Chinnappa Reddy, J.:— The Agricultural University, Rajendranagar, the appellant in this batch of appeals, is faced at the outset with an objection regarding the maintainability of the appeals. A vast extent of land was acquired by the Government of Andhra Pradesh for the purposes of the Agricultural University. At the instance of the owners of the land, who were dissatisfied with the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, references were made to the Court under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Court made awards enhancing the compensation. The Government of Andhra Pradesh did not prefer appeals. The Agricultural University, who was not a party to the references, sought leave of the High Court to prefer appeals, Our brother ??? Reddy, J. granted leave ‘subject to the question of maintainability’. The appeals are now before us and the Claimants before the lower court object to the appeals and claim that the appeals are not maintainable. Leave having been granted exparte and subject to the question or maintainability the respondents are well entitled to object. This position was not disputed before us. Indeed it Cannot be disputed. In In re Youngs Doggett v. Revett(1) leave was originally granted exparte but at the hearing of the appeals on the objection of the respondents the appeals were held to be not maintainable.

2. In order to appreciate the force of the preliminary objection it is useful to discover the place of the person for whose benefit the land is acquired in the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act enables the Government to publish a notification stating that land in a locality is needed or is likely to be needed for a ??? purpose. Section 38 provides for the exercise of a similar power by an officer of a Company authorised by the Government in that behalf where the land is required for the purposes of the Company. Section 39 prescribes that the provisions of Sections 6 to 37 shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company except with the previous consent of the Government and unless the agreement contemplated by S. 41, providing among other things for the payment to the Government of the cost of the acquisition, is executed by the Company. It is of interest the payment of the cost of acquisition is to the Government by the Company. No payment by the Company to owners of acquired property is contemplated. It may not be out of place to mention here ??? the Agricultural University is not a Company.

3. On the publication of the notification under Section 4 (including a notification under section 38 read with Section 4) that the land is needed for a public purpose or a Company any person interested in the land may, under Section 5-A object to the acquisition of the land. The objection shall then be considered by the Government. Thereafter a declaration shall be made under S. 6 to the effect that any particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. Before taking possession of the land Section 9 requires the Collector to give public notice that the Government intends to take possession of the land and that calaims to compensation may be made to him. Claims for compensation are thereafter requited to be considered and the Collector is required to make his award. On making his award, the Collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested or entitled ??? After the Collector has made the award he may take possession of the land which will thereupon vest absolutely in the Government (vide Section 16). Any person interested who does not accept the award may, under section 18, require the Collector to make a reference to the Court for the determination of the compensation. The Court shall thereafter determine the compensation to be awarded and make its award. Section 50 provides that where the acquisition is to be made at the cost of any fund controlled or managed by a local authority or of any company, such local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence before the Collector or Court for the purpose of ??? the amount of compensation subject to the proviso that no such local authority or Company shall be entitled to demand a reference Under S. 18. It may not Again be out of place to mention hate that the Agricultural University is neither a company nor a local authority. Section 54 provides for an appeal to the High Court from the a ward of the Court hearing the reference under S. 18 of the Act.

4. This brief ??? of the ??? provisions of the Act shows that ??? the Government that acquires the land, it is in the Government that the land vests on acquisition, it is the Government that takes possession of the land from the owner, it is the Government that pays compensation to the claimant and it is to the Government alone that the claimant must look for payment of compensation. If any issue is raised by the claimant the issue has to be settled with the Government only and none else. The lis, if any, is between the Government and the claimant. The person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who may ultimately pay to the Government the cost of acquisition has nothing to do with the lis. The person for whose benefit the land is acquired must look to the Government only for obtaining title to and possession of the acquired land. The cost of acquisition required to be paid under the agreement with the Government must be paid by the person for whose benefit the land is acquired to the Government only and not to the person whose land is acquired. Thus the person whose land is acquired and the person for whose benefit the land is acquired are never brought face to face. “…………and never the twain shall meet”. Clearly, therefore, it is the legislative design that the person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not to interest himself in the lis between the Government and the person whose land is acquired. Whom the Legislature has kept asunder, surely it is not for the Court to bring together.

