UAPA Bail Appeals May Consider Subsequent Evidence: Prolonged Custody Requires Individualised Constitutional Review
Case: MOHD SHAHZAD KAMAL v. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY
Citation: 2026 DHC 8585-DB
Court: Delhi High Court
Bench: Justices Navin Chawla and Arun Bhardwaj
Decision: 1 October 2026
Proceeding: CRL.A. 761/2024
1. Introduction
This judgment addresses two connected questions in terrorism-related bail proceedings: whether an appellate court may consider evidence recorded after the order refusing bail, and how prolonged pre-trial imprisonment should be assessed alongside the restrictions imposed by Section 43D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“UAPA”).
The Delhi High Court held that its appellate assessment need not remain confined to the factual position existing when the Special Court rejected bail. Particularly where the appeal had remained pending for over two years and hearings had been adjourned by consent to permit examination of important witnesses, subsequently recorded testimony could properly be considered. Requiring the accused to begin another bail proceeding before the Special Court would, in these circumstances, defeat the interests of justice.
On the substantive question, the Court granted bail after considering more than five years of custody, the distant prospect of completion of trial, the material connecting the appellant individually to the alleged conspiracy, and the release of relevant co-accused. The decision does not establish an automatic entitlement to bail after five years. Its significance lies in combining an updated evidentiary assessment with an accused-specific examination of continued detention.
2. Background, Allegations and Issues
The prosecution case
Mohd Shahzad Kamal, accused No. 18, was prosecuted in proceedings arising from an investigation into Harkat-Ul-Harb-E-Islam, alleged to be a terrorist gang affiliated to ISIS. The underlying prosecution was titled National Investigation Agency v. Mufti Sohail & Ors.
The National Investigation Agency (“NIA”) alleged that the appellant knowingly participated in the conspiracy and arranged funds for terrorist activities while working in Saudi Arabia. The charges identified in the judgment were under Section 121 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 17, 18, 39 and 40 of the UAPA.
The principal material relied upon comprised:
- Facebook and WhatsApp communications allegedly exchanged with accused No. 5, including references to transferring money and jihad;
- other electronic material said to demonstrate ideological radicalisation and knowledge of the conspiracy;
- a disclosure by accused No. 6 and recovery of ₹30,000 allegedly sent by the appellant;
- statements concerning additional payments allegedly made on his behalf; and
- telephone records said to establish connectivity between the appellant and accused No. 6.
These were prosecution allegations, not findings of guilt. Their attribution, significance and ultimate evidentiary value remained matters for trial.
Procedural history and competing submissions
The appellant was arrested on 31 August 2021. He appealed under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 against the Special Court’s order of 29 May 2024 refusing bail.
By the time of the High Court’s decision, he had spent more than five years in custody. The prosecution had cited 161 witnesses, and the testimony of PW-42 was still being recorded. The appellant relied on the likely duration of the remaining trial, disputed the attribution of the electronic communications, and challenged the strength of the funding evidence. His counsel also submitted that he had no criminal antecedents and had not caused trial delay.
The NIA argued that the alleged funding role was central rather than peripheral, that the proceedings concerned a large conspiracy, and that delay alone could not justify bail. It further contended that the High Court should neither conduct a detailed evidentiary examination nor consider testimony recorded after the impugned order. In its submission, the appellant should seek fresh relief before the Special Court.
Questions for determination
- Could subsequent testimony be considered in the pending bail appeal?
- How should prolonged detention and the realistic progress of trial be reconciled with Section 43D(5)?
- Did the material presently available justify continuing this appellant’s custody?
- Could conditions of release adequately protect the trial and address relevant risks?
3. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court allowed the appeal, set aside the refusal of bail, and directed the appellant’s release subject to conditions.
Its central findings were:
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The trial was unlikely to conclude soon. More than five years of custody had elapsed, while examination had reached only the forty-second of 161 cited witnesses.
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Attribution of the electronic communications remained unresolved. When specifically questioned, the prosecution indicated that the connection between the appellant and the relevant number would be proved through witnesses and material concerning accused No. 5. The Court found no presently identifiable positive evidence establishing that the disputed chats originated from, or were addressed to, the appellant.
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The funding evidence did not warrant indefinite continued custody. Having considered the testimony of PW-36 and protected witness PW-37, together with the Section 161 statement of the still-unexamined witness Mohd. Habib, the Court concluded that continued detention was not justified in the circumstances.
