Roscorla v Thomas

Factual and Procedural Background

This case involves an action of assumpsit brought by the Plaintiff against the Defendant for breach of warranty concerning the soundness and age of a horse sold. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant promised the horse was sound, free from vice, and under five years old, but the horse was in fact vicious and ungovernable. The Defendant pleaded non assumpsit and that the horse was indeed vicious. At trial before Judge Wightman at the Cornwall Spring Assizes in 1841, a verdict was returned in favour of the Plaintiff on these issues. Subsequently, the Defendant obtained a rule nisi to arrest the judgment on the first count, challenging the sufficiency of the consideration supporting the Defendant’s promise. The matter was argued before the Court in Easter and the following term, with the judgment delivered by Lord Denman C.J.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the executed consideration alleged in the declaration was sufficient to support the Defendant’s express promise that the horse was sound and free from vice.
2. Whether an express warranty made after the sale, supported by a past or executed consideration, can be enforced.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellee's Arguments (Plaintiff)

• The Plaintiff argued that there was an executed consideration (the purchase of the horse at the Defendant’s request) which, together with that request, supported the Defendant’s promise.
• The Plaintiff relied on precedents where the law implies a request when a promise is raised by law, supporting the enforceability of the warranty.
• It was contended that the sale and warranty were coincident, making the consideration practically executory, and thus supporting the promise.
• Precedents such as Osborne v. Rogers, Payne v. Wilson, and Thornton v. Jenyns were cited to show that simultaneous promises or executed considerations can support enforceable promises.

Appellant's Arguments (Defendant)

• The Defendant argued that the warranty must be given at the time of sale; if made after, it lacks consideration and is unenforceable.
• The sale was completed before the warranty, making the warranty a separate, unsupported promise.
• The warranty is not implied by law upon sale and requires independent consideration.
• Precedents such as Roswell v. Vaughan, Pope v. Lewyns, and Parkinson v. Lee were cited to support the position that an express promise without legal consideration is invalid.
• It was also argued that the promise must be coextensive with the consideration, and here the consideration only supported delivery upon request, not a warranty of soundness.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed whether the executed consideration alleged could support the Defendant’s express promise that the horse was sound and free from vice. The Court reaffirmed the general rule that a promise must be coextensive with the consideration. In this case, the consideration—purchase of the horse at the Defendant’s request—only supported a promise to deliver the horse upon request, not a warranty of soundness.

The Court acknowledged that while the promise was express, it could not be extended beyond what the consideration supported. It rejected the argument that an express promise could be upheld without sufficient consideration, finding that the warranty was effectively a promise unsupported by the stated consideration.

The Court distinguished this case from others involving ratification of voidable contracts or moral obligations, concluding that a past and executed consideration cannot support an express promise beyond what would be implied by law.

Accordingly, the Court held that the first count failed to state a cause of action upon which judgment could be entered.

Holding and Implications

The Court made the rule for arresting judgment on the first count absolute, effectively dismissing the Plaintiff’s claim based on that count.

This decision means that the express warranty alleged, made after the executed sale, was not enforceable due to lack of sufficient consideration. The judgment limits the enforceability of express promises unsupported by consideration coextensive with the promise. No new legal precedent was established beyond the affirmation of existing principles regarding consideration and promises.