Marriage-Triggered Revocation of Wills Under Section 69 Upheld: Reasonable Classification and Compatibility with Section 20

Case: SUO MOTU PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE HIGH COURT v. UNION OF INDIA

Court: Kerala High Court
Citation: 2026:KER:77525
Date: 8 October 2026
Bench: Sathish Ninan and P. Krishna Kumar, JJ.
Connected proceedings: CR No.1 of 2025, W.P.(C) No.27213 of 2017 and OP(C) No.903 of 2026

1. Introduction

The Kerala High Court upheld Section 69 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, which ordinarily revokes an existing will when its maker subsequently marries. The principal constitutional objection was that this consequence operates selectively across religious communities: the reference identified Christians, Parsis and Jews as subject to the provision, while wills governed by the relevant exemptions for Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jainas are not revoked merely by marriage.

The judgment addresses two distinct questions. First, does this differential treatment violate the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution, particularly Articles 14 and 15? Secondly, does automatic revocation contradict Section 20 of the same Act, which provides that marriage neither creates an interest in the other spouse’s property nor disables a person from dealing with their own property?

The Court answered both questions against the challenge. Its central reasoning was that the classification remains constitutionally defensible because the statutory protection available to a Hindu wife differs materially from the corresponding personal-law position considered for Christians. It also held that the legislature’s failure to extend a protective rule to every comparable community does not, by itself, invalidate that rule.

Background and parties

The civil reference arose from an order dated 12 February 2025 in IA No.216 of 2017 in OS No.26 of 2016 before the Sub Court, Punalur. The underlying proceedings involved Susamma Mathai and Sherly Mathai and Sheena Mathai, identified in the cause titles as the widow and daughters of the late P.C. Mathai. Susamma Mathai separately challenged the order of reference through OP(C) No.903 of 2026. Roy Philip’s W.P.(C) No.27213 of 2017 also placed the constitutional issue before the High Court. The Union of India and the State of Kerala were respondents in the constitutional proceedings.

The judgment does not reproduce the disputed will, its dispositive terms, or a complete account of the underlying property dispute. Accordingly, its significance lies in its constitutional and statutory rulings, not in any final determination of the parties’ ownership or succession shares.

2. The Statutory Framework

Section 69: revocation by operation of law

Section 69 provides that every will shall be revoked by the marriage of its maker, subject to a narrowly framed exception concerning certain exercises of a power of appointment. Its ordinary operation does not depend on proof that the testator actually intended to revoke the will. Marriage itself supplies the legal consequence.

The power-of-appointment exception is not a general exemption for all appointed property. It concerns a will exercising authority over property which, without that appointment, would not pass to the maker’s executor, administrator or persons entitled on intestacy. The exception reflects the distinction between disposing of one’s own estate and exercising a dispositive power over another’s property.

Sections 57 and 70: deliberate community-specific treatment

Section 57 makes specified provisions of Part VI applicable to the wills of Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jainas through Schedule III. Section 69 is not included. The proviso to Section 57 additionally states that marriage shall not revoke such a will or codicil.

Section 70, which identifies methods of revoking an unprivileged will or codicil, also mentions marriage. However, its application through Schedule III excludes the words relating to revocation by marriage. The Court therefore treated the differential treatment as a conscious legislative arrangement, not an accidental omission.

Section 20: marriage does not transfer ownership

“No person shall, by marriage, acquire any interest in the property of the person whom he or she marries or become incapable of doing any act in respect of his or her own property which he or she could have done if unmarried.”

The challenge required the Court to distinguish this protection of proprietary independence from the separate statutory rule governing the continuing effectiveness of a premarital will.