5. It is true that in the case of a company or a local authority, a right but a very circumscribed right, is given to such company or local authority to participate in the proceeding before the Collector or the Court by appearing and adducing evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. It is made clear by the proviso to S. 50(2) that this circumscribed right to appear and adduce evidence does not clothe the company or local authority with the right to demand a reference under S. 18 of the Act. It is also necessary to mention here that the Agricultural University, the appellant herein does not possess even this circumscribed right since it is neither a company nor a local authority. It is therefore, clear that the intention of the legislature is to exclude the person for whose benefit the land is acquired from being treated as a party to the proceedings. The intention of the legislature, clearly, is to confine the lis to the claimant and the Government and not to compel the claimant to fight legal battles with any one other ??? the Government. After all it is the Government that acquires his land and it would be unfair to expose him to litigation from other quarters. That the person for whose benefit the land is acquired may ultimately pay to the Government the cost of acquisition is neither here nor there since that is as arrangement entirely between the Government and that person and is of no concern or consequence to the ??? whose land is acquired. We are therefore of the view that to permit the person for whose benefit the land is acquired to litigate against the person whose land is acquired is to defeat the very legislative design which is so patent from the scheme of the Act. We have no manner of doubt that under the scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, the person for whose benefit the land is acquired is neither a necessary nor a proper party to ??? under S. 13 of the Act and cannot intervene in such proceedings. If the person happens to be a Company or Local Authority a limited right of participation is given under S. 50(2) of the Act but such right will not make that person a party so as to demand a reference or claim a right to appeal, with or without leave.

6. In Municipal Corporation of Patna v. Jogihdranarayan Rajkut Mitra and Caspers, JJ. observed:

“A Company or corporation for whose benefit any land may be acquired by the Collector is not a necessary party in the proceeding and there can be no doubt that no proceeding can properly go on in the absence of the Secretary of State for India in Council. Under S. 50 of the Act, a company or a local authority for whose benefit the acquisition is made may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation but that is in the nature of the addition of a party simply for the purpose of watching the proceedings or assisting the Secretary of State. Such a company or local authority has not the power to ask for a reference under Sec. 18 of the Act: neither does the Act give it the right of appeal.”

7. In Nagapur Corporation v. Narendarakumar(2), Kotwal, J., observed;

“The only parties who may be said to be interested in the payment of compensation are the Government which alone can legally acquire the land, and of course the owner whose land is being acquired. Sec. 50(2), in my opinion, cannot be construed to enlarge the right of the local authority or corporation beyond the right expressly mentioned therein namely, to appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the compensation. The local authority or corporation do not by virtue of that right become parties to the acquisition proceedings.”

8. In C.R.P No. 1335[3] Rajamannar, C.J held that the right given under Sec. 50(2) to a local authority or a company for whose benefit the land was acquired to appear and adduce evidence did not extend to participation in the arguments in the reference. In Gowthamlal v. Land Acquisition Officer(4), Shaw and Shelat, JJ. reviewed the provisions of the Act and observed:

“We think that a local authority or company as the case may be has no status of a party as such for it has no right to demand a reference and against whom no award having the force of a decree can be passed. In other words, even if it is on record by reason of its being given a right to appear and adduce evidence in regard to the compensation, no order either for payment or for costs can be passed against it by the Court, Nor it has been given even a right of appeal against the award of the Court.”

9. Later, the learned Judges observed:

“It also follows that it has no right to file any appeal against the Judgment of the Court. It would thus appear that having regard to the definition of the expression “persons interested” in Sec. 3(b) and taking into account the scheme of the Act as a whole, and though the funds for acquisition of the land were to be paid by them, they cannot be said to be persons interested as to claim any right to have a reference made or to have any right of appeal filed against any such award-passed by the Court. They are not recognised under the Act as parties to the proceedings.”

10. Finally, in M.V.M.M Trust v. C. Varadarajulu]1 the question arose whether the person for whose benefit the land was acquired could claim to be impleaded as a party to an appeal filed by the claimants againts the award of the Court. After referring to the provisions of the Act and the case law on the subject my brothers Kondaiah and Sriramulu, JJ., had no hesitation in holding that the person for whose benefit the land was acquired was not a necessary or proper party. Referring to the special right given to a local authority or company for whose benefit the land was acquired, the learned Judges have observed:

“In our judgment, the local authority or company will only be a watching party in a proceeding before the Collector or the court of original jurisdiction. It can only appear and adduce evidence to determine the quantum of compensation. In other words, it can independently lead evidence, oral and documentary, and also cross examine the witnesses examined on behalf of the claimants as well as the Land Acquisition Officer in determining the quantum of compensation. However, it has no right to argue either by itself or through a counsel in such proceedings as the right to argue would accrue only to a party entitled to be on record as a necessary or proper party. Further the right to appeal against a decision of the Collector or the Court of original jurisdiction would accrue only to a party, be it necessary or proper, to such proceedings but not to others.”

