Review Is Not an Appeal: No Reopening of Suspension Challenges Rendered Infructuous by Removal
Case: M.M. DHONCHAK, v. UNION OF INDIA
Court: Delhi High Court
Citation: 2026 DHC 9257-DB
Decision: 16 October 2026
Proceeding: Review Petition 469/2026 in LPA 703/2025
Bench: Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Tejas Karia
Judgment authored by: Justice Tejas Karia
1. Introduction
The Delhi High Court’s decision concerns the boundary between correcting an obvious judicial error and reopening a concluded dispute. Dismissing a review petition filed by a former Presiding Officer of the Debts Recovery Tribunal-II, Chandigarh, the Division Bench reaffirmed that review is not an opportunity to secure a second decision on the merits.
The judgment is particularly significant for its treatment of three connected questions: whether challenges to suspension survive a subsequent removal order; whether a claim for enhanced subsistence allowance remains independently actionable when no specific monetary relief was sought; and whether an alleged failure to discuss every submission amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record.
The decision principally reaffirms established review principles. Its distinctive contribution lies in applying those principles to the interaction between interim suspension, completed disciplinary proceedings, the precise reliefs pleaded, and a separate challenge to removal.
2. Background and Procedural History
M.M. Dhonchak, a retired judicial officer, was appointed Presiding Officer of the DRT on 20 February 2022. Following complaints from the DRT Bar Association, Chandigarh, alleging misbehaviour towards members of the Bar and excessively long adjournments, he was suspended on 13 February 2024. A chargesheet followed on 26 February 2024.
In W.P.(C) 5143/2024, he challenged the suspension, the chargesheet, and the appointment of the Inquiry Officer. When his suspension was extended by an order dated 13 May 2024, he filed W.P.(C) 8478/2024. Among his objections was that his subsistence allowance had remained at 50% of his last drawn pay rather than being enhanced.
Principal procedural developments
| Date |
Development |
| 13 May 2024 |
Suspension extended until 9 November 2024; this extension became the subject of W.P.(C) 8478/2024. |
| 5 November 2024 and 6 May 2025 |
Further orders extended suspension until 8 May 2025 and 4 November 2025 respectively. |
| 3 June 2025 |
The Inquiry Officer submitted the inquiry report. |
| 26 September 2025 |
The Single Judge dismissed W.P.(C) 5143/2024 and W.P.(C) 8478/2024 by a common judgment. |
| 18 November 2025 |
The appellant was removed from service. |
| 26 November 2025 |
An interlocutory order recorded the appellant’s position concerning the relationship between the inquiry and removal; early hearing was declined. |
| 17 August 2026 |
The Division Bench dismissed LPA 703/2025 against the Single Judge’s judgment. |
| 16 October 2026 |
The present review petition was dismissed. |
A separate challenge to the suspension extension dated 5 November 2024 had also failed before the Single Judge and in appeal. The associated special leave petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on 29 August 2025. The present judgment records that history without treating the special leave dismissal as a substantive determination of the issues raised in review.
The removal order was separately challenged before the Punjab and Haryana High Court in CWP 6521/2026. That pending proceeding was central to the Delhi High Court’s treatment of the reliefs still available in the earlier suspension litigation.
3. Questions Raised in Review
The appellant argued that the appellate judgment contained apparent errors because it had:
- Failed to consider material pleadings and written submissions;
- Not decided his asserted entitlement to enhancement of subsistence allowance from 50% to 75% after 90 days;
- Incorrectly treated the suspension and extension challenges as infructuous following removal;
- Overlooked the effect of the order dated 26 November 2025; and
- Failed to give adequate reasons concerning the chargesheet, including allegations of forgery, dishonesty, and mala fides.
His position was that the suspension orders had legal consequences distinct from removal and that delay in the inquiry was not attributable to him. He also maintained that invalidation of the inquiry would necessarily affect the removal order.
