Little v Chief Appeals Officer, Social Welfare Appeals Office and Minister for Social Protection (Approved)

Smart Summary (Beta)

Factual and Procedural Background

The judgment is a concurring opinion delivered by Judge Hogan in an appeal brought by the Appellant against the Respondents. The opinion focuses exclusively on the statutory foundations for Rules of the Superior Courts governing costs. No further factual details regarding the underlying social-welfare dispute or prior procedural steps are supplied in the text.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether section 53 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Ireland) Act 1877 remains part of the statutory foundation for Superior Court costs rules after the establishment of the modern courts.
How section 53 of the 1877 Act interacts with later enactments, specifically section 22 of the Courts of Justice Act 1924, section 14(2) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act 1961, and sections 168–169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015.
Whether overlapping statutory provisions create uncertainty that should be resolved by legislative clarification.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gordon v. Irish Racehorse Trainers Association [2020] IEHC 446	Section 94 of the 1924 Act was not impliedly repealed by section 169 of the 2015 Act.	Used as an example of a court recognising survival of earlier cost-related provisions.
Whitmore v. O’Reilly [1906] 2 IR 357	Historical purpose of section 53 of the 1877 Act—fusion of common-law and equity approaches to costs.	Cited to explain the original discretionary nature of costs under section 53.
Little v. Dublin United Tramways Ltd. [1929] IR 642	Whether section 53 of the 1877 Act survived the 1924 reforms.	Illustrates early judicial ambiguity; suggested continued—but limited—operation of section 53.
McLaughlin v. Minister for the Public Service [1985] IR 631	Later legislation prevails where it covers the same ground.	Invoked to argue that section 94 of the 1924 Act may supersede section 53 of the 1877 Act.
Quinn and White v. Stokes and Quirke [1931] IR 558	Section 53 of the 1877 Act does not apply to new courts created in 1924.	Relied on as direct authority that section 53 lacks application in modern courts, especially the Circuit Court.
The People (Attorney General) v. Bell [1969] IR 24	Rules of 1962 derive their authority from section 14(2) of the 1961 Act, not from section 53 of the 1877 Act.	Supports the view that section 14(2) is the current statutory basis for Superior Court cost rules.
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Grey [1986] IR 317	Presumption against implied repeal.	Quoted to acknowledge that any claim of implied repeal must overcome a strong presumption to the contrary.
Mogul of Ireland Ltd. v. Tipperary (NR) County Council [1975] IR 260	Standard for departing from established precedent—decision must be “clearly wrong.”	Used to explain the threshold required to overrule Quinn or Bell.
Director of Public Prosecutions (O’Grady) v. Hodgins [2024] IESC 36	Reinforces the “clearly wrong” standard for overruling precedent.	Cited alongside Mogul for the same proposition.
Moorview Developments Ltd. v. First Active [2018] IESC 33; [2019] 1 IR 417	Recent reliance on section 53 without examining its jurisdictional basis.	Highlighted to show that section 53 is still occasionally cited, notwithstanding unresolved doubts.
WL Constructions Ltd. v. Chawke [2019] IESC 74	Further instance of modern citation of section 53.	Supports the observation that courts continue to refer to section 53 even where its applicability is uncertain.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Judge Hogan, concurring with the forthcoming majority opinion of Judge Murray, undertakes a historical and statutory analysis to clarify the legal basis for awarding costs in the Superior Courts:

He identifies three potentially operative statutory sources for cost rules: section 53 of the 1877 Act, section 14(2) of the 1961 Act, and sections 168–169 of the 2015 Act, with section 94 of the 1924 Act also relevant for jury actions.
Tracing the evolution of costs jurisdiction, he notes that section 53 originally unified common-law and equitable practices, granting discretion except in jury trials where costs followed the event.
The 1924 Act created entirely new courts and introduced section 22 (general costs) and section 94 (jury costs). Early Supreme Court decisions (Little; Quinn) produced mixed views on whether section 53 survived.
Judge Hogan highlights Bell (1969), where the Supreme Court held that current rules of court derive their authority from section 14(2) of the 1961 Act, not from section 53.
He recognises the presumption against implied repeal (Grey) but contends that ordinary canons of construction and subsequent statutory schemes suggest section 53 “never applied” to the modern courts established in 1924 and 1961.
Despite occasional modern citations of section 53 (Moorview; WL Constructions), those cases did not analyse jurisdiction, leaving lingering uncertainty.
He concludes that overlapping statutory provisions create unacceptable ambiguity and invites the legislature to clarify the matter.

Holding and Implications

The concurring judgment agrees with the majority decision (to be delivered by Judge Murray) and does not alter the outcome of the appeal.

Implications: Judge Hogan’s analysis signals that, absent legislative intervention, litigants and courts may continue to face uncertainty over the statutory basis for cost rules. The judgment therefore serves as a call for the Oireachtas to harmonise and clarify the governing legislation. No new binding precedent on costs was set, but the opinion furnishes detailed guidance on the historical and statutory landscape.

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Little v Chief Appeals Officer, Social Welfare Appeals Office and Minister for Social Protection (Approved)