Unilateral Cancellation of Accepted Gift Deeds Is Void: Executive Memos Cannot Override Property Law

Case: Selam Komala Kumar v. The State of Andhra Pradesh
Court: Andhra Pradesh High Court, Amaravati
Judge: Justice Subba Reddy Satti
Case number: Writ Petition No.16935 of 2026
Decision: 1 October 2026

1. Introduction

This judgment concerns the security of ownership acquired through a registered gift or settlement deed and the limits of administrative instructions governing registration. The Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a donor cannot reclaim property already transferred under an accepted, unconditional gift merely by executing and registering a unilateral cancellation deed.

The decision’s principal institutional significance lies in its treatment of two departmental memoranda issued in 2008 and 2016. These instructions supported the registration authorities’ position that restrictions on unilateral cancellation applied only to sale deeds, not gift deeds. Rejecting that distinction, the Court set aside both memoranda as inconsistent with substantive property law, the applicable registration rule, and binding judicial precedent.

The dispute arose between the petitioner, Selam Komala Kumar, and his mother, Selam Padma, the eighth respondent. The official respondents included the State Government, registration authorities, and Nellore Municipal Corporation. Although the immediate controversy was familial, the judgment addresses a broader question: can administrative registration machinery facilitate the destruction of vested property rights without the owner’s consent or lawful adjudication?

2. Background and Questions Before the Court

Material facts

  • On 30 May 2015, the petitioner’s mother executed a registered settlement deed, Document No.3752 of 2015, concerning 288 square yards in Nellore.
  • The petitioner accepted the gift and, after obtaining municipal permission, constructed a building on the property.
  • On 17 September 2022, the mother unilaterally executed a cancellation deed, registered as Document No.13770 of 2022.
  • On 21 January 2026, the Municipal Corporation issued notice proposing removal of the petitioner’s name from its records because of the cancellation. According to the petitioner, this was when he discovered the revocation.
  • The registration authority defended its action by relying on departmental memoranda permitting unilateral cancellation of gift deeds.

The competing positions

The petitioner argued that registration of the unilateral revocation violated Rule 26(i)(k)(i) of the Andhra Pradesh Registration Rules and the protection of property under Article 300-A of the Constitution.

The registering authority maintained that the rule concerned only previously registered conveyances on sale. It also relied on Rule 58, under which examining a document’s substantive validity is not ordinarily part of a registering officer’s duty. The authority further contended that no prescribed time limit prevented registration of a cancellation deed.

Central issues

  1. Could the donor unilaterally revoke the completed gift or settlement?
  2. Could the registering officer lawfully register that revocation?
  3. Could executive memoranda narrow the protection afforded by statutory law and its judicial interpretation?
  4. Could the High Court invalidate those memoranda even though the petition contained no specific prayer seeking that relief?

3. Summary of the Judgment

The High Court allowed the writ petition. Its conclusions were:

  1. A completed gift cannot be revoked at the donor’s mere will. Once the registered gift was accepted, title vested in the petitioner, subject to legally recognised grounds of revocation.
  2. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 governs revocation. A donor alleging fraud, coercion, or another legally sustainable ground must pursue appropriate adjudication rather than use unilateral registration as self-help.
  3. The registration rule’s protection extends to gift and settlement deeds. The Court followed precedents rejecting a narrow interpretation confined to sale deeds.
  4. Administrative instructions cannot override statutes, statutory rules, or binding decisions. The memoranda relied upon by the registration authority were therefore unsustainable.
  5. Article 226 permitted consequential relief against the memoranda. Their invalidation was necessary to address the legal foundation of the impugned registration.

The Court expressly set aside:

  • The revocation settlement deed, Document No.13770 of 2022 dated 17 September 2022;
  • Memo No.G4/4597/2016 dated 6 June 2016; and
  • Memo RC.No.G1/10547/2008 dated 18 July 2008.

No costs were awarded, and pending miscellaneous applications were closed. The operative order did not separately prescribe a timetable or detailed directions for correcting municipal records.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. The evolution from permissive registration to protection against unilateral cancellation

Yanala Malleshwari Vs. Ananthula Sayamma

Citation: 2006 SCC OnLine AP 909 : AIR 2007 AP 57.

The Full Bench majority had held that the registering officer lacked statutory power to refuse registration of a unilateral cancellation deed. Its reasoning included the ability of authorities to recall proceedings affected by fraud and the recognition of cancellation documents in the registration rules.