4. Summary of the Judgment
The Division Bench dismissed the review petition, with no order as to costs. Its principal conclusions were:
- No apparent error was established: The petition sought reconsideration of issues already decided rather than correction of a self-evident defect.
- The appellate judgment contained sufficient reasons: It had addressed the determinative issues and affirmed the Single Judge’s reasoning. It did not have to answer every submission concerning challenges already held infructuous.
- No independent enhancement relief had been sought: In W.P.(C) 8478/2024, the prayers were for setting aside the extension order and reinstatement, not a specific direction enhancing subsistence allowance.
- The suspension challenges no longer served the reliefs claimed: Disciplinary proceedings had culminated in removal, which was separately under challenge.
- The earlier procedural order decided no contrary issue: The order dated 26 November 2025 recorded the appellant’s position but did not accept it.
- The chargesheet objections could not be reheard: The earlier decisions had found no jurisdictional defect and had rejected the allegation of mala fides. Review could not reopen those findings without an apparent error.
5. Precedents Cited and Their Role
A distinction is necessary between the authorities relied upon by the appellant and the authority expressly used by the Court in its reasoning. The judgment lists numerous cases supporting the appellant’s arguments about reasons, fairness, and discretion, but does not separately analyse or adopt each of them. By contrast, it expressly invokes Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal to explain the interim character of suspension.
5.1 Authorities on reasoned decisions
- Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P., (1970) 1 SCC 764
-
The appellant cited this authority to support the obligation to give reasons. Its relevance was to the contention that material objections could not simply be left unanswered. The Court did not reject that obligation; it held that the earlier judgment had already supplied reasons for the conclusions that controlled the appeal.
- Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Woolcombers Workers Union, (1974) 3 SCC 318
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This authority supported the importance of reasons in demonstrating a rational decision-making process and enabling judicial scrutiny. The review decision distinguishes that requirement from an obligation to discuss every argument after a threshold conclusion has rendered the underlying challenge infructuous.
- Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor, (1973) 2 SCC 836
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This case is associated with the principle that reasons connect the material considered with the conclusions reached. The appellant invoked it against the alleged inadequacy of the appellate judgment. The Bench’s answer was that the necessary reasoning was already present, including its treatment of subsequent removal and its affirmation of the Single Judge’s findings.
- Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuran v. State of Kerala, (1979) 4 SCC 782
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The appellant placed this case within the authorities supporting reasoned adjudication. The present judgment does not discuss its particular facts or extract a separate rule from it. Its role was therefore supportive rather than independently determinative.
- Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. Sales Tax Officer, Rourkela-I Circle, (2008) 9 SCC 407
-
This authority reinforced the argument that decisions must disclose an intelligible basis. The Court considered that requirement satisfied: disagreement with the adequacy or correctness of the stated reasons was, in the circumstances, a merits challenge rather than an apparent error warranting review.
- Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405
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The appellant invoked the rule that an order must stand on the reasons stated in it, rather than be repaired through later explanations. The Court did not identify any impermissible supplementation of reasons. It relied instead on the reasoning already contained in the appellate judgment and the findings it had affirmed.
5.2 Authorities on discretion and procedural fairness
- Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] 1 All ER 694
-
This authority concerns the lawful exercise of statutory discretion consistently with the purpose for which it is conferred. It supported the appellant’s broader challenge to the rationality of official action. The review court did not reopen that underlying administrative-law dispute because the requirements for review had not been met.
- Sharp v. Wakefield, [1891] AC 173
-
The case supports the understanding that legal discretion must be exercised according to law and reason, not arbitrary preference. Its invocation did not resolve the procedural question before the Bench: whether the earlier appellate judgment disclosed an obvious, reviewable error.
- Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, [1971] 1 All ER 1148
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This authority was cited in support of administrative fairness and the importance of reasons. The judgment does not separately apply its factual setting. The Bench’s response was that the proceedings had already received a reasoned determination and could not be reopened merely by renewing fairness-based objections.