11. These authorities fully support our view that the person for whose benefit the land is acquired has no place in the lis between the Government and the person whose land is acquired and is neither a necessary nor a proper party to the proceedings in Court. Even so, it was argued by Sri Babulu Reddy that the appellant was entitled to the discretionary leave to appeal as a person affected by the award. He argued that the appellant was directly affected by the award of the Court as the appellant would have to pay the cost of the acquisition to the Government. He relied on the of cited observations of Lindley L.J, in Securities Co. Ltd. In Re] to which we shall presently refer.

12. We do not agree with Sri Babulu Reddy that the appellant can be said to he directly affected by the Judgment of a Court unless some right or liability of his is declared by the Court. In the present case, the award did not declare any right or liability of the appellant. All that it declared was the amount of compensation payable by the Government to the claimant. The appellant may be ??? affected because of some arrangement between the appellant and the Government. For all that the persons whose lands ??? case, the arrangement may be that the Government should give the land of cost or at a nominal price or at a concessional price or on payment of the full cost of acquisition. The persons whose lands are acquired have no concern with the arrangement. The person for whose ??? the land is acquired cannot be said to be directly affected by the award between the Government and the persons whose lands are acquired.

13. We may now consider the question when a person who is not a party to an action may obtain leave to appeal. The English practice is ??? up in Halsbury's Laws of England (Simond's Edition Vol. 30 page 461) thus:

“Any of the parties to an action or matter or any persons served with notice of the Judgment or order may appeal (by leave, where leave is necessary). A person who is not a party and who has not been served with such notice, cannot appeal without leave, but a person who might properly have been a party may obtain leave to appeal”

14. In Seton on ‘Judgments and Orders’ (7th Edition Vol. 1 page 824) the position is stated as fallows:

“Where the appellant is not a party to the record he can only appeal by leave to be obtained on motion ‘exparte’ from the Court of Appeal….. leave to appeal will not be given to a person not a party unless his interest is such that he might have been a party.”

15. In the Annual Practice for 1965, it is stated at page 1658:

“Any party to the action may appeal and also any person served with notice of the judgment or order. But in addition in accordance with old chancery practice, any person may appeal by leave (obtained on exparte motion to the Court of Appeal) if he could by possibility have been made a party to the action by service. (per Jessel Mr. In Crawcour v. Salter)2.

16. In Re Youngs Doggest v. Revolt] a residuary legatee under a will sought to appeal from a decree made against the executor at the suit of a creditor. The Court gave leave, quantum valeat, that the question might be fully argued. On the question being fully argued, the Court of appeal held that the appeal was contrary to the practice of the Court and could not be allowed. The Court of appeal held that though the appellant was interested in the estate, it was on the executor that the law threw the duty of protecting the estate from the claims of creditors, and it would be wrong to allow the residuary legatee to intervene. It was as pointed out by Cotton L.J, agreed that the case was quite different from the case where one of several cestiusquetrust was suing a trustee, or where some persons were suing on behalf of a class. In such cases all the others could be made parties to the action as they stood on the same line as the parties who were suing, and if they considered the judgment erroneous they could on application to the Court of appeal obtatin leave to appeal from it. But in a case where the executor was the only person who could properly be made a party to the action there was no power to give a person ??? could not be made a party to the action leave to appeal against the judgment. This case, therefore, is an authority for the proposition that leave to appeal cannot be granted to a person, merely because of his interest, if he is not a proper party to the action.

17. In In re Securities Insurance Co.,] certain creditors who had failed to appear at a meeting of creditors of a company in liquidation held by the direction of the Court to consider a scheme and who had failed to appear before the Judge when the scheme was taken up for confirmitation were denied leave to appeal from the judgment confirming the scheme on the ground that they were not parties to the proceedings. Lindley L.J, observed.

“I understand the practice to be perfectly well settled that a person who is a party can appeal without any leave and that a person who without being a party is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it, or is prejudicially affected by it cannot appeal with out leave. It does not require much to obtain leave. If a person alleging himself to be aggrieved by an order can make out even a prima facie case why he should have leave he will get it, but with out leave he is not entitled to appeal.”

