Hobbs & Anor, R. v

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns an application by Her Majesty's Solicitor General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for leave to refer two sentences as unduly lenient. The case involves two offenders, referred to as Defendant A and Defendant B, both convicted in the Crown Court at Guildford for offences related to a conspiracy to supply cocaine. Defendant A was sentenced for conspiracy to supply cocaine and a separate supply offence involving his son. Defendant B was sentenced for conspiracy to supply cocaine related to the same conspiracy.

The conspiracy spanned from June 2018 to May 2019, involving the supply of 175 kilograms of cocaine seized in Spain. Defendant A's role involved financial dealings and delivery of cash within the conspiracy until January 2019, after which he left the group. Defendant B maintained involvement throughout the conspiracy, including supplying encrypted phones, handling finances, and arranging storage.

The investigation involved surveillance and analysis of encrypted communications ("Encrochat"), revealing a hierarchy within the organised crime group. Several co-defendants were also charged, with some acquitted or awaiting trial abroad.

Defendant A was sentenced to a total of five years and three months' imprisonment, combining a three-year sentence for conspiracy and a consecutive two years and three months for the separate supply offence. Defendant B received a sentence reduced to eight years after a guilty plea, reflecting a significant role but not a leading one.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising Defendant A's role as lesser rather than significant in the cocaine conspiracy, and in applying money laundering guidelines instead of the offence specific drug supply guidelines.
2. Whether the sentencing judge erred in categorising Defendant B's role as significant rather than leading in the conspiracy.
3. Whether the sentences imposed on Defendant A and Defendant B were unduly lenient, particularly in light of the quantity of drugs involved and their roles within the conspiracy.
4. Whether the sentencing judge appropriately applied sentencing guidelines, including the offence specific guidelines under the Sentencing Act 2020 and the relevant culpability and harm categories.

Arguments of the Parties

Solicitor General's Arguments

• Defendant A should have been found to have a significant role rather than a lesser role in the conspiracy.
• The judge erred in applying money laundering guidelines to Defendant A instead of the offence specific drug supply guidelines.
• Defendant B should have been categorised as having a leading role rather than a significant role.
• The sentencing range for Defendant B should have been at the top of the significant role category, with a greater increase to reflect the volume of cocaine.
• The reductions for mitigation and the impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on Defendant B's sentence were excessive.

Defendant A's Arguments

• The sentencing judge, having conducted the trial and heard evidence, was entitled to find that Defendant A had a lesser role.
• The judge rightly noted that Defendant A acted under the direction of Defendant B and had limited financial gains.
• The application of money laundering guidelines was appropriate given Defendant A's role in handling proceeds rather than drug supply.
• The sentence imposed was within the range reasonably considered appropriate by the judge.

Defendant B's Arguments

• The judge correctly assigned roles based on evidence, including Encrochat material, and did not err in categorising Defendant B's role as significant.
• Factual findings made by the sentencing judge should not be lightly disturbed.
• Defendant B's financial reward was significant but not substantial compared to those higher in the chain.
• The four-year increase to reflect the volume of drugs was appropriate and not excessive.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court acknowledged the complexity of the organised crime conspiracy and the detailed factual findings made by the sentencing judge, who had presided over a lengthy trial and several Newton hearings. It affirmed the principle that factual findings by sentencing judges are entitled to considerable deference and can only be disturbed on grounds such as internal inconsistency, lack of evidential basis, or irrationality, none of which were found here.

Regarding Defendant A, the court found the sentencing judge was plainly entitled to categorise his role as lesser rather than significant, given Defendant A's limited influence, modest financial gain, and subordination to Defendant B. However, the court held that the judge erred in applying the money laundering guidelines instead of the offence specific drug supply guidelines, which must be followed unless contrary to the interests of justice—a finding not made here.

Applying the correct offence specific guidelines, the court recalculated Defendant A's sentence to reflect a lesser role in a category 1 harm offence, increasing the sentence to nine years before mitigation. After mitigation, the sentence was reduced to seven years and nine months, which could not be further reduced due to the absence of a guilty plea on the conspiracy count. The separate sentence for the supply offence was left undisturbed but remained consecutive, resulting in an overall sentence of ten years.

For Defendant B, the court found no justiciable basis to interfere with the judge's assessment of his role as significant rather than leading. The court upheld the judge's approach to the starting point and the increase to reflect the quantity of cocaine, recognizing the four-year uplift as substantial but appropriate. The generous mitigation and guilty plea discount were noted but did not render the sentence unduly lenient. Consequently, the court refused the application to refer Defendant B's sentence.

Holding and Implications

The court granted leave for the Solicitor General to refer Defendant A's sentence as unduly lenient and allowed the reference, increasing Defendant A's sentence from five years and three months to ten years' imprisonment.

The court granted leave to refer Defendant B's sentence but refused the reference, upholding the sentence of eight years' imprisonment as not unduly lenient.

The direct effect is an increased custodial sentence for Defendant A reflecting the correct application of offence specific sentencing guidelines. No new precedent was established, and the court reaffirmed the importance of deference to sentencing judges’ factual findings and the mandatory application of offence specific guidelines unless contrary to the interests of justice.