The present judgment uses this decision as the historical starting point, not as controlling authority supporting the respondents. It explains that the subsequent rule amendment and Supreme Court jurisprudence displaced the permissive approach. The Court characterises the relevant view as impliedly overruled by the later Supreme Court decision discussed below.

Kaitha Narasimha Vs. The State Government of A.P.

Citation: W.P.No.3744 of 2007 dated 13.03.2007.

This Division Bench decision upheld the validity of Rule 26(k), introduced following the Full Bench ruling. It treated the rule as incorporating natural justice into registration procedure and reducing litigation arising from ex parte cancellation.

Its importance is twofold: the restriction on cancellation was within the statutory scheme, and procedural protection for parties to the original transaction was a legitimate component of registration law. The present Court relies on that foundation while emphasising the further requirement of consent or competent legal authority.

Thota Ganga Laxmi and another Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh and others

Citation: 2012 (1) ALD 90 (SC) : (2010) 15 SCC 207.

This is the central Supreme Court authority. It held that a unilateral cancellation deed and its registration were void and non-existent in law. Once title passes through a valid registered sale, the transferor cannot recover ownership merely by registering another document. The transferor must seek cancellation through a civil suit or obtain a lawful transfer back.

The distinction between the parties’ remedies is particularly important. A person seeking to undo an existing transfer may need civil adjudication, while the transferee need not necessarily institute a civil suit merely to neutralise an inherently void unilateral cancellation. That distinction supports writ relief in the present case.

B. Applying the prohibition to gifts and settlements

Ediga Chandrasekar Gowd and another Vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by the Principal Secretary, Revenue (Registration & Stamps) Department

Citation: 2017 SCC OnLine Hyd 543 : (2017) 4 ALD 12 : (2017) 3 ALT 420.

This decision interpreted “conveyance” broadly rather than confining the registration safeguard to sale deeds. The passage reproduced in the judgment discusses gifts, exchanges, and certain agreement-based instruments.

For the present dispute, its decisive contribution was the proposition that the rule’s protective operation extends to gift and settlement transactions. It supplied the interpretive answer to the respondents’ argument that the words “conveyance on sale” necessarily excluded gifts.

Kolli Rajesh Chowdary Vs. State of A.P. and Others

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine AP 18 : AIR 2019 AP 40.

This was a direct precedent concerning unilateral cancellation of a gift settlement deed. It applied the Supreme Court’s reasoning on sale deeds to gifts and treated cancellation without the prescribed safeguards as void.

Its factual and legal proximity strengthened the conclusion that the registration authority could not distinguish gifts from sales merely by invoking departmental practice.

Jorigala Bangaram and Others Vs. Prl. Secy., Rev. Dept. and Others

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine AP 5759.

This decision emphasised that affected owners must receive an opportunity to respond before cancellation deprives them of property rights. Even where cancellation implements an earlier governmental determination about the land, notice remains important because the affected person may dispute that determination or may not know of it.

The present Court uses this authority to reinforce natural justice and protection against arbitrary deprivation. Its role should not be misunderstood: notice alone does not supply substantive power to revoke an unconditional private gift.

C. Substantive restrictions on revocation of gifts

J. Radha Krishna Vs. Pagadala Bharathi and Another

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1447.

The Court relied on this Supreme Court decision for its endorsement of reasoning that a settlor cannot revoke a settlement at will. The reproduced discussion also distinguishes an immediately operative settlement from a testamentary disposition.

Its significance is substantive: the objection to unilateral cancellation does not depend solely on registration procedure. It also arises from the nature of the property interest already created.

M. Venkatasubbaiah Vs. M. Subbamma and others

Citation: 1955 SCC OnLine AP 202 : AIR 1956 AP 195.

This authority appears through the discussion endorsed in J. Radha Krishna Vs. Pagadala Bharathi and Another. It explains that an undertaking to maintain the donor does not automatically create a power of revocation. Without a legally effective agreement satisfying Section 126, non-maintenance cannot simply be treated as an event defeating the gift.

The cited reasoning also distinguishes revocation from other remedies, such as proceedings to recover maintenance. The present case did not require determination of a maintenance dispute; the authority reinforced the prohibition on revocation at the donor’s pleasure.

Namburi Basava Subrahmanyam v. Alapati Hymavathi

This decision is mentioned within the passage reproduced from J. Radha Krishna Vs. Pagadala Bharathi and Another. It concerned a document construed as a settlement creating a vested remainder, rather than a will, and the inability subsequently to defeat that settlement by bequeathing the same property elsewhere.