18. Sri Babulu Reddy argued that this case laid down that in order to obtain leave to appeal all that was necessary was to show that the person seeking to file an appeal was prejudicially affected by it. He urged that it was not necessary to show that he could have been a proper party to the proceeding. We do not agree with this submission or Sri Bdbulu Reddy. The observations of Lindley L.J, were made in the context of the ??? table circumstance that the creditors were proper parties to the action and, therefore, were Competent to seek leave to appeal. Such persons who were proper parties and who could therefore seek leave to appeal, Lindley L.J said, had in order to obtain leave, to establish prima facie that they were either bound by the order or aggrieved by it or ??? affected by it. Lindley L.J, did not depart from what he and Cotton L.J, had laid down in Doggett v. Revett. In re Youngs].

19. In Hambrough's Estate in re], the counsel after ??? to In re Securities Insurance Co.]3 and the Annual ??? quoted the following passage from Jessel M.R in Crawcour v. Saiter]4 “The test in such applications as these, is, could or could not the appellant by possibility be made a party to the action by service?” Warrington, J. is ??? have reported that service there meant service of the judgment.

20. In In re B. (as infant),]5 Lord ??? M.R approved the note in the Annual Practice 1957, at page 1244 which said.

“But in addition, in accordance with old ??? any person may appeal by leave (??? ex parte motion to the Court of Appeal) if he could by possibility have been made a party to the action by service”

21. So much about the English practice. In Ponralagu Ammal v. State of Madras,]6 Rajamannar, C.J, and Venkararama Ayyar, J., after referring to the statement of the rule in Halsbury's Laws of England and noting the cases mentioned in the footnote, stated as follows:

“Several instances are referred to in the footnote and the limits of the rule can be gathered from those instances. Leave will not be given where the applicant could not have been a party and application for leave must be made within the time limited for the appeal. The reason for the practice apparently is the principle that a person who could have been made a party and who might have appealed should not afterwards bring an action to declare that the judgment or order was not binding on him.”

22. The learned Judges then proceeded to consider when it would be proper to grant leave to appeal and observed:

“We think it would be improper to grant leave to appeal to every person who may in some remote or intricate way be projudicially affected by a decree or judgment. We think that ordinarily leave to appeal should be to persons who, though not parties to the proceeding would be bound by the decres or judgment in that proceeding and who would be precluded from attacking its correctness in other proceedings”

23. In Pullaiah v. Nagabhushanam,]7 the question arose before the Full Bench whether a person deemed to be party under Order 1 Rule 8 and for the purposes of Section 11, Explanation 6 could be granted leave to appeal in an ??? case. The Full Bench approved what was stated by Rajamannar, C.J, and Venkatrama Ayyar, J. In Potmalagu Ammal's,] case and said.

“What emerges from the above discussion is that if a person is deemed to be a party under Order I Rule 8 C.P.C and for purposes of S. 11 Explanation 6 C.P.C leave to appeal could be granted to him by the appellate Court in an appropriate case, if the decision rendered in those proceeding would adversely affect him. It is not in every case where a person may be remotely or indirectly affected that leave should be granted but it should be granted to persons who though not nominee parties would be bound by the decree or judgment in the proceeding and who could not by reason of Explanation 6 to Sec. 11 C.P.C agitate the same question in separate proceedings.”

24. In Radhabai v. Banka Chiniah], another Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court affirmed what was said by Rajamannar, C.J in Ponnalagu Ammal's] case and by Chandra Reddy, C.J in Pullaiah v. Nagabhushanam]. Referring to the appellants before them the Full Bench said: “They are certainly persons who are adversely affected by the order of the Tahsildar. They would have certainly been proper parties to be brought on record during the pendency of the application before the Tahsildar. In these circumstances, we hold that the order of the Collector granting leave to them to file the appeal is correct”.

25. In Seetha Ramayya v. Kotiah], the Supreme Court said:

“But it is settled by a long course of authorities that a person who has not been made a party to a proceeding may still appeal with leave of the Appellate Court, provided he might have properly been made a party to the proceeding.”

26. The Learned Judges quoted with approval the passage from the judgment of Lindley L.J in In re Securities Co.,] to which we have already made a reference and also noted with approval the decisions in Ponnalagu Ammal v. State of Madras] and Pullaiah v. Nagabhushanam].

