Exaggerated Income Claims in Section 125 Proceedings Do Not Automatically Justify Perjury Complaint: “Expedient in the Interests of Justice” as the Controlling Threshold under Section 340 CrPC / 379 BNSS
1. Introduction
The Allahabad High Court, in Shiva Kant Dubey v. State of U.P. and Another (decided on 13-03-2026 by Hon’ble Raj Beer Singh, J.), examined the limits of initiating perjury-related proceedings arising from pleadings/affidavits filed in a pending maintenance case.
The appellant (husband) challenged the Family Court’s order refusing to proceed on his application under Section 340 Cr.P.C. / Section 379 BNSS (perjury complaint mechanism), which was premised on the allegation that the respondent-wife, in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C., falsely stated his monthly income as Rs. 80,000/- (and elsewhere Rs. 1,25,000/-) whereas, according to him, it was Rs. 11,000/-.
The core issue was whether an assertedly incorrect/exaggerated income statement in an affidavit in a pending maintenance proceeding, without final adjudication on that factual dispute, should trigger the court’s power to make a complaint for offences contemplated by Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. via Section 340 Cr.P.C. / 379 BNSS.
2. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court dismissed the appeal at the admission stage, upholding the Family Court’s rejection of the appellant’s application. The Court held that:
- Section 340 Cr.P.C. / 379 BNSS is discretionary, conditioned by the requirement that the court must form an opinion that it is “expedient in the interests of justice” to inquire and make a complaint.
- In a pending Section 125 Cr.P.C. proceeding, the husband’s income is a matter to be determined on evidence; the veracity of the wife’s affidavit statement was yet to be adjudicated by the Family Court.
- Mere assertion that income was exaggerated—even if common in maintenance litigation—does not, by itself, justify invoking Section 340/379; otherwise, it risks converting the perjury mechanism into a litigation tactic rather than a tool to protect the administration of justice.
- No material illegality or perversity was shown in the Family Court’s reasoned order.
3. Analysis
3.1 Precedents Cited
(a) Dr S. P. Kohli V The High Court Punjab and Haryana, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1753
The High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s caution that prosecution for perjury should be sanctioned only where the falsehood appears deliberate and conscious and where conviction is reasonably probable or likely. This precedent reinforces that Section 340 is not triggered by every alleged false statement; the court must evaluate seriousness, deliberateness, and prosecutorial utility.
In the present case, since the income dispute was still sub judice in the maintenance proceedings and the record did not show a concluded finding of deliberate falsity, the threshold described in Dr S. P. Kohli was not met.
The judgment quotes Chajoo Ram to underline the controlling principles:
- Courts should not start perjury prosecution “too readily and too frequently”.
- Prosecution is warranted only when it is expedient in the interests of justice to punish the delinquent—not merely because some inaccuracy exists.
- There must be a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance, with a reasonable foundation for the charge.
This precedent directly shaped the outcome: an assertedly inflated income figure, before final determination and without a demonstrable prima facie of deliberate falsehood meeting the above standard, was treated as insufficient to warrant a Section 340/379 complaint.
The Court invoked this authority for the proposition that courts should not become instruments of personal vendetta and that Section 340 is meant to curb perjury in a manner that keeps judicial proceedings “unsullied and pure,” not to facilitate retaliatory tactics between litigants.
The present court analogized the husband’s attempt to initiate Section 340/379 proceedings—while the maintenance dispute was pending—as resembling adversarial escalation rather than a necessary step to protect the administration of justice.
3.2 Legal Reasoning
(i) Statutory architecture: Section 340 Cr.P.C. / 379 BNSS read with Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C.
The Court first set out Section 340 Cr.P.C. (mirrored in the new code as Section 379 BNSS for the operative mechanism discussed) and explained that it is engaged only for offences falling within Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C., i.e., specified offences concerning false evidence/false claims and certain document-related offences, where cognizance is barred unless a complaint is made by the court (or authorized officer).
(ii) “Expedient in the interests of justice” is a filter, not a formality
The key doctrinal move in the judgment is to treat “expedient in the interests of justice” as a high-threshold filter. The Court emphasized:
- Even if an offence “appears” to have been committed, the court is not bound to complain.
- The court should weigh the impact on the administration of justice, not merely the private injury alleged by a party.
- Section 340/379 is aimed at preventing frivolous and vexatious prosecutions and preserving judicial purity—not at multiplying proceedings in ongoing disputes.
(iii) Application to maintenance litigation (Section 125 Cr.P.C.)
The Court’s fact-sensitive reasoning rests on the procedural posture:
- The Section 125 proceeding was pending; income determination was yet to be made “on the basis of evidence of the parties.”
- Since the Family Court had not yet adjudicated the husband’s true income, the wife’s affidavit could not, at this stage, be conclusively branded as deliberate perjury warranting prosecution.
- The Court candidly recognized a litigation reality: claimants may exaggerate income in maintenance claims; that tendency alone cannot convert the maintenance forum into a perjury-prosecution trigger at the interim stage.
3.3 Impact
- On Section 125 practice: The decision discourages routine resort to Section 340 Cr.P.C. / 379 BNSS as a counterblast to maintenance claims, especially at interlocutory or evidence-incomplete stages.
- On judicial administration: It reinforces that perjury-complaint powers exist to protect the system (administration of justice), not to provide strategic leverage to parties.
- On Family Courts and trial courts: The judgment supports a disciplined approach: first decide the disputed fact (e.g., income) on evidence; only then, in rare cases with clear deliberate falsehood and prosecutorial viability, consider Section 340/379.
- On BNSS transition: By treating Section 340 Cr.P.C. and Section 379 BNSS as functionally aligned for the analysis, the judgment signals continuity of the cautious, precedent-driven approach under the new procedural regime.
4. Complex Concepts Simplified
-
Section 340 Cr.P.C. / Section 379 BNSS (perjury complaint mechanism):
A procedure enabling a court to file a complaint to a magistrate for certain offences (like perjury/false evidence) connected to proceedings before it—but only after the court forms an opinion that such action is necessary in the interests of justice.
-
Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. (bar on cognizance):
For specified offences (notably perjury-related), a criminal court cannot take cognizance unless the concerned court itself (where the alleged perjury occurred) files a complaint. This prevents private parties from launching perjury prosecutions as pressure tactics.
-
“Expedient in the interests of justice”:
Not “useful for one party,” but “necessary to protect the justice system.” Courts ask whether the alleged falsehood seriously undermines judicial proceedings and whether prosecution is warranted and likely to succeed.
-
Prima facie deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance:
There must be an apparent, intentional lie about an important fact—not a disputed estimate, ambiguity, or an issue awaiting evidentiary determination.
5. Conclusion
Shiva Kant Dubey v. State of U.P. and Another reaffirms a restrained and system-protective approach to perjury complaints under Section 340 Cr.P.C. / 379 BNSS. The High Court held that an allegedly exaggerated income statement in a wife’s affidavit in a pending Section 125 Cr.P.C. maintenance case does not, without more, make it “expedient in the interests of justice” to initiate perjury proceedings—particularly when the underlying factual dispute (true income) remains to be adjudicated on evidence.
The decision’s broader significance lies in reinforcing that Section 340/379 is an exceptional power aimed at safeguarding the administration of justice, not an all-purpose weapon in adversarial family litigation.