Its supporting principle is that an existing proprietary interest cannot be treated as though it were merely a revocable testamentary expectation. No separate citation for this case is supplied in the judgment.

D. Executive instructions cannot displace statutory law

R. Ranjith Singh v. State of T.N.

Citation: (2025)11 SCC 73.

This Supreme Court decision supplied the administrative-law rule that executive instructions may supplement or clarify statutory rules but cannot supplant them. Although the quoted discussion arose in service jurisprudence, the present Court applied its general principle to registration administration.

That principle directly supported invalidation of the memoranda: administrative convenience could not legitimise a transaction prohibited by substantive property law and the governing rule as judicially interpreted.

State of M.P. v. G.S. Dall & Flour Mills

Citation appearing within the quotation: 1992 Supp (1) SCC 150.

Quoted through R. Ranjith Singh v. State of T.N., this authority establishes that instructions may operate in areas not covered by legislation, but cannot contradict statutory provisions or diminish their effect.

Jaiveer Singh v. State of Uttarakhand

Citation appearing within the quotation: (2024) 15 SCC 227 : 2023 INSC 1024.

Also quoted through R. Ranjith Singh v. State of T.N., this decision distinguishes permissible gap-filling from impermissible amendment of statutory rules by office memorandum. Together, these authorities explain why the memoranda were not merely unpersuasive: they exceeded the lawful function of executive instructions.

E. The High Court’s power to grant effective relief

S. Nagaraj Vs. State of Karnataka

Citation: 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595.

Dwarka Nath Vs. ITO

Citation: AIR 1966 SC 81.

Union of India Vs. Bali Ram

Citation as supplied: 2026 SC OnLine SC 1319.

The judgment invokes these three authorities together to support the breadth and equitable character of Article 226. It does not separately analyse their facts. Their stated influence is to justify effective relief despite the absence of a specific prayer challenging the memoranda.

The Court regarded the memoranda as inseparable from the registration authority’s defence. Leaving them untouched would preserve the administrative basis for the illegality being corrected. This is an exceptional, case-connected exercise of writ jurisdiction, not a general declaration that pleadings and procedural fairness are irrelevant.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Registration completes a transfer; it does not reserve a power to take it back

The Court read Sections 123 and 126 of the Transfer of Property Act together. Section 123 prescribes the registered and attested instrument required for a gift of immovable property. Acceptance completes the gift in the circumstances considered here. The petitioner’s construction after municipal approval supported the finding that the gift had been accepted and implemented.

The essential consequence was divestment: the mother no longer retained ownership merely because she had originally owned the property. A later cancellation document could not itself recreate the title she had transferred.

B. Section 126 permits limited revocation, not unilateral reconsideration

The judgment recognises that the prohibition is not an assertion that every gift is irrevocable in every circumstance. Section 126 permits revocation on an agreed specified event independent of the donor’s mere will, and on recognised grounds analogous to rescission of a contract, subject to the statutory exclusion concerning want or failure of consideration.

The deed before the Court was treated as unconditional. There was no established basis allowing the mother to terminate it at will. Allegations such as fraud or coercion would require appropriate adjudication; registration of a cancellation deed could not substitute for proof of those allegations.

C. The registration rule was interpreted purposively

The respondents’ strongest textual argument was that Rule 26(i)(k)(i) referred to conveyances “on sale.” The Court rejected a narrow reading by following existing decisions interpreting “conveyance” more broadly.

The underlying reasoning was that the safeguard protects completed transfers against unilateral destruction. Restricting it to purchasers while excluding recipients of registered gifts would undermine that protective purpose and conflict with Section 126.

This is an application and consolidation of an existing judicial interpretation, rather than a wholly new rule invented in this case.

D. Limited registration functions do not authorise prohibited registration

The reliance on Rule 58 confused two different propositions. A registering officer is not a civil court and ordinarily cannot decide contested questions of title or determine whether fraud justifies rescission. But that limited adjudicatory role does not require the officer to register an instrument that governing law prohibits.

The officer’s inability to adjudicate a donor’s grievance is a reason to require competent adjudication, not a reason to permit unilateral dispossession through registration.

Similarly, the absence of a prescribed registration time limit could not cure the absence of legal authority to revoke. The seven-year interval formed part of the factual setting; delay was not the controlling legal defect.

