Allegedly False Reporting Does Not Justify Prosecution Without the Essential Ingredients of BNS Offences

Case: SK. SAFIKUL ISLAM v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

Court: Calcutta High Court, Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction, Appellate Side

Judge: Justice Anuj Singh

Case number: W.P.A. No. 21356 of 2024, with CAN 1 of 2026

Judgment date: 9 October 2026

1. Introduction

This judgment concerns the limits of criminal prosecution arising from allegedly false online reporting. The Calcutta High Court quashed an FIR against journalist Sk. Safikul Islam after finding that the complaint, even if accepted entirely as true, did not disclose the essential ingredients of the offences invoked under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (“BNS”).

The decision establishes an important distinction: a viewer’s belief that a broadcast is false or socially disruptive is not, without the necessary factual allegations, sufficient to constitute forgery-related wrongdoing, statements conducing to public mischief, or intentional insult intended to provoke a breach of peace. Equally, a prosecution concerning alleged public-order harm cannot be terminated merely because the original complainant withdraws support.

Rather than creating a general exemption for journalists, the judgment applies established Supreme Court principles governing the quashing of criminal proceedings to offences under the BNS.

Background and parties

The petitioner described himself as a journalist operating the YouTube news channel Arambagh TV, which published news and critical analysis of the State Government. He challenged Cyber Crime Police Station, Hooghly Rural, Case No. 6 of 2024, registered on 15 August 2024 following a complaint by Subhashish Chakraborty.

According to the complaint, a video broadcast by the petitioner contained a female voice alleging irregularities at RG Kar Hospital in Kolkata and referring to a protest rally within the hospital. The complainant characterised the reporting as false and fabricated and asserted that its dissemination could disturb peace and create social unrest.

The FIR invoked Section 340(2), the provisions described in the judgment as Section 353(1)(b)(2), and Section 352 BNS. The petitioner alleged that this was another instance of criminal proceedings being used against him because of his critical reporting.

Procedural developments

  • The petitioner approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the FIR.
  • During the proceedings, his bank account was frozen under orders of the jurisdictional magistrate, allegedly affecting his livelihood.
  • On 4 October 2024, the High Court stayed further proceedings, prohibited coercive action, and directed that the account be de-frozen. The investigating officer remained free to obtain transaction statements.
  • The investigation thereafter remained stayed, and no charge sheet was submitted.
  • Through CAN 1 of 2026, the complainant sought impleadment and stated that the complaint had resulted from a misunderstanding of fact. He expressed no objection to quashing. His impleadment application was allowed by consent.

Principal issues

  1. Whether the High Court could quash the FIR at the investigation stage under Article 226.
  2. Whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of the BNS offences invoked.
  3. Whether the complainant’s unwillingness to proceed independently justified quashing allegations concerning public order.
  4. Whether allowing the prosecution to continue would constitute an abuse of legal process.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court quashed the FIR and all proceedings arising from it. Any bail bond furnished by the petitioner in that case stood discharged, and the order was directed to be transmitted to the jurisdictional magistrate.

The Court’s principal findings were:

  • No allegation of the requisite forgery-related conduct: The complaint did not allege that any document or electronic record was forged, or that the petitioner knowingly used such a record as genuine.
  • No sufficient public-mischief allegations: The complaint did not identify the necessary statutory connection between the broadcast and inducement to offences against the State or public tranquillity, or the promotion of hostility between communities.
  • No intentional insult of the statutory kind: It did not allege an intentional insult accompanied by the intention or knowledge required to provoke a breach of peace or another offence.
  • Withdrawal was not decisive: The complainant’s changed position could not, by itself, terminate a prosecution alleging harm to public order.
  • Continuation would be abusive: Since the allegations disclosed no relevant offence even at face value, the criminal process could not legitimately continue.

Crucially, the Court expressly declined to decide whether the video was true or false. Its conclusion concerned the legal sufficiency of the complaint, not the factual accuracy of the reporting.

3. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.1 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal

In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335, the Supreme Court identified broad categories in which the High Court may quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The present judgment specifically noted that this precedent itself arose from proceedings under Article 226.

This authority supplied the principal framework for intervention. The High Court did not need to resolve disputed evidence or determine the petitioner’s innocence. It instead asked whether the allegations, accepted in their entirety, constituted the offences for which the FIR had been registered.

Two aspects of that framework were particularly relevant: the absence of an offence on the face of the allegations, and the use of criminal proceedings for an improper or malicious purpose. The Court found both deficiencies, although the absence of statutory ingredients provided the clearest and expressly independent basis for the final decision.