3. Summary of the Judgment

  1. Section 69 survives constitutional scrutiny. Its differential operation was held to satisfy Article 14, and the challenges under Article 15 and other provisions of Part III were rejected.
  2. The original distinction had a historical explanation. Monogamy among Christians and the historical prevalence of polygamy among Hindus explained why marriage was originally treated as having different consequences for existing wills.
  3. The Court identified a continuing justification after 1955. Although the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 removed the earlier distinction by prescribing monogamy, the Court found a present distinction in Hindu wives’ maintenance rights and the statutory protection afforded by the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act.
  4. Under-inclusion was not sufficient to invalidate the provision. A rule intended to protect a newly formed family need not be struck down merely because the legislature has not extended it to every potentially comparable group.
  5. Testamentary freedom remains available after marriage. Section 69 revokes the earlier will but does not prevent the maker from executing a fresh will.
  6. Sections 20 and 69 are compatible. Revocation does not transfer present ownership to the spouse or disable future dealings with the property. Any prospective succession entitlement remains an expectancy until death.
  7. The procedural objection to the reference was left undecided. Because the constitutional question was independently answered in the writ proceedings, determining compliance with Section 113 CPC and Order XLVI would have been academic.

The connected proceedings were disposed of on that basis.

4. Analysis: Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The judgment uses precedent in several different ways: to reconstruct legislative history, formulate equality standards, identify substantive maintenance rights, distinguish an earlier invalidation of succession legislation, and support judicial restraint concerning incomplete legislative reform. Some additional decisions appear only within quotations from other judgments; their more limited role is identified separately below.

4.1. Historical recognition of Hindu testamentary power

  • Sreemutty Soorjeemoney Dossee v. Denobundoo Mullick, (1862) 9 Moore’s Indian Appeals 123: The judgment refers to this Privy Council decision, through Majumdar’s commentary, as recognition that Hindu testamentary power in Bengal was established by 1862.
  • Vallinayagam Pillai v. Pachche, 1 M.H.C.R. 326: This supplied corresponding historical support concerning Madras.
  • Narottam Jagjivan v. Narsandas Harikisandas, (1866) 3 Bom. H.C.R. (A.C.J.) 6: This supported the historical account of testamentary practice in Bombay.

These decisions were not constitutional authorities on Section 69. Their function was explanatory: they helped show why early legislation governing Hindu wills initially concentrated on places where testamentary practice had become established. The Court situated the exemption from marriage-triggered revocation within that cautious, historically incremental legislative process.

Parayankandiyal Eravath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma (Smt) And Others v. K. Devi And Others, (1996) 4 SCC 76, and Martha Samadhanam David Complainant- v. Sudha Accused, AIR 1950 Karnataka 26, were cited alongside historical writings concerning the prevalence of polygamy among Hindus before statutory monogamy. Their role was to support the social background of the original classification, rather than establish its continuing validity by themselves.

4.2. The governing Article 14 framework

K. Thimmappa v. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, SBI, AIR 2001 SC 467, and D.S.Nakara & Ors v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305, supplied the familiar two-part test for permissible classification:

  1. The persons grouped together must be distinguishable from those excluded by an intelligible differentia.
  2. That distinguishing feature must bear a rational relationship to the legislation’s objective.

The High Court applied these requirements to the objective of protecting a newly formed family against the unintended survival of a premarital will.

State of Bombay and Another v. F. N. Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 318, drawing upon Chiranjit Lal v. The Union of India, established that equality does not require every law to apply universally. Different circumstances can justify different treatment; inequality alone does not establish unconstitutional discrimination. Equally, a classification must rest on a real and substantial distinction connected with the statutory purpose.

Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538, reinforced these principles. Its discussion, quoting Budhan Choudhry v. The State of Bihar, was important in two respects. First, historical conditions and surrounding circumstances may illuminate the basis of a classification. Secondly, courts cannot sustain discriminatory legislation merely by imagining undisclosed reasons where no reasonable basis appears.

Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State Of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 404, supported the proposition that classifications need not be logically exhaustive. The Court nevertheless acknowledged that practical flexibility does not eliminate the requirement of reasonableness.

Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra, (1952) 1 SCC 215, supplied the distinction between “discrimination without reason” and “discrimination with reason.” That distinction underlies the judgment’s position that differential treatment is not unconstitutional merely because different communities receive different legal treatment.

