Removal-of-Difficulties Orders Cannot Bypass the Act’s Fee-Fixation Scheme: Interim Abeyance of Delhi’s 2026 School Fee Timelines

1) Introduction

This Delhi High Court decision (Devendra Kumar Upadhyaya, CJ and Tejas Karia, J) arose from a batch of writ petitions filed by associations of unaided recognized private schools and individual school managements (including Ryan International School and others) against the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi and the Government of NCT of Delhi/Directorate of Education.

The petitions challenge the Notification-cum-order dated 01.02.2026 titled the Delhi School Education (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2026, issued under Section 21 of the Delhi School Education (Transparency in Fixation and Regulation of Fees) Act, 2025 (“Act”) read with the Rules, 2025. The Notification attempted a one-time acceleration of statutory timelines for constituting School Level Fee Regulation Committees (SLFRC) and submitting/procuring approval of fee proposals for the three-year block commencing Academic Year 2026–27.

The Court was not finally deciding the vires of the Act/Rules/Notification; it decided only the interim applications seeking stay of the Notification’s operation pending final hearing (fixed to commence on 12.03.2026).

Key issues

  • Whether the “removal of difficulties” power can validly impose timelines that appear inconsistent with, or impracticable under, the Act and Rules.
  • Whether Section 3 of the Act (“Prohibition of collection of excess fee”) creates an urgency such that fees must be approved before 01.04.2026.
  • Whether, pending such approval, schools can lawfully collect fees—and if so, at what level.
  • Balance of convenience and public interest in granting or refusing interim relief.

2) Summary of the Judgment

The Court held prima facie that the accelerated timelines in the Notification were unworkable and did not account for the statutory contingency where the SLFRC fails to reach a unanimous agreement (Section 5(4))—triggering reference to the District Fee Appellate Committee (Section 5(7)). Because the Notification did not provide a revised timeline for this appellate/reference stage, the Court found it unrealistic to assume fees could be fixed/approved for all schools before 01.04.2026.

Crucially, the Court interpreted Section 3’s “excess fee” prohibition as not a blanket ban on collection of fees; rather, read with Section 5(7), schools may collect the previous academic year’s fee during pendency before the District Fee Appellate Committee.

Accordingly, pending disposal of the writ petitions, the Court directed that the operation and implementation of Clause 3(1) and 3(2) of the Notification shall remain in abeyance. The petitioners were permitted to collect the same fees for Academic Year 2026–27 as collected for the previous academic year, subject to the final outcome and adjustment/refund consequences contemplated by the regime (including Clause 3(6) of the Notification).

3) Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

i) Scope and limits of “removal of difficulties” / “Henry VIII” type clauses

The petitioners relied on Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union Of India, (1975) 3 SCC 765, which recognises that removal-of-difficulties clauses may be a practical necessity, but only to allow minor adaptations and peripheral adjustments to make a statute workable “without touching its substance.” They invoked this to argue that changing mandatory statutory timelines amounts to impermissible executive amendment.

They also cited Lachmi Narain & Ors. v. Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 953, emphasising that where Parliament lays down an “absolute rule of conduct” integral to the scheme, a delegate cannot dilute it through subordinate action.

Further, STATE OF WEST BENGAL v. ANINDYA SUNDAR DAS, (2022) 16 SCC 318 was cited for the proposition that the State cannot misuse “removal of difficulty” provisions to sidestep statutory restrictions or change the scheme of the Act: in the guise of removing difficulties, the State cannot “change the scheme and essential provisions.”

The respondents, while accepting the limited nature of the power, used Madeva Upendra Sinai v. Union Of India, (1975) 3 SCC 765 to justify “rounding off angularities” so that the Act could operate effectively for 2026–27, and relied on Union of India v. Gautam Khaitan, (2019) 10 SCC 108 as an illustration of using a statutory adjustment to remove anomalies and make a one-time window workable. They also referred to Ramakant S. Bhattad & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 1647 to contend that minor adjustments are permissible if the statute’s substance remains intact.

The High Court did not conclusively rule on vires at this interim stage; however, it found on a prima facie basis that the Notification’s timelines were practically incapable of achieving the stated purpose (approved fees by 01.04.2026), especially because the Notification did not accommodate the Act’s own dispute-resolution pathway (SLFRC unanimity failure → District Fee Appellate Committee).

ii) Interpreting statutory purpose through preamble/long title; constitutionality presumptions

The respondents cited In Re: Kerala Education Bill 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956 (purpose/policy deduced from long title and preamble) and Maharao Sahib Shri Bhim Singhji v. Union Of India, (1981) 1 SCC 166 (preamble assisting interpretational doubts). They also invoked Mohd. Hanif Quareshi v. State Of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 and Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, AIR 1960 SC 554 for presumptions favouring constitutionality and legislative wisdom.

The Court did not reject these general principles, but treated the matter as one requiring “careful consideration” at final hearing. For interim relief, the operative question was not the abstract objective (curbing profiteering), but whether the Notification’s mechanism was workable and legally justified as an urgent “difficulty” removal.

iii) Autonomy of schools and permissibility of fee regulation; public interest in interim injunctions

To counter arguments founded on school autonomy, the respondents cited Indian School, Jodhpur & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 10 SCC 517 for the proposition that fee regulation is not per se violative of Article 19(1)(g) and autonomy is not absolute.

For public interest in refusing injunctions, the respondents relied on Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd. v. Hindustan Liver Limited, (1999) 7 SCC 1 and Mahadeo Savlaram Shelke & Ors. v. Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr., (1995) 3 SCC 33.