The judgment also retained the accompanying restraint: quashing is an exceptional power to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection. Intervention here was justified not by a premature assessment of evidentiary strength, but by the complaint’s failure to allege a legally recognisable offence under the provisions invoked.

3.2 RP Kapoor v. State of Punjab

RP Kapoor v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866, appears through the Court’s discussion of the authorities considered in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.

Its significance is foundational: it places the power to stop legally unsustainable criminal proceedings within the established jurisprudence concerning abuse of process and the ends of justice. The present judgment does not separately reproduce or analyse its propositions. Accordingly, it should not be treated as having applied a distinct test from that case beyond the broader quashing principles developed through the cited line of authority.

3.3 Gian Singh v. State of Punjab

In Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Supreme Court recognised that proceedings involving non-compoundable offences may sometimes be quashed where the dispute is predominantly private or civil and the possibility of conviction is sufficiently remote that continuation would be oppressive.

That power, however, is not an unrestricted settlement mechanism. As the High Court explained, serious and heinous offences, offences with significant societal consequences, and offences against the State stand on a different footing.

This distinction was central because the allegations concerned supposed threats to public order rather than a purely private disagreement. The complainant’s consent could not substitute for judicial examination of the FIR. The Court therefore considered the complaint independently and quashed the case because its allegations did not disclose the offences—not simply because the complainant no longer supported prosecution.

4. Legal Reasoning

4.1 Constitutional jurisdiction and the face-value test

The Court recognised that an FIR may be quashed under Article 226 of the Constitution or under the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction preserved by Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”). The present proceeding invoked Article 226.

The operative inquiry was straightforward: assuming that everything materially alleged in the complaint is true, do those allegations satisfy the essential ingredients of the offences invoked?

This is different from deciding whether the prosecution can ultimately prove its case. An FIR need not contain trial-level proof, but it must allege facts capable of constituting an offence. General accusations of falsehood or unrest cannot replace the statutory elements.

4.2 Section 340(2): False reporting is not automatically use of a forged record

Section 340(2) addresses the fraudulent or dishonest use, as genuine, of a document or electronic record which the person knows or has reason to believe is forged.

The complaint did not identify a forged document or electronic record, nor did it allege the petitioner’s use of one as genuine with the required knowledge or reason to believe. Calling a broadcast “false and fabricated” did not supply these missing allegations.

The distinction is important for digital publications. An electronic medium can contain a disputed assertion without necessarily involving a forged electronic record. The statutory offence requires more than disagreement about the truth of the message.

The complaint’s reference to cheating under Section 420 IPC likewise did not establish criminality by labelling alone. The Court found no element of cheating or forgery in the allegations before it.

4.3 Section 353(1)(b): A statutory connection to public mischief is necessary

As reproduced in the judgment, Section 353(1)(b) concerns statements, false information, rumours or reports intended or likely to cause fear or alarm whereby a person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or public tranquillity.

The complaint did not identify the necessary factual basis for that statutory sequence. A general assertion that reporting disrupts harmony or creates social unrest was insufficient.

The provision includes both intention-based and likelihood-based language. The decision should therefore not be read as requiring proof of subjective intention in every case, or an actual completed disturbance before proceedings can begin. Its narrower point is that the complaint must contain allegations supporting the applicable statutory elements, rather than merely invoking public-order concerns in general terms.

4.4 Section 353(2): General controversy is not the same as inter-group hostility

Section 353(2) addresses the publication or circulation of specified material intended or likely to promote enmity, hatred or ill-will between the groups or communities described in the provision.

The complaint supplied no allegation of the required promotion of hostility between such groups. Criticism of hospital activities, an allegation of administrative irregularity, or discussion of a protest did not, without more, satisfy that requirement.

The reasoning preserves the distinction between reporting capable of generating public debate and material falling within a particular statutory prohibition on inter-group hostility.

4.5 Section 352: Intentional insult requires more than objectionable speech

Section 352 requires an intentional insult that provokes a person, accompanied by an intention or knowledge that the provocation is likely to cause a breach of public peace or another offence.

The complaint did not allege that the petitioner intentionally insulted anyone in this manner. The Court therefore found the required elements absent. The mere perception that speech is objectionable or provocative cannot replace the particular conduct and mental element prescribed by the section.

4.6 The complainant’s withdrawal and the independent basis for quashing

There is a potential tension within the judgment: paragraph 25 gives particular weight to the complainant’s unwillingness to support the prosecution, while paragraph 26 expressly states that the conclusion rests entirely on the complaint’s failure to disclose the essential ingredients of the offences.

