Pre-2019 Solar EPC Supplies: Optional 70:30 GST Valuation and No Automatic Works-Contract Classification

Case: M/S STERLING AND WILSON PVT LTD v. UNION OF INDIA
Citation: 2026 INSC 1222
Court: Supreme Court of India
Date: 16 November 2026
Bench: Sanjay Kumar and Sanjeev Sachdeva, JJ.
Judgment by: Sanjay Kumar, J.

1. Introduction

This judgment resolves an important dispute concerning the taxation of turnkey contracts for supplying and installing solar power generating systems under the Goods and Services Tax regime. Its central holding is that the statutory 70:30 allocation between goods and services, introduced from 1 January 2019, could not compulsorily be imposed on transactions undertaken between 1 July 2017 and 31 December 2018. A subsequent circular permitted taxpayers to adopt that allocation for the earlier period; it did not require them to do so.

The Court also reaffirmed that installing equipment on a civil foundation does not automatically make it immovable property. Where a solar power generating system remains detachable and capable of use elsewhere, and its attachment serves operational stability rather than the permanent beneficial enjoyment of the land or foundation, its supply and installation cannot be classified as a works contract merely because some civil construction is involved.

Background and parties

The appellant, Sterling and Wilson Pvt. Ltd., undertook Engineering-Procurement-Construction, or EPC, contracts for solar power generating systems across India. For the disputed period, it paid aggregate CGST and SGST at 5%, treating the transactions as supplies covered by Serial No. 234 of Schedule I to Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate).

The tax authorities instead applied 5% GST to 70% of the contract value and 18% GST to the remaining 30%. The Joint Commissioner’s order dated 17 January 2025, followed by a summary order dated 24 January 2025, imposed aggregate taxes and penalties of ₹53,35,80,964. The authorities also alleged deliberate misclassification and suppression, invoking the extended limitation period under Section 74 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

The Bombay High Court dismissed the appellant’s writ petition because a statutory appeal was available and the prescribed pre-deposit had not been shown to warrant exceptional treatment. The Supreme Court entertained the challenge and decided the substantive dispute rather than remanding it.

Principal issues

  • Whether the High Court should have declined writ jurisdiction solely because an alternative appellate remedy existed.
  • Whether the 70:30 valuation mechanism was compulsory for supplies made before 1 January 2019.
  • Whether the appellant’s solar EPC transactions constituted works contracts involving immovable property.
  • Whether fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression could justify extended limitation and penalties in the circumstances.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside both the adjudication order dated 17 January 2025 and the consequential summary order dated 24 January 2025. The parties were directed to bear their own costs.

The Court’s principal conclusions were:

  1. Alternative remedy is not an inflexible bar. The High Court’s cursory dismissal overlooked substantial, arguable issues requiring consideration.
  2. The 2019 mechanism was prospective. Notification No. 24/2018 expressly commenced on 1 January 2019 and did not retrospectively split earlier supplies into goods and services.
  3. The 2021 circular conferred a choice. Its statement that taxpayers “can” use the 70:30 mechanism for the earlier period was permissive, not mandatory.
  4. Foundation attachment was insufficient to establish immovability. The appellant’s systems could be detached and used elsewhere; the foundation supported the equipment’s functioning.
  5. Extended limitation was unjustified. Failure to apply a subsequently introduced allocation mechanism could not, on these facts, establish fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression during the earlier period.

The judgment therefore sustained the appellant’s treatment of the disputed supplies under the earlier 5% regime and rejected the additional liability founded on compulsory retrospective application of the 70:30 split.

3. The Statutory and Regulatory Framework

3.1 The original renewable-energy entry

Section 9 of the CGST Act authorises the levy of central tax at notified rates. Notification No. 1/2017-Central Tax (Rate), dated 28 June 2017, placed specified renewable-energy devices and parts in Schedule I. Serial No. 234 expressly included a “solar power generating system”, attracting 2.5% CGST and a corresponding 2.5% SGST.

The Court considered the GST Council’s deliberations preceding this entry. Those discussions identified the risk that higher input taxation would increase electricity costs and burden consumers. The concessional treatment of renewable-energy equipment consequently reflected a deliberate policy choice. This history supported the Court’s reading of the original entry, although the result also rested on the operative notification’s language.

3.2 The 70:30 mechanism from 1 January 2019

Notification No. 24/2018-Central Tax (Rate), dated 31 December 2018, inserted an explanation deeming 70% of the gross consideration for qualifying combined supplies to represent goods and the remaining 30% to represent the specified taxable service. Notification No. 27/2018 simultaneously introduced the corresponding service entry, Serial No. 38, in Notification No. 11/2017.