27. In Jatan Kanwar v. Golcha Properties,] a landlord who was entitled to notice of a proceeding instituted by the official liquidator for sale of the lease hold rights and structures on a certain premises but who was not given such notice, was held entitled to prefer an appeal with the leave of the Court notwithstanding that the landlord was not a party to the proceeding by reason of the default of the liquidator in not issuing a notice. The Supreme Court held that it was well settled that a person who was not a party to the suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment. The case was a clear case where the landlord was a proper party to the proceeding and notice ought to have been given to him of the original proceeding. Since the landlord was prejudicially affected he was held entitled to file an appeal with the leave of the Court.

28. On a consideration of these authorities, we are of the view that a person who is not a party to a proceeding may obtain leave to appeal if he is prejudially affected by the judgment and if he may have properly been made a party to the proceeding or if he is bound by such proceeding being deemed to be a party to it. In the present case it cannot be said that the Agricultural University may have properly been made a party to the proceeding in the lower Court or be deemed to be a party to it. In fact the University could not, in law, be a party or deemed to be a party to the proceeding, since the scheme of the Land Aquisition Act, as pointed out by us, specifically excludes it from the proceedings. The Agricultural University is, therefore, not entitled to be granted leave to appeal.

29. C.M.P No. 3311/1971 etc. have now been filed at this belated stage to transpose the Special Deputy Collector. The Land Deputy Collector says in his affidavit “I would have myself filed the appeals but for the fact that the University preferred the appeals on the basis of the G.O issued by the Government permiting the institutions, for whose benefit the lands were acquired to prefer appeals. In these circumstances I may be permitted to contest the claim of the contesting respondents in the appeals.” The G.O referred to has not been placed before us but we fail to see how the G.O can authorise what is forbidden by the law. Neither the University nor the Land Aquisition Officer states that their legal advisers advised them that the University was competent to file the appeals.

30. Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and our inherent Jurisdiction are invoked in aid of applications for transposition. The question of transposition can arise only if there is a regurlarly instituted appeal. Once we deny leave to appeal to the Agricultural University there can be no further question of transposition. There can be no question of giving life to a still-born appeal, by the transposition of parties. We do not think that we can permit a person, who had the right to prefer an appeal but who refrained from doing so, to be transposed as an appellant in an incompetent appeal by a virtual stranger to the action. Sri Babulu Reddy relied on the observations of the Nagpur High Court in R.S Deoji Dharsi & Sons v. Ghishulal. In that case the person for whose ??? the acquisition had been made filed an appeal in the High Court. The High Court held that the appeal should have been filed either by the Collector or by the Provincial Government and not by the Company. It was held that the Company had no locus standi except for the purpose of watching and assisting the Collector. The High Court then observed.

“It would also follow that the Collector or the Provincial Government was necessary party to the appeal. If the company had joined these two as proforma respondents something might have been said on behalf of the company to show that the appeal was competent. It might have been even possible, subject to terms, to allow the Collector or the Provincial Government to be transposed. But it is impossible now to do so because the appeal when filed was filed by the wrong party and did not even name the true party as the respondent. The appeal cannot, therefore, be righted now; nor can we exercise any powers under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C read with S. 107 ibid.”

31. It is clear that the learned judges did not decide any question. The observations were made casually and we are unable to agree with those observations. The transposition of parties whether ordered under Order 1 Rule 10 C.P.C or our inherent jurisdiction can only be to cure technical defects but not fundemental defects. Transposition can be ordered only when it is necessary for a complete adjudication on the questions involved and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. We cannot consider the institution of the appeals by the University instead of by the State Government as a technical defect. Nor can it be said that the denial of the applications for transposition will lead to multiplicity of proceedings. We may also add that though under S. 21(2) of the Limitation Act of 1963 there can be no question of limitation when parties are once transposed, the Court must take into account the question of limitation as a material circumstance in exercising its discretion whether to transpose the parties or not. In the present case, the applications for transposition are so patently belated that we would not be justified in ordering transposition. The order of Madhava Reddy, J. granting leave ‘subject to maintainability’ was made on 21-7-1971 and that should have at once put the parties on the alert as apparently it was the thought even then that there was a doubt about the maintainability of the appeals at the instance of the University. The applications for transposition were filed on 3-4-1974 and even later in some cases. Even if it is permissible for us to transpose the Land Acquisition Officer as an appellant we are not inclind to exercise our discretion and order transposition. In the result, all the appeals fail and are dismissed with half costs in each appeal.

M.S.K

32. Appeals dismissed.