Prior Approval and Salary Payments Do Not Bar Verification of Madrasah Appointments
Case: TARIKUL MOLLA AND ORS v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL AND ORS.
Court: Calcutta High Court, Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction, Appellate Side
Judge: Justice Bivas Pattanayak
Decision: 7 October 2026
Proceedings: WPA 19888, 19902, 19910, 19914 and 19923 of 2026
1. Introduction
This judgment addresses whether government-approved teaching and non-teaching appointments in West Bengal madrasahs could be subjected to further verification after approximately a decade of service and salary payments. The petitioners argued that their appointments had acquired finality through administrative approval and protection granted by the Supreme Court. The State authorities and the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission maintained that subsequent Supreme Court decisions required compliance with the applicable recruitment conditions to be examined.
The immediate challenge concerned two memoranda, dated 28 and 29 July 2026, issued by the Director of Madrasah Education. These called upon the petitioners to attend a hearing with documents for verification of the validity and legality of their recruitment. They were not orders cancelling appointments or stopping salaries.
The High Court upheld the verification process. Its central conclusion was that prior approval, continued salary payments and the protective language of an earlier Supreme Court judgment did not establish unconditional immunity from scrutiny under the recruitment standards subsequently explained by the Supreme Court.
2. Background and Questions Before the Court
2.1 The statutory controversy
The West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Act, 2008 established a specialised recruitment mechanism for recognised aided non-government madrasahs. Its stated objectives included fair and transparent selection, educational quality and accommodation of the distinctive requirements of madrasah education.
Sections 8, 10, 11 and 12 were challenged on the ground that the statutory arrangement displaced minority institutions’ authority to select their teachers. A Single Judge declared the provisions unconstitutional on 12 March 2014. A Division Bench affirmed that conclusion on 9 December 2015. The Supreme Court stayed the High Court judgment on 14 March 2016 and ultimately upheld the statutory provisions on 6 January 2020.
Appointments made while the High Court’s invalidation operated generated a separate controversy: whether, and subject to what conditions, those appointments remained valid after the Supreme Court restored the statutory recruitment regime.
2.2 The petitioners and their appointments
| Petition |
Institution and posts |
Appointment history recorded in the judgment |
| WPA 19888 of 2026 |
Assistant teachers at Basirhat Aminia Senior Madrasah (Fazil) |
Appointed on 10 March 2016; approved on 28 November 2016. |
| WPA 19902 of 2026 |
Assistant teachers and a Group-D employee at Gimageria Welfare High Madrasah (H.S) |
Appointed in December 2015; approvals issued or extended during 2016. |
| WPA 19910 of 2026 |
Assistant teachers at Contai Shawkatia Junior High Madrasah (English Medium) |
Appointed on 27 January 2016; approved on 15 November 2016 until further orders. |
| WPA 19914 of 2026 |
Assistant teachers at Majna High Madrasah |
Appointments recorded as 27 November 2015; approvals issued or extended during 2016. |
| WPA 19923 of 2026 |
Assistant teachers and a librarian at Contai Rahamania High Madrasah (H.S) |
Joining dates in December 2015 and January 2016; approvals issued or extended during 2016. |
Many approvals operated “until further orders”, and the petitioners stated that their approvals were subject to the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings. They relied on their continued service and receipt of salaries as evidence that the authorities had already verified and accepted their appointments.
A factual qualification: although the parties generally described the relevant recruitment window as 9 December 2015 to 14 March 2016, the judgment records appointments in WPA 19914 of 2026 on 27 November 2015. It does not resolve that discrepancy. The decision therefore should not be read as conclusively determining the temporal eligibility of every petitioner.
2.3 The competing positions
The petitioners invoked administrative finality, res judicata, estoppel, delay and the absence of a statutory review power. They argued that the Supreme Court’s 2020 protection had settled their status and that later proceedings concerning other employees could not reopen their approvals.
The opposing position was that the Supreme Court’s later decisions demonstrated that appointment validity still depended on prescribed qualifications, lawful selection procedures, competent management and genuine vacancies. The challenged memoranda merely commenced that examination.