Both changes commenced on 1 January 2019. Under the rates relevant to the judgment, the resulting aggregate liability was:

(70% × 5%) + (30% × 18%) = 8.9% of the total consideration.

Thus, on consideration of ₹10,000, the earlier 5% treatment produced tax of ₹500, whereas the new allocation produced ₹890. The change was substantive in its financial effect, not merely a different description of an unchanged liability.

3.3 The 2021 circular

Circular No. 163/19/2021-GST, dated 6 October 2021, followed representations seeking permission to use the same allocation for projects supplied before 1 January 2019. It stated that GST for the period 1 July 2017 to 31 December 2018 can be paid using the 70:30 ratio.

The circular also stipulated that no refund would be granted where tax already paid exceeded the amount calculated under that mechanism. The judgment treated the retrospective facility as optional; it did not invalidate this no-refund stipulation or direct refunds.

4. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.1 Writ jurisdiction requires attention to the actual dispute

The Supreme Court criticised the High Court for treating the availability of an appeal as practically conclusive. The writ petition raised substantial questions about retrospective taxation, the proper construction of a circular, and the classification of the appellant’s supplies. It also relied on a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court concerning the appellant itself on the same issue.

The Court additionally noted that the High Court referred only to the summary order, although both the underlying adjudication order and the summary order had been challenged. This reinforced its concern that the petition had not received adequate examination.

The ruling does not establish that every arguable tax dispute must be heard in writ jurisdiction, nor does it waive statutory pre-deposit requirements generally. Its narrower point is that the alternative-remedy rule is a discretionary restraint requiring application to the particular facts, rather than a mechanical ground for dismissal.

4.2 An express commencement date controlled the new valuation rule

The 2018 notifications expressly operated from 1 January 2019. The Court therefore rejected the attempt to apply their allocation mechanism compulsorily to earlier transactions. The fact that the goods notification introduced the mechanism through an “Explanation” did not override the commencement provision.

This reasoning is specific to the instruments before the Court. The judgment does not hold that every statutory explanation is necessarily prospective. It establishes that this particular explanation, read with its effective date and the subsequent Council deliberations, did not retrospectively impose the new allocation.

4.3 A permissive circular could not become a compulsory demand

The decisive interpretive distinction was between permission and obligation. The circular addressed requests from taxpayers wishing to adopt the later mechanism for earlier supplies. Its wording preserved that choice. The authorities inverted its function by using it to impose additional tax on a taxpayer that had not elected to adopt it.

The Court also explained the circular’s statutory footing. Section 168 authorises the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs to issue instructions for uniform implementation, which departmental officers must follow. Such instructions do not require Gazette notification merely because the Act separately defines a “notification” in Section 2(80).

The defect was therefore not that the circular lacked Gazette publication. It was the department’s misunderstanding of what the circular required. The Court enforced the instrument according to its permissive terms rather than declaring it invalid.

4.4 A composite supply is not necessarily a works contract

Section 2(30) defines a composite supply as naturally bundled supplies made together in the ordinary course of business, one of which is the principal supply. Section 2(119), by contrast, defines a works contract through specified activities concerning immovable property and involving a transfer of property in goods. Paragraph 6 of Schedule II treats such works contracts as supplies of services.

The distinction is crucial: although a works contract is a composite supply, a composite supply involving goods and installation does not become a works contract unless the statutory immovable-property requirement is met. Neither the EPC label nor the inclusion of civil works supplies that missing requirement automatically.

The Joint Commissioner’s approach was particularly problematic because he treated the movable-or-immovable inquiry as immaterial in light of the circular, while also relying on immovability to classify the transaction as a works contract. The Court restored the statutory inquiry to its proper place.

4.5 Attachment must be assessed by purpose, permanence and removability

It was undisputed that the appellant’s solar panels/modules could be detached from their civil foundations and used elsewhere. The foundations ensured firmness and stability; the systems were not attached for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of the foundations themselves.

Drawing on earlier authority, the Court identified a functional distinction between equipment that becomes part of immovable property and equipment secured to immovable property merely to work effectively. The need to dismantle an installation before moving it is relevant, but not conclusive.

The six tests discussed in the judgment provide a structured inquiry:

  1. Nature of annexation: Can the equipment be removed without damage?
  2. Object of annexation: Does attachment benefit the land or facilitate use of the equipment?
  3. Intention of the parties: Was permanent incorporation intended?
  4. Functionality: Is fixation needed chiefly for efficient, stable operation?
  5. Permanency: Can the equipment be dismantled and relocated without damage?
  6. Marketability: Can it be removed and sold as equipment?

These are contextual considerations, not a licence to classify every solar installation as movable. The holding depends on the characteristics of the appellant’s systems and the purpose of their attachment.