4.3. Equality, non-arbitrariness and contextual treatment of succession

Maneka Gandhi v. Union Of India And Another, AIR 1978 SC 597, E.P Royappa v. State Of Tamil Nadu And Another, AIR 1974 SC 555, and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority Of India And Others, AIR 1979 SC 1628, were invoked for the constitutional relationship between equality, reasonableness and non-arbitrariness. These authorities prevented the analysis from becoming a merely formal exercise in identifying different groups: the distinction also had to be substantively defensible.

Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, 1996 AIR SCW 2178, was particularly relevant to succession law. The High Court relied on its recognition that non-uniform succession rules do not invariably violate Article 14 and that customs, traditions and community-specific legal arrangements require careful consideration.

Special Courts Bill, 1978, In re, (1979) 1 SCC 380, and Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State Of Orissa and Ors, (2014) 4 SCC 583, provided a broader synthesis: classification need not achieve scientific precision, but it cannot be arbitrary, artificial or unrelated to the subject matter. These decisions supported the Court’s refusal to equate constitutional equality with complete legislative uniformity.

4.4. Maintenance rights as the present basis of differentiation

The most consequential substantive authorities were Raghubar Singh and Ors v. Gulab Singh and Ors, (1998) 6 SCC 314, and V. Tulasamma and others v. Sesha Ready (Dead) by L.Rs., (1977) 3 SCC 99.

Drawing upon the principles reproduced in these decisions, the High Court emphasised that a Hindu woman’s maintenance right is not simply a discretionary benefit. It is a pre-existing legal entitlement rooted in the marital relationship. The quoted propositions explain the husband’s personal obligation, the enforceability of maintenance against property in the relevant circumstances, and the ability to secure a charge through an agreement or decree.

The judgment also relied on the Kerala High Court Full Bench decision in Sulochana v Anitha, 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 29, as affirming a Hindu woman’s maintenance entitlement upon marriage.

These authorities allowed the Court to identify a contemporary justification after the historical polygamy-based distinction had disappeared. Its reasoning was that the protection which Section 69 seeks to provide for a new family is addressed, in the Hindu statutory setting, through a distinct maintenance framework.

The language describing a wife as “a sort of co-owner” must be read with care. The quoted authorities distinguish an enforceable maintenance entitlement from an ordinary proprietary title. The judgment does not establish that marriage automatically gives every Hindu wife a defined ownership share in all her husband’s property.

4.5. Gradual reform and legislative under-inclusion

Pannalal Bansilal v. State of A.P., 1996 AIR SCW 507, recognised that reform in a plural society may proceed gradually rather than through a single universally applicable enactment. The judgment noted that this authority had recently been referred to in Arjun Dass v. State of A.P., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 992. The latter was used as confirmation of the continuing relevance of the gradual-reform approach, not as an independently analysed succession precedent.

The principal under-inclusion authority was The State of Gujarat and Another v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad, (1974) 4 SCC 656. A law is under-inclusive when it addresses a legitimate problem for one group but leaves other persons affected by the same problem outside its operation. The decision recognises that legislatures face practical constraints and need not always choose between complete inaction and comprehensive reform.

The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Girish Kumar Navalakha and Others, (1975) 4 SCC 754, developed this approach through considerations such as administrative necessity, experimentation and piecemeal solutions to social problems.

Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 127, similarly supported reform limited to particular institutions, objects or areas where historical conditions or the exigencies of the situation justify that choice.

Amarendra Kumar Mohapatra v. State Of Orissa and Ors brought these authorities together. The High Court relied on that synthesis to conclude that the non-extension of Section 69 to Hindus does not itself establish invalidity.

In Re : Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, (2024) 16 SCC 105, and M. Vijayakumar v. State of Kerala, 2022 SCC OnLine Ker. 5949, were additional authorities recognising the relevance of under-inclusion analysis.

Importantly, this line of authority does not make all under-inclusive laws valid. The quoted decisions preserve the need for a fair reason for differential coverage. The High Court considered that requirement satisfied through the protective purpose of Section 69 and the distinct maintenance framework it had identified.

4.6. Why the invalidation of Section 118 did not control Section 69

The challengers relied heavily on John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611, which struck down Section 118 of the Indian Succession Act. That provision imposed special restrictions upon certain religious and charitable bequests, including requirements linked to the existence of specified relatives, execution at least twelve months before death, and deposit within six months of execution.