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Subsequent developments were properly examinable on appeal. There was no jurisdictional embargo preventing consideration of later testimony, especially given the history and purpose of the appeal’s adjournments.
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Release remained conditional and provisional. The observations were expressly confined to bail and did not determine the merits of the prosecution.
The Court also noted that some co-accused had already obtained bail, including accused No. 5, with whom the appellant allegedly exchanged incriminating messages. This supported, but did not replace, its individual assessment.
4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
4.1 Shoma Kanti Sen v. State of Maharashtra and Another, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 498
This was the principal authority on appellate consideration of subsequent material. The Supreme Court had recognised that a High Court exercising appellate jurisdiction could examine developments arising after the original bail decision, including a later supplementary charge-sheet. Remand was not the only legally permissible course.
Its importance here was practical as well as jurisdictional. The High Court had repeatedly adjourned the appeal, with the parties’ consent, so that relevant witnesses could testify. Two important witnesses had since been examined, while the prosecution could not provide a definite schedule for the third, who lived abroad. Refusing to consider the resulting testimony would have frustrated the very purpose of those adjournments.
The quoted Supreme Court discussion concerned Section 21(2) of the NIA Act, whereas the present bail appeal was instituted under Section 21(4). The High Court relied on the broader proposition concerning appellate competence to consider supervening facts, not on treating those statutory references as interchangeable.
This decision supplied a structured approach to prolonged incarceration under the UAPA. As reproduced through the High Court’s earlier judgment, it rejected both automatic release merely because time had elapsed and mechanical refusal merely because a special statutory restriction applied.
The inquiry is contextual: the court must examine the allegations, individual role, stage and realistic trajectory of trial, causes of delay, and risks associated with release. It must also ask whether the prosecution material, accepted at face value, discloses the essential ingredients of the alleged offences against the particular accused.
This influenced the present judgment’s combination of custody duration, trial progress and individual evidentiary linkage. The Court did not treat the appellant’s membership in a common prosecution as sufficient to answer his bail claim.
This authority, extensively discussed in the passages reproduced by the High Court, supplied the constitutional foundation. Statutory bail restrictions do not extinguish the power of constitutional courts to protect fundamental rights where a timely trial is not realistically possible and incarceration has become excessive.
The cited reasoning explains that restrictions respected at the commencement of proceedings may “melt down” when continued detention conflicts with the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. It also distinguishes Section 43D(5) from the differently framed restrictions under Section 37 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
The present judgment applied the constitutional safeguard without establishing a universal custody period or calculating a fixed fraction of a likely sentence. Its conclusion remained grounded in the appellant’s circumstances.
4.4 Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 881; 2026 INSC 503
This decision questioned aspects of the approach taken in Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) concerning the relationship between Article 21 and Section 43D(5). It emphasised that “bail is the rule and jail is the exception” has a constitutional foundation in liberty and the presumption of innocence, rather than being merely an ordinary procedural slogan.
The reproduced passages also referred to low conviction rates under the UAPA. Those observations formed part of the broader constitutional discussion; they were not an individualised finding that the present appellant would probably be acquitted.
The significance of this authority was to reinforce that the seriousness of charges cannot, by itself, end scrutiny of prolonged imprisonment. Equally, the judgment did not treat the disagreement between Supreme Court decisions as conclusively resolved.
The High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s order dated 22 May 2026 referring the constitutional issue to a larger Bench. That order cautioned against both extremes: treating elapsed time as invariably compelling release, and applying Section 43D(5) without regard to prolonged detention.
Relevant considerations included the accused’s centrality to the alleged offence, protected witnesses, intimidation risks, possible reactivation of networks, responsibility for delay, public order and national security. The order expressly preserved the authority of Union Of India v. K.A. Najeeb .
Its influence was twofold. It supported contextual scrutiny rather than a time-only rule, and demonstrated that a pending reference did not prevent immediate consideration of liberty: the Supreme Court itself granted interim bail in that proceeding after making the reference.
The present Bench reproduced its earlier synthesis of these Supreme Court authorities from this decision. It served as the immediate analytical bridge between the competing formulations of constitutional protection and the individual bail assessment.
Its role was therefore primarily explanatory: it organised the governing authorities, acknowledged the pending larger-Bench reference, and identified the continuing obligation to decide cases under existing law.
This precedent establishes that High Courts must decide cases according to the law presently binding upon them. A reference to a larger Bench, a pending review, or doubts expressed by a later coordinate Bench do not, without a specific direction, justify suspending adjudication or refusing to follow binding authority.
