant must disclose all material matters fairly, including points likely to be taken by the absent party. This duty protects the court’s process.
• Serious issue to be tried / reverse summary judgment: Interlocutory thresholds assessing whether a claim is realistically arguable. Courts may test whether pleaded facts can support the inferences required, without finally deciding disputed facts on the balance of probabilities.

5. Conclusion

Magomedov & Ors v TPG Group Holdings (SBS) LP & Ors [2026] EWCA Civ 516 confirms the narrowness of CPR 52.30: reopening a PTA refusal requires an exceptional process defect that undermines the integrity of the earlier decision and a powerful probability that the result would otherwise have been different. The court treated most complaints as disagreements with evaluative judgments rather than integrity failures.

The decision is particularly notable for its clear statement that failures of ex parte fair presentation—owed to the court and assessed at the time—cannot be retroactively neutralised by later forensic choices of the respondent or by attempts to characterise later reliance on undisclosed matters as abusive. The message is that finality and procedural integrity, not iterative merits review, are the organising principles of CPR 52.30.