The High Court explained that those conditions had been found arbitrary and lacking a rational connection with the permitted disposition. It also noted its earlier decision in Preman v. Union of India, 1998 (2) KLT 1004, which had reached a similar conclusion concerning Section 118.

The distinction was functional. Section 118 restricted the effectiveness of a category of bequests through conditions which the Supreme Court found constitutionally unjustified. Section 69, by contrast, was understood as a protective rule triggered by a major change in family circumstances, while leaving the maker free to execute a fresh will after marriage.

Thus, the Court rejected the proposition that the invalidation of one community-specific provision of the Succession Act necessarily invalidates every other provision with differential religious coverage. Each provision requires examination of its own purpose, operation and justification.

4.7. Article 15 and adverse discrimination

The Court relied on the view expressed by two judges in John Vallamattom v. Union of India concerning Article 15’s protection of citizens as individuals in relation to rights, privileges and immunities pertaining to citizenship. It also cited Nain Sukh Das & ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & ors., (1953) 2 SCC 137, for the individual character of the guarantee.

Additionally, Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of Saurashtra supplied the explanation that discrimination involves an adverse or unfavourable distinction. The High Court characterised Section 69 as protective rather than unfair or prejudicial and therefore rejected the Article 15 challenge.

This reasoning should be understood as the Court’s resolution of the provision before it. It does not warrant a broader claim that all statutory succession rules organised by religion are immune from Article 15 scrutiny.

4.8. Manifest arbitrariness and heightened objections

Khalsa University v. State of Punjab, 2024 KHC OnLine 6539, and Anurag Krishna Sinha v. State of Bihar, 2026 KHC OnLine 6168, were invoked by the challengers to support an attack based on manifest arbitrariness. The Court rejected that attack because its earlier analysis had already identified a rational purpose and an acceptable classification.

A related argument describing the provision as suspect legislation relied upon Nair Service Society v. State Of Kerala ., (2007) 4 SCC 1. The Court rejected it on the same substantive grounds.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dr. Rao V.B. J. Chelikani, 2024 KHC 6653, reinforced the proposition that courts should not demand “delusive exactness” in legislative classifications. The High Court used it to support contextual scrutiny rather than a requirement of perfect correspondence.

4.9. Authorities appearing within quoted passages

The extracts from earlier Supreme Court decisions additionally refer to State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, Lachmandas Kewalram v. State of Bombay, Qasim Razvi v. State of Hyderabad, and Mohammed Habeeb Petitioner v. State Rep. By Its of Hyderabad. They form part of the historical body of Article 14 jurisprudence summarised in the quoted authorities. The present judgment does not separately examine their facts or apply their individual holdings to Section 69.

Similarly, Missouri K. and T. Rly. v. May, West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish, and Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell appear within the discussion of legislative classification and incomplete reform. They reinforce tolerance for laws addressing a problem where the need is considered clearest. Their relevance here is mediated through the Indian precedents quoting them; they were not treated as independently binding authorities.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1. Legislative history established an original rational basis

The Court traced Section 69 through Section 56 of the Indian Succession Act, 1865, to the English Wills Act, 1837 and the Indian legislation of 1838. The underlying assumption was that marriage fundamentally changes a person’s obligations, priorities and family relationships. An earlier will might therefore cease to reflect what its maker would want after marriage.

Whitley Stokes’ commentary and the Law Commission of India’s 110th Report explained the rule as protection against the accidental survival of an old will.

The Hindu Wills Act, 1870 adopted a contrary position. Crucially, the Court obtained and appended the Gazette of India dated 2 October 1869 containing the relevant Bill and Statement of Objects and Reasons. That material expressly connected the exemption to the historical prevalence of polygamy: a further marriage was not considered necessarily to alter an existing testator’s circumstances in the same way.

On that historical footing, the Court held that the classification was constitutionally defensible when the Constitution commenced.

5.2. The judgment did not treat historical justification as permanently sufficient

The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 made monogamy the rule. The Court expressly recognised that the original substratum of the classification appeared to have disappeared.