Read together, the withdrawal is contextual rather than legally decisive. Paragraph 26 makes the controlling basis clear: the Court independently examined the original allegations and found them deficient. This prevents the decision from being read as allowing private consent to determine the fate of a public-order prosecution.

4.7 The finding of mala fides

The Court also characterised the proceedings as maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive to wreak vengeance. The petitioner had alleged a history of criminal cases linked to his criticism of the government.

However, the judgment does not provide an extensive separate factual analysis establishing that alleged retaliatory history. Its strongest and most transferable reasoning remains the ingredient-by-ingredient examination of the complaint. Future litigants should not treat the decision as establishing that every unsuccessful complaint against a journalist is necessarily malicious.

4.8 Drafting inconsistencies in the judgment

The judgment repeatedly uses the composite reference “353(1)(b)(2)”. Its substantive discussion shows that it examines Section 353(1)(b) and Section 353(2) separately. Paragraph 18 also refers initially to Section 353 when discussing intentional insult, although the provision quoted there is Section 352. A concluding reference in paragraph 21 is similarly imprecise.

These appear to be citation or drafting slips. The quoted statutory text and the surrounding analysis make the provisions under consideration sufficiently clear. The operative reasoning should be understood by reference to those distinct provisions, rather than the inconsistent shorthand.

5. Potential Impact

Greater discipline in criminal complaints concerning digital speech

The judgment encourages complainants and investigating authorities to identify the relevant statement, the conduct alleged, and the factual basis for the applicable offence. Electronic publication does not itself convert disputed reporting into forgery or public mischief.

Protection against legally unsupported prosecutions

For journalists and other digital publishers, the decision provides an application of the principle that criminal proceedings cannot continue where the complaint omits the required statutory ingredients. Such scrutiny is especially important where investigation and ancillary measures can themselves seriously affect livelihood.

The bank-account freezing illustrates those practical consequences. Nevertheless, the judgment does not formulate a general legal test governing the freezing of journalists’ accounts; the account-related direction arose at the interim stage.

Continuity of quashing principles under the new criminal codes

By applying established Supreme Court authorities to BNS offences and recognising Section 528 BNSS, the judgment demonstrates continuity in the High Court’s supervisory role following the replacement of the earlier criminal statutes.

No blanket immunity and no adjudication of truth

The decision does not protect knowingly unlawful reporting as a category, prevent investigation where the required ingredients are alleged, or establish that the broadcast was accurate. Nor does it make complainant withdrawal conclusive.

Although the case has implications for freedom of expression and the chilling effect of criminal process, the Court did not decide a separate constitutional challenge under Article 19 or invalidate any BNS provision. Its holding is grounded in the legal insufficiency of this complaint.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

Quashing an FIR
A High Court order terminating an FIR and related proceedings because allowing them to continue would be legally unjustified. It is not the same as an acquittal after trial.
Essential ingredients of an offence
The specific acts, circumstances and mental elements required by the law creating the offence. General accusations cannot substitute for them.
Taking allegations at face value
Assuming the allegations are true for the limited purpose of asking whether they describe an offence, without deciding whether they can ultimately be proved.
De facto complainant
The person who originally reported the alleged wrongdoing, although the State ordinarily conducts the resulting prosecution.
Non-compoundable offence
An offence that cannot ordinarily be brought to an end through the statutory process of agreement between the affected parties. Exceptional High Court quashing is a separate power.
Abuse of process
Use or continuation of legal proceedings in a manner inconsistent with their legitimate purpose, including pursuing a prosecution that does not disclose the alleged offence.
Mala fides
Bad faith or an improper purpose, such as using prosecution to retaliate against someone rather than genuinely enforce the law.
Inherent jurisdiction
The High Court’s preserved authority, recognised in Section 528 BNSS, to prevent abuse of court process and secure the ends of justice.

7. Conclusion

The central principle of this judgment is that an allegation of false reporting cannot sustain criminal proceedings unless the complaint discloses the essential ingredients of the particular offences invoked. Neither a complainant’s subjective disbelief nor a general assertion of social unrest can fill statutory gaps.

Equally important, public-order prosecutions cannot be ended merely at the complainant’s preference. The Court must independently examine their legal foundation. Here, that examination—not a finding that the broadcast was true, and not withdrawal alone—justified quashing the FIR.

The judgment’s broader significance lies in applying established safeguards against abusive prosecution to the BNS framework while maintaining the distinction between disputed speech and specifically defined criminal conduct.