- Neelima Misra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, (1990) 2 SCC 746
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The appellant relied on this case within the group of authorities concerning discretion, natural justice, and reasons. The judgment does not identify a distinct proposition from it as controlling. It should therefore not be read as establishing, through this citation, a universal requirement governing every administrative decision.
- Satish Jaggi v. State Of Chhattisgarh, (2007) 3 SCC 62
-
This case was likewise invoked in support of the appellant’s general submissions on lawful decision-making. The Bench neither discusses its facts nor derives an independent rule from it. Its citation does not displace the separate requirement to establish a permissible ground of review.
5.3 Authority expressly supporting the Court’s reasoning
- Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2013) 16 SCC 147
-
The Court expressly relied on this decision for the proposition that suspension pending inquiry is an interim measure intended to facilitate unhindered disciplinary proceedings. That characterisation supported its conclusion that, once the inquiry culminated in removal, the suspension order ceased to operate independently in the litigation before it.
The authority supplied the conceptual link between the temporary measure and the completed proceedings. It was not used to determine whether the appellant had a substantive entitlement to any particular rate of subsistence allowance.
Overall significance: The appellant’s authorities addressed important standards of lawful and reasoned decision-making. The petition nevertheless failed because invoking those standards did not demonstrate that the earlier judgment contained a self-evident error.
6. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
6.1 Review corrects apparent error; it does not provide a second appeal
The Court approached the petition through Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It identified discovery of new and important material, unavailable despite due diligence, and an error apparent on the face of the record as recognised grounds for review.
The decisive distinction was between an obvious defect and an arguably incorrect conclusion. An apparent error must be discernible without elaborate reasoning. A request to reconsider documentary evidence, reassess the survival of relief, or prefer another interpretation ordinarily belongs to appellate scrutiny rather than review.
Here, the appellant’s objections required renewed examination of matters already adjudicated. Describing them as “errors apparent” did not alter their substance.
6.2 Reasons must address the decisive issues, not necessarily every submission
The Court rejected the equation of non-reference with non-consideration. It found that the appellate judgment had addressed the issues requiring determination, supplied its own reasons, and affirmed those of the Single Judge.
Once the suspension challenges were held infructuous, the Court considered it unnecessary to answer every submission directed at their original validity. This reasoning reflects the distinction between explaining a dispositive conclusion and exhaustively reproducing the parties’ arguments.
The holding should not be overstated. It does not excuse silence on a genuinely decisive issue. It establishes that, on this record, the asserted omissions did not reveal an apparent error because the judgment had explained why the relevant reliefs no longer survived.
6.3 Removal changed the utility of the suspension litigation
The Court treated suspension as an interim arrangement connected to an ongoing disciplinary inquiry. Once that inquiry culminated in removal, the suspension order no longer independently governed the appellant’s service position.
The reliefs sought were important. Setting aside the suspension extension and directing reinstatement would not resolve the legal effect of a subsisting removal order, particularly when that order was under challenge elsewhere. The Court therefore assessed the continued utility of the earlier proceedings in light of subsequent events.
This is a context-specific conclusion. The judgment should not be read as declaring that removal automatically extinguishes every possible legal consequence of an earlier suspension. Its reasoning was tied to the reliefs pleaded and the absence of a separately framed claim for monetary relief.
6.4 The subsistence-allowance issue turned on the prayers, not entitlement
The appellant asserted that his allowance should have increased from 50% to 75% after 90 days because he was not responsible for delay. The Court did not adjudicate that substantive assertion.
Instead, it examined W.P.(C) 8478/2024 and found that the appellant had sought only the setting aside of the extension order and reinstatement. There was no specific prayer for enhancement of subsistence allowance. The allowance argument was consequently treated as incidental to a challenge that had become infructuous.
This distinction is crucial: the judgment does not establish either an automatic entitlement to 75% allowance or a general prohibition on claiming suspension-period arrears after removal. Neither proposition was decided. The practical lesson concerns the independent framing of financial relief.
6.5 Recording a litigant’s position is not accepting it
The appellant relied on the order dated 26 November 2025, which recorded his position that invalidation of the inquiry would automatically nullify removal. The Court distinguished a recital of that submission from an adjudication accepting it.
The earlier order had neither held that the suspension challenges survived nor endorsed the asserted automatic consequence. Indeed, early hearing had been declined because removal had already occurred. There was therefore no inconsistency requiring correction in review.
6.6 The chargesheet objections had already been adjudicated
The Court reaffirmed that the truth of disciplinary charges ordinarily cannot be examined in writ proceedings under Article 226. The earlier decisions had found no jurisdictional defect in the chargesheet, and the Single Judge had rejected the allegation of mala fides.
The review court did not make fresh factual findings on the alleged misconduct or the appellant’s allegations of forgery and dishonesty. It held that the relevant objections had already been addressed and could not be reopened without an apparent error.
6.7 The removal challenge remained for the pending proceeding
The Court expressly left grounds concerning the removal order, including reservations about the inquiry report, for consideration in CWP 6521/2026 before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.
Dismissal of review should therefore not be equated with a substantive endorsement of the removal order. The judgment identifies the proceeding in which that order and the relevant objections are to be examined.
7. Potential Impact
7.1 Tighter separation between review and appeal
The decision reinforces the finality of reasoned adjudication. Future review applicants will need to identify a specific, self-evident defect rather than restate unsuccessful arguments as failures of consideration.
7.2 Greater importance of independently pleaded financial relief
Litigants challenging suspension should distinguish relief against the suspension itself from claims for allowance enhancement or arrears. Where financial consequences may outlast an interim order, an express monetary prayer can be important to showing that a live controversy remains.
7.3 Attention to subsequent events
The judgment illustrates how completion of disciplinary proceedings can change the practical relevance of pending challenges to interim measures. Parties must address the effect of later orders on both the legal foundation and utility of their original prayers.
7.4 Protection of reasoned adjudication without requiring exhaustive judgments
The decision supports focused judgments that address controlling issues without discussing every argument. Its limit remains equally important: the Court found that reasons existed; it did not dispense with the obligation to provide them.
7.5 Clear limits on the precedent
The judgment does not determine the merits of the removal challenge, prescribe the applicable subsistence-allowance rate, or decide whether a properly pleaded independent monetary claim would survive removal. Those questions remain outside its actual holding.
8. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Error apparent on the face of the record
- An obvious mistake that can be identified without conducting a lengthy fresh analysis of the case.
- Review versus appeal
- An appeal challenges the correctness of a decision within the applicable appellate framework. Review is a narrower process for correcting recognised defects in the court’s own decision.
- Infructuous proceedings
- Proceedings in which later events mean that the relief originally requested no longer serves a practical legal purpose.
- Subsistence allowance
- A payment supporting a person during suspension. The applicable rules determine its amount and conditions; this judgment did not decide those substantive conditions.
- Incidental claim
- A contention treated as part of another challenge rather than as an independently framed request for relief.
- Jurisdictional defect
- A defect concerning legal authority to act, as distinct from a disagreement about whether allegations are factually true.
- Mala fides
- Bad faith or use of power for an improper purpose. Alleging bad faith does not itself establish it.
- Recording a submission
- Noting what a party has argued. It is different from the court accepting that argument or deciding the issue.
9. Conclusion
M.M. Dhonchak reinforces that review cannot become an appeal in disguise. The Court found that the appellant sought to reopen reasoned conclusions rather than correct an apparent error.
The judgment’s practical significance lies in its treatment of relief: removal rendered the pleaded suspension challenges infructuous, while the allowance contention did not survive independently because no specific enhancement relief had been sought. At the same time, the Court preserved the distinction between dismissing review and deciding the legality of removal, which remained before the Punjab and Haryana High Court.