4.6 Extended limitation required an actual factual foundation

The authorities alleged wilful misstatement and suppression to invoke Section 74 and imposed penalties under Section 122(2)(b). The Supreme Court rejected that foundation. A taxpayer could not be accused, on these facts, of fraudulent non-compliance with a mandatory allocation rule that did not exist during the relevant period.

The Court further emphasised that merely inserting statutory expressions such as “fraud” or “suppression” into a notice does not establish the conditions for extended limitation. The notice must disclose the foundational facts supporting the allegation.

This does not immunise all classification disputes from extended limitation. It requires the Revenue to demonstrate the statutory misconduct rather than infer it from the department’s disagreement with the taxpayer’s legal position.

4.7 The later change in the goods entry could not rewrite earlier transactions

Notification No. 8/2021-Central Tax (Rate), dated 30 September 2021, omitted Serial No. 234 and introduced Serial No. 201A in Schedule II. The new entry referred to a “solar power generator”, rather than a “solar power generating system”.

The Court treated this wording change as further support for recognising that the earlier entry covered the system as a unit. The later substitution could not retrospectively alter the treatment of earlier transactions. This reasoning must nevertheless be read alongside the separate 70:30 mechanism effective from 1 January 2019; it does not erase that intervening amendment.

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Sterling and Wilson Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner, State Tax, Vijayawada

Citation: (2025) 26 Centax 301 (A.P.) = 2025 (95) G.S.T.L. 402 (A.P.).

This was the closest authority: an earlier Andhra Pradesh High Court decision involving the same appellant and comparable solar supplies. It distinguished composite supplies from works contracts by examining whether the resulting property was immovable. The High Court found that the system was attached to a civil foundation for the system’s own beneficial use, not permanently incorporated for the foundation’s enjoyment.

The Revenue had not challenged that decision. Although its finality did not itself make the High Court’s reasoning nationally binding, the Supreme Court expressly approved the substantive approach and applied it in the present appeal.

5.2 TTG Industries Ltd., Madras v. Collector of Central Excise, Raipur

Citation: (2004) 4 SCC 751.

This decision represented the line of authority emphasising the substantial and permanent character of site-erected machinery, including the inability to shift it without dismantling and re-erection. It supplied the principal counterpoint to the appellant’s argument.

The present judgment did not treat it as establishing that every machine requiring dismantling is immovable. Read with the later authorities, its application depends on the particular machinery, the nature of incorporation and the consequences of removal.

5.3 Commissioner Of Central Excise, Ahmedabad v. Solid and Correct Engineering Works and others

Citation: (2010) 5 SCC 122 = 2010 (252) ELT 481 (SC).

This case provided a central doctrinal foundation. It examined the General Clauses Act and the Transfer of Property Act to distinguish things rooted in the earth, embedded in the earth, and attached to embedded structures for permanent beneficial enjoyment.

A hot-mix plant fixed with nuts and bolts for stable operation did not become immovable merely through that fixation. The present Court applied the same distinction to solar equipment resting on civil foundations: operational stability is not equivalent to permanent incorporation into land.

5.4 Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Hyderabad

Citation: (1998) 1 SCC 400.

This decision rejected the assumption that embedding or securing machinery necessarily makes it immovable. Its illustration of a pump fixed to a cement base showed that attachment can serve efficiency and security without changing the equipment’s legal character.

It reinforced the appellant’s position that the purpose of fixation, rather than fixation alone, was decisive.

5.5 Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State Of U.P. and others

Citation: (2000) 1 SCC 633.

In this stamp-duty dispute, machinery permanently embedded for operating a factory formed part of the immovable property conveyed. There was no proposal to remove it as part of the transaction.

The case supplied an important qualification: machinery can indeed become immovable, depending on the facts and the parties’ intention. It prevented the mobility analysis from becoming an equally mechanical presumption in favour of all installed equipment.

5.6 Bharti Airtel Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Pune

Citation: (2024) 19 SCC 1 = (2024) 132 GSTR 404 (SC).

This decision furnished the six tests concerning annexation, purpose, intention, functionality, permanence and marketability. It explained why towers assembled at site from completely or semi-knocked-down components do not necessarily become immovable merely because they must be dismantled before relocation.

The distinction from TTG Industries was especially influential: dismantling that restores an installation to transportable components without damaging its essential character is not, by itself, proof of permanent incorporation.

5.7 M/s. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Private Limited v. The Assistant Commissioner ST, Kavali Circle, Nellore, and others

Citation: 2025 (12) TMI 1888.

The Andhra Pradesh High Court applied the same principles to wind turbine generators. Their foundations supported the generators’ functioning; the equipment could be removed and relocated, and attachment was not intended to improve the foundation’s enjoyment permanently.