This acknowledgment is important. The Court did not simply hold that a distinction valid in the nineteenth century must remain valid indefinitely. It sought a contemporary basis for maintaining the differential treatment.

That basis was found in Section 18(1) of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act and the pre-existing maintenance principles discussed in the authorities. The Court contrasted that framework with the absence of a comparable Christian personal-law obligation of the kind it considered necessary for this analysis. It also referred to the Divorce Act’s provision for maintenance in connection with matrimonial proceedings.

The judgment should not be read as declaring that Christian women have no maintenance remedies under any law. Its comparison concerned the particular personal-law protection identified as relevant to the constitutional classification.

5.3. Protection need not take an identical statutory form

The Court’s approach was functional: a Hindu wife’s protection need not be delivered through automatic revocation if another applicable legal framework sufficiently protects her maintenance interests.

This is the central bridge between the statutory objective and the present classification. The Court treated different protective arrangements as capable of supporting different succession rules.

There are, however, limits to the comparison. Maintenance is not the same legal entitlement as inheritance. Moreover, Section 69 is framed in terms of protecting a new spouse and family, whereas the alternative framework discussed concentrates substantially on the Hindu wife. The judgment does not comprehensively compare every affected family member or separately develop the position of Parsis and Jews. These are limits on the breadth of its analysis, not qualifications expressly imposed on its operative holding.

5.4. Under-inclusion supplied an additional route to validity

The Court also reasoned that a beneficial rule does not become unconstitutional merely because its coverage is incomplete. It referred to commentary suggesting that, after statutory monogamy, the exemption for Hindu wills should be reconsidered. Nevertheless, the legislature’s failure to extend the rule did not require the Court to invalidate its existing operation.

This preserves a distinction between two questions:

  • Would broader or more uniform legislation be desirable?
  • Is the existing provision constitutionally impermissible?

The Court answered only the second question. It neither extended Section 69 judicially nor directed the legislature to enact a uniform revocation rule.

5.5. Revocation of an earlier will is not incapacity to make another

The Court rejected arguments based on liberty, expression and freedom to dispose of property because Section 69 does not remove testamentary capacity. After marriage, the person remains free to execute a fresh will.

This is not to say that Section 69 has no effect on testamentary choices: it plainly defeats the continuing effectiveness of the earlier document. The narrower holding is that this consequence, coupled with continuing freedom to make a new will, did not establish the constitutional infringement alleged.

The provision is therefore not a compulsory inheritance reservation. It does not itself require a fresh will to leave a specified share to the spouse or family. Its protection operates through revocation of the earlier instrument and the consequences of intestacy if no effective testamentary disposition replaces it.

5.6. Pre-constitutional legislation does not acquire a presumption through later references

The Court distinguished between the continuation of existing law under Article 372 and a presumption that the law satisfies the Constitution.

It rejected the argument that later parliamentary references to the Succession Act in statutes such as the Special Marriage Act, the Hindu Succession Act, the benami legislation and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam transformed Section 69 into post-constitutional legislation for this purpose. Such references did not themselves establish that Parliament had constitutionally reconsidered the provision.

Consequently, although several precedents quoted the ordinary presumption of constitutionality, the Court did not treat that presumption as automatically available to Section 69. It upheld the provision on the substantive justification it identified.

5.7. Section 20 and Section 69 operate on different legal planes

The alleged statutory conflict failed because the provisions address different matters:

  • Section 20 concerns present proprietary independence and continuing legal capacity to deal with property.
  • Section 69 concerns whether an existing testamentary instrument remains effective after marriage.

Revocation does not presently vest the estate in the new spouse. The maker remains the owner and may dispose of the property during life or through a fresh will. If no effective will governs the estate at death, the applicable intestate succession rules determine its devolution.

The Court described the family’s position before death as a spes successionis: an expectation of succession, not a vested ownership interest. There was therefore no contradiction between the two provisions.

5.8. International standards and comparative reform did not establish invalidity

The challengers relied on international equality standards, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court considered that its rejection of the equality challenge also answered those submissions. It did not undertake a separate, detailed ruling on the domestic enforceability of particular international provisions.