It was especially important because the UAPA bail issue had been referred for further consideration. The High Court could not leave the appellant’s liberty unresolved merely because doctrinal clarification was awaited.
This five-Judge Bench authority appeared indirectly through the preceding decision. It supported the principle that, when faced with conflicting Supreme Court decisions of equal Bench strength, High Courts should follow the earlier decision.
Its relevance was to judicial discipline and the handling of precedent, not to the substantive requirements for UAPA bail.
4.9 Mohammad Saqib @ Saqib Iftekar v. National Investigation Agency, 2026:DHC:7763-DB
The appellant relied on this decision granting bail to accused No. 5. The Court acknowledged that release because this co-accused was directly connected to the alleged electronic exchanges.
Nevertheless, the judgment did not apply parity mechanically. The appellant’s alleged funding role and the evidence against him were separately considered. Co-accused bail was a supporting circumstance, not a substitute for individual scrutiny.
4.10 The indirect reference to Gurwinder
The reproduced discussion from Syed Iftikhar Andrabi v. National Investigation Agency, Jammu also referred to Gurwinder, questioning a characterisation of the ordinary bail principle as merely statutory. The supplied judgment provides no full case title or independent analysis of that decision. Its significance here is confined to the constitutional debate reflected in the quoted passage.
5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
5.1 A bail appeal is not necessarily confined to an outdated factual record
The clearest procedural holding appears in paragraphs 21–22: an appellate court may consider facts and events arising after the impugned bail order. The Court rejected the proposition that later evidence invariably requires a fresh application before the trial court.
That conclusion was particularly compelling here. The appeal had remained pending for more than two years, its hearings had been adjourned to obtain relevant testimony, and the prosecution could not identify when the remaining important witness would be examined. Remitting the appellant would have added another procedural cycle to an already prolonged deprivation of liberty.
The decision establishes competence to consider subsequent material, not an inflexible requirement that every appellate court determine every new factual issue without remand. Whether to do so remains sensitive to procedural fairness and the circumstances of the case.
5.2 Constitutional review and statutory restraint must operate together
Section 43D(5) restricts bail where the prescribed prima facie threshold is met for offences within its scope. Article 21, however, continues to require that detention remain fair and constitutionally permissible.
The Court did not frame these provisions as mutually exclusive. It recognised the legislative seriousness of terrorism offences while examining whether further custody was justified after five years and with substantial trial work outstanding.
The reasoning therefore avoids two errors: assuming that a serious charge authorises detention for as long as the prosecution takes, and assuming that a particular duration of custody automatically displaces the statutory regime.
5.3 Individual attribution matters in a common conspiracy prosecution
The prosecution alleged a substantial funding role. If established, such conduct could not be dismissed as peripheral merely because the appellant was abroad or did not personally execute a violent act. The Court’s concern was instead the material presently connecting this appellant to that role.
Its focused question about the electronic messages illustrates this distinction. The potentially incriminating content of a conversation does not, without attribution, establish who participated in it. The prosecution’s answer that the connection would be proved later did not remove the present evidentiary gap.
Importantly, the Court did not finally find that the chats were fabricated, inadmissible, or unrelated to the appellant. It expressly left the ultimate conclusion to the completed evidentiary record.
5.4 Meaningful scrutiny need not become a mini-trial
The NIA correctly identified the danger of deciding credibility and guilt during bail proceedings. The Court nevertheless distinguished a prohibited final weighing of evidence from the limited examination necessary to decide whether custody should continue.
It reviewed the relevant witness material but deliberately declined to reproduce a detailed assessment that might influence the trial court. This was restrained scrutiny rather than either wholesale acceptance of the allegations or premature adjudication.
The judgment does not finally uphold the defence objections concerning hearsay, identification, inconsistencies, or the co-accused’s disclosure. Nor does it expressly declare every charge prima facie untrue. Its conclusion was narrower: the available material, considered alongside prolonged custody and trial prospects, did not justify requiring the appellant to remain imprisoned.
5.5 The framing of charges did not end the inquiry
The prosecution argued that charges having been framed, the appellant had not satisfied the requirements for bail. The Court did not accept that circumstance as dispositive.
Framing charges permits the prosecution to proceed to trial; it does not establish guilt or immunise continued detention from subsequent constitutional review. Later testimony, further elapsed custody and a clearer picture of trial duration can remain relevant.
5.6 Trial complexity does not eliminate the consequences of delay
A multi-accused conspiracy prosecution may legitimately require considerable time. Nevertheless, complexity cannot make the duration of imprisonment irrelevant.