The Court framed the immediate issue narrowly: was the Director justified in calling the petitioners for verification of their appointment approvals?
3. Summary of the Judgment
The High Court dismissed all five writ petitions. Its principal findings were:
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The Supreme Court’s protective observation in its 2020 decision could not be read independently of subsequent decisions requiring verification of recruitment legality.
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The applicable recruitment notifications supplied standards relevant to these petitioners even though they had not participated in the later Supreme Court proceedings.
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Salary payments and administrative approvals did not, by themselves, conclusively establish lawful recruitment.
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The State’s earlier compliance affidavit had reserved the right to act against appointments of ineligible teachers; it did not establish that every relevant condition had been conclusively examined.
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The memoranda required attendance with documents and did not presently impose adverse service consequences. A challenge at that stage was therefore premature.
No costs were awarded. Connected applications were disposed of, and any interim orders stood vacated. The Court did not itself cancel the petitioners’ appointments or determine that every appointment was unlawful.
4. Analysis of the Precedents Cited
4.1 The three central Supreme Court decisions
Sk Mohd Rafique versus Managing Committee, Contai Rahamania High Madrasah and Others — (2020) 6 SCC 689
This decision supplied both the constitutional background and the petitioners’ principal argument. The Supreme Court upheld Sections 8, 10, 11 and 12 of the 2008 Act, reversing the High Court. It considered the Commission’s expert composition and sensitivity to Islamic culture and theology sufficient to reconcile merit-based recruitment with minority institutional interests.
Paragraph 64 validated the Commission’s nominations and added that appointments made by the madrasahs after disposal of the High Court matters “shall be deemed to be valid for all purposes”. The petitioners treated that language as a complete and final validation of their appointments.
The High Court rejected that isolated reading. It held that the meaning and practical operation of the protection had to be understood through the Supreme Court’s subsequent consideration of appointment legality. The present judgment does not purport to overrule the 2020 decision; it applies that decision as subsequently explained.
Snehasis Giri and Others versus Subhasis Mitra — (2023) 18 SCC 529
This case arose from contempt proceedings alleging non-compliance with directions concerning salaries and service benefits. The Supreme Court accepted that individual appointments required verification before entitlement could be determined. Exercising Article 142 powers, it constituted a committee headed by retired Justice Debi Prasad Dey.
The committee was directed to examine:
- Recognition of the madrasah or its managing committee when the appointment was made;
- Possession of prescribed qualifications, experience and other eligibility conditions;
- Compliance with the recruitment procedures in the relevant notifications;
- Existence of vacancies consistent with the sanctioned staffing pattern;
- Actual performance of work after appointment; and
- Whether appointment documents reflected genuine dates or had been backdated.
This was the decisive link in the High Court’s reasoning: if the 2020 judgment had conclusively validated every appointment without further inquiry, the later verification exercise would have been unnecessary. The Supreme Court’s express insistence on verification therefore undermined the petitioners’ claim of automatic finality.
This decision concerned challenges to the committee’s rejection of appointment claims. The committee had examined slightly fewer than 500 teaching and non-teaching claimants, none of whom had successfully established a valid appointment.
The Supreme Court rejected reliance on paragraph 64 of the 2020 judgment as sufficient, by itself, to establish validity. It explained that the subsequent verification directions governed the controversy and confirmed the necessity of following the applicable recruitment notifications.
It also held that appointments made after 14 March 2016 without its express permission were facially illegal. Its reasoning distinguished a stay from the disappearance of a judgment: the High Court judgment remained in existence but became inoperative, and the recruitment notifications deriving from the earlier judicial position could not independently sustain appointments after the stay.
For the present High Court, this decision demonstrated that recruitment legality remained an examinable question. Although the current petitioners had not been claimants before the committee, the legal requirements governing comparable appointments did not cease to apply to them.
