Prematurity Bar: Section 340 CrPC Not to Be Invoked on Mere Alleged Contradictions in Affidavits Pending Trial

1. Introduction

This decision of the Delhi High Court (Subramonium Prasad, J.) dated 24.03.2026 arose in CS(OS) 246/2023, a family dispute where the plaintiffs (Nisha Chandola & Anr., daughters of the deceased) sued the defendants (Manoj Sharma and Anr., including the son of the deceased) seeking partition, rendition of accounts, and recovery concerning the estate of Late Ram Chander Sharma (as pleaded, deceased on 28.04.2022).

During the suit, the Court directed disclosure affidavits about assets received after the father’s demise. The plaintiffs then moved CRL.M.A. 6275/2026 under Section 340 CrPC, seeking initiation of perjury/false evidence proceedings against Defendant No. 1, alleging that his affidavits (dated 03.09.2025 and 15.01.2026) contained false statements and were supported by “forged documentation.”

The key issue was whether, at this stage of the civil suit, the Court should commence a Section 340 CrPC inquiry for alleged false statements in affidavits, or whether the dispute should first be resolved in trial and Section 340 reserved for later if warranted.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court dismissed the Section 340 CrPC application. It held that:

  • The plaintiffs’ assertions were essentially challenges to the correctness of disclosures and alleged contradictions between affidavits and record, which did not, by themselves, satisfy the threshold for Section 340 CrPC action at this juncture.
  • Whether statements in the affidavits are false must be established in trial.
  • The Court declined to run parallel proceedings—one under Section 340 CrPC and another in the civil suit— merely to test affidavit correctness at an interim stage.
  • Liberty was preserved: the plaintiffs may renew Section 340 recourse if, during trial, material emerges showing offences falling within Section 195(1)(b) CrPC and the corresponding IPC provisions.
  • The Court noted a growing tendency to use Section 340 applications for arm-twisting, pressurising the opposite party, and delaying trial. Although it did not impose costs because Plaintiff No. 1 appeared in person, it characterized the application as intended to “derail” proceedings and “harass” Defendant No. 1.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

No judicial precedents/case-law were cited in the text of this judgment. The Court’s reasoning is anchored in the statutory scheme of Sections 340 and 195 CrPC and the nature of the allegations presented (i.e., alleged contradictions and disputed accuracy in disclosure affidavits).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The judgment applies a structured statutory gatekeeping approach to Section 340 CrPC:

  • Section 340 CrPC is not automatic upon allegation of falsity: The Court emphasized that merely alleging that affidavit statements are wrong, contradictory, or unsupported is insufficient to trigger Section 340. A Section 340 inquiry is tethered to offences contemplated by Section 195(1)(b) CrPC.
  • Linkage to Section 195(1)(b) CrPC and specified IPC offences: The Court expressly referenced that Section 195(1)(b) deals with prosecution of offences relating to documents given in evidence, and it listed IPC provisions: Sections 193–196, 199, 200, 205–211, 228, 463, 471, 475, 476 IPC. The Court found such offences were not made out “at this juncture”.
  • Trial-first principle for contested factual falsity: The Court held that “falsity” must be established in the civil trial. In other words, where the dispute is fundamentally evidentiary (what assets exist, what was transferred, whether documentation is genuine), the proper course is adjudication in the main proceedings rather than collateral criminal inquiry.
  • Avoidance of parallel, potentially disruptive proceedings: The Court refused to initiate a Section 340 process alongside the civil suit merely to verify affidavit disclosures at an interim stage, signalling that Section 340 should not become an interlocutory battleground that slows the suit.
  • Deterrence of misuse (abuse-of-process lens): The Court’s observation about the emerging “practice” of filing Section 340 applications for arm-twisting/delay is a clear normative message: Section 340 is a serious mechanism meant to protect the administration of justice, not a tactical pressure tool. Even while declining costs due to the plaintiff’s in-person status, the Court recorded adverse findings about the application’s intent.
  • Liberty preserved—Section 340 as a post-materialisation remedy: The Court balanced restraint with access: it expressly granted liberty to re-approach if material surfaces during trial indicating the commission of relevant offences attracting Section 195, which would then justify Section 340 initiation.

3.3 Impact

The decision has practical and doctrinal significance for civil litigation, particularly in estate/partition disputes where disclosure affidavits are frequently contested:

  • Raises the threshold for interim perjury moves: Parties cannot expect Section 340 proceedings to be triggered solely on alleged inconsistencies in affidavits; courts may insist that disputed facts be tested in trial.
  • Anti-delay signal in disclosure-heavy litigation: By explicitly calling out Section 340 as a delaying tactic, the judgment may embolden trial courts to control satellite litigation and keep civil trials on track.
  • Clarifies timing: Section 340 is treated as a remedy better suited when the record has matured—i.e., after evidence reveals a prima facie offence affecting the administration of justice—rather than at the stage of contested pleadings/disclosure.
  • Guidance in corporate-asset disclosure disputes within family suits: The case involved demands to disclose accounts/investments of a company (M/s Ambika Garments Pvt. Ltd.) and the defendant’s position that the company is not a party. The judgment does not finally decide corporate separateness issues, but it indicates that disputes about such disclosures—without more—should not be escalated into perjury proceedings prematurely.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Section 340 CrPC: A procedure allowing a court to consider initiating criminal action (commonly called “perjury proceedings”) for offences affecting judicial proceedings (e.g., giving false evidence, using forged documents in court). It is not meant to be invoked casually; it is a court-controlled filter.
  • Section 195(1)(b) CrPC: A “bar” provision—certain offences (including perjury-type and document-related offences in court) cannot be prosecuted by a private complainant directly; they require a complaint by the court (or with the court’s sanction), protecting litigants from retaliatory criminal litigation over statements made in court.
  • “Parallel proceedings” concern: If every dispute about affidavit accuracy triggers a criminal inquiry, civil trials can be derailed. Courts therefore often require that the alleged falsity be demonstrably established (or at least clearly prima facie) before invoking Section 340.
  • Perjury vs. inconsistency: Not every inconsistency is perjury. Perjury involves knowingly making a false statement on oath (or using forged evidence) in a manner that implicates the administration of justice. The judgment treats the plaintiffs’ complaint as, at present, a contested factual dispute rather than an immediately prosecutable offence.

5. Conclusion

The Delhi High Court’s ruling in Nisha Chandola & Anr. v. Manoj Sharma and Anr. reinforces that Section 340 CrPC is an exceptional, timing-sensitive remedy. Alleged contradictions or disputed correctness in disclosure affidavits—without trial-tested material—will ordinarily not justify immediate perjury action. The Court’s refusal to entertain Section 340 as a tactical tool, coupled with preserved liberty to revive the request if incriminating material emerges, sets a clear procedural discipline: prove falsity in the main proceeding first; invoke Section 340 when the record truly warrants it and when it serves the administration of justice.