The judgment did not depend on a finding of deliberate prosecutorial delay. Its concern was the practical position: the appellant had already spent more than five years in custody and completion was not realistically imminent. Constitutional harm from excessive detention need not disappear merely because no single participant is shown to have acted in bad faith.
6. Operative Relief and Safeguards
Release was ordered on a personal bond of ₹50,000 with two sureties of the same amount, to the Special Court’s satisfaction. The conditions also required:
- surrender of any passport, or an affidavit stating that none was held;
- prior court permission for foreign travel, with specified travel particulars;
- remaining within District Hapur, except travel to Delhi for trial attendance or NIA reporting;
- use of one mobile/landline number, kept switched on;
- disclosure of residential and contact details, with at least seven days’ prior intimation of changes;
- attendance at trial unless exempted, and no conduct delaying proceedings;
- no prohibited contact with witnesses, other specified case-related persons, co-accused or their family members;
- no interference with physical or electronic evidence;
- no public statements concerning the merits, evidence, witnesses or pending trial;
- no activity prejudicing public order or trial integrity, and no circulation of “anti-national material”; and
- reporting to the concerned NIA branch office every fortnight, or as otherwise directed by the Special Court.
The prosecution could seek cancellation upon breach. These safeguards demonstrate that the Court treated release as a means of reconciling liberty with attendance, witness protection and trial integrity.
Some conditions, particularly the restriction using the undefined expression “anti-national material”, are broadly worded. Their possible future interpretation is distinct from the holding on entitlement to bail; this judgment does not analyse or establish a general test for their validity.
7. Potential Impact and Limits
Practical and doctrinal significance
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More effective appellate protection: Courts may assess liberty against the current record rather than force successive applications based on developments occurring during a pending appeal.
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Greater emphasis on individual linkage: A common conspiracy allegation does not dispense with examining how electronic communications, payments and witness accounts connect to each accused.
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Realistic trial forecasting: Courts should consider actual progress and the likely remaining duration, rather than rely solely on assurances of expedition.
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Continued adjudication despite references: Pending reconsideration by a larger Bench does not ordinarily suspend the operation of binding precedent or the duty to determine bail.
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Conditional release as risk management: Appropriate safeguards can protect the prosecution without making continued incarceration the only available response.
What the judgment does not establish
The decision creates no five-year ceiling on UAPA custody, does not resolve the larger-Bench controversy, and does not hold that every funding allegation or disputed electronic communication warrants release. It also does not acquit the appellant or finally exclude any prosecution evidence.
Its strongest precedential contribution is a procedural clarification supported by a fact-sensitive application of existing constitutional principles: appellate bail review may take account of subsequent evidence, and continued detention requires individual justification as proceedings evolve.
8. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Section 43D(5)
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A special restriction on bail for specified UAPA offences. It requires a preliminary assessment of the prosecution’s case, not a final finding of guilt.
- “Prima facie true”
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Whether the material, provisionally accepted, supports the essential elements of the alleged offence against the particular accused.
- Article 21 and speedy trial
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The constitutional protection of life and personal liberty includes protection against unfairly prolonged criminal proceedings and detention that effectively becomes punishment before conviction.
- Supervening circumstances
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Developments occurring after an earlier order, such as further testimony, additional custody or a changed assessment of trial duration.
- Mini-trial
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An inappropriate attempt to decide contested credibility, defences or guilt conclusively during a preliminary proceeding such as bail.
- Section 161 statement
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A witness account recorded by police during investigation. It is not equivalent to substantive testimony tested in court, although it may form part of the material examined for bail.
- Section 27 disclosure and recovery
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A limited evidentiary rule concerning information from an accused in custody that leads to discovery. It does not make every part of a co-accused’s police statement admissible against another person.
- Parity
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Considering whether similarly situated co-accused should receive comparable treatment, while still accounting for differences in roles and evidence.
9. Conclusion
The judgment affirms that a pending UAPA bail appeal can respond to an evolving evidentiary record. Where later testimony has been awaited during the appeal itself, appellate consideration need not be postponed through an unnecessary return to the trial court.
More broadly, serious allegations do not remove the obligation to justify continued detention individually. Here, prolonged custody, limited trial progress, unresolved attribution of electronic material and the Court’s restrained assessment of funding evidence together justified conditional release. The prosecution remained free to prove its case, while bail prevented the unfinished trial from becoming an indefinite basis for imprisonment.