4.2 Premature challenges to notices
The Commission cited this authority for the ordinary rule against entertaining writ challenges to preliminary notices before an adverse decision has been made. The judgment recognises the relevance of exceptional circumstances, particularly a notice issued without jurisdiction. The High Court applied the ordinary rule because the challenged memoranda merely requested participation in verification.
This decision reinforced judicial restraint at the notice stage. Its influence was procedural: the petitioners should not ordinarily prevent the competent authority from examining the relevant documents merely because an adverse outcome might eventually follow.
Abdul Malek versus State of West Bengal & Ors. — 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 4989
The petitioners relied on this Calcutta High Court authority to argue that administrative action producing adverse civil consequences is reviewable and that a jurisdictionally defective notice may be challenged immediately. The Court did not reject those propositions. It found them inapplicable because these memoranda had not yet altered any enforceable service right.
4.3 Application of legal standards to persons outside the earlier litigation
Union of India Divisional Railway Manager, Divisional Office Personnel Branch Southern Railway Tiruchirapalli & one other versus Satish Kumar Rajan & one other — 2016 SCC Online Mad 26537
The Commission relied on this Madras High Court decision to resist the proposition that legal principles apply only to the parties named in the case declaring them. The High Court accepted that the recruitment norms considered by the Supreme Court could govern similarly situated appointees who had not participated in those proceedings.
This authority was invoked for the distinction between judgments operating against particular parties and judgments determining a status with wider effect. The High Court accepted the submission that the Supreme Court’s determination concerning the governing recruitment conditions bound persons claiming validity under those conditions.
This part of the reasoning should be read carefully. The common legal standards could apply beyond the original litigants; it does not follow that the committee’s adverse factual findings against particular claimants automatically proved that the present petitioners were also ineligible.
4.4 Finality, obedience to judgments and constitutional precedent
Suganthi Suresh Kumar versus Jagdeeshan — (2002) 2 SCC 420
The managing committees cited this decision for the binding force of Supreme Court law under Article 141. A High Court cannot disregard a Supreme Court ruling because it believes an argument was overlooked. The Court answered that it was not departing from Supreme Court authority: it was reading the earlier protection together with the later Supreme Court decisions.
T.R Dhanajaya versus J.Vasudevan — (1995) 5 SCC 619
The petitioners invoked this contempt decision against governmental attempts to defeat the implementation of a binding judgment through subsequent administrative manoeuvres. The High Court distinguished it because that case concerned obstruction of an adjudicated entitlement. Here, whether the appointments satisfied the applicable legal conditions remained open to verification.
This authority supported the principle that a concluded case cannot be reopened merely because the law is later interpreted differently. The High Court distinguished the land-acquisition litigation before the Supreme Court from the present dispute. Its operative premise was that the petitioners’ individual recruitment legality had not been conclusively adjudicated in the manner they claimed.
The important distinction is therefore not simply between different subject matters. It is between reopening a finally determined entitlement and examining factual conditions that were never conclusively settled.
The petitioners relied on the distinction between a declaration of law under Article 141 and case-specific relief under Article 142. They characterised the later Supreme Court proceedings as confined to the litigants concerned.
The High Court rejected that restrictive application. It treated the requirements concerning qualifications, recruitment procedures and competent appointing bodies as governing legal standards, not merely individual equitable relief. The judgment does not, however, separately classify every direction in the later Supreme Court decisions under Articles 141 and 142.
This case was cited for the rule that judgments must be read in their factual and legal context, rather than through isolated sentences. The High Court accepted the principle but found substantial contextual continuity: both the earlier litigation and the present verification concerned the legality of appointments made in madrasahs under the disputed recruitment arrangements.
4.5 Minority institutional autonomy and the constitutional background
Ahmedabad St. Xavier's College Society versus State of Gujarat — (1974) 1 SCC 717
The petitioners invoked this authority to defend institutional autonomy and the role of management in choosing personnel. The argument was particularly relevant to appointments by an ad hoc managing committee at Gimageria Welfare High Madrasah.