The United Kingdom Law Commission’s report dated 15 May 2025 presented a more substantial policy challenge. It recommended abolishing automatic revocation, referring to testamentary freedom, public expectations, decision-specific capacity and the risk of predatory marriages used for financial abuse.

The High Court acknowledged these concerns but distinguished a recommendation for law reform from a sufficient reason to invalidate Indian legislation. Likewise, the Indian Law Commission’s recommendation to protect wills made in contemplation of marriage had not been enacted. The Court did not introduce that exception through interpretation.

6. Significance and Potential Impact

Succession practice and estate planning

The immediate consequence is that marriage remains a legally significant event requiring review of an existing will where Section 69 applies. An assumption that a premarital will continues unchanged may produce unintended intestacy.

The decision also underscores that an intention to marry, or an intention that a will should benefit a future spouse, cannot simply be treated as an enacted general exception to Section 69 on the strength of an unimplemented Law Commission recommendation.

Future constitutional litigation

The judgment offers a structured response to challenges against community-specific succession legislation: identify the actual statutory objective, examine the history of the classification, consider whether its justification survives changed circumstances, and assess the wider legal protections available to the compared groups.

It does not establish that religious differentiation is automatically valid. Indeed, the distinction from John Vallamattom v. Union of India confirms that provisions within the same Act can receive different constitutional outcomes because their purposes and burdens differ.

Questions remaining open

  • Maintenance versus inheritance: The judgment accepts maintenance protection as a sufficient differentiating feature, but does not establish that the two forms of protection are equivalent in every practical setting.
  • Community-specific analysis: The reference included Christians, Parsis and Jews, while the developed comparison is principally between Christians and Hindus.
  • Vulnerability and financial abuse: The policy concern that automatic revocation can facilitate predatory marriage was acknowledged but not resolved through legislative safeguards.
  • Procedural references: The requirements for a valid reference under Section 113 CPC and Order XLVI remain undecided in this case.

Legislative reform remains possible

Constitutional validity does not establish that the current rule is the best available policy. Parliament may still consider abolition, broader application, or exceptions for wills made in contemplation of marriage. The judgment preserves that legislative space while declining to undertake reform through constitutional invalidation.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Testator
The person who makes a will.
Testamentary succession
Distribution of a deceased person’s estate under a valid will.
Intestate succession
Distribution under statutory inheritance rules where no effective will governs the relevant estate.
Automatic revocation
A will loses legal effectiveness because the law attaches that consequence to an event, without requiring a separate intentional act of cancellation.
Intelligible differentia
A clear and relevant feature distinguishing the people covered by a law from those excluded.
Rational nexus
A sensible connection between that distinguishing feature and the law’s purpose.
Under-inclusion
A law addresses a problem for some affected people but not everyone facing a comparable problem. That incompleteness is not invariably unconstitutional.
Manifest arbitrariness
A constitutional objection that legislation is plainly irrational or lacks an adequate determining principle. The Court found Section 69 sufficiently justified to defeat this objection.
Power of appointment
Authority to decide who receives property that the person exercising the power does not own. Only the particular category described in Section 69 falls within its exception.
Spes successionis
A hope or expectation of inheriting in the future, rather than a present ownership right.
Jus ad rem and jus in rem
In the maintenance discussion, the distinction is between an enforceable entitlement concerning property and an existing proprietary right in the property itself. A maintenance entitlement should not automatically be equated with full ownership.
Civil reference
A procedure by which a subordinate court places a qualifying legal question before the High Court. This judgment did not decide whether the particular reference satisfied every procedural requirement.

8. Conclusion

The Kerala High Court upheld Section 69’s marriage-triggered revocation rule by combining a contemporary reasonable-classification analysis with the doctrine permitting justified legislative under-inclusion. It also clarified that revocation of a premarital will neither transfers present ownership to the spouse nor removes the maker’s freedom to execute a fresh will, so Section 69 does not conflict with Section 20.

The decision preserves the existing statutory rule, not its immunity from future reform. Its broader significance lies in distinguishing constitutional equality from compulsory uniformity, while recognising that historical classifications must still possess a defensible basis under present legal conditions.