E. The memoranda failed because they contradicted superior law

The 2008 memorandum confined the rule to sale conveyances. The 2016 memorandum expressly stated that there was no bar to registering a donor’s unilateral revocation of a gift. The Court held that this administrative position conflicted with both the substantive restrictions on revocation and the rule’s binding judicial interpretation.

The resulting hierarchy is clear: executive memoranda must yield to legislation, statutory rules, and binding judicial decisions. An internal instruction cannot confer a power that the legal framework withholds.

F. Natural justice supported, but did not replace, substantive entitlement

The absence of notice reinforced the arbitrariness of the process. Nevertheless, the judgment should not be read as permitting unilateral cancellation whenever the donee receives a hearing. For the completed unconditional gift at issue, consent or legally competent authority remained essential.

Article 300-A was pleaded, and protection against arbitrary deprivation informed the reasoning. The judgment did not separately develop an independent constitutional test or award constitutional compensation.

G. Reading the judgment’s limits carefully

The Court reproduced a 2026 substitution of the registration rule, including a proviso concerning documents executed by competent judicial or statutory authorities. The judgment should therefore not be understood as eliminating every legally authorised route to cancellation.

The challenged registration occurred in 2022. The Court did not expressly hold that the 2026 amendment operated retrospectively; its conclusion was independently supported by Section 126 and earlier precedents. Moreover, although the judgment describes the 2026 amendment as adding “mutual consent,” the earlier rule reproduced in the supplied text already contains those words. No substantial conclusion should depend on that asserted textual novelty.

There is also an apparent drafting inconsistency in paragraph 32: it initially says the gift was not acted upon, then immediately states that it was acted upon and followed by construction. Read with the factual findings and outcome, the reasoning clearly proceeds on an accepted and implemented gift.

6. Likely Impact

Greater security for donees

The judgment strengthens confidence that an accepted registered gift cannot be undone through unilateral paperwork. This is particularly important where donees have built on, occupied, or otherwise dealt with the property in reliance on the transfer.

Clearer obligations for registration authorities

Registration officers cannot continue to rely on the two memoranda set aside by the Court to justify unilateral cancellation. Departmental practice must conform to statutory law and the relevant judicial interpretation.

Separation of civil remedies from administrative shortcuts

Donors with genuine grounds to challenge a gift must pursue the legally appropriate forum. Conversely, an affected donee may seek writ relief against a registration that is inherently unauthorised, without automatically being relegated to a civil suit merely because property is involved.

Consequences for municipal administration

The dispute shows how registration of an invalid instrument can trigger downstream changes to municipal records. Setting aside the cancellation removes the foundation identified for the proposed alteration here, although the Court did not issue detailed consequential municipal directions.

Limits on wider application

The reasoning may influence disputes concerning other instruments, especially because the 2008 memorandum addressed several transaction types. However, the case directly decides the unilateral cancellation of a completed gift or settlement. The legal incidents of every agreement, mortgage, partition, release, or statutory cancellation remain questions requiring their own analysis.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Donor and donee
The donor gives the property; the donee receives it.
Vested title
An existing legal ownership interest, not merely a hope of receiving property later.
Unilateral cancellation
An attempt by one party alone to undo an earlier transaction without the other party’s agreement or sufficient legal authority.
Void ab initio and non-est
Legally invalid from the outset and treated as having no legal existence for the purpose in question.
Rescission
Setting aside a transaction on recognised legal grounds, such as fraud or coercion—not simply because one party regrets it.
Natural justice
Procedural fairness, including a meaningful opportunity to respond before adverse action affects one’s rights.
Supplementing versus supplanting rules
Instructions may fill permissible administrative gaps; they cannot replace or contradict binding rules.
Vested remainder
An existing right to enjoy property in the future, commonly after another person’s lifetime interest ends.
Article 226 jurisdiction
The High Court’s constitutional power to review unlawful public action and grant appropriate writ relief.

8. Conclusion

The judgment reaffirms that a completed gift is a transfer of ownership, not a continuing permission revocable at the donor’s pleasure. Neither unilateral registration nor an executive memorandum can substitute for consent, a valid statutory basis, or competent adjudication.

Its distinctive contribution is the express invalidation of the departmental memoranda that enabled the contrary practice. By combining substantive property law, registration safeguards, and effective writ relief, the Court protects vested ownership against administrative shortcuts while preserving lawful routes for challenging genuinely invalid gifts.