The High Court rejected the suggestion that autonomy supplied authority which the committee did not otherwise possess. Relying on the later Supreme Court examination of that institution, it noted that permission to conduct day-to-day administration did not authorise recruitment involving substantial continuing expenditure. Institutional autonomy and the legal competence of a particular committee were therefore separate questions.
T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka — (2002) 8 SCC 481
This Constitution Bench decision appears in the passages quoted from the 2020 Supreme Court judgment. It supplied the framework for balancing minority educational rights with regulatory measures promoting educational excellence. Its role here was foundational rather than a separate source of power to issue verification notices.
As explained in the quoted Supreme Court reasoning, this decision did not finally determine the validity of the particular rules before it, but required conformity with the principles governing minority educational institutions. It was distinguished rather than treated as invalidating the 2008 Act.
Sindhi Education Society v. State (NCT of Delhi) — (2010) 8 SCC 49
The Supreme Court distinguished this authority because it concerned reservation and the compatibility of nominated teachers with linguistic minority institutions. The specialised composition of the Madrasah Service Commission supplied a materially different safeguard.
Chandana Das v. State of W.B. — (2020) 13 SCC 411
This decision was also distinguished in the quoted reasoning. Its central issue concerned minority status, and its statutory setting lacked the special institutional safeguards identified in the madrasah recruitment regime.
The earlier Calcutta High Court decisions
Contai Rahmania High Madrasah v. State of W.B., 2014 SCC OnLine Cal 5787, and Sk. Mohd. Rafique v. Contai Rahmania High Madrasah, 2015 SCC OnLine Cal 10521, were the Single Judge and Division Bench decisions subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. Their significance is historical and temporal: they explain why managing committees made appointments outside the Commission mechanism and why the dates of appointment became legally important. They do not remain authority for the unconstitutionality of the statutory provisions.
5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning
5.1 Protection from reversal was not unconditional validation
The Court’s reasoning distinguishes protection against the consequences of restoring the Commission regime from certification that every individual appointment complied with all recruitment requirements. An appointment could escape invalidity merely because the High Court judgment was reversed, yet still require examination for qualifications, sanctioned vacancies, lawful selection and the authority of the appointing committee.
That distinction explains why the 2020 protective clause and the later verification decisions could operate together. The earlier judgment was not treated as a substitute for facts that had never been individually established.
5.2 The notifications supplied substantive standards
The judgment refers to the government order dated 9 February 2015, published through the Gazette notification dated 11 March 2015, and the notification dated 4 March 2016. Their recruitment requirements were central to the proposed verification.
These requirements were not treated as optional formalities. The Supreme Court’s later decisions connected entitlement to State-funded salary with appointments made through the applicable lawful process. Nevertheless, the temporal limits identified after the stay of 14 March 2016 remain important: the notifications were not an unrestricted alternative route for recruitment after that date.
5.3 Salary payments were not conclusive proof of legality
The petitioners’ strongest practical argument was that the State had approved them, paid them and accepted their services for years. The Court nevertheless found no conclusive admission that every recruitment condition had been satisfied.
The compliance affidavit was significant because it reserved action against appointments of teachers lacking the prescribed basic qualifications. Accordingly, compliance with interim payment directions could not be equated with an irreversible adjudication of appointment validity.
The Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s findings concerning Raj Kumar Bag at Gimageria Welfare High Madrasah, where the appointing ad hoc committee lacked recruitment authority. That example demonstrated why payment alone could not settle legality. It did not itself determine the individual cases of the present petitioners.
5.4 Finality arguments failed because their premise failed
Administrative finality, estoppel and res judicata all depended, in different ways, on the proposition that the relevant entitlement had already been conclusively settled. The Court rejected that foundational proposition.
Although the petitioners invoked the lengthy delay, the judgment does not formulate a general rule that administrative approvals may always be reopened regardless of time. Its reasoning is tied to the continuing judicial clarification of this recruitment controversy. Nor does it provide a separate, detailed determination of every technical element of res judicata or estoppel.
5.5 The procedural stage was decisive
The memoranda required the petitioners to attend with documents. They did not declare the appointments invalid, terminate employment or stop salaries. The Court therefore found no present adverse consequence affecting a justiciable right.