This decision demonstrated the applicability of the mobility principles to renewable-energy installations beyond solar equipment and supported a consistent, fact-sensitive construction of Section 2(119).

5.8 The Assistant Commissioner, ST, and others v. M/s Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Private Limited

Citation: 2026 (8) TMI 847 (SC).

The Supreme Court dismissed the challenge to the wind-generator decision, finding no grounds to interfere. The present judgment noted that procedural history as supporting context.

The dismissal should not be mistaken for a separately elaborated statement of all the underlying principles. The substantive precedential significance here also comes from the present Court’s express approval and application of the movable-property analysis.

5.9 M/s. Arka Green Power Private Limited v. The State of Andhra Pradesh and others

Reference: Writ Petition No. 11989 of 2022 and batch, decided on 24 December 2025.

This decision concerned solar devices, including solar pumping systems, supplied during July 2017 to December 2018. The authorities had applied the same 70:30 allocation disputed here.

The High Court followed the earlier Sterling and Wilson decision, holding that mere attachment of a pumping system to a base did not make it immovable. It illustrated the consistent application of the relevant principles to comparable transactions.

5.10 M/s. Rudraksha Allied Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Ordnance Factory, Itarsi, a unit of Munitions India Ltd., and others

Reference: Writ Petition No. 29929 of 2025, decided on 22 May 2026.

The Revenue relied on this Madhya Pradesh High Court decision concerning a tender and the application of a policy to work characterised as a works contract.

The Supreme Court distinguished it because its factual and legal context differed materially. The label applied to work in a tender dispute could not replace the specific statutory inquiry required under the CGST Act.

5.11 M/s Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, and others

This authority supplied the controlling reasoning on extended limitation. The Court relied on its insistence that allegations of fraud, wilful misrepresentation or suppression must rest on foundational facts evident from the notice itself.

Its influence was direct: the department could not sustain the extended period merely through formulaic allegations attached to an unsound retrospective interpretation of the tax regime.

6. Impact and Limits of the Decision

Historical solar GST disputes

The ruling provides strong authority against demands that compulsorily apply the 70:30 allocation to qualifying solar supplies made between 1 July 2017 and 31 December 2018. Taxpayers must nevertheless establish that their transactions fall within the earlier entry and the factual reasoning approved by the Court.

Classification of installed equipment

The judgment strengthens a purpose-based approach to machinery attached to foundations. Future disputes concerning renewable-energy and other industrial installations will require evidence about removability, damage on dismantling, intended permanence and the function served by attachment. The existence of foundations or ancillary civil works is not enough.

Administration of circulars and limitation provisions

Tax officers must respect the distinction between an optional concession and a mandatory obligation. They must also identify actual grounds for alleging fraud or suppression, rather than using those allegations to extend limitation in an ordinary interpretive dispute.

Important boundaries

  • The judgment does not invalidate the 70:30 mechanism for periods in which it lawfully applies.
  • It does not hold that every solar installation is movable property.
  • It does not establish an unrestricted right to bypass statutory appeals or pre-deposits.
  • It neither directs refunds nor strikes down the circular’s no-refund condition.
  • Its historical rate analysis should not be treated as a statement of the rate applicable to all present-day solar transactions.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

EPC or turnkey contract
A contract under which one supplier undertakes the engineering, procurement and construction needed to deliver a functioning installation. The commercial label does not determine its GST classification.
Composite supply
Supplies naturally provided together as one commercial package, with one principal supply. Combining goods and installation does not automatically create a works contract.
Works contract under GST
A contract involving specified work on immovable property and a transfer of property in goods. The immovable-property element is essential.
Deemed valuation
A legally prescribed allocation used instead of calculating the actual separate values. The 70:30 mechanism treats those percentages of total consideration as goods and services respectively.
Beneficial enjoyment
The inquiry into what the attachment serves. A foundation may simply hold equipment steady, rather than the equipment becoming a permanent improvement to the land or foundation.
Extended limitation
A longer period for recovering tax where specified misconduct is established. A disputed legal interpretation alone does not prove that misconduct.
Alternative remedy
The statutory route of appeal ordinarily available against an assessment. Its existence generally influences writ-court discretion but does not automatically extinguish that jurisdiction.

8. Conclusion

The judgment establishes that a prospective valuation mechanism cannot be transformed into a compulsory retrospective levy through a circular that merely offers taxpayers an option. It also confirms that solar equipment does not become immovable property simply because it is secured to a civil foundation.

Its broader significance lies in insisting on three disciplines: tax liability must follow the instruments applicable to the relevant period; works-contract classification must satisfy the statutory immovable-property requirement; and allegations supporting extended limitation must rest on demonstrated facts, not formulaic language.