The Court acknowledged that parents/students are not to be prejudiced; however, it found that interim abeyance would not irreparably harm students because any excess collection could be refunded/adjusted depending on the final outcome, and because the Act itself contemplates interim collection at the previous year’s rate during appellate/reference pendency (Section 5(7)).

B. Legal Reasoning

i) The “unworkability” finding and the missing appellate timeline

The Notification’s thesis was urgency: fees must be approved before 01.04.2026 to avoid “unapproved” fees. The Court tested this against the Act’s own design:

  • Section 5(4) requires unanimous approval by SLFRC.
  • If unanimity fails, the matter goes to the District Fee Appellate Committee (Section 5(7)).
  • The Notification did not set a revised schedule for this reference stage.

On that basis, it was “premature to presume” all SLFRCs would achieve unanimity and unrealistic to expect completion of fixation/approval by 01.04.2026 for all schools.

ii) Section 3 is not a ban on fee collection; Section 5(7) provides an interim collection rule

The Court’s core interim holding is an interpretive one: Section 3 prohibits “excess fee” once the fee is fixed/approved under the Act; it does not mean a school cannot collect any fee unless approval is already in hand. The Court anchored this in Section 5(7), which expressly authorises collection of the previous academic year’s fee during pendency before the District Fee Appellate Committee.

This reading substantially undercut the respondents’ urgency argument (that without accelerated timelines, schools could not lawfully charge fees from 01.04.2026).

iii) Interim balance of convenience: practicality, compliance burdens, and reversibility

The Court weighed the asserted compliance burdens and the practical calendar:

  • Non-availability of audited financial statements for FY 2025–26 before 01.04.2026 (relevant to Rule 9).
  • Physical processes for parent selection by draw of lots under Rule 4 amid examinations and school logistics.
  • The reality that the Court itself was hearing interim applications over multiple dates, consuming the very timeframe the Notification attempted to compress.

The Court also treated the financial impact as reversible: if ultimately the Act/Rules prevail, excess fee can be adjusted/refunded; if the petitioners prevail, an imposed fee for three years could cause administrative and financial dislocation. Thus, pending final hearing, it was “expedient” to defer the SLFRC constitution.

iv) What the Court did (and did not) accept from each side

  • Rejected (at least for interim purposes): the claim that Section 3 compels approval before 01.04.2026 on pain of total fee collection prohibition.
  • Accepted: the petitioners’ practical/unworkability objections as supporting interim abeyance.
  • Did not accept: that fixing the fee “for 2026–27 in the same year” was inherently impermissible; the Court noted 2026–27 starts on 01.04.2026 and the exercise would still occur in the “previous academic year” (2025–26).
  • Did not accept: the “new admissions parents excluded” argument; for a three-year block, later-year parents are structurally outside the initial committee formation anyway.
  • Reserved: all deeper vires questions for final hearing.

C. Impact

i) Immediate operational effect

  • Clause 3(1) and 3(2) of the 01.02.2026 Notification are kept in abeyance during pendency.
  • Schools may collect the same fees as the previous academic year for Academic Year 2026–27 until fee is fixed/approved under the Act/Rules, subject to the writ outcome and consequential adjustment/refund obligations.

ii) Doctrinal signal for future “removal of difficulties” exercises

Although interim, the order signals a judicial insistence that a removal-of-difficulties instrument must be tested not only against its stated objective, but also against the statute’s complete procedural architecture. If the delegated measure compresses timelines but ignores a mandatory statutory contingency (here, unanimity failure and referral), courts may treat it as administratively unworkable and not a genuine “difficulty” removal.

iii) Consequences for fee-regulation litigation

The Court’s reading that Section 3 is not an absolute bar, and that Section 5(7) permits collection at the previous year’s level pending decision, may shape arguments in future fee regulation disputes where the State claims urgency to pre-approve fees before a session starts.

4) Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Removal of difficulties” clause (Section 21): A limited power allowing the Executive to issue orders to make a new law workable when unforeseen implementation problems arise—typically for minor adjustments, not to rewrite the Act.
  • Non-obstante clause: A “notwithstanding anything” phrase used to override conflicting provisions. Petitioners argued the Notification’s non-obstante wording effectively overrode the Act/Rules.
  • SLFRC (School Level Fee Regulation Committee): The school-level body under the Act designed to scrutinize and approve a school’s proposed fee structure for a three-year block.
  • Unanimity requirement (Section 5(4)): Approval must be unanimous; failing that, the dispute moves to a higher statutory committee (District Fee Appellate Committee).
  • “Prima facie” view: A tentative view for interim relief, not a final ruling on legality.
  • Balance of convenience / irreparable injury: Interim injunction principles: the Court compares which side will suffer greater harm that cannot later be cured if interim relief is granted/refused.

5) Conclusion

The Delhi High Court, at the interim stage, effectively laid down this practical rule: where a “removal of difficulties” notification attempts to accelerate a statutory fee-approval regime, courts will examine whether it remains workable within the Act’s full design (including dispute/escalation steps) and will not presume that statutory contingencies (like mandatory unanimity) will never arise.

By holding that Section 3 does not amount to a total embargo on fee collection and that Section 5(7) permits interim collection at the previous year’s rate, the Court neutralised the State’s claimed urgency for immediate committee constitution. Pending final adjudication of vires, it placed the Notification’s key operative timelines in abeyance and preserved a status-quo collection rule—aimed at preventing administrative chaos while keeping the statutory objective enforceable through later adjustment/refund.