The resulting rule is one of judicial restraint at an investigative stage, not blanket immunity for administrative notices. A genuinely jurisdictionless notice or an order already producing adverse legal consequences would raise a different question.
5.6 Limits of the jurisdictional analysis
The petitioners expressly argued that the Director lacked a statutory review power. The judgment upheld the exercise by characterising it as verification consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions, rather than as the cancellation of a conclusively adjudicated entitlement.
It does not identify and analyse a specific statutory provision conferring a general review power. Consequently, the decision should not be expanded into authority for unrestricted administrative reconsideration of all approved appointments.
6. Impact and Future Significance
6.1 Comparable appointments may be scrutinised
Employees outside the earlier committee proceedings cannot resist examination solely because they were not parties to those proceedings. The governing recruitment standards may apply to comparable appointments. Each employee’s factual compliance must nevertheless be separately assessed.
6.2 Long service does not replace recruitment legality
The decision strengthens the distinction between the fact of continued employment and the legal validity of entry into service. Years of salary payments may be relevant background, but they do not automatically cure defects in qualifications, vacancies, selection or appointing authority.
6.3 Institutional autonomy does not enlarge a committee’s mandate
Minority educational autonomy does not automatically empower an ad hoc body to undertake recruitment beyond its authorised functions. Future cases involving temporary committees will require close examination of the instruments or judicial orders defining their authority.
6.4 Later adverse decisions remain distinct questions
The Court’s refusal to intervene at the notice stage does not establish that any eventual cancellation would necessarily be lawful. Questions concerning evidence, jurisdiction, fair hearing and reasons would arise in the context of the actual decision taken.
The judgment makes no determination concerning recovery of past salaries, financial penalties or the ultimate service status of individual petitioners.
6.5 Wider effect must not become collective factual condemnation
The Court’s description of the Supreme Court ruling as operating in rem gives its reasoning breadth. The sound operational distinction is between common legal standards and individual factual findings. Extending the former does not justify importing the latter without examining the affected employee’s documents and circumstances.
7. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Ultra vires
- Beyond legal authority. Here, the earlier High Court decisions held statutory provisions unconstitutional; the Supreme Court later reversed that conclusion.
- Stay of a judgment
- A temporary suspension of its operation, not its erasure. This distinction affected which recruitment arrangements could lawfully be used after 14 March 2016.
- Administrative finality
- The expectation that settled official decisions will not be repeatedly reopened. Its strength depends on what was actually and conclusively decided.
- Res judicata
- The rule preventing issues finally adjudicated by a competent court from being litigated again. A general protective statement does not necessarily decide every employee’s individual eligibility.
- Estoppel
- A restraint on taking an inconsistent position after an earlier representation or course of conduct. The Court did not treat salary payments as conclusive confirmation of lawful recruitment.
- Judgment in rem and judgment in personam
- The former determines a status with wider effect; the latter ordinarily binds particular parties. The Court invoked the wider-effect concept when applying common recruitment standards to non-parties.
- Article 141 and Article 142
- Article 141 makes Supreme Court declarations of law binding on courts. Article 142 enables orders necessary to do complete justice in a case. Case-specific relief and a generally applicable legal rule are not necessarily the same thing.
- Adverse civil consequences
- Effects impairing a person’s legal position, such as termination or loss of salary. The Court found that these document-production notices had not yet produced such effects.
- Premature writ petition
- A challenge brought before the authority has made an actionable decision, where no sufficient exception justifies immediate judicial intervention.
8. Conclusion
The judgment establishes a focused proposition: prior approval, prolonged service and salary payments do not prevent verification of madrasah appointments where compliance with the governing recruitment conditions has not been conclusively established.
Its significance lies equally in its limits. The High Court upheld an inquiry, not a collective cancellation of appointments. It required the earlier Supreme Court protection to be read alongside subsequent verification rulings, while leaving individual appointment legality to the examination that the petitioners had sought to prevent.