1. Introduction
This judgment examines the boundary between legitimate regulation of public demonstrations and the criminalisation of dissent. Six petitioners challenged criminal proceedings arising from a protest concerning alleged irregularities in recruitment by the School Service Commission. The police invoked unlawful assembly, wrongful restraint, disobedience of a public servant’s order, infection-related offences, and the Disaster Management Act, 2005.
The central question was not whether protest enjoys unrestricted constitutional protection. It was whether the allegations in the First Information Report, accepted as true, disclosed the essential ingredients of the particular offences charged. The Court held that general assertions of slogan-raising, obstruction and violation of COVID protocols were insufficient where the necessary factual foundations were absent.
The decision principally reaffirms and applies established quashing principles. Its particular significance lies in their offence-by-offence application to a pandemic-era protest prosecution, reinforced by the constitutional protection of peaceful expression and assembly.
Background and competing positions
The petitioners described their protest as a peaceful expression of grievances about hunger, unemployment and allegedly unlawful recruitment. They invoked Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b), challenged the justification for police action, and argued that continued investigation would abuse the criminal process and damage their employment prospects.
The police complaint, lodged by SI Suman Roy, alleged that SLST candidates assembled near Mayukh Bhawan, Salt Lake, proceeded towards Bikash Bhawan, raised slogans, violated COVID restrictions and an order under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and failed to disperse. It further alleged attempted obstruction of public movement and interference with officials. Thirteen people, including the six petitioners, were arrested.
The State opposed the writ petition on maintainability grounds and sought its dismissal. The judgment does not record a developed response from the State addressing the ingredients of each offence.
A factual qualification: the petitioners’ narrative refers to a protest beginning on 28 September 2021 and an intended demonstration outside the Education Minister’s residence, whereas the FIR concerns events on 5 August 2021 near government buildings. The supplied judgment does not reconcile these accounts. Its operative decision expressly concerns Bidhannagar North Police Station Case No. 169 of 2021, dated 5 August 2021.
3. Legal Reasoning
3.1 Article 226 permits intervention, but not a preliminary criminal trial
The Court rejected the suggestion that the writ jurisdiction was unavailable merely because an investigation was pending. It recognised the High Court’s power to quash an FIR under Article 226, alongside its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
That jurisdiction is exceptional. The Court distinguished between testing the legal sufficiency of allegations and deciding their factual truth. It accepted the FIR allegations at face value, did not examine the petitioners’ defence, and asked whether the alleged conduct satisfied each statutory ingredient.
This distinction reconciles judicial protection against abusive proceedings with the police’s statutory responsibility to investigate cognizable offences. Where an offence is adequately alleged, courts ordinarily should not interrupt investigation merely because the accused disputes the narrative. Where essential ingredients are missing even on the prosecution’s account, investigation cannot be justified simply by attaching statutory labels.
3.2 Peaceful assembly is not automatically unlawful assembly
Section 143 IPC depends on membership of an “unlawful assembly” as defined in Section 141. An assembly of five or more people does not become unlawful merely because it is large, vocal or unwelcome. Its common object must fall within one of the statutory categories.
The FIR described people gathering and raising slogans but did not identify the prohibited common object that converted their gathering into an unlawful assembly. The Court therefore found Section 143 inapplicable.
Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) reinforced that conclusion: expression and peaceful, unarmed assembly are constitutionally protected, subject to reasonable restrictions. The Court’s observation that a demonstration does not become an offence merely because those in authority dislike it is a central constitutional theme of the decision.
This does not mean that every protest is lawful, or that every participant must be assigned a separate overt act before unlawful-assembly liability can arise. The defect here was the absence of allegations establishing the prohibited common object itself.
3.3 Section 188 requires more than citing a prohibitory order
Section 188 IPC concerns knowing disobedience of an order duly promulgated by a public servant, accompanied by the prescribed harmful consequence or tendency. The FIR referred to Memo No. 743/CP/BDN/C dated 14 July 2021, issued under Section 144 Cr.P.C., but the order was not placed on record.
The Court also found that general references to obstruction and interference with officials did not explain how the petitioners’ conduct caused, or tended to cause, the consequences contemplated by Section 188. Merely declining an officer’s request did not fill that factual gap.
Drawing on the Supreme Court’s treatment of Section 144, the Court additionally questioned the absence of circumstances demonstrating the gravity necessary for its application.
The holding should remain tied to these combined deficiencies. The Court did not separately invalidate the underlying Section 144 order, nor establish that every FIR becomes invalid merely because the complete order is not reproduced in it. It also did not decide the separate complaint-and-cognizance requirements associated with Section 188.
3.4 Wrongful restraint requires an actual restriction on someone’s movement
Section 341 punishes wrongful restraint. Its foundation is voluntary obstruction preventing a person from proceeding in a direction in which that person has a right to proceed.
The statement that protesters “tried to obstruct the way of public navigation” did not establish who was restrained or how their movement was prevented. The Court therefore distinguished a general allegation of disruption from the specific interference with movement required by the offence.
References in the judgment to the identity of the person, manner and duration of restraint illustrate the missing factual substance. They should not be converted into an inflexible rule that every otherwise sufficient FIR must state a victim’s full name or an exact duration.
3.5 Pandemic conditions do not dispense with the ingredients of Sections 269 and 270
Section 269 addresses an unlawful or negligent act likely to spread infection of a disease dangerous to life, coupled with knowledge or reason to believe in that likelihood. Section 270 addresses such conduct when done malignantly.
The FIR identified no particular infection-spreading act and no facts supporting malignity. It also did not allege circumstances giving reason to believe that the petitioners were infected with COVID-19 or carrying an infectious disease.
The Court relied on decisions treating these omissions as fatal in comparable COVID prosecutions. Its reasoning rejects the assumption that participation in a public gathering during the pandemic automatically establishes these offences.
An important limit remains: the statutory provisions concern conduct likely to spread infection, not proof that transmission actually occurred. The discussion of infection status should be understood in the context of the authorities adopted and the allegations before this Court, rather than as a universal requirement that every prosecution must produce a positive laboratory test.
3.6 Disaster-management liability requires an identifiable statutory breach
Section 51 of the Disaster Management Act addresses, without reasonable cause, obstruction of an officer or employee performing functions under the Act, or refusal to comply with an authorised direction.
The FIR cited a Health and Family Welfare Department order dated 29 July 2021 and asserted complete violation of COVID protocols. But it did not identify the particular requirement breached, the manner of breach, or the person responsible. Nor did it adequately describe obstruction of an officer acting under the Act or refusal of a relevant direction.
The Court consequently refused to presume unlawfulness from the general expression “COVID Protocol”. Emergency administration remained subject to ordinary requirements of statutory specificity.
3.7 Abuse of process and the inference of retaliatory prosecution
The most direct basis for quashing was that the FIR, taken at face value, disclosed no offence. That corresponds to the first Bhajan Lal category. The Court also invoked the third category concerning uncontroverted allegations and supporting material, although the judgment does not set out a substantial separate body of investigation evidence.
Its reliance on the seventh category added an abuse-of-process dimension: the Court inferred that the petitioners were being punished for their protest. That inference should not be generalised into a proposition that every legally deficient FIR necessarily proves malicious motive. Here, the Court linked the deficiencies to the surrounding protest context.
The petitioners’ concern about employment consequences explained the practical seriousness of the proceedings. It was not, however, an independent legal ground for quashing. The decisive grounds remained the absence of offence ingredients